SPILLING THE NID

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01137R000100150001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 12, 1986
• Content Type: NSPR

ARTICLE NEW YORK TIMES
APP&4 e{eass 2006/0rIORa)CI WP90-0113
ESSAY I William Sa lire
Spilling the NID
WASEDWTON
W= Casey, Director of
gam, al}
pears to be
getting nervous
in the service on the subject of leeks.
Having been made the laughingptock
of world spookery by his mishandling
of the defector Yurchenko, he is now
threatening journalists with jail
terms for publishing secrets other
than those leaked from the top.
He is joined in this always-popular
pastime of Intimidation by David
Durenberger, chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on' Intelligence,
whose heavily publicized midlife
crisis makes him seem, In my opin-
ion, eager to show he has not become
a blabbermouth.
Let me put forward my own Na-
tional Estimate of the crackbrained
crackdown.
John McMahon, until two months
ago the C.I.A.'s Deputy Director, was
the product of its intelligence-gather.
Ing side, and resisted Director Casey's
policy (with which I agree) of putting
missiles in the arms of freedom fight-
ers willing to shoot them at oppressors
in Afghanistan, Africa and Nicaragua.
He was booted out and replaced by
Robert Gates, who came up through
the evaluation rather than gathering
branch. Mr. Gates is thus more a
driver of spies than a spy by trade; he
is comfortable with the Casey covert
action, and his pride and joy has been
the National Intelligence Daily.
This "NID," with Its blue card-
board cover and 10 or 12 pages of in-
formation, is the evaluated product of
the intelligence community. The cir-
culation is limited to about 200 offi-
cials whose lowest clearance is "top
secret," and who enjoy the thrill of in-
sidership six mornings a week. (On
Sundays they have to rely on the
newspapers. and can catch up on
what is happening.)
Do not contuse the NID with the
P.D.B. - the President's Daily Brief-
ing, in the white cover - which goes
to only a handful of people, and which
I presume contains poop from the
human group as well as from satel-
lites and big ears. (I used to confuse
A scapegoat was needed to said a
warning to the list, and to justify the lie
detector "experiment" within the Pen-
After a story appeared in the
~
Evans and Novak column about using
Zaire as the distributor of missiles to
the Savimbi insurgents in Angola - in-
formation that may have been in the
NID - Michael Pillsbury, a Defense
official, was fluttered and bounced.
"Mike the PW" was expendable; as
a Senate aide in the hard-line "Madi-
son Group" during the Carter era, Mr.
Pillsbury was a valued Casey-Weinber-
ger ally; but now the Jesse Helms
crowd is losing its clout and the firing
of Mike the pill could serve as a warn-
ing to others. Moreover, a head od a
platter was needed for Zaire.
Then
far scam ~ a bridge too
are
press, he went to The
tainn Washington
Bob Woodward to ~ ~ p
lashed, he would recommend proses
[
tier under some untested statute.
"I'm not threatening. but ..." ' _
The Justice Department, hoverer,
while willing to go after Makers in Gov.
The C.I.A.
tries to spook
the press
ernment, is unwilling to join Mr. Casey
in chilling the leakees in the press..,
One reason is that law enforcement
officials have long been aware of, and
are discreetly curious about, meet-
ings held in Mr. Casey's home, alone,
between the Director and reporter
Woodward, who is writing a book
about the C.I.A.
I would never ask Bob Woodward
about that, because a man's sources
or non-sources are nobody's business
but his own. But a few months back I
put the question buzzing around Jus-
tice directly to my old friend Casey.'-
"I haven't seen Woodward for -1$
months
" was the
ruff
l
N
,
g
rep
y,
o basis.
Dictionary, Merriam-Webster's Un- at a11 to the obvious F.B.I. wonderment
abridged, and found it difficult to un- if Mr. Casey was the source of the ate?
derstand why spooks were concerned rise he most complains about. He does
that "the NID is leaking.') readily admit seeing Mr. Woodward
That's it. That's the reason Mr. (as he did me) long ago.
Casey is having fits, losing sight of I do not suggest that the Director of
the freedoms we hired him to protect: Central Intelligence has ever been the
the NID is leaking. source of a fact the Government does
Rather than consider if secrets are not want known. But to the extent
coming out of C.I.A. or N.S.A. (No politicians on background seek to use
Such Agency), when fooling the poly- Journalists to advance policy. Mr.
graph is child's play, the blame is Casey and even higher officials ar
being placed on the consumers of Intel- "sources." They will find their out.
ligence: the 200 NID subscribers, a lets turn user-wilrlendly when their?
third of whom are in the Pentagon. . carrots become sticks.
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 ARTICLE APPpprovel For Release 2QQ /01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137R000
ON PACE 3A HINGTON MONTHLY
February 1986
The real story
Soviet combat brig
The
5TUPIDIT~of
Intellz'gence
by Stansfield Turner
presidency," Jimmy Carter said of the failure to
secure Senate ratification of the SALT iI agree-
ment. He had staked his presidential prestige and
to a significant extent, his political future on the
signing and ratification of the treaty. While many
factors combined to put Senate ratification in
doubt, the White House thought the prospects
hopeful even in an election year, hopeful that is,
until an intelligence failure concerning the report
of a brigade of Soviet troops in Cuba caused a
political uproar that seriously damaged the
chances for passage of SALT II. Here, Stanfield
774rner, director of the CIA at the time, gives his
account of the mishandling of the report and the
unnecessary damage it caused
Technology has so increased the amount of in-
formation we can acquire that a whole new set
of problems has resulted. On the one hand,
analysts are inundated with data and must find
ways to filter, store, and retrieve what is signifi-
cant. On the other hand, analysts must be con-
cerned with whether they are receiving everything
that is collected in their area of interest; with
whether the members of the intelligence
The most profound disappointment of m
y
Adapted from secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transi-
tion by Stanfield 71.rner Houghton Mifflin Ca. Boston..c
1985 by Sransfield 74rner. Reprinted by permission of the
publisher
community-the CIA's espionage branch, the
NSA [National Security Agency], the Defense
organizations responsible for overhead recon-
naissance, the CIA's electronic surveillance com-
ponent, the State Department's diplomatic
reporting system, the FBI's foreign intelligence
branch, the Defense Intelligence Agency's [DIA]
attaches, the intelligence organizations of the
military services, and the intelligence offices of
the departments of Treasury, Energy, and the
Drug Enforcement Agency-all share what they
collect. An unfortunate example of information
not being shared adequately came in the summer
of 1979. It led to the most serious intelligence
failure of my tenure. The failure to forecast the
fall of the Shah earlier that year was of far less
significance than our mishandling of the report
that a "combat brigade" of Soviet troops was in
Cuba. Had we predicted the Shah's fall from
power even six or seven months ahead of time,
there was little the United States could have done
to prevent it. The reporting on the combat
brigade, however, did play a direct part in
scuttling the SALT II arms control treaty with
the Soviet Union.
In June 1979 President Carter had met with
President Brezhnev and signed the SALT II trea-
ty. The Senate was preparing to hold its initial _
hearings on ratification when, on July 18, the
Washington Star reported, "Sen. Richard Stone,
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~ ^' r.m.PPEARED WASHINGTON POST
Iq) 16 November 1985
Joint Ceremony to Cap Sumnu*t
Soviets Resolve 10 of 25 Divided-Family Cases, State Dept. Says
By Lou Cannon and David Hoffman
W,ishinghm Post Stiff Writers
President Reagan and Soviet
leader Mikhail Gorbachev have
agreed to add a joint appearance
Thursday at the end of their meet-
ings in Geneva, where they are like-
ly to sign cultural and air-safety
agreements and to review the sum-
mit, White House officials said yes-
terday.
In another development, the
State Department said last night
that the Soviets had resolved 10 of
the 25 U.S.-Soviet cases involving
separated spouses, dual nationals
and divided families.
Prior to this month, only
three separated spouses had re-
ceived exit visas over the past 1'/z
years and only one dual national
case was resolved within the last
year. The gesture was termed by a
senior department official as "a sig-
nal prior to the summit" of Soviet
willingness to resolve the problems.
These developments came as
Reagan prepared to depart this
morning for Geneva and the first
superpower summit, since 1979.
Sources said that Reagan and Gor-
bachev are expected to agree to
establish a regular process of con-
sultation, including future summit
conferences.
A senior White House official said
that the Thursday ceremony that
has been added to the summit
schedule also could include either
joint or separate statements by the
two leaders on summit accomplish-
ments.
Describing the Thursday cere-
mony, a senior official said: "As we
see it now, the two leaders in some
public forum would sign the docu-
ments [and]. would each make a
statement. Ours would probably be
on how.we saw the summit. Then
there would be some more casual
conversation between the two, and
they'd leave."
The senior official said that Gor-
bachev is "the head of the Commu-
nist Party and a very staunch ad-
vocate of his cause" and that Rea-
gan is under no illusions that the
meetings will be easy.
"You cannot expect him to be
soft, you cannot expect him to be
genial, you cannot expect him to be
anything except what he is, leader,
of the Soviet people and a very dy-
namic person," the official said.
Reagan spent his last day in
Washington in an hour-long Nation-
al Security Council meeting review-
ing summit themes. An official said
the president's advisers "don't want
to overload him" with briefing ma-
terial and added that ,Reagan was
rereading earlier papers that had
been given him.
Reagan also met during the day
with Sens. Pete Wilson (R-Calif.),
and Ernest F. Hollings (D-S.C.).
They presented a petition signed
by 37 colleagues urging Reagan not
to agree to restrictions on his Stra-
tegic Defense Initiative (SDI). The
senators said they shared Reagan's
view "that SDI is too important to
be traded for marginal improve-
ments in the status quo."
"The quest for a world free of
`push button' Armageddon must not
be abandoned for short-term gains
in the superpower thermostat," the
senators said. "Ironically, we have
let the Soviets make real progress
on their campaign against our SDI,
while they proceed apace on their
own."
Earlier this week, Reagan was
briefed on the Soviet Union by
three CIA analyst .
Staff writer Don Oberdorfer
contributed to this report.
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_5 P', aroh, 19LS 5
Managing `the Fudge Facto'
By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, March 24 - As,
Ronald I. Spiers tells it, he was hap-
pilv at work as Ambassador to Paki-
stan when he complained offhandedly
to Secretary of State George P.
Shultz, who was passing through Isla-
mabad, about the way the State De-
partment was managed worldwide.
The next thing he knew, Mr. Shultz
was asking him to return to Washing-
ton to become Under Secretary of
State for Management. Mr. Shultz's
first choice as head of management, a
corporate expert in the field, had
dis t after less than a
m gus
iven u
to do. Former Secretary of State
Dean Rusk complained in the early
1960's that the department had "too
many chiefs and not enough Indians."
Mr. Spiers makes the same point
when he says: "We have too many
senior officers who cannot be placed
in jobs appropriate to their rank" and
"currently, 40 senior officers are
overcomplement" (doing "make-
work" jobs). In part, this is because
of politics. Since 1981, he says, 23 am-
bassadorial or other senior assign-
ments have moved from career to
- /~
g
k,
year of trving to put order into what At the. heart of
has affectionately been called "the
Fudge Factory."
The problems of the State Depart- many problems is
ment are so long-standing - inade-
quate resources, cliquish personnel a loss of discipline.
policies and a pervasive feeling that -Ronald I. Spiers
what most officers do has little im-
pact on foreign policy - that being
ement is viewed by
d of mana
h
g
ea
many in the department as an invita-
tion to frustration. Mr. Spiers said he
took the job because after complain-
ing to Mr. Shultz "I could hardly tell
him I preferred to stay where I was."
Mr. Spiers, a veteran of the Foreign
Service, has in recent months begun
speaking out candidly about his un-
happiness with the state of affairs at
Foggy Bottom, and he is quick to say
that not much has changed yet. He re-
cent gave a speech to the American
Foreign Service Association, the
trade union for the State Department,
and excerpts from that speech appear
in the current issues of the Foreign
Service Journal and the State Depart-
ment's own house organ:
In his view, not only does the State
Department not receive enough
money to do its job well, but it has
failed to manage well the resources it
has, namely a dedicated corps of dip-
lomats. -
In a way Mr. Spiers may have dis-
covered the wheel. It has. long been
known that a disproportionate num-
ber of competent diplomats had little
political appointees. Even the most
respected category is not immune. Of
40 career ministers, the absolute
cream of the foreign service, seven
are without meaningful jobs, he says.
Many officers, particularly those
without challenging assignments,
complain that despite all sorts of ob-
jective criteria that are supposed to
be used to rank officers and to select
the best for promotion, in the end it all
depends on whom one knows in a posi-
tion of power. An officer may have
performed superbly in some far-off
embassy, but ususally has less
chance of getting a top position`than
does a talented aide to a senior offi-
cial in Washington.
For instance, it is regarded in the
State Department as a passport to a
prized overseas assignment to spend
two or three years as a senior aide to
a high official. In fairness to those
officers, they do put in I6-hour days
and long weekends, and the toll on
their personal lives is often heavy.
Too often, Mr. Spiers says, assign-
ments depend "more on whom you
know than whether you are the best
for the job or the job is best for you."
The system today penalizes officers
"who are less visible to the decision-
makers in Washington" and fails to
insure "equitable sharing of hardship
assignments," he -says.
"At the heart of many of these
problems is a loss of service disci-
pline that, in my view, arises from a
sense that the system is not operating
equitably," he said. "I see little
chance of restoring esprit de corps
and a sense of service until we find
ways to restore trust in the system
and overcome a feeling that nice guys
finish last."
Another major complaint of Mr.
Spiers is the lack of funds given to the
State Department for its basic job.
The budget is about $2 billion annual-
ly, which, as Mr. Spiers points out, is
less than one percent of the Penta-
gon's budget.
Moreover, he says despite
mvti ue attached to tne Central in-
telligence Agency and o er c andes-
tine operations. Percent of the Ea-
tin-al in the Presidents supersecret
morning report covering crucia
overnignt internationa aevelo
ments comes from F oreiign ervice
reporting. Ana yet, in the last d"ade,
there has been an percent cut in the
number o peop a evo ego 'cam
nomic and political re rtin and
analysis - t e heart o the dart-
. men's responsibilities - as we had
to meet increases in consular work,
loaosand provi eadministrative-S u11-
Dort for other a encies." -
"What we nave done, year after
year, is thin the soup," Mr. Spiers
said.
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St
WASHINGTON TItlES
18 September 1984
Ms,
orts
-The Soviet Union is developing
and deploying three new types of
nuclear-tipped intercontinental
ballistic missiles, informed admin-
istration sources have told The
Washington Times.
This represents a major new -
effort by the Soviets to upgrade
their strategic missile network. It
also would place them up to 10 to 15
years ahead of the United States in
deployment of comparable strate-
gic missile systems, the sources
say.
As part of this effort, the Soviet
Union has embarked on a crash pro-
gram to deploy upwards of 460 new
SS-25 nuclear ICBMs at two launch
sites before the end of 1985.
According to information
recently reported in the CIA's top-
secret National ntel igence ails
the Soviets have accelerated _SS 2
ifl 9 - -test programs and are
e~ tae new mt`~"ssiles at Yosh-
a and. YurS?a_ Yoshkar Ol
presently houses SS-13
cdngla-
warhead ICBMs, and Yu rya is an
SS-20 missile com lex.
The sources said that 60 triple-
warheaded SS-25s are being
installed in SS-13 silos at Yoshkar
Ola to replace those older single
missiles. An additional 200 road-
mobile SS-25s each are to be
deployed at Yoshkar Ola and Yurya
as well for a total of 460.
The sources report that the war-
head on the SS-25 is about one-third
of the missile's total throw-weight,
or payload. This not only violates
another provision of SALT II; it also
indicates the SS-25 will be covertly .
deployed with three MIRVed war-
heads.
The strategic significance of this
crash program to deploy 460 new
missiles is that it will add 1,380 new
warheads by 1985.
In addition, U.S. intelligence offi-
cers have identified a totally new,
mmissile, the SS-X-2 7, as being un er
development. Its liquid-fueled
engirIgs are being tested at the
Soviet facility at Dnepropetrovsk
etrovsk
and-the missiletest silos have
been detected at the Tyuratam mis-
sile/space center, the ssources say.
The SS-X-27 had been foreseen
by the Pentagon as an outgrowth of
the SS-18 ICBM. But based on the
observed size of the SS-X-27's silo. L
it is believed that the new missile
will be significantly larger than the
SS-18.
First flight tests of the SS-X-27
are expected' in 1986 but could
occur as early as next year.
The Soviets, in the past, have
maintained that their missile devel-
opments are simply modifications
of existing systems. The SALT II
treaty, by which both the Soviet
'Union and the United States have
agreed to abide even though it has
not been ratified, prohibits deploy-
ment of more than one "new type"
ICBM. The Soviets have designated
the medium-sized SS-24 as this new
type and claim that the SS-25 and
others are merely modifications of
it, and proper.
Two administration reports on
Soviet arms control violations have
concluded that the SS-25 repre-
sents an illegal second "new type"
ICBM. The president's report to
Congress, released in January, and
the still-classified General Advi-
sory Committee's report on arms
control violations both term the
SS-25 as a "probable violation" of
SALT II.
The sources say that the evi-
dence is now stronger and the
"probable" qualification has been
strengthened to "certain" in official
reports.
The third new missile, the
SS has been seen at the
Plesetsk test range, the sources
U n t i l reported. recent )7. U.S. rote -
l Bence believed that the Soviets
would hold off testing the SS-X-26
in t t until a ter SALT II expire
at the end of 1985. But now, the
sources say, "it is known it will be
_ ig t_tested bj early l9 5."
The SS-X-26, which uses a solid
propellant, is a ? successor to the
SS-18, which uses a liquid propel-
lant. The sources said that, based
on the observed size of the SS-X-26
silos, it will be "significantly
larger" than the SS-18, which can
be fitted with up to 14 nuclear war-
heads.
The silos for the SS-X-26 are said
to be larger, than those of the SS-18,
which would constitute a violation
of SALT II limits on silo size.
The sources say that Soviet mis-
sile complexes for old, deactivated
SS-7 ICBMs are likely sites for
future deployments of the road-
mobile SS-25s. They identified four
such sites at Verkhnyaya Salda,
Novosibirsk, Omsk and Tyumen.
The deployment of the SS-25,
SS-26, and SS-27 missiles would vio-
late several arms control
agreements, the sources say.
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WASHINGTON POST
24 May 1984
Asks
istrnoreIand SU
By Eleanor Randolph
Washington Post start Wrttef
I , Drawing from almost ,4.OO
Libel lawyers for CBS argued yesterday that
sworn statements from almost 40 military and
intelligence analysts from the Vietnam war years
prove the network's charge that the U.S. military-
command in Vietnam lied about enemy troop
strength to bolster political support for the war in
the late 1960s.
In a motion asking, U.S. District Court Judge
Pierre Leval to dismiss a $120 million libel action
against CBS by retired Army Gen. William C.
Westmoreland, network lawyers said that "few
broadcasts have been as thoroughly researched" as
a Mike Wallace program called "The Uncounted
Enemy A Vietnam Deception," which ran in Jan-
uary, 1982.
Included in the CBS brief are quotations from
letters that a former Army analyst sent his wife.
"You should have seen the antics my people
and I had to go through with our computer cal-
culations to make the February strength calcula-
tions come out the way the general wanted them
to," one read. "We started with the answer and
plugged in all sorts of figures until we found the
combination the machine would digest."
The writer of the letter, James Meacham, now
a journalist in London, has said recently that he
was merely dissatisfied with his work and did not
mean the letters to be construed years later as
evidence of a conspiracy.
The CBS brief also quoted Richard Kovar, a
30-year CIA veteran who now writes President
Reagan's daily CIA briefing, as saying that the
CBS documentary is "a great service to the intel-
ligence process."
The network brief also contended that Kovar
said it should be broadcast annually on the anni-
versary of the Tet offensive "so that no intelli-
gence analyst, soldier or citizen who watches it
will ever let anything like this happen again."
Ronald Smith, a 25-year CIA intelligence offi-
cer and analyst who is at the Department of En-
ergy, said that for CBS to call efforts to hold
down enemy troop estimates a "conspiracy ... ac-
curately describes the concerted effort undertaken
by military officials to distort and suppress critical
intelligence information about the enemy we faced
in Vietnam,"
, .
documents that have made the
detailed chronicle of one of the
a nu an torpor
media, CBS used a rare tactic
I stage of a libel case, saying that ocumen
>s true and thus is not libelous. Such an assertion,
normally awaits the findings of the court as a re-
sult of the trial.
As a fallback to a more standard legal position
in such cases, CBS lawyer David Boies also argued
that First Amendment protections of a free press
in this country should warrant dismissal of West-
moreland's "attempt ... to impose a price on crit-
icism of the way in which our government's high-
est officials exercise their official powers" by his
filing of the libel suit.
Boies acknowledged that the broadcast has
flaws, some of which were the subject of a highly
critical article in TV Guide last year and a recent-
ly released book charging that CBS set out to
"smear" Westmoreland.
But Boies argued that "none of those flaws im-
plicates either the truth of what the broadcast
says or CBS' belief in it."
Don Kowet, author of a controversial new book
about the documentary, "A Matter of Honor," and
Sally Bedell, now with The New York Times,
wrote the an' article in TV Guide, "Anatomy of a
Smear-How CBS Broke the Rules and `Got'
Westmoreland."
After the story, CBS conducted an internal in-
vestigation that criticized the network for re-in-
terviewing some witnesses unfairly, for not iden-
tifying former CIA analyst Sam Adams on the air
as a paid-CBS consultant and for failing to prove
that there-was a `conspiracy" by the military to
"cook" the figures, ' as such manipulations are
sometimes called.
In June, 1983, CBS suspended the show's pro-
ducer, George Crile, for, taping telephone inter-
views with former secretary of defense Robert S.
McNamara and others without their knowledge,
The tapes and the internal CBS investigation
have become a part of the voluminous record.
Westmoreland's lawyer, Dan M. Burt, said he
could not comment in detail on a motion he had
not read. He labeled as "ridiculous" a CBS argu.
inert th tt W
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ON PAGE 30 March 1984+
U. S. Aides Say
Iraqis Made Use
Of a Nerve Gas
Assert Lab Gear Came
From West Germans
By SEYMOUR M. 1RSH
5pccal to The Am YorkTiraes
WASHINGTON,
, March 29 - United
States intelligence officials say
have obtained what they believe to be
i_ controvertible evidence that Iraq has
used nerve s in its war with Iran and
is Hearin eom lesion of e ensive sues
for the massproduction of the lethal
chemical
agent
Pentagon, fare State . Department and in-
telligence officials said in interviews
this week that the evidence included
documentation that Iraq has been buy-
laboratory equipment from a West'
German company, purchases that are.
believed to be linked to Iraq's nerve
gas production plans.
The intelligence also shows, the offi-
cials said. that Iran has as manv as five
dispersed sites for the storage, produc-
tion and assembly of nerve gas wed
.-ts Without intervention. these offi-
cials ?said, Ira is estimated to be
weeks or months away from the ability
to mount mjor chemicalattacks
against Iran's far more numerous
-
troops.
in small canisters, it would be virtually
impossible to effectively monitor the
spread of such weapons to other coun-
tries.
In 1969 the United States reaffirmed..
its renunciation of, the first use of
chemical warfare, and it later reduced
its preparations to defend against a
chemical war. The United States has
accused Iraq of using chemical weap-
ons in the war with Iran, but Baghdad
has denied the charge.
A senior official said this week that
the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been asked
to provide what he termed a "prelimi-
nary look" at the feasibility of an
American air strike on the fortified
sites, but. concluded there were not
enough American aircraft in appropri-
ate locations.
This official went on to say that there
were many in the Government who, re-,
calling the successful Israeli air attack
in 1981 on what was determined to be an
Iraqi nuclear plant, would like to see
the Israeli Air Force attack again.
Some sensitive high-level conversa-
tions on the issue between the United
States and Israel have already taken .
place, the official added.
This information could not be con-
firmed, although many American offi-
cials, in interviews, volunteered their
personal judgment that such an attack
would be one welcome solution to the
problem.
A senior State Department official
described his frustration over the
issue. "It's not lack of knowledge at
high levels," he said. "It's been in all
the high-rollers' briefing books. The
Iraqis appear to be ready to do any-
thing. The question is what do we do?
Should we cast a major air strike?
That's a big move," The official ac-
knowledged hearin
"s
ecul
ti
"
g
p
a
on
Deep Underground Bunkers - i that the Israelis might be "ready to
Each of the sites, the officials said, move," but added that such talk was in.
has been built in deep underground his view only talk.
ed
bunkers, heavily ifortified by concrete, The intelligence, which was provided
that are reported to be six stories below the surface. Officials said the Iraqi
concern appeared to be protection from
an air attack.
Neither the White House nor the
State Department would formal] corn-
ment today on the intelligence informa-
l ti on,
If full-scale chemical war develops,
one senior American official said, "the
genie is out of the bottle." He added:
Arms control is down the drain. And
we've got our forces completely at
risk." The official warned that because
of the nature of chemical weapons,
huge doses of which can be transported
from sources epict~in tter
~~ee
than on-si a as Lte(hy and
forceful v resented to genLRga-
gan _
gan in the last week, the officials said,
with a te~iouse not yet providing
politer guidance.
Of ills saia that on three occasions
within the week the Central Intelli.
en c
Agency, to mat_ize it concern
over the intelligence, had empbasized
or "red lined " the relevant informa-
on on Ira 's chemical war abilities
jbf, ident's daily intelli a ae rief,
one of the most high] classified docu-,
;nenE- m _e vernmerit. .'s in i-
;na ion is Arepared_p & by,-the
C.I.A. and resented early each morn-
ingg to tthe'P resident.
One official, reflecting the frustra-
tion of many in the Intel igence field,
praised William J. Case the Director I
of entry me iaence for _avinF'~t i'e
is to stand ar` t addin
"He's given the correct information to
the White Ouse an it s u to em
The State Department said on March
5 that the United States had concluded'
that the available evidence indicated
that lethal chemical weapons were
being used by Iraq against Iran, in
violation of the Geneva Protocol of
1925, which Iraq agreed to adhere to in
1931- At the time of the statement an
Administration official said the chemi-
cal weapon being used by - the Iraqis
seemed to be mustard gas; a blistering
agent. At that time Iran accused the
Iraqis of using nerve gas and nitrogen
mustard, but the Administration said
there_was no evidence Iraq had used
nerve gas-
One reason for` hesitation over the
issue a indite House official aclaiowl-
edged, is the traditional concern of in-
telligence offici s for the rotection of
"sources and methods." The specific
in o a oout tth extent of Iraqi
nerve Qas dev ypnef rat is said,a e
been derived from unusually sensitive
sources. -
A maior diplomatic complication
confronts the Administration, officials
say. American intelligenregenc~e
have identified Karl K4]k,.scientific
and technical supply_ comp~nv j
Dreieiest German, as being re-
s nsible for the sale and shipg of
sor ted laborators,-uip~nt
at, intelligence. officials sa,,_s
been used - aona_eDily ithout the
v' -
i4i e ei3L3n~t d
ability uito develop a nerve as. Sales L.iTie
o
ment considered b American of-
cia s to essentia to to Iraqi
were said to have taken place e ov
at least two yea
period of
-* iod of
chemical company ~, a?1h_tbe
obtaintng all of ht
required export licenses from the We st
German Government before shipment.
- Evidence Presented to Bonn
Sometime within the last month, offi-
inte i e ce o icia s o
tained evidence directly linkin the
companr's s pments to Iraqi ey?Tp.
The C.I.A. relayed some of its infor-
mation'and its concern directly to the
. United States Embassy in B a of-
ficial said, which in turn made a diplo-
a c representation to the4R L ez
Irian Government. The official Amen-
Continued
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 G,TICI.E APP RTved For Release 2/96W -RDP90-01137R00
c11 PAGE' A ;/
11 December 1983
Intelligenee: Togo Much
Teo Little Evaluation
This report wes prepared and written by Philip Taubman and Joel Brinkley.
The marines, defending the ad-
equacy of security at their ? Beirut
headquarters on Oct. 23, have said
they never received intelligence in-
lormation warning that they might be
the target of a suicidal truck-bomb at-
tack. General Kelley, the Marine
Commanda , told Congress - last
month that the marines "have-yet to
find a shred of intelligence which
would have alerted a reasonable and
-prudent commander to this new and
unique threat." -
intelligence and military officials
say General Kelley may be right in
the sense that the marines never re-
ceived a tip that a large truck packed
,with explosives would come crashing
into the Marine compound. But they
said intelligence warnings about ter-
?rorist threats, particularly car
bombs, were never in short supply.
"We m one or two a day," recalled
-General Mead, who served two tours
and five months as Marine com-
mander in Beirut. He said, "I was
told by ,my intel officer, `Hey boss,
we've had another warning.' You got
that every day. 'You're gonna get it,
you're gonna get it, you're gonna get
it' Initially, after the American Em-
bassy went, we went into a condition-
one-type situation. I had my men on
alert all the time. But then I began-
mittees that the marnes were given
descriptions of at least 100 potential
car bombs between June 1 and Oct.
General Mead recalled receiving
dozens of warnings about white Mer-
cedes vehicles that might be carrying
bombs- "We were told .-this every
day, he said in an interview, "so
everybody's looking. for this white
Mercedes. I used to- laugh every day
when I'd get on the street with my
driver and I'd_ say; 'Cam the white
Mercedesl' "
No one in the Marine contingents in
Beirut or the chain' of =command .-
above them appears to have appreci-
ated the influence this might have on
security. No one. proposed establish-
ing a special intelligence task force
composed of terrorism experts to
help the marina, according to the in-
telligence officials.
Intelligence experts said such a
unit, which could have been based in
Washington, Europe or Beirut, could
have sifted through the various kinds
of intelligence, including information
obtained from informants and elec-
tronic surveillance, and helped sepa-
rate the reliable from the unreliable.
Bits and Pieces of Data
In addition, they said, the special.
ists could have looked for pattern in
thinking I had to have more specifici- the bits and pieces of data,that might'
ty, I'm wearing my men .down with- ?.-.. reveal why terrorists were re.
out more specificity of a threat."
Too Much Raw Intelligence
The problem in Beirut was not in-
sufficent intelligence, but insufficient
evaluation; according to a variety of
current and former military and in-
telligence officials familiar with the
intelligence support provided to the
marines.
. If anything, commanders up the
line agreed; the marines received too
much raw'intelligence about terror-
ism and were not trained to analyze
it, eventually becoming somewhat
complacent about almost- daily cacti
bomb warnings.
Admiral Holcomb, the deputy com-
mander of American Naval Forces in
Europe, said the flow of intelligence
information was filled with warnings
of impending terrorist attacks. Gen-
eral Kelley told Congressional com-
which, is turn, could help~pinp support from Iran Sia,
targets for surveillance. - .
Analysis of this kind in Washington
since the Marine bombing indicates
that an Iranian-backed Shiite Moslem
faction in Lebanon called the Islamic
Amal, located in Baalbek, northeast
of Beirut, was involved in both the
embassy and Marine bombings.
A senior' intelligence official said
there are also "some indications"
that Syria aided in the attack by
providing explosives. He denied re-
ports that the United States has ir-
refutable evidence linking the attacks
to Syrian leaders.
Formation of?a group of specialists
before the attack could have given a
more sophisticated reading of the ter-
rorist threat, intelligence experts
said.
"It was a colossal oversight,,. one
former senior intelligence official
said. He added, "It's almost criminal
to send Marine intelligence officers, -.
men who've dealt only with battle-
field intelligence, into Beirut without
sending some experts in to help them
specialized kind of infor-
mation they were getting on terror-
ism."
Senator Warner, who has been in-
vestigating intelligence aspects of the
Marine mission, said the chain of
command "should have required that
someone with this training be reas-
signed temporarily to the Marines."
From the- beginning of their mis-
sion,' the marines seemed to be'
haunted by American -intelligence
setbacks. The first, which the ma-
rines indirectly abetted in their first
tour in August 1982, was the ..-
.O.-evacuation after The Israeli invasion.
Over the years, while the United
States officially refused to deal di-
rectly with the P.L.O. because of its
terrorist activities and hostility to-
ward Israel, the C.I.A. developed a
highly effective intelligence network/
in the Palestinian community. in
Lebanon. "The disintegration of the
_P.L.O.,was a serious intelligence loss_
for the United States," one forvier in-
telligence official said.
Then in April almost the entire
i C.I.A. staff in Beirut was killed by the
bomb blast that destroyed the embasr
sy,'including several of the agency's
leading experts on the Middle East.
Intelligence officials said the C.I.A.
station was quickly rebuilt and the
network of informants in Lebanon
was not affected, but acknowledged
that the change was disruptive.
Gathering intelligence about ter-
rorism, particularly trying to pene-
trate terrorist groups, is considered
one of the toughest jobs in the intelli-
gence business.
One intelligence official said: "Ter- 1
rorist cells are small, fanatical and
highly paranoid. It's almost impossi-
ble to plant an agent in one. You may
get -lucky and turn someone already
inside, but you generally have to rely
for information on wiretaps anctother
communications intercepts."
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 many American lives in jeopardy
when offers of Israeli medical anad
rescue assistance were rejected.
THE U.S. air attack yesterday 0 The Syrian regime of Press- brass on Capitol Hill indicates that
on the Syrian artillery bat. dent Assad directly controlled the a "coverup" of intelligence and se-
teries, which fired on unarmed `terrorists who carried out the w~ hin the Shortcoming$ Defense Dept under way II
American reconnaisanee planes, bombings.
was the first strike the U.S. has ? There is strong circumstantial This is the story the Defense
made directly against the ' evidence that the Syrians also Ord- Dept. does not want to seeins
i
t
h
n
.
e pr
forces of President Hofez Assad. ered the April 16 bombing of t
Yet the Syrians - with strong U.S. Embassy in Beirut - an The following Is the first part of
Soviet backing - have waged a atrocity which killed 63 embassy an exclusive day-by-day account
brutal undeclared war against
the international peacekeeping
force since It arrived In Leba-
non.
This emerges from a major
Post -investigation into the Octo-
ber 23 "kamikaze" bombings of
THE U.S. air attack yesterday on
the Syrian artillery batteries,
which fired on unarmed American
reconnaisanee planes, was the first
strike the U.S. has made directly
against the forces of President
Hatez Assad.
Yet the Syrians - with strong
Soviet backing - have waged a
brute; undeclared war against the
international peacekeeping force
since it arrived in Lebanon.
This emerges from a major Post
Investigation into. the October 23
"kamikaze" bombings of the U.S.
and French military compounds in
Beirut which cost the peacekeep-
ing farces almost 300 lives.
Among the disturbing conclusions
of the investigation:
T. I
ks j,
personnel. : of events leading up to I e c...r
O The bombings were carried toting attacks.
out with Soviet and East Bloc com- it has been pieced together from
plicity If not explicit approval. exhaustive interviews by Post re-
Otherfindings includes porters in Lebanon, Israel and
? The American, French and Is- Washington.
roeli Intelligence services inexpii-I
cably ignored vital evidence of the
Involvement of fanatical Shiite'
Moslem "Shahid" suicide squads in
Middle East terrorism. '
? Even so, many lives would
have been saved had the Defense
Dept. heeded urgent warnings
from the CIA and other intelli-
gence agencies of plans for a
spectacular" strike against the!
Marines compound.
O Security at the Marine com-
pound was inexplicably lax on the
night of the bombing - even by
the "relaxed" standards of the
Beirut peacekeeping forces.
O Defense Dept. anxiety about
alienating Syrian "goodwill" put
Monday, April
18,.1483:
The U.S. Embassy, Bei.-
ru.t. Time: Midday. A
pickup truck loaded with
high explosive detonates
in the embassy -fore-
court, 'demolishing the
entire front of the build-
ing and killing 63 em-
bassy personnel. .
Among the. dead are
Bob Ames, the CIA's I
chief Middle ' East ana-
lyst, and it of his most
important subordinates.
U.S intelligence sources
claim that It is still not
known whether or not it
was a suicide attack. i
apZMvLXD
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100
ARTICLE
ON PAGE. WASHINGTON POST
7 November 1983
~' b . p irti
By Chuck Conconi
One of West Germany's most influential
publications, Der Spiegel, has a harsh piece
this week on "The World of Ronald Rea-
gan." On the weekly news magazine cover
Sunday was Reagan in cowboy hat, along
with Mickey Mouse, a sultry blond, covered
wagons, an Indian, combat troops leaving a-
landing-craft and skyscrapers.-in describing
the president's world, Der Spiegel wrote:
"Ronald Reagan, who in the White House
is briefed by the CIA about the foreign sit-
uation in 20-minute films, probably consid-
ers the world is a movie. Grenada is no ac-
cident, but a new film scene in the life of
this president-the first takes on location
since he took office. It has the old, tested
B-movie motives-to the right. the, cavalry.
on the hilltop, left in the bush the enemies'
of civilization, the Reds. So simple, so old.is
Ronald Reagan's California cosmology."
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 ATM;-1!N 1 A.t"=`='EATtrg Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010
` '`` " ?`` PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
3 Noveriber 1983
U.S. camp
in: Lebanon::
shifts entry
PPWR Inquver hire Ulu
; BEIRUT. Lebanon US-Marines.
.yesterday -shifted. the maiii. entrant
to their- camp to the 'gate used by the -
truck-bomb, terrorist and set up ' a
heavily fortified -130-yard `maze . in .
hope 'oT foiling any more bomb at
tacks
Meanwhile, . 'police'- sources. said
that Lebanese investigators had been'.
threatened with death if they contin-
ued to probe the Oct. 23 bombings
that killed at least 230 Marines and
sailors at Beirut International Air-
port and 58 French :paratroopers.
about a mile away.
The sources, :.who requested .ano-
nymity; did not-say who had -made
the .threats. But- they disclosed thaj,
according toinformants,-the terror
ists first surveyed the.bomb targets
by posing -as peddlers.... .....
As FBI laboratory specialists. con-
-tinned; analyzing - the 40-foot=wide
bomb crater, the Marines shifted th
main entrance to their camp,. from
north to south. The new main gate
.is
the _ same' ;one through .which ..the
bomb=laden truck ;passed before
speeding into the fou_ r-story' Battal-
ion , .Landing' :.Team , headquarters,
where it'detonated and reduced the
structure to rubble. -
Now, vehicles entering the .gate
face. Marilte sentries and must be
driven .alonga zigzag route::
-,ibe New York Times reported yes-
terday. that a warning _of a- terrorist
attack on U.S. forces in Lebanon was
circulated among top government of=
Ticials'three days' before the Oct- 23
bombing.- - = . _. 7.: ... r.._ ,l.
The Times said an intelligence tt-
portspeeified that a pro-lranian3hi-
ite.MusI1r gionp,Ifown as ls-a r
-Amai':-and "the, Pa y~f_.Cpdr.wt
311natte~Gl4er.es,~~-er-
The i:tA -said eras that- it .,- . The :radio, known as, the .Voice of
could not confirm the-warning was Lebanon, also, said that snipers tired
given and a rte House spokesman on motorists in- Kharoub, 15 miles
c to o ere -south of Beirut, and that several pt*
Within hours - e m ing, De- = ple were wounded.
fense Secretary Ca par' W. Weinbet? -The artillery and- mortar blasts
ger;said he suspected prb-'Iranian ter- L echoed over the US. Marine peace-
- rorists were responsible, The bead-elf - keeping base sandwiched between
, laatic'Amal-has'denied'the,. group the combat zones, but -a Marine
carried out the bombing ? t spokesman- said no- Americans .were
-' Tlie Times said te warning did {involved .--
not predict:a:time; date-orl lace r& ` "You can hear the fighting, but
the attack:1"? `right now. the Marines are not being
The newspaper said3h report was fired .on," said Caps Wayne Jones 15
distributed Oct.-20101& government minutes after he toured Marine posi-
-officiaisand military - eiders -iti-Eu- , Lions adjacent to south Beirut Shiite
ropeaiidprnbsbaj!was`seea-by'top actors it+vclvpd in the. clashes.
Marine off'ic'ers u ~e1rliL
The- Times quoted-Martha '-Gel.
.James, McManaway -as `'saying . thle
warning was not precise enough fdr
rMarines-in Beirut'so..take -extraordi-
nary precautions '.around. 1he, head-
nuarters -.building:
- 'For all we:knew;'the:threat -men-
,.:ioned -might have -involved: an -,oid
-lady carrying .6 shopping -bag fillcd
with explosives," he said. ?t w
In fighting - in - Lebanon;?-govern-
.ment?troops'and Muslim gunmen ea:
-gulled Beirut's southern suburb az l
surrounding.., hills .with- artillery,
mortar and machine-gun- fire: yester-
` Iayina serious breach,of.the Sept. 26
cease-fire agreement.
Lebanese army-sources also repou-
-ed Druse Muslim. shelling of the de-
fense ministry' in Yam.. and. the
Shout Mountain-.village of: Souk el
Gharb, the key army base eight miles
from. Beirut that guards the :sour--
east approaches to the ? capital.
State-run Beirut Radio . said the
nine leaders of Lebanon's. warring
factions, who are attending a nation-
al: -reconciliation, talks, in . Geneva,
: Switzerland,.had learned of the figllt-
ing'The-radio said they-called their
.-Christian" and Muslim field - com-
manders -to try to silence the guns.
Unconfirmed reports on'the.right-
wing Phalange militia radio reporter
:battles And sniping en:-the Galerie
Semaaa.:-Beirat'a-meip, east-west
-roadway --and in-- e~: Tayoune;.aria
r,t hat separates Cbr an east ;t orn
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 Approved For Release 200'11OFZKCKS90-01137
3 -November 1983
=M1= 4z
Major Questions Raised:
On CJ.A.'s Performance
By-PHILIP TAUBMAN
SpedtltoT .NrwYC,kT,mII
WASHINGTON, Nov. 2- The terror.
ist bombing of the United States Ma-
rine headquarters in Beirut and the
that Cuban presence
tot ythey found in
Grenada have raised major questions
in the Reagan Administration and Con-
gress about the performance of Ameri-
can inte_igenrp agencies.
These questions, like those about the
adequacy of security at the building in
Beirut, represent some of the most con-
tested issues growing out of the recent
events mLebanon and Grenada.
The intelligence questions, according
to Administration officials and mem-'
bers of Congress, revolve around two
immediate concerns: whether better
intelligence information might have
helped prevent the attack on the Ma-
tines in Beirut on Oct. 23 and whether
the American troops that invaded Gre-
nada two days later were suffi
ciently
informed about the strength of Cuban
forces an the island.
The officials said fundamental ques-
tions had also been raised about the
mission and methods of the nation's in-
telligence agencies, including the issue
of whether the United States had be-:
come too dependent an sophisticated
electronic -surveillance equipment in-
stead of human agents for spying.
Agencies an the Defensive
The questions have put the Central.
Intelligence Agency and other intelli-
gence organizations somewhat on the
defensive and produced strains be-
tween the uniformed military services
and civilian intelligence officials. Mili-
tary officers who commanded the inva-
sion of Grenada, for example, com-
plain about an intelligence vacuum
that they say left assault forces unpre.
'pared for the stiff resistance they en-:
comtered from Cuban troops.
While most said it would be some
time before a full review was complet-
ed, they said it already seemed clear
that serious shortcomings were ex-
posed in Lebanon and Grenada. '
.In Lebanon, the American intelli-
gence - agencies had been . trying to
monitor the activities of terrorist
groups and to anticipate political devel-
opments among the volatile Moslem
and Christian. communities, Adminis-
tration officials said.
Because of the difficulty of infltrat-.
ing militant groups, however, the pffi:
cials said, the resulting intellige e
tended to lack the specific information
that would enable the authorities to
block assassination plots or other ter-
roristactivities..
Three days before a terrorist drove a
truck filled with tans of explosives into.
the Marine headquarters at Beirut air,,
port, killing about 230 American server
icemen, the C.I.A. reported that a pro-
Iranian Moslem spinter group ap,,
peered to be planning an attack against,
the Marines. The report was widely;
distributed among senior Government.
officials, including Marine leaders. .
Defenders of the C.I.A. cite the re
port, which appeared in the highly clas-
sified National Intelligence Digest orb
Oct: 20, as - evidence that the agency
provided at least some warning before
the bombing, even if it did not give thq
Gen. Paul X. Kelley, the Marine
Commandant, disputed that suggestion
today, telling members of the House
Armed Services Committee that no one
had given the Marines the kind of de.
tailed intelligence they needed to pre!
vent a suicide bombing attack. ,
"I'm not talking about those broad,
vague, general statements that they
hide behind," General Kelley said in an
apparent reference to the Oct. 20 intel-
ligence report. "I'm tallang about
specificity, about a truck," he said.
Surprises in Grenada
In regard to Grenada, Defense Deb
partment officials said they were sur,
prised by both the number of Cuban
combat forces and the extent of Soviet
and Cuban Influence on the island. '
Intelligence officials acknowledged.
that detailed information on both subl
jects was unavailable, but said that
planning for the invasion bad moved sq
rapidly there was little time to prepare
the tactical intelligence normally re-:
quired for a military assault. They also
said that the military services, not thy
C.IA, were responsible for the collect
lion of tactical intelligence. 1 7"
The officials said the C.I.A. esti-
mated before the invasion that there
were about 700 Cubans in Grenada, a
figure that the Defense Department ulr
,timately accepted last week after re-
porting earlier in the week that 'the
total was more than 1,100.
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The intelligence officials said the,
C.I.A. had provided a periodic flow of '
information in recent months showing
that Cuba and the Soviet Union were
expanding their influence in Grenada.
But they said they were unaware of the
large stockpiles of Russian weapons re-
portedly found in the invasion.
Administration officials said the
C.I.A. also had little information about
political developments in Grenada. As
a result, they caught by.surprise when Washington Prime Min
ter. Maurice Bishop was ousted in a
coup last month.
In both Grenada and Lebanon, intel-
ligence officials said, the information
that was lacking was of the kind best
obtained by human agents rather than
satellites, reconnaissance aircraft or .
,other electronic equipment.
While the officials~said C.I operated';a~
large number of American and foreign
agents in Lebanon but had been u~nable
to penetrate terrorist groups.
In Grenada, the officials said, the
C.IA had no permanent presence and
the State Department maintained no
permanent diplomatic presence on the
island. As a result, the officials said,
the United States had few reliable
sources of information and found itself
relying on other Latinnatioas.
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.O ?r. . NEItr YORK TIDES
3 November 1983
Questions by House Panel Anger Mari,
By JOEL BRINHLEY day of testimony before House and Sen-
ate committees today. He said the
.
WASHINGTON, Nov. 2 - The Com-
mandant of the Marine Corps. Gesn.
PaulX Kelley, *told the House Armed
Services Committee today that it
should be asking more questions about
the people who bombed the Marine
t"?quarters at Beirut airport rather
than abort sedmity precautions. -
The death toll may rise to 239, he'
said: Questioned for the second day
abof_why sentries an duty were not
carrying loaded rifles when the truck
loaded with explosives raced past, Gen.
eral Kelley shouted: _ _.._
"We're talking about clips in weap-'
ors, but we're not talking about the
people who did it. I want to- find the
perpetrators. ?I want to bring them to
justice! You have to allow me this one
represents a new and
truck bombing `
unique terrorist threat, one that could
not have been anticipated by any com-
could have loaded their rifles in a sea
ood or two. The rifles are carried un-
loaded to prevent accidents, a Marine
spokesman said.
Besides, the general told the commit-
tee, "In my professional Judgment, it
would have been impossible to stop that
He defended the field commander's
decision to house several hundred ma-
rines in one place, saying that the air
po;t headquarters had survived many
months of fighting, including shelling
during the Israelioccupation. .
Representative Dave McCurdy, an
Oklahoma Democrat, asked why there
were so many people in the building,
considering that, "in the Middle East,
terrorism is just as much a function of
their use of power as our use of the M-1'
tank."
Some military officials and experts
on terrorism said the same thing in in-
Representative Larry Hopkths, a
Kentucky Republican, nErod, :
"Maybe the M-16 would rot have
stopped the truck. We'll know.
But one thing we do know is that an
empty'M-16 won't stopatruck." -
Now, the, general said, the Marine
sentries are carrying loaded w pop me.
meetly to a report that the Central In- i -0u--'
put that t th
'Yat many people in one
telligence Agency said Oct. 20, three place together. and you are creating a
days before the bombing, that there situation, especially in that part of the I
might be a possible terrorist attack on world where terrorism is so common."
American forces in Lebanon. H K reran of
s
a
b
"I read in The New York Times
today," General Kelley said, "that
some nameless, faceless intelligence
official had an intelligence report that
should have been sufficient that we
should have recognized the threat.
"But I would like that nameless and :
faceless official to come by and tell me
he recognized that it would be a five-ton
truck carrying 5,000 pounds of ord-
nance going at 60 miles per hour. And
I'll tell you, I'll be damn mad! "
He said the tragedy might have been
averted if the Marines had received a
specific warning. -
"I'm not talking about those broad,.
vague general statements they hide be.
hind," he said. "I'm talking about
specificity, about a truck." -
General Kelley completed his $hird
pp
ert
Prof. Ro
Georgetown University, a specialist an
terrorism who used to be with the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency,
said:
"I just don't understand it. In addi-
tion to providing barriers against vehi-
cles, you just don't want to concentrate
your people in a situation like that.
They seemed more interested in crea-
ture comforts than in safety."
On the question of unloaded weapons,
General Kelley told the committee that
sentries were following orders and
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 Y
ARTICLE APPEARF ved For Release 2001/03' _CI~390-01 I37R0
ON PAGE ovember
Reagan Aides Say U.S. encies
Issued Warning of Beirut Attack
By PHILIP TAUBMAN -
Spsc & ao lbe l in-Yasl2lew
WASHINGTON, Nov.1 -Three days
before a bomb blast killed United
States marines, soldiers and sailors in
Beim, intelligence agencies warned
that American forces in Lebanon would
probably be the target of a'terrarist at-
tar
k, Reagan Adminisrxatian officials ;
said today.
The intelligence report, the officials
said, specified that the ffiai
peered to be planning such an attack
was a militam pro-Iranian Shiite-
Mos-lem group in Lebanon known as the Is
lamic Amal and the Party of God.-
The bond of the Islamic Amal has
denied that his group was responsible
for the attack Oct. 23 that destroyed the
Marine headquarters at the Beirut air-
-port. After the attack. American and
French intelligence officials said the
Moslem splinter group appeared to
have bees involved.
In a related.developme:nt, a spokes.
man for the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, Lane Bonner, said a team of ex
plosives experts from the bureau's
laboratory had been sent to Beirut to
help determine who- was responsible
for the attach. -
Mr. Bonner said debris recovered at
the blast site would be brought back to
Washington for analysis to determine
whether the bomb could be linked to
improvised explosive devices used in
other attacks in r ?nOn
- No Exact Predictions
The intelligexr a warning did not pre-
dict the exact time, type or target of an
attack, according to the officials. but
DUVertheless stood not from the flow of
vagae rumors and imprecise intelli
gen about terrorist activities in
Lebanon. It was published in a classi-
fied intelligence bulletin an Oct; 20, the
officials said. _ - ..
"It was a beadsitp, a .dear,. promi=
neat warning;" one official who read
the report said. He said similar, though
less precise, warnings bad appeared in
intelligence reports earlier-in the year..
The officials said the report ap-
peared in the National Intelligence Di-
gest, a summary of Intelligence infor-
mation that is prepared by the Central
I_wAlgig Agency and distributed
every day to about x00 senior Govern-
ment officials, including Marine Corpe
off cers and United States military
commanders in Europe who have spe-
. dflcodmmand over the Marine tm1ts in
? IabanasL
The -adequacy of Marine security
procedures and the quality of intelli-
;gence before the bombing have
emerged as major issues in the wake of
the bombing.
17- C mandant Didaft See Report
General, Kelley. the Marine Com-
mandant; did not 'see or know of the
Oct. 20. intelligence report, a Marine
spokesman: said today. The -spokes
maim, Cal: James L. McManaway, said
General Kelley, who returned to Wash-
ington an Oct.19 afteran eight-day trip
to Europe and the Middle East, worked
at his living quarters inWashington on
Oct. 20 and did not see the National In-
telligence Digest because rules govern-
ing the handling of the highly classified
document stipulate that it not be taken
out of Marine headquarters in Virginia.
Colonel McManaway said he did not
know what 'the Marines did with the
specific intelligence report on Oct. 20,
but he said that in genera] "bur com-
manders in Beirut get exactly the same
information we see bere." He said the
Oct. 20 report did not contain the kind
of precise information that could have
helped the Marines defend against the
bombing. "For all we knew," be said,
the threat mentioned might have in-
volved an old lady carrying a shopping
bag filled with explosives."
Colonel McManaway said the Oct. 20
report did not contain the kind of pre-
cise information that could have helped
the Marines defend against the bomb-.
ing. "For all we knew," be said, "the
threat mentioned-might have involved
an old lady carrying a shopping bag .
filled with explosives.:' ... .
The number of American : deaths
from the bombing is uncertain. Gen.
Pahl X Kelley said the death toll was
x39, and spokesmen for the Defense De-
?partmeat and the Marine Corps said
20. A Marine spokesman in Beirut said
it was at least 230, and a report from a
military hospital in West Germany ip-
dicated the numberwas 231.. ?' - -
A second terrorist bomb attack the
same day blew'up the headquarters of
French forces in Beiri t, killing 56 pare-
troops. The American and the French
troops were based in Beirut as part of a
international peacekeeping force.
General Kelley and other top milk-
tart' officers in Washington and in Bei-
rut have said the Marines in Lebanon
bad no intelligence information warn-
rug that they faced the threat of a sta-
cide bomb attack such as the one that
destroyed the Marine headquarters.
Senior AdmmistrAtion officials and
members of Congress looking into the
circumstances Surrounding the attack
mud, tofty that warn-
ing published on Oct. not
providing details about a possible at-
tac k against the Marines, did include
e?xlghinivrmation so that the Marines
should have increased security.
Specifically, they said, in the wake of
the suicide terrorist bombing attack
against the United State mbassy in
Beirut that was carried outin a similar
fashion earlier this year, the warning
should have alerted the Marines to take
-apeaalprecautions.
The intelligence report, the officials
said, pinpointed the Islamic Amal as
the group that, intelligence sources in
Lebanon said was most likely to attack
the Marines. It'also -described the
group as a leading suspect in the bomb-
ing of the American Embassy. The
leader of the splinter group,- Hussein
Musavi, denied any involvement in ei-
ther attack last week.
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001
WASHINGTON POST
9 October 1983
George- F. Will
Bush Is
Wearing
Well
Kaiser Wilhelm's aides prepared for.
him each morning a newspaper of care:
fully excerpted items, printed in gold.. -
Vice President George Bush gets less'
gilded,but better, information.
- Tucking into scrambled eggs at his of--
frce at 7:30 a.m. last week, Bush looked_,
forward to a day that began with the:
feeding of a columnist but soon became-
interesting. It included several meetings
with the president and ended with a
political fund-raiser, the sting of whim..
was assuaged by the-fact that it involved
playing tennis. By &30 a. r he was re-,.
ceiving his daily briefing from the CIA
the brutality of facts, not printed in gold
He went from there to another national
security briefing with the president- --
Most thoughtful people entering gov-
ernment are dismayed by. and their dis-
may? steadily deepens about, the weak
information base on which decisions are'-
made. So Bush works to be a super:
-tanker loaded to the Plimsoll mark with .
information.
His experience during the last three
years is a case study in the natural mor=
tality of the silliness that flourishes dui=-
ing campaigns. References to Ronald'
Reagan as "a B-movie actor" are dead-:
So is the science of preppyology. That
involved the scrutiny of Bush's wrists .
watch bands for signs of terminal Yale
influences. Another melody no longer
heard is the refrain that his conservative
credentials are not in good order- He has_
now extinguished the suspicions of all
conservatives except, those who need
suspicions the way plants need sunshine
Bush only became suspect because he
was Reagan's -opponent Leave aside,
those conservatives who themselves wear
white collars and whose manual labor
extends only to moving the carriage of a
typewriter, but who thinly Bush cannot
relate to-as they -can-blue-collh
America. If Bush would just do som
thing ungenteel-drink the water from
the finger bowl, perhaps-he might
complete his conquest of conservative-
It is to the credit of the current presi
dent and especially his predecessor_two
former governors with no Washington`-
experience--that the vice presidency has,
become a serious job. Walter Mondaie
was the first vice president to have %arn :
office in the White House West Wing, as
does Bush. Hitherto, vice presidents had
offices next door, in the Executive Office
Building. That building is just a 30-sec= -
ond walk from the Oval -Office, but. (-in
the .words of -a Bush aide) "politically; _
it's Baltimore." -
Bush -can- attend any meeting the-
president has, except those which head5,i
of state traditionally have alone.
..He,
spew his mind onh' in private with tlie`
president, for several reasons.
The author of the most memorable
phrase of the 1980 campaign---"voodoo-
ecommics"-must feel somewhat inhib.
ited about entering the intramural de-
bate between those who still say the tax
cuts-will be self-financing (because eco-
nomic growth will close the budget gap)
and those who say tax increases are new;.
wary- Furthermore; Bush speaks cir
cumspectly when not alone. with the .
president because he knows it would be'-
a matter of minutes before any real or.`
imagined differences with the president
became common gossip-
Bush has had the sort of career coin
mon in Britain but rare here. That is, he
has passed through a series of significant.'
offices (congressman; chairman of his`:
part)-, ambassador to the U.N. and -so
Peking, director of the CIA). He is the
most comprehensively experienced per
son to serve as. vice president This is a
political asset because of Reagan's age.
That was expected to be an issue in 19.80.1
and was not. It is not expected to be in:{
1984, but may be. Perhaps it will be less -~
an "issue" than a vague anxiety. If so, .
Bush and his many credentials will be.,'I
important again.
Last time, he was important as evi-1
dence of Reagan's pragmatism and taste..;
for quality. "Exit polls" taken among'
voters leaving polling places showed that.
9 percent of those who voted for Reagan -
listed his choice of Bush as the reason.'+It. '
is hard to know exactly what those.
polled were saying, but 9 percent is,a
large number of persons saying it
Of all-mortals in their 60th year, Bush;
is the least weatherworn, perhaps be,
cause he has come to terms with the fact
that there is only so much, and not ver`
much, any man can do to control events.
His cheerful absence of anxiety about
The Question (will Reagan run?) reflects
his certitude that Reagan will run, and
his general knack for cheerfulness. Hap-.
piness often is a byproduct of a mature
person's fatalism, and a certain fatalism
is essential to the emotional well-beir
of a long-distance political runner. -
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 ARTICLE APPEAproved For Release
'h~jf~,3pri?!A
ON PAGE 1A .
31 July 1983
~ Reagan'S
move called
ed the maneuvers to accomplish.
They did not explain his decision to
order the exercises. .
In fact- they said, Reagan's key rea-
son for deploying the U.S. forces was
the U.S. perception that Cuba and the
Soviet Union were planning a signifi-
cant escalation of their milit
`preemptive'
By Alfonso Chardy
lnauirer l5ashingIor. aurewi
WASHINGTON - Hints that Cuba
and the Soviet Union were preparing
to expand their military role in Nica-
ragua led President Reagan to in-
crease the U.S. military presence .n.
Central America. according to Penta-
gon and National Security Council
officials.
"All our indications were that
Cuba and the Soviet Union were pre-
paring major military moves in Nica-
ragua, and so we bad to move, too,'
one security council official said
Thursday.
"Our move was a preemptive
strike, so to speak." said a Pentagon
official: who, along with other
sources knowledgeable about the sit-
uation. agreed to talk on condition
that he remain anonymous.
Administration_ officials said. how-
ever. there was no hard evidence
that Cuba was mobilizing troops or
warplanes to intervene in Central
America.
And congressional critics suggest
ed Thursday that U.S. intelligence
analysts might have misread the evi-
dence under pressure to supply proof
for Reasan's hard-line stance on the
reeion.
The Reacsn administration sur-
prised the U.S. public and angered
critics Monday when it announced
that it would dispatch -19 U.S. war-
ships, including two aircraft carri-
ers, and 3.000 to 4.000 ground troops
to Central America for maneuvers
that would last six months.
On Tuesday, Reagan described the
deployments as "routine exercises--
But privately, senior administration
officials said they were meant to
show support for U.S. allies in the
region, step up U.S. pressures on Nic-
aragua's Sandinista rulers to moder-
ate their Marxist stance. and prove to
U.S- foes that Reagan could act deci-
sively in Central America. despite
congressional opposition to his poli-
cies.
Pentagon. State Department and se-
curity council officials interviewed
this week said that although these
factors explained what Reagan want-
ary
roles in Nicaragua. - The report said Ochoa had -been i
State Department sources said U.S. instrumental in negotiating, organiz-`
ambassadors in Latin America had ing and leading the deployment of
been instructed to tell "trusted" lead- j Cuban troops to Angola in 1976 -and
ers in the region that Reagan had to Ethiopia in 19777.
fresh intelligence data suggesting Officials who read the IA journal
such an escalation. said that in July it not at 1,00
.The Cuban moves are .to be de-~ Cuban military advisers had arrived.
scribed as amounting to .a direct in Nicaragua-in recent months. rais--
challenge to vital US- interests and' ing the total of Cuban. civilian and
national
se
i
.
cur
ty, .said the sources,
who saw the cables sent to the-Amer-
ican diplomats.
. IOn Thursday,-Cuban President Fi-
del--Castro - suggested to reporters
that .he-would 'be willing -to pull Cu-
ban military -advisers out of Nicara-
gua and -stop sending arms to that
country if .Washington did the-same
throughout Central America.On Fri?
day, Reagan indicated he could ac-
cept such an agreement.
1"If he is really serious about this,I
think it's fine," Reagan said in an
interview. "1 think that I am willing
to give him the benefit of the doubt
in any negotiations."i .
Security-council and Pentagon-offi-
cials said hints of Cuban and Soviet
buildups in Central America began
flowing: into US, intelligence agen-,
ties 10 10 15 weeks ago. -
Officials- said alarm bells began
y a
v
sers in Cuba had
ringing at CIA headquarters in Lang- increased by 20 percent in 1982- up to-
ley, Va-, in May. when photographs 2500. In addition, he said the Soviets
snapped by an SR-71, a high-flying had 6.000 to 8,000 civilian advisers
spy aircraft. showed about 400 Cuban and a 1,700-member combat brigade
marines practicing "sophisticated . in Cuba.
amphibious landings" on beaches By last week. the Pentagon had
near the Cuban port of Mariel, 25 revised upward the number of Soviet
miles west of Havana. : civilian advisers in Cuba to 8.500 to
The CIA's-chief aerial-photography 10.500. The Pentagon also said that in
analyst, John Hughes. concluded r the first six months Q.f 1983, approxi-
that the Cubans were-practicing an - i mately?0.000 metric tons of military
invasion of a foreign country, not a ' :equipment as shipped from Mos-
defense' of their own beaches. The. ow to Cuba.
officials said. -
Administration officials said they
believed the 'Cubans . might have
been practicing for landings in Nica-
ragua.and perhaps even Hgnduras. a
staunch U.S. ally' -
At about this same time, the offi-
cials said. Hughes reported that four
Soviet merchant ships had been pho-
tographed unloading military equip
ment at Nicaragua's Pacific port of
Corinto.
1
T
"jol
Nat
journal distributed to senior policy
makers - reported on June 1 that
Cuban army Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa
Sanchez had been in Nicaragua since -
security, advisers there to about:
5.500.
Finally.'said one securitycouncil
official:: U.S. diplomats around the
world noticed in recent weeks-that
their Cuban counterparts were
"probing" -to assess how Reagan
would react should Havana send
troops or Soviet-made MiG warplanes
to Managua. -
While all this was going on. U.S-
intelligence agencies were reporting-
an ongoing expansion of the Soviet
military role in Cuba and Nicaragua-.
Undersecretary of Defense -'Fred
We advised the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee-in March that Mos--
cow'bad shipped, 63.000 tons of arms
to Cuba in 1981 and 68,000 tons in
1982-the highest yearly totals since
the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.
Jkle also said that the number of
Soviet militar
d
i
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 i
ARTICLAPPEARED. 1-? Approved For Release 200%IRLl Ig4lE19A P90-01137R0001
ON PAGE IA 29 July 1983
Cohan, Soviet move
said to spur R~agan.-.
--Washington - A hurry -of hints
that Cubd-and the Soviei Union-were
preparing to -expand their military
role in Nicaragua led President Rea-
gan..to . increase the U-S. military
presence in Ventral America, accord-
ing to Pentagon and lliational'Securi-
-tw Council officials.'
r "All -our indications were that -Cuba .and --.the,,Soviet Union=,:were:
preparing majdr military moves in i
Nicaragua. and so we had to -move,
too," one NSC official said yesterday.-
"Our move was a .preemptive ~
strike, -so to speak". said .a Pentagon
official who, like other sources knowl-
edgeable about the situation, -agreed
to talk on condition that be remain
anonymous. -
Administration officials conceded,
however, that there has been no hard
evidence that -Cuba is mobilizing
troops or warplanes to intervene in -
Central America.
Congressional . critics suggested
yesterday that U.S. intelligence ana-
lysts may have misread the evidence-
under pressure to supply proof for
Mr. Reagan's hard-line stance on the
region.
The Reagan administration sur-
prised the American public and ang-
ered critics Monday when it an-
- In fact, they-said, Mr. Reagan's
kec reason -for deploying the -US.
forces was the U.S. perception that
'Cuba and the Soviet Union were plan-
nind -to significantly iticrease4their,
ry roles in Nicaragua.
'State Department sources said -.
U.S. ambassadors in Latin America
have been instructed to tell "trusted"
leaders in the region that Mr. Reagan
'has fresh' intelligence data suggesting s u c h : . 'in-'
tensification.
r The Cuban moves are.:-16 -be :described as
amounting to-a direct challenge to vital U.S.;:inter-
ests and national security, said .the. sources, who-
saw the cables sent.to the American diplomats.. -, : -
NSC and Pentagon officials said hints of the
Cuban and Soviet buildups in Central America-be-
gan flowing into U.S. intelligence. agencies 10 to 15
weeks ago. .
Officials said alarm bells began ringing at CIA
headquarters in Langley, Va., in -May when photo-
graphs taken by an SR-71, a high.-flying spy air-
craft, showed about 400 Cuban .marines practicing
"sophisticated amphibious landings" on beaches
near the Cuban port of Mariel,.25 miles west of
Havana.
The CIA's chief aerial photography analyst,
-John Hughes, concluded the Cubans were practic-
ing an invasion of a foreign country, not a defense,
of their own beaches, the officials said.
Administration officials said they -first inter-
preted the Cuban maneuvers as preparation for an
invasion of some small Caribbean nation. Now,
however, they believe the Cubans may have been
practicing for landings in Nicaragua, and perhaps
even Honduras. a staunch U.S. ally.
About the same time, the officials said, Mr.
Hughes reported that four Soviet merchant ships
had been photographed-unloading military equip-
ment at Nicaragua's Pacific port of Corinto.
The administration was further "jolted," the of-
ficials said, when the National Intelligence Daily
(NID), a CIA journal distributed to senior policy-
makers, reported June 1 that Cuban army Gen. Ar-
naldo Ochoa Sanchez had been in Nicaragua since
nounced that it would dispatch 19 UM:
warships, including two aircraft-car
riers, and 3,000 -to 4-000 ground troops.
to Central America for maneuvers
that will last six months.'
Mr. Reagan described the-deplgy-
-menns Tuesday . as "routine ? zer-:
- -cises," but senior administration offs
-dials privately said they were meant
to -show support Jor -U.S. Allies in the
region; step up .'U.S. pressures.-on
-:Nicaragua's' Sandinista..rulers?to.mod-
-erate their Marxist stance; and ,prow
to U-S. -foes -that MP Reagan .can pct -
.decisively in -Central America; -de-
spite congressional -opposition to...his
policies.:
Pentagon, State Department -and
NSC officials -interviewed this week
said that while.these factors explain
what Mr. Reagan wants the maneu-
vers to accomplish, they do not -ex-
plain his decision to order the exer-
cises.. - -
early May.
. The NID report said General Ochoa:had been in-.-
strumental in negotiating, organizing and leading
the deployment of Cuban troops to Angola in 1976
and to Ethiopia in 1977, totaling about 42,000 sol-
diers.
NID's June 1 report said the Soviet-trained Gen-
eral Ochoa apparently was in Nicaragua to com-
pile a report for Fidel Castro on whether it would;
be feasible to send Cuban troops to Nicaragua.
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 Approved For Release 200G A/ G%-RrJ l O-01137RO09
.2~T!PLF APPEARED 1 27 June 1983
Casey, Who Can't Rexnemer,
Berates Officials WhaCan't- R
Lou
HEAGAN&Cd. .
Central Intelligence Agerjcy- Director;
William J. Casey, whose memory ranges
from weak to -nonexistent on unauthorized
disclosure- of -President- - Carter's brie>n&o
-books to the 1980 Reagan campaign;-i
worried that fellow Reaganites,-are a .bunch.;
of blabbermouths.
Appearing before- the senior.-.. White;'
House staff last Tuesday=:. and reading a
prepared lecture in a tone-described-as="an
admonishing mumble," Casey fretted about.
the difficulties of keeping classed. infor-
mation classified
In the process.. he gave several still-clas-
sified examples of - "unauthorized disclo-
sures" to staff members not normally au=
thorized to receive classified information of
arv kind-
Fortunately for- the- security of the re-
public, Casey's examples included such pre-
viously rehashed events as the thwarted
Libyan invasion of the- Sudan. the .world--?
publicized sending of arms to Afghan goer- .
rillas and the open secret that the United _
States is assisting anti-government rebels
in Nicaragua.
All of this was old hat. But some of the
White House staff members were startled
to hear Casey's report on care and feeding
of the National Intelligence Daily, the com-_ _
paratively low-level CIA analysis provided
daily to i50 U.S. government officials. A
legend on the cover of this document,
known- as NID, says it is to be returned the
same day and not to be duplicated.
According to Casey, a CIA check showed
that more than 100 of the documents were
not being turned in and that some of those
returned came complete with handy nota-
tions instructing secretaries to- copy them.
One responsive official, asked to return his
copy, supposedly gave. back 7.5 photocopies.
As it - turns out, there area remedies to
deal with such carelessness. Casey mentioned a few of them,.such as
dismissal and administering lie-detector
tests to employes-who engage- in "unautho-
rized disclosures.."__. As. far.- as:is=.known; he
would make-an: exceptiorr.-for-briefing ma-
terial -that .mysteriously appears on the
desk of campaign chairmen. just before a
crucial debate= - -
Two days, later,%when . asked to provide
details- of how the Carter- briefing book
wound up in'the? Reagan camp-, Casey gave
an.impressive demonstration of what a CIA
director might do--if- he became- a prisoner
of-way .
Altliopgh he: provided .his name and
ranki,. Casey said he- remembered nothing
wha?+gveabout a briefing book that White
Haase chef of staff James A- Baker III re-
called Casey giving him. Casey's recollec-:
tion has. not improved subsequently.
Most- Americans- would, of course, be
genuinely concerned by= disclosure of real'
national-security secrets by those charged
with keeping them- But some-in. the White-
House, believe that national. security in the
Reagan administration would be served es-
pecially-well by appointment of a CIA di-
rector who starts with a greater presump-
tion_ofsredibility..__,
That-is not Casey's long-suit, as a couple
of jokes making, the White House rounds
last week attest:. One, attributable to Alan
Abelson, in Barron's* said "CIA" really stood
for "Casey Investing Again," a reference to
the remarkable timeliness of the director's.
successful stock-market investments.
The other, repeated on background and
presumably not classified, was a tongue-in-
cheek assurance that Casey, could not have
been the. recipient of the Carter briefing
hook. -
"If Bill had received, it," one White
House official said, "he would have placed
it in a blind trust."
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 pp-roved For Release 20VdQ1i l;G' ?P
014PAGE A 19 June 1983
Cuba's Top Combat General move decisively to prop up the 5andin-
Combat ista regime."
Ocboa's Previous Roles
Is Said to Serve in Nicaragua The C.I.A. writers of the report con-
tended that General Ochoa's assign-
By LESLIE H. GELS Reagan Orders a Review meat, based on his previous activities,
was "
spocui mre.re.Yoi h D BO @Il*(31i 1 611001-2 NTL'\
1981. "It won't bother to denounce it, it will tion of the White House position on the Sovi-
 e 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01 137R000100150001-2
NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
anuary 1983
By Philip Taubman
illiam J. Casey, the Director
of Central Intelligence, sat at
the end of the mahogany con-
ference table in his office.
Outside, the late afternoon
sun played across the trees
that ring the Central Intelli-
gence Agency's headquarters
in northern Virginia, filling the windows with a
fresco of autumn colors. A short stack of docu-
ments, some stamped SECRET, rested at Mr.
Casey's left elbow, and a yellow legal pad on which
he had penciled several notes was positioned to his
right.
"The reason I am here is because I have a lot of
relevant experience and a good track record," Mr.
Casey said, alluding to comments that he was un- I
qualified for the job and had been appointed only
because he was Ronald Reagan's campaign man-
ager. Mr. Casey, an imperious and proud man, had
been fuming over the criticism for months, accord-
ing
to his friends, and now, in his first cotnprehen-
sive interview since taking office, he wanted to set
the record straight.
He flipped through the papers and extracted a
yellowing clipping from The New York Times that
extolled his record as chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission from 1971 to 1973. Next,
he provided several pages copied from a book about
Allied intelligence operations during World War II;
he had underlined a glowing assessment of his con-
tribution to the Office of Strategic Services. The
final clipping was a story that appeared in The
Washington Star in the summer of 1980, describing
Mr. Casey's role as Reagan campaign director.
The headline: "Casey, the Take-Charge Boss."
It was an oddly defensive performance for a man
who, according to classified budget figures pro-
vided by Government officials, is overseeing the
biggest peacetime buildup in the American intelli.
gence community since the early 1950's. Because
intelligence expenditures are secret, it is not widely
known that at a moment when the Reagan Admin.
istration is forcing most Government agencies to
retrench, the C.I.A. and its fellow intelligence or.
ganizations are enjoying boom times. Even the
military services, which have been favored with
substantial budget increases, lag well behind in
terms of percentage growth, although military-run
intelligence agencies are growing almost as
quickly as the C.I.A. Spending figures for intelli-
gence agencies, including the C.I.A., are hidden
within the Defense Department's budget. With a
budget increase for the 1983 fiscal year of 25 per.
intentions. lnfe ItY cent, not allowing for inflation, compared with 18
percent for the Defense Department, the C.I.A. is
and ca abif gved For Release 2006/01/03 : C -R Og6digiiiiR (>' *5 OOl1f2e Federal
P Government, according to Administration budget
officials.
I ='r1V7 ."\*r
 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010
F, E J)
THE POST
3 1,overber 1982
Sai y id toF1ind S. Afri~an Rebels;
* ? I
STAT
Stronger,
eii
~Neig i N targe-L-s-
By Virginia Harrill
F cre;Fn Senvice
A ~i-a_shington _hhv group that has pre-
vicus' obtained sensitive classified docu-
ments says it has been given a U.S. intelli-
gence report warning that the main guerrilla
group operating in South Africa is gaining
streng h and is weighing a more militant
strawg involving attacks on white civilian
targets.
A second document made available to The
_a-shin ton Post by Trans-Africa, a black
American, lobby group on African affairs,
suggests that the white-minority government
in South Africa is considering suppression of
liable repots of successful guerrilla attacks
to protect white morale.
That report is contained in what Trans-
'es as a copy of a page from the
A- r': 15. 19S2, National Intelligence Daily, a
bigniy classified compilation of current, in-
teliiernce information from the CIA, the De-
fense Intelligence Agency, the National Se-
curity Agency and other intelligence sources.
- It is circulated by the CIA director, as
,head of C;.S. intelligence, to a limited num-
. ber of senior nolicv makers in the White
House, the Cabinet and elsewhere in Wash-
ington and to certain military commanders
overseas.
The daily summary said Pretoria was con-
sidering new and stricter limitations on pub-
licizing terrorist attacks because "the ANC
[African National Conference, the main guer-
rilla group in South Africal benefits from
press coverage of its attacks." That, in turn,
the summary said, "will strengthen the mil-
itants in the ANC who want the group to
engage in spectacular attacks against whites."
Supporting that assessment is what
Trans-Africa Director Randall Robinson said
was an extensive CIA report on the outlawed
nationalist group. Robinson, who said the :
report came into his hands in April, refused
to make portions of it available for publica-
tion, He said they dealt with specific person-
alities and bases of the ANC.
Separate CIA spokesmen, making what
each called the 'agency s `'usual" response to
r
pre 5
security inner circle=;'.Ile-latest -prob
an with - cxiticigai frara two a
m be
-1
g
e
Haig's. deputies. of I rf icir;ance: of
US.. Annbaseador'tn ttae l `nited `.Na
newel the corers: of the president'
and-his;senior=-yv-hits= : ?reuse officials.:
about:Haig's:willing perform~as
roi g
1
The problem'. con u - t}
published -reports; tbat" l 1n dies
was-s
cussions.'with reports - -Iny
considerable nhappine-withY Allen:
THE 1'1ASHIilGT0 POST
12 July 1981
Senior presidential - aides said the
decision on the ? new policy, put into
_. effect last 'week, was made by the
president after consultation - with his
top staff : advisers, notably Meese,
Baker and Deaver. _ :,:
"A decision has been. made' ' to
streamline--the' president's, schedule;.
one of Reagan's senior advisers- said-
"It is not intended to reflect-on Dick
Allen. or Al. Haig or anyone else." .:
In.-- practice, ,;.however, the. change
does ? reflect,on...Allen: because,-"every.;
national - security affairs - adviser has'
given daily-briefings to the president
since the - job -was formalized in the
Kennedy =White- House with the ap-
pointment:.of McGeorge: Bundy.: And
it reflects; upon :Haig in that the for-
matlized'.inclusioi., on_ the.. president's
eight-person- committee known as the
National- Security. Planning Group
amounts' to the regular participation
of two officials-the defense sec re-
tarv and the CIA director who had
not previously..- been part at me press
'T'his insane- that the -presxaem-wui
. with h virtually his-
be meeting regularly
.
entire . national: security council. While
the entire. 'group' will be included on
the. president's schedule every . Mon-
not- actuallyTme_ quite that often,- according to: one senior White-House
aide.-'The meetings will be convened
tuna.', y -of the members.- feels
`: here lie _ .matter::that'"ought? to ,be-
q-
. expect'--,tbatthe -group - will..
f meet at? least a couple of times each
weer;:'::The`reason- for- the change
issues have : often- surfaced:.. in
is::: that:
,
the-:~moming ;briefings that `affected.
not ;only.. State. but; Defense;" the CIA-
'
..tthere.-
and others='and theyweren
Now.they1will be.--It's iii extension-of.
Before last week, the president had
basin read' oral national securi
Relea
~- ded .~
morning: briefings were atten by
T-__L _~J LLB- xreirs nr Tlunnthl -1
cording to a presidential aide.
"I think every president feels that it.
clarifies a briefer's-mind to first Put,
[his thoughts] down: on paper, this
presidential adviser - said. "-`.. Each
morning,- if:: Dick. Allen want3 ` to : see..-
the president, he will be able to,do 50--
Also, every time Al Haig wants to as the president;; he will be able to -see
Allen', who-assumed office in Jan-
uary with the understanding that his.
job would not, be. as commanding in.
scope as it was.in`the era of two of his
more, ~: famous _.predecessors, HenryKissinger "and Zbigniew.-Brzezinski,-
was asked .in a telephone interview if
.he considered.` the -'new format' d re
duction of his duties. "Not at all, he-
said. "I suppose - it, could seem that
way. But not at ala We axe trying-to `.
make - better' use of' the , presidents-
time. I'maltogether enthusiastic- about
the new schedule.
Now,. he said;. the president willread- his national security briefing, and
then Allen.will' appear in the Oval Of-
fice for" the first five' minutes of the
.regularly scheduled morning meeting
that, the,,. president has with,:Meese;
Baker .end Deaver'-"just to see if.
there: is ;anything; that needs to