SUN TIMES ARTICLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 79
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 17, 1986
• Content Type: CABLE

25X1 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3
WASHINGTON POST
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1 THE CIA IN TRANSITION
Casey Strengthens Role
Under 'Reagan Doctrine'
By Patrick E. Tyler
and David B. Ottaway
Wativingtca Post Star Writers
When the Soviet Union shot
down a Korean Airlines plane in
September 1983, an angry Presi-
dent Reagan told CIA Director Wil-
liam J. Casey that the United States
should send U.S.-made antiaircraft
missiles to Afghanistan to help the
rebels shoot down a few Soviet mil-
itary aircraft in retaliation. .
Casey was willing, but the plan
was never approved, in part be-
cause of a reluctant Central Intel-
ligence Agency bureaucracy, ac-
cording to one source. Some top
CIA officials argued that introduc-
ing U.S. weapons into that conflict
would escalate it dangerously, end
any possibility of "plausible denial"
of U.S. involvement for Washington
and alienate Pakistan, the main con-
duit for covert American aid to the
rebels.
Now, with the decision to begin
supplying U.S.-made Stinger anti-
aircraft missiles to the rebels in
Angola and Afghanistan, the Rea-
gan administration apparently has
dispensed with such cautionary di-
plomacy. In so doing it has thrust
the CIA into a far more public role
as the lead agency in carrying out
the United States' secret diploma-
cy.
This stepped-up commitment,
under what some administration
officials have called the "Reagan
Doctrine," is dedicated to the pres-
ident's vision of effectively support-
ing anticommunist "freedom fight-
ers" in their struggle against Sovi-
et-backed Marxist governments in
the Third World.
An earlier article in this occasion-
al series examined the evolution
and debate over the "Reagan Doc-
trine." This one focuses on the role
of the CIA in implementing that
doctrine and the agency's remark-
able growth during the tenure of
Casey, the former Reagan cam-
paign manager turned spymaster.
Casey's influence, both in rebuilding
the CIA and as a trusted counselor
to the president, has made him a
critical and sometimes controver-
sial player in the administration.
During his five years as CIA di-,
rector, the intelligence budget has
grown faster than the defense bud-
get and the agency has rapidly re-
built its covert-action capabilities
with a goal of restoring the prestige
of the CIA's Directorate of Oper-
ations. The "DO," as it is called,
suffered a series of purges and in-
vestigations during the 1970s and
its image was smeared by disclo-
sures of past assassination plots,
use of mind-altering drugs and spy-
ing on U.S. citizens.
Since that time, a new generation
of senior managers has ascended to
the top of the CIA, and they in gen-
eral have been a more cautious
breed, eager to avoid risky opera-
tions that would. embarrass the
agency if disclosed
But Casey is not a prisoner of
that past. -
He is one of the anti-Soviet "ac-
tivists" in the top echelon of an ad-
ministration that has promoted
stepped-up U.S. involvement in the
struggle to "roll back" recent Soviet
gains in the Third World. While
supporting the CIA's more cautious
career bureaucracy, Casey also has
moved quietly?sometimes in his
political channels?to prepare his
agency for a more aggressive role
in countering Soviet influence in the
Third World.
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to promote the administrations
goa s in Nicaragua and elsewhere in
the Third World. More than once,
according to sources, Casey has
angrily rejected CIA analyses that
did not mesh with the anti-Soviet
pronouncements of White House
policy-makers and speech writers.
One key senator has said that
relations between Casey and the
committees are at an all-time low.
The penalty for Casey could come
in the next two months as the com-
mittees prepare to make the largest
cuts in the intelligence budget since
the Carter administration.
Some officials see Casey's most
formidable challenge in Reagan's
second term as facing severe bud-
get cuts mandated by the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings deficit-reduction
act. This comes as. the U.S. intel-
ligence community is projecting
multibillion-dollar outlays for a new
generation of high-technology spy
satellites that some officials say are
badly needed to guard U.S. inter-
ests until the end of the century.
Some critics charge that Casey is
40 years out of touch with intelli-
gence management and shows ob-
sessive interest in mounting covert
operations in the style of the World
War II Office of Strategic Services,
where he cut his teeth on clandes-
tine warfare under Gen. William J.
Donovan. His critics point out that
these were tactics of a bygone era.
The country was at war; the more
covert operations the better.
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WASHINGTON POST
14 March 1986
CIA Official Sherman Kent, 82, Dies
By Bart Barnes
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sherman Kent, 82, a Yale Uni-
versity history professor who came
to Washington in the summer of
1941 and became a major figure in
the development of this nation's in-
telligence community, died March
11 at his home in Washington. He
had a form of Parkinson's disease.
He was an early recruit of the Of-
fice , of Strategic Services, the
World War II predecessor of the
Central Intelligence Agency, and he
served abroad as well as in Wash-
ington. When the war ended he re-
turned briefly to Yale. Shortly after
the outbreak of the Korean conflict
he joined the CIA. From the early
195ds until he retired in 1967, he
was director of the Office of Nation-
al Estimates of the CIA.
At his retirement, he received a
Career Civil Service Award for hav-
ing played "a unique role in the de-
velopment" of the CIA. He also re-
ceived a President's Award for Dis-
tinguished Federal Service, with an
accompanying citation stating that
he had played "a unique role in im-
proving the contributions of intel-
ligence to our national security."
Colleagues in the intelligence
community said Mr. Kent ended, or
at least curbed, "a strong tradition
of equivocation" in intelligence es-
timates.
Mr. Kent's particular genius, ac-
cording to former colleagues, went
to both method and organization.
First, he had a rare ability to glean
significant facts and decipher trends
from the morass of information re-
ported from a worldwide network of
intelligence sources. And second,
he perceived at an early stage that
the effectiveness of the National
Intelligence Estimate, for which his
office was responsible, would de-
pend on direct access to the White
House.
"He saw the main art form in
which the CIA would distinguish
itself was in having the ear of the
president," said one former col-
league.
As director of the Office of Na-
tional Estimates, Mr. Kent presided
at meetings of intelligence repre-
sentatives from a variety of depart-
ments and agencies?Army, Navy,
Air Force, State Department,
Atoihic Energy Commission and the
like-:?and then sent to the president
a distillation of their findings.
His office dealt with such issues
as the rate of Soviet aircraft and
nuclear weapons production. One
notable success was its ability to
adviSe the White House six months
in advance of Sputnik in 1957 that
the:Soviet Union had the capability
of laiinching an earth satellite.
TAscribed as "intellectually de-
mantling but not arrogant," Mr.
Kent habitually wore red suspend-
ers,:and he liked to hook his thumbs
in the galluses and put his feet up
on the table during high-level meet-
ings: He was said by friends to have
been blunt and forceful and to have
had a profound and colorful com-
mand of profanity that was "most
useful," in the words of a colleague,
"in keeping the Army and the Air
Fore in their place."
BOrn in Chicago, Mr. Kent moved
to California as a child. He lived in
Washington from 1911 to 1917
when his father, William Kent, was
a Republican congressman from
California. He attended Sidwell
Friends School here and graduated
froin Yale, where he also earned a
doctorate in history. Throughout
his life he refused to be called "Doc-
tor.?
BY the summer of 1941 he had
been teaching a popular course in
modern European history at Yale
for'several years when William J.
("Wild Bill") Donovan, a New York
'airier and World War I Medal of
Hotior winner, invited him to come
to Washington.
lirt the time Donovan was assem-
blink a cadre of the brightest minds
he eould find in academia, law and
business to determine the nation's
intelligence needs in a world war
that was certain to involve the Unit-
ed States,
III 1942, Donovan became the
first head of the Office of Strategic
Seririces, and his recruits became
thelfirst OSS officials. Mr. Kent was
put; in charge of the Africa section
and later was chief of the research
and analysis branch. He served in
Waihington, North Africa and Italy.
After the war Mr. Kent became
acting director of the Office of Re-
seal-ch and Intelligence at the State
Department, taught at the National
W11- College and then returned to
hiOrofessorship at Yale.
Ile wrote a book, "Strategic In-
telligence for American World Pol-
icy: that was published in 1949 and
waa said by columnists Joseph and
Start Alsop seven years later to
have been "the most important
postwar book on strategic intelli-
gence."
Mr. Kent's tenure at the Office of
National Estimates covered a tu-
multuous period that included not
only the fighting in Korea but also
the collapse of French rule in Indo-
china, the Cold War, the Cuban mis-
sile crisis and U.S. entry into the
war in Vietnam.
In retirement, he wrote a book
based on his boyhood experiences
on a brother's ranch in Nevada and
he produced an unusual set of
blocks for children called "Buffalo
Blocks."
He is survived by his wife, Eliz-
abeth Gregory Kent of Washington;
one daughter, Serafina Kent Ba-
thrick of New York; one son, Sher-
man Tecumseh Kent of Oklahoma
City, and four grandsons.
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oNANT0AGEICLEAFproved For Release 2ows) EgIVAPIE10-01137
17 January 1986
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To Check on the CIA, Send In t
By EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN
The ambiguous nature of secret intelli-
gence is often not fully appreciated, espe-
cially by top Central Intelligence Agency
executives who boast that they are privy to
the intentions of the Kremlin through
sources that report to them directly from
its inner sanctum, the KGB.
The "facts" that proceed from secret
intelligence are not discrete objects, like
marbles, that can easily be separated by
color, lined up and counted. They tend to
change their shape, color and meaning
depending on how, and by whom, they are
arranged.
Consider the case of Vitaly S. Yurchen-
ko. He came to Washington last August as
a "defector" from the highest stratum of
the KGB. Then, after the deputy director of
the CIA, John N. McMahon, had staked his
reputation on the quality of Yurchenko's
information and CIA Director William J.
Casey had proclaimed him "for real,"
Yurchenko returned to Moscow.
Despite this embarrassment, Casey con-
tinued to assert that Yurchenko had pro-
vided extraordinarily important informa-
tion to the CIA during his curious visit.
That very same week, on the basis of a
briefing about the case by his national-
security staff, President Reagan said
categorically that "the information he
provided was not anything new or sensa-
tional." He added that the putative defector
had told the CIA nothing more than it
"already knew."
Clearly the CIA director and his deputy,
and the President and his national-security
adviser, had looked at the same set of
secret intelligence "facts" from the same
defector, but they arrived at diametrically
opposite conclusions about their value.
The issue goes far deeper than the
credibility of a single defector. It cuts to the
core of the CIA's assumptions about Soviet
deception. Does, for example, the KGB
systematically attempt to mislead Ameri-
can intelligence by allowing its agents to
reveal misleading data? The CIA's current
position on this vexing question, as stated
in a letter sent to the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, is that it can
find no evidence of such kinds of deception
on strategic issues in the past 20 years.
Counterintelligence experts outside the
government, such as those at the Rand
Corp., reached the opposite conclusion.
The problem can be resolved neither by
insiders, who are committed to a denial of
deceptions, nor outsiders, who lack access
to the highly classified data. Nor does the
evidence speak for itself. What is needed to
break this conceptual logjam, if only on a
temporary basis, is another "B Team."
The B- Team idea stretches back a
decade, when George Bush was the CIA
director. Data from reconnaissance satel-
lites had raised serious doubts about the
CIA's assessment of Soviet bomber and
ballistic strategy. The question again
was not the raw data but what might be
missing from it. In order to settle the
matter, Bush appointed two teams to look
at the same data. The A Team, headed by
Howard Stoertz, the CIA's national intelli-
gence officer on the Soviet Union, consist-
ed entirely of CIA insiders; those on the
B Team, headed by Richard Pipes, a
professor of Russian history at Harvard,
were all outsiders ( with proper clearances)
who were not committed to any prevailing
view of Soviet strategy.
The most dramatic result of this un-
precedented competition was a radical
reassessment of the Soviet threat, based on
the B Team's conclusion that the CIA had
seriously underestimated the accuracy of
earn
Soviet missiles. It also shook up much of
the complacency at the CIA.
Casey, at his confirmation hearings,
suggested that there was definite value in
these kinds of competitive analysis. If so,
the current crisis in counterintelligence
presents a golden opportunity for a new
B Team.
The team should be chosen by Casey, not
in his capacity as the director of the CIA
but in his wider role as the head of the
intelligence community. As in the model of
the 1976 B Team, these experts should be
drawn both from other U.S. intelligence
services, such as the Defense Intelligence
Agency and the National Security Agency,
and from think tanks, such as Rand and
R&D Associates, that have been working
on these problems for a decade or more. To
head the team, Casey might consider a
senator who has served on the intelligence
committee and is respected for independent
thinking on these issues, such as Malcolm
Wallop (R-Wyo.) or Daniel Patrick Moy-
nihan (D-N.Y.).
Since this B Team's primary purpose
would not be to investigate but rather to
test the CIA's imagination, it should have a
limited mandate and be confined to two or
three specific issues. These might include
Soviet use of double agents and Soviet
disinformation tactics to confuse anti-
ballistic-missile strategy and mislead U.S.
submarine deployments. The idea would be
to test the proposition that analysis with
diverse views might discern different clues
from the same raw data. The results, again,
might prove both surprising and useful.
Edward Jay Epstein, the author of "Leg-
rrui: The Secret World of Lee Harvey
Oswald," is completing a book about inter-
national deception.
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AIR= AMAMI
pAguLassi 27 December 1985
Nicaragua Rebels Linked to Drug Trafficking
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WASHINGTON POST
US. Investigators Say Contras Help Transport Cocaine in Costa Rica
By Brian Barger and Robert Parry
Prcs
Nicaraguan rebels operating in northern
Costa Rica have engaged in cocaine traffick-
ing, in part to help finance their war against
Nicaragua's leftist government, according
to U.S. investigators and American volun-
teers who work with the rebels.
The smuggling operations included re-
fueling planes at clandestine airstrips and
helping transport cocaine to other Costa
Rican points for shipment to the United
States, U.S. law enforcement officials and
the volunteers said.
These sources, who refused to be iden-
tified by name, said the smuggling involves
individuals from the largest of the U.S.-
backed counterrevolutionary, or contra,
groups, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force
(FDN) and the Revolutionary Democratic
Alliance (ARDE), as well as a splinter group
known as M3.
An M3 leader, Sebastian Gonzalez Men-
diola, was indicted in Costa Rica for cocaine
trafficking a year ago. No other contra lead-
ers have been charged.
A new national intelligence estimate, a
secret Central Intelligence Agency-pre-
pared analysis on narcotics trafficking. al-
leges that one of ARDE's top commanders
royal to ARDE leader Eden Pastora used
cocaine profits this year to buy a $250,000
arms shipment and a helicopter, according
to a U.S. government official in Washington.
Bosco Matamoros, the FDN spokesman
hare, and Levy Sanchez, a Miami-based
spokesman for Pastora. denied that their
groups participated in drug smuggling.
[Matamoros said the charges were a
"dirty and repulsive insinuation against our
movement that impugns our integrity and
our morality.")
Cornelius J. Dougherty, spokesman for
the Drug Enforcement Administration, said
the DEA is aware that drug traffickers use
airstrips in northern Costa Rica to transship
cocaine, but has not examined the political
affiliations of those involved. Dougherty
said the DEA focuses its Latin American
enforcement efforts on the cocaine-produc-
ing nations of South America, rather than
on countries, such as Costa Rica, that are
used in shipping the drugs to the United
States.
Earlier this year, President Reagan ac-
cused the leftist government of Nicaragua
of "exporting drugs to poison our youth"
after a Nicaraguan government employe,
Federico Vaughan, was indicted by a federal
grand jury in Miami.
But Dougherty said DEA investigators
are not sure whether Sandinista leaders
were involved.
Rep. Samuel Gejdenson (D-Conn.), a
member of the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee, called on the administration last
week to investigate the allegations "with
the same vigor that they would devote to
charges of left-wing drug trafficking.
"After all, the victims of narcotics smug-
gling are not able to differentiate between
left-wing and right-wing cocaine," he said.
State Department deputy spokesman
Charles E. Redman said the United States
"actively opposes drug trafficking" and that
the DEA is not conducting any investigation
of the charges.
' "We are not aware of any evidence to
support those charges," Redman added,
The U.S.-backed rebels, fighting to over-
throw the Nicaraguan government, cperate
from base camps in Honduras to Nicara-
gua's north and from Costa Rica, to its
south.
Contra leaders claim a combined force of
20,000 men, although some U.S. officials
say the actual number is much lower. The
Costa Rica-based rebel groups are smaller
and more poorly financed than those in
Honduras.
' Associated Press reporters inte.,viewed
officials from the DEA, the Custon is Ser-
00100140001-3
vice, Federal Bureau of Investigation and
Costa Rica's Public Security Ministry, as
well as rebels and Americans who work
with them. The sources, inside government
and out, spoke on condition that they not be
identified by name.
Five American rebel supporters said they
were willing to talk about the drug smug-
gling because they feared the trafficking
would discredit the war effort.
The five?including four who trained
rebels in Costa Rican base camps?said
they discovered the contra smuggling in-
volvement early this year, after Cuban
LL
... The victims of
narcotics smuggling are
not able to differentiate
between left-wing and
right-wing cocaine."
?Rep. Samuel Geidenson
Americans were recruited to help the Hon-
duran-based FDN open a Costa Rican front.
These American rebel backers said two
Cuban Americans used armed rebel troops
to guard cocaine at clandestine airfields in
northern Costa Rica.
They identified the Cuban Americans as
members of the 2506 Brigade, an anti-Cas-
tro group that participated in the 1961 Bay
of Pigs attack on Cuba. Several also said
they supplied information about the smug-
gling to U.S., investigators.
One American rebel backer with close
ties to the Cuban-American smugglers said
that in one ongoing operation the cocaine is
unloaded from planes at rebel airstrips and
taken to au i Atlantic Coast port where it is
concealed on shrimp boats that are later
unloaded in the Miami area.
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ART IAP'
ON PAGE WASHINGTON TIMES
2 October 1985
Space weapons development opposed,
not research, Moscow negotiator says
?
00140001-3
STAT
FROM COMBINED DISPATCHES
GENEVA, Switzerland Chief Soviet
arms negotiator Viktor Karpov yesterday
said Moscow had never opposed basic
scientific research but was sticking to its
demand for a ban on development and
testing of space weapons in return for
reductions in the superpowers' nuclear
weapons arsenals.
Mn Karpov, speaking to reporters
before resuming presentation of new
Soviet proposals at the 7-month-old
superpower arms talks, said the Soviet
proposals are reasonable and are aimed
at making a success of the Nov. 19-20
summit in Geneva between President
Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhael Gor-
bachev.
But he also said the proposed deal
links, any limitation of existing long-
range and medium-range nuclear weap-
ons to a scrapping of the U.S. Strategic
Defense Initiative, or SDI, and a ban on
space weapons, including testing and
development.
Mr. Reagan has repeatedly said SDI,
commonly known as "star wars," is not
negotiable and last week repeated that
his $26 billion program would be contin-
ued to develop a defensive shield that can
shoot down missiles in space.
The Soviets have proposed a 50
percent cut in the approximately 11,500
"nuclear charges" or warheads in their
arsenal.
The U.S. arsenal contains 10,645 total
warheads. But only 2,130 of those are on
the more accurate land-based missiles
compared to 8,500 Soviet highly accurate
ICBM warheads.
A recent National Intelligence Esti-
mate, however, indicates the number may'
be difficult to verify, -thereby making.
warhead constraints difficult to negoti-
ate.
The still-secret National Intelligence_
Estimate indicates that the main Soviet
ICBM, the SS-18, may be deployed with
12 warheads instead of the 10 permitted
under SALT H, according to U.S. govern-
ment sources familiar with the estimate.
Last June, a Soviet negotiator in
Geneva told U.S. negotiators the Soviet,
SSN-20 Typhoon ballistic missile has.
been deployed with 10 warheads instead
of [lie nine orlgfnaiiy estrmnea
American intelligence analysts, the
Source saig.
"As a result, constraintsbn Soviet war-
heads will be .impossible to verify or
negotiate," the defense expert said in
commenting on the latest Soviet pro-
posal.
Mr. Karpov said the Soviets were not
opposed to "basic research, basic sci-
ence." But he added that, "We are against
any research that leads to the creation of?
space strike weapons."
"Every sane man shouldn't want .the-
'star wars' project," he said. "It leads to
more instability. It leads to an increasing
danger of war ... despite all words tattle._
contrary"
The Soviet proposals ? said by offi-
cials in Washington to call for cuts of up
to 50 percent in nuclear arsenals if SDI
is abandoned? were outlined by Foreign
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in his
meeting with President Reagan last Fri-
day at the White House and presented to
U.S. arms negotiators in plenary sessions
Monday and Tuesday in Geneva.
The New York Times yesterday quoted
American officials as saying the Soviet
proposal called on the United States to
reduce its long-range and medium-range
nuclear weapons by 50 percent, while
offering a reduction that would cover
only Soviet long-range weapons.
The chief U.S. arms negotiator, Max M.
Kampelman, on Monday said the Soviet
proposals were "interesting" and would
be "studied with care," but he made no
comment after yesterday's meeting. Mr.
Kampelman was expected to return to
Washington today.
Asked if the Soviet Union was taking
such a tough stand on SDI that it could
block any arms agreement, Mr. KaPpov
replied, "We are taking a reasonable
--Stand. We are trying to do everything we
can that the meeting between Mr. Reagan
and Mr. Gorbachev is successful, but of
course if takes two to do a tango."
"Our proposal is as balanced as I stay
on my feet. It covers all three areas of our
discussions and is well-balanced. It is bal-
anced as far as the whole complex of
problems is concerned:'
The Geneva negotiations, which began _
March 12, deal with space and defense,
strategic nuclear weapons, and medium-.
range systems.
Bill Gert contributed to this report in
Washington.
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WASdINGTON TIMES
7 August 1985
Soviets fill craters, dig new
STAT
0100140001-3
to fool U.S. on missile accuracy
By Bill Gertz'
THE VIREANNICfrON TIMES
The Soviet Union is trying to
deceive the 17mted States abouf the
accuracy of one of its nuclear nus-
sites by fllUing in impact craters
from test warheads, and by digging
false craters to be photogra_phe-d by
tr.s. spy satellites, sa_ys a U.S. govern-
ment defense expert.
Recent photographs obtained by
satellite reconnaissance taken in the
early morning showed Soviet troops
concealing test craters from incom-
ing SS-19 warheads launched the
night before at Soviet missile test
sites on the Kamchatka peninsula,
the expert said.
The photographs also show mili-
tary personnel digging false craters
in a wider radius, the expert said.
The SS-19 carries up to six mul-
tiple, independently targeted war-
heads ? called MIRVs ? on three
known nuclear ' warhead modes.
With a force of 360 missiles, it is the
most widely deployed Soviet first-
strike ICBM.
Revelations about the accuracy of
the SS-19 appear to be part of a dis-
pute within the 13. intelligence
community over estimates ot the
S-19's accuracy.
The controversy seems to involve
different views of analysts from the
CIA and the Defense Intelligence
Agency andthe outcome could sway
administration detense policy on
strategic modernization programs,
the defense expert said.
The Soviet deception is one of sev-
eral reasons why Pentagon analysts
dissented from a U.S. intelligence
community assessment of the
decreasing accuracy ot the SS-19
- and which was reported to pose less
of a first-strike nuclear threat to US.
strategic forces, the expert said.
Press reports citing the 1985
National Intelligence Estimate of
Soviet strategic weapons trends said
the CIA revised its estimate ot the
warheadssfr Eima'-cNtige" new
judgment, reflected in the still-
secret estimate, retroactively down-
grades the CINs previous analyses
of the first-strike SS-19 since it was
first -tested in wrs.
Miss& warhead accuracy is
measured through a process called
circular error probable ? the radius
of a circle within which at least 50
percent of a missile's warheads fall.
The SS-19's accuracy reportedly
fell from a CEP radius of 330 feet to
440 feet, according to a report ear-
lier this month in the National Aar-
.nal. The loss in targeting ability
would seriously affect U.S. assess-
ments of the missile's ability to
knock out "hardened" missile silos.
Public support for a very expen-
sive military buildup over the last
five years has been based in part on
the idea that the United States is now
more vulnerable to Soviet attack
because of major increases in Soviet
missile capabilities during the
1970s.
Defense experts believe the
revised estimate of SS-19 accuracy
could undercut the Reagan adminis-
tration's strategic modernization
program.
If Soviet missiles are deemed less
accurate, critics of the administra-
tion's defense buildup in Congress
could succeed in cutting the U.S.
strategic modernization program.
The, new estimate could
strengthen support for the admin-
istration's plan to place new missiles
in older, more vulnerable silos. The
administration has been battling
Congress over the deployment of the
MX "Peacekeeper" missile.
Critics have charged that placing
the larger MX in existing silos would
Leave the only U.S. ICBM capable of
deterring a Soviet first strike vul-
nerable to such an attack.
Congress cut MX funding to SO
missiles, half the number requested
by the administration.
A New York Times report on the
SS-19 published July 19r states that
the DIA disagreed with the revised
accuracy estimate ot the CIA and
other -U.S. intelligence community
components. The dissent is re_part-
edry outlined in a footnote to theNIE.
DIA-believes the SP.9's accuracy
has improved since the first
uncoded electronic intercepts of
flight data were made between April
1973 and March 1974.
? Since 1974, only a small portion of
the data has not been encoded, and
therefore its characteristics ? such
as accuracy and weight have been
more difficult to determine.
"As a missile gets older, it gets
better not worse through modi-
fications," the expert said.
Another reason for the dispute on
SS-19 accuracy, the expert said, is
that the latest NIE indicates that the
largest-sized Soviet ICBM, the
' SS-18, is expected to be deployed
with more warheads than it has been
tested with. lb date, 10 warheads
have been detected on tests of the
SS-18.
"When it upgraded the estimate of
SS-18 warheads, the CIA felt it had
to downgrade the SS-19 in order to
be partially consistent with its old
bias of underestimating Soviet stra-
tegic forces;' the defense expert
The latest intelligence estimate
reportedly states that future mod-
ernizations of the SS-18 will put 12
-warheads on each missile, accord-
into the defense elpert.
The controversy over Soviet mis-
sile accuracy dates to 1976 when two
competing teams ot intelligence
-analysts offerect divergent opinions
of the evolving accuracy of Soviet
missile warheads.
The so-called "A-Team, B-Team"
study revealed that Soviet missile
accuracy was increasing faster than
anticipated by previous CIA analy-
ses. As a result, a " windorulner-
ability" to Soviet attack would exist
in the early 1980s before the United
States could modernize its forces.
"The CIA is trying to revert to its
originarertimate of Soviet missile
accuracy trends," the expert said.
The agency was charged by a
team of analysts from outside the
CIA with underestimating Soviet
missile accuracy developments.
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency expert Matthew Murphy
would not comment on the details of
SS-19 accuracy, but he said missile
accuracy is determined by "national
technical means;' the government
euphemism for intelligence gath-
ered by satellite reconnaissance and
eiectronicTistening posts.
An ACDA statement in response
to reports of SS-19 accuracy warned
against drawing "erroneous" con-
clusions about Soviet strategic cap-
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ARTICLE AMR% August 1985
ON PAGE 14
CIA Sees Soviet Strategic Buildup,
But Critics Slam Report's Release
by Michael Ganley
The Soviet Union is on the brink of
a massive expansion of its
strategic nuclear offensive and de-
fensive forces, according to a new in-
telligence estimate by the Central In-
telligence Agency.
In rare public testimony, intelligence
officials told Senate Members at a joint
hearing of the Armed Services Strategic
and Theater Nuclear Forces Subcommittee
and the Defense Appropriations Subcom-
mittee June 26th that the USSR's arsenal of
strategic nuclear warheads could grow to
12.000 by 1990 from an estimated 9,000
warheads today. Without continued arms
control restraints, the officials estimated,
the number of deployed Soviet warheads
could rise to between 16,000 and 21,000 by
the mid-1990s.
Some conservative Republican Sena-
tors, apparently frustrated by the Con-
gressional slowdown of the Reagan
Administration's military buildup, urged
the White House to release the CIA report
and let CIA officials testify in open session
about it. The report is based on conclusions
? of a secret new National Intelligence Esti-
mate on Soviet military forces prepared by
the CIA.
Some Senate Democrats, however,
complained that Republicans were playing
"partisan" politics with the intelligence as-
sessment and damaging the CIA's credibil-
ity on Capitol Hill.
The CIA assessment and testimony came
only two weeks after President Reagan an-
nounced June 10th that the US will con-
tinue to comply with SALT II despite in-
tense pressure from conservatives in Con-
gress to renounce the accord.
The Soviets could deploy more than the
Thousands ol Warheads
Growth in Number of Deployed Warheads
on Soviet Strategic Intercontinental
Attack Forces by 1994
Ballistic Missiles SLBMs ICBMs Bombers
21
18
15
12
6
3
1985
SALT II
Possible
Soviet
US
Numerical
Expansion
START
START
Restreints
Beyond
Proposal
Proposal
Until Mid-1990
Arms Control
1990
Source: Soviet Strategic Force Developments; CIA paper presented in testi-
mony before the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommitee, June 26, 1985,
STA
137R000100140001-3
predicted 3,000 new nuclear warheads in
the next few years, according to informa-
tion provided AFJ by one Republican Sena-
tor's office.
Those documents show a potential
Soviet warhead increase in the next six to
seven years of between 2,956 and 5,072,
even under current SALT I and SALT
restraints. The US. by contrast, must dis-
mantle nearly four times as many warheads
as the Soviets between now and 1991 in
order to stay within the treaties' limits.
Some of. the new Soviet missiles are de-
signed to carry More warheads than older
ones they replace. The numbers of laun-
chers would still remain within the SALT I
and SALT II accords, however. Because
the US is deploying hundreds of single-
warhead, air-launched cruise missiles.
which are counted as launchers under the
SALT accords, its Trident modernization
program would raise the total number of
launchers above treaty limits unless older
Poseidon subs and Minuteman missiles are
retired.
About 7,600 US warheads, over two-
thirds of which are based on nuclear sub-
marines, are currently deployed- Only
modest future increases in the number of
US nuclear warheads are planned. depend-
ing upon how many M-X missiles are ap-
proved by Congress. (The Senate voted to
cap deployment at 50 M-X missiles, while
the House voted on June 18th for only 40
missiles. the difference to be resolved in a
House-Senate conference that began July
I 1th . )
Republican Pressure
The Republican who pushed hardest to
get portions of the new intelligence report
released was Sen. James A. McClure (R-
ID). On June 6th, Mc-
CI ure . along with
Senators Jesse Helms
(R-NC) and Steven D.
Symms (R-ID), wrote
President Reagan ask-
ing him to release as
much of the informa-
tion in the new Na-
tional Intelligence Es-
timate as possible.
They told the Presi-
dent that because the new report?NIE
11-3-8-85?predicts "a dangerously wor-
sening state of Soviet military suprem-
acy. . . . We consider a full public under-
standing of the evolving military imbalance
between the US and the Soviet Union to be
essential. . ."
Shortly after receiving the letter, the
White House ordered release of a declassi-
fied version of the intelligence report's
conclusions, according to Hill sources.?
McClure
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A provAst, For Release 2006rWitiegl5590-01137
8 July 985
vie.7
How the U.S. Assesses Soviet Wea
RC.135 aircraft based in Alaska record telemetry
? the FM signals given off by transmitters Rus-
sian scientists attach to monitor their missile's
vital parts.
By RILL KELLER
WASHINGTON?The Government periodically
Issues reports reciting specifications of Soviet
weapons with the itemized precision of a hard-
ware catalogue. They are sources of fascination
for Soviet-watchers, and they underpin auhorita-
live studies such as the weighty reappraisal Of
the superpower balance released last week by a'
Library of Congress expert, John M. Collins.
But occasionally there is a reminder that what
we think we know about Soviet weapons, we can
rarely claim to know for sure.
.
The most recent example is the revisionist i&
telligence assessment of a missile caliedthe SS-
la. a six-warhead mainstay of the Soviet missile
force. Since the late 1970's, the SS-19 has beep
classed as a "stio-killer,'T accurate enough to
have NO likelihood of destroying American rnEr
site silos. Government sources jay that a new,
classified National Intelli Tatimate_a con-
_Menus of intelligence experts-711as oalicludeirtbe
missile is less accurate than previously thought,
by more than a third. The estimate nas led many
analysfs to CcescrUdeinat the onssite Is ha, Atter
all. it reliable silo-killer.
The Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency
vigorously dissented, defending the earlier ac-
curacy estimates. And in any case, downgrading
the 55-19 does not substantially diminish the
Soviet military threat ? the 3,090 independently
targetable warheads on the bigger SS-113 missiles
are still considered accurate enough to destroy
most American targets. Still, the putative ac-
curacy of the SS-19 has helped shape .the United
States image of the Soviet war machine, contrib-
uting to the notion of an American "window of
vulnerability," and influencing the 1979 arms
talks.
The Duplicity Factor
One problem with intelligence about Soviet
weaponry may be duplicity. The United States
has accused the Russians of camouflaging mis-
siles sites and encrypting the signals given off by
their test missiles, both violations of arms con-
trol treaties because they impede verification. In
1979, according to a former Central Intelligence
Agency analyst, American satellite photographs
of the Kamchatka firing range were said to have
caught the Russians digging holes and planting
dummy warheads to try to spoof American
eavesdroppers. Both sides practice various
forms of what's called "strategic deception."
More often, the Soviet-watchers' handicap is
the inherent complexity of their detective work.
The estimate of what a Soviet missile can do,
for example, is a distillation of hundreds' of
pieces of data, mostly technical. Reconnaissance
satellites take high-resolution photographs of the
launch site. perhaps providing information on the
size and configuration of the missile. Radars in
the Aleutians and elsewhere plot the missile's
trajectory in test flight. High-orbit satellites and
000100140001-3
These crucial intercepts may tell
eavesdroppers how many warheads were tested,
or how steady and reliable the missile is in flight.
Ships in the region may help plot where the war-
heads land.
Once the raw data are gathered
Jalencies begin debating what makeft
.he course of a missile lobbed into the Pacific
may be known with some precision, but it is a
matter of educated guesswork what point in the
ocean the Russians were aiming for. The agents
may have collected dozens of clear signals from
the missile in flight, but which frequency was
transmitting the fuel flow, and which the steadi-
ness of the gyroscope? "The data besets fairly
common," said Jeffrey T. RicheLsan, author of a
neu book an United States intelligence "What
? can change from agency to agency, and even
from person to person, is the analysis."
One reason is the analysts make different as-
sumptions. A missile was tested vrith 10 war-
heads and 2 decoys. Will the missile be deployed
with 10 warheads. ot 1.2? John Prados, author of a
book on estimates of Soviet weaponry, argues
that eves with the great leaps in the sophistica-
tion of intelligence-gathering equipment. faulty
assumptions about Soviet intentions have often
produced misleading intelligence that propelled
American policy. For example, exaggerated
American estimates of Soviet antimissile de-
fenses in the 1960's spurred the development of
multiple-warhead missiles.
One source familiar with the new disagree-
ment over the accuracy of the SS-19 said the
earlier estimates had been based on assumptions
about how rapidly the missile would improve.
The Central Intelligence Agency, this source
said, judged from recent telemetry readings that
the missile had not improved as much as expect.
'ed. The Pentagon insisted that the new readings,
taken through a fog of Soviet encryption, were too
fragmentary to be given much weight.
Although the agencies deny it, many Intelli-
gence experts say that the bureaucratic impera-
tive puts its own spin on weaponry estimates.
Conservative aelligence buffs contend the
C.I.A. Ueda to put a benign slant on its estimates
in order to encourage arms control; the agency is
an 2t_pjnyes_to_tinns_aggatiatians_and
v rificatlon. Liberals say the Defense Intelli-
gence ency and the military service intelli-
gence operations tend to justify the military
budget by portraying the Russians in the most
sinister light.
"Sure, estimates have political input," said
one Government intelligence evaluator. "But for
the most part, the intelligence community is ob-
jective. The problem is simply that we can only
know things so well,"
COVDPITTrm,
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? 21 -July 1985
Soviet missile lesser threa
than 1st thought, CIA says
By Richard Gross
United Presa Iniernatmal
WASHINGTON ? Reassessing the
Soviet SS-19 intercontinental missile,
the CIA has concluded that the nu-
clear-armed weapon is not as accu-
rate and poses leas of a threat to the
'U.S. missile force than first believed,
administration sources said.
The U.S. intelligence community
had characterized the missile as hav-
ing the capability of destroying U.S.
Minuteman missiles in their silos.
But the Pentagon's Defense Intelli-
gence Agency disagrees with the re-
vised CIA evaluation, contained in a
secret report called the National In-
telligence Estimate.
"We believe the CIA view is com-
pletely wrong," a Pentagon official
said Friday of the assessment, speak-
ing on the condition he not be identi-
fied.
"We believe the CIA analysis is
based on incorrect assumptions.
They've made a mistake. We are con-
vinced the CIA is wrong and will be
proven wrong over time."
The Pentagon estimates that the
Soviet Union has deployed 360 of the
six-warhead SS-19s. U.S. officials used
the 55-19 and the bigger 55-18, which
carries 10 warheads each, to support
arguments for building the 10-war-
head MX to give the United States an
appropriate nuclear counterpunch.
The CIA re-evaluation of the 55-19's
capabilities was reported by Michael
Gordon in Friday's Issue of the week-
ly National Journal magazine. Ad-
ministration sources confirmed the
account.
The article quoted a Pentagon offi-
cial as saying the revised CIA esti-
mate had reduced the projected ac-
curacy of the 55-19 by "better than a
third." extending the radius of the
missile warhead's circular error of
probability from 1,000 feet to 1,300
feet. The circular error of probabili-
ty, known as CEP, is the radius of a
circle in which a warhead has a SO
percent chance of falling.
A Pentagon official said the re-
vised CIA estimate "did reduce" the
estimated accuracy of the SS-19 war-
head, but he declined to go into de-
tail.
U.S. officials suggested that the re-
assessment was valueless because
there is widespread agreement in the
intelligence community that the 55-
18 can knock out all 1,000 Minute-
man.
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NAL JOURNAL
20 July 1985
CIA Downgrades Estimate or soviet L.SS-19
25X1
. . . Saying Missile Too Inaccurate for First Strike
By Mideael R. Gordon
Key U.S. intelligence officials have
revised their estimate of the capabili-
ties of the Soviet Union's SS-I9 mis-
sile and no longer believe the intercon-
tinental ballistic missile has the
accuracy to threaten U.S. missile silos
in a first strike, government officials
said.
The new assessment is reflected in
the latest National Intelligence Esti-
mate (NIE) prepared by the National
Intelligence Council, a panel k intelli-
gence experts chaired by a deputy
director of the Ceitral Intelligence
;Agency- But there is not unanimity on
the S5-I9's capabilities, according to
a Pentagon official.
"The CIA has revised its estimate
of the SS-19's accuracy: the DIA has
not." the official said, referring to the
Pentagon's Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA). While the CIA's view
is reflected in the main text of the
NIE, a footnote states the DIA's dis-
senting view, the official added.
The SS-I9 figured prominently in
public debate during the Carter Ad-
ministration. In 1977, intelligence pro-
jections showed the missile's accu-
racy?as well as that of the SS-I 8?
was improving at a quicker rate than
earlier forecast. "Analysis of intelli-
gence data on new versions of the SS-
18 and SS-I9 missiles indicates that
by the early 1980s, a substantial
threat to our Minuteman will exist,"
said the Defense Department's fiscal
1980 report to Congress.
The view that the SS-I9 was a "silo
killer" encouraged the notion that the
"window of vulnerability"?the time
when U.S. land-based missiles would
be vulnerable to Soviet attack?had
opened earlier than expected.
In addition, those assessments of
the SS-I 9 influenced the U.S. negoti-
ating approach in the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT). In light of
intelligence estimates. the Carter Ad-
ministration in 1977 was amenable to
a Soviet suggestion that the treaty set
an over-all limit on multiple-warhead
land-based missiles, including the SS..
19. Previously. the Carter Administra-
tion had pushed to limit the multiple-
warhead SS-I8. the largest of the
Soviet land-based missiles, according
to Walter B. Slocombe, a Carter Ad-
ministration Defense official.
At present, the Soviets have 308
SS-I8 missiles, each of which can
carry up to 10 warheads under the
terms of the SALT II treaty, for a
total of 3,080 warheads. There are 360
SS-19 missiles, each carrying 6 war-
heads. for a total of 2.160 warheads.
The view that the SS-I9 is a silo
killer is still expressed in Pentagon
publications. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
fiscal 1986 military posture assess-
ment states that "today, the most ac-
curate versions of the SS-18 and SS-
19 missiles are capable of destroying
most time-urgent and hardened tar-
gets in an initial attack on the United
States."
The new CIA reassessment, how-
ever. casts doubt on this view. "It is no
longer a silo killer." said a State De-
partment official familiar with the re-
assessment.
A Pentagon official said that "what
the CIA basically says is that given
the large increase in CEP it now asso-
ciates with the the 55-1 9, the individ-
ual probability of' kill is low.7- "CEP"
is a technical measure of missile accu-
racy that stands for "circle error prob-
able" and refers to the radius of a
circle within which 50 per cent of a
missile's warheads can be expected to
fall. The London-based International
Institute for Strategic Studies esti-
mates that the CEP of the latest
models of the 55-18 and the SS-19 is
300 meters.
In its reassessment, the CIA has
increased its estimate of the SS-19's
CEP by "better than a third" and now
puts it in the range of 400 meters, the
official said. That would mean that
the SS-I 9 would not provide a high-
confidence capability against a U.S.
missile silo even if two SS-l9 war-
heads from two separate missiles were
aimed at the same U.S. missile silo.
"Even two gives you low confidence
of killing a silo." the Pentagon official
said. "You could use three or four and
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fig p _ 19 July 1985
U.S. Study Finds a Soviet ICBM
Is Less of a Threat to Missile Si!
WASHINGTON, July 18 ? Umteo
States intelligence officials, in a re-
vised assessment of a Soviet missile
known as the 55-19, now believe that it
is too inaccurate to pose a threat to
American missile silos, Administra-
tion sources said today.
The new appraisal, which differs
from assessments by the Pentagon, is
contained in a secret report, the Na-
tional Intelligence Estimate, which is
prepared once a year by the Central In-
telfigetice Agency and represents the
cressensus of United States intelligence
experts.
Administration sources said that the
Pentagon's Defense Intelligence
Agency dissented in a footnote to the
document and steed by earlier esti-
mates of the missile's accuracy.
The purported capacity of the 55-19,
an intercontinental ballistic missile, to
destroy United States missile silos has
been an important political factor in
American arms control considerations
and in the campaign to build an Amer-
ican counterpart, the MX.
Officials said the military signifi-
cance of the revised estimate of SS-19
capabilities was minimal because an-
other Soviet ICBM, the SS-18, is be-
lieved accurate enough to threaten
missile silos.
The revised estimate of the 55-19 was
first reported by Michael R. Gordon in
an article to be published Friday in the
weekly magazine National Journal.
The information was confirmed today
by Administration sources.
Some Officials Draw a lesson
Present and former Government of-
ficials said one lesson to be drawn from
the new estimate is that intelligence re-
ports used as the basis for major deci-
sions often seem fragile and uncertain.
The intelligence agencies generally
rely on the same data ? in this case,
observations of Soviet missile tests ?
but differ in interpretation.
A former national security official,
referring to the revised estimate, said,
"It shakes my confidence in our ability
to know what the Soviets are doing."
The Pentagon estimates that the
Soviet Union has deployed 388 SS-19
missiles with six warheads each, a
total of 2,180 warheads. The 308 55-18
missiles have 10 warheads each, a total
of 3,080.
In 1977, the Central Intelligence
Agency said the accuracy of the two
missiles was improving faster than ex-
pected, posing the danger that by the
early 1980's or sooner, they would be
. .
By BILL HELLER-
SpoclaJ op The Now York Timm
able to wipe out- the 1,000 American
Minuteman missile silos in a pre-emp-
tive strike. ?
That estimate was central to the
view that the United States faced a
"window of vulnerability."
It also influenced President Carter's.
approach to the arms control talks, of-
ficials said. The American negotiators
had initially focused attention on the
SS-18, and sought to negotiate a treaty
limiting the size and destructive power
of missiles. But after the C.I.A. esti-
mate of 1977, the Carter Administra-
tion accepted an overall limit on num-
bars of multiple-warhead missiles and,
because of Soviet resistance, set aside
efforts to limit destructive power.
The 1977 estimate has continued to be
Influential. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
told Congress in February in a report
on the American, military posture:
"Today, the most accurate versions
of the ? SS-18 and SS-19 missiles are
capable of destroying most time-ur-
gent and hardened targets in an initial
attack on the United States."
Defense Secretary Caspar W. Wein-
berger has frequently cited the ac-
curacy of the two missiles in the same
breath when arguing for the MX. A
major justification for the MX has been
the need to match the silo-killing abil-
ity of the two Soviet missiles.
Administration officials said the new
estimate of the SS-19 was open to inter-
pretation, but one official said the best
00140001-3
estimate of the missile's abilities was
significantly lower than earlier esti-
mates.
The National Journal article quotes a
Pentagon official as saying that the
new estimate bad reduced the pro-
jected accuracy of the SS-19 by "better
than a third.'
The technical measure of missile ac-
curacy is called circular error prob-
ability, which is the radius of a circle
within which a warhead has a 50 per-
cent probability of faffing, The, Na-
tional Journal said the revised esti-
mate had extended the radius from
LOW feet to 1,300 feet. Administration
officials said they would not dispute the
National Journal figures.
A Pentagon official familiar with the
report said that even if the estimate
was accurate, it would still leave the
Soviet Union with 3,000 more accurate
warheads on 55-18 missiles, or three
for every Minuteman silo.
One Administration arms control
specialist said the new estimate might
give the United States more time for
missile modernization and might be
used to defend the Administration's
plan to put the MX missiles in fixed
silos. Critics have said that the MX
would be a sitting duck in fixed silos be-
cause of the accuracy of the Soviet mis-
siles.
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\LLcTREET .5nURNAL
16 July 19S3
REVIEW & OUTLOOK
Winnable Nuclear War
Caspar Weinberger has until No-
vember to assess Soviet treaty viola-
tions and suggest a response to the
president. Yet from public reports of
a 1985 National Intelligence Estimate.
11-3-885. the impact should be known:
a. ?f:langerously worsening state," sen-
ators briefed on the report say, of
''Soviet military supremacy.'
The response must be a defense to
shield U.S. forces, and someday cit-
ies, from nuclear attack. For years,
policy makers have held to the belief
that things like NIE estimates, and
terms like "supremacy," are moot.
After all, we and the Soviets have so
many weapons; some of them will
survive an attack; the attacker gets
blown up in a "second strike"; so he
never attacks. No need to fret about
missile accuracy, ABM technology or
Soviet treaty violations: Whatever the
numbers are, we have a stable stale-
mate of Mutual Assured Destruction.
The NIE assessment, representing
the collective wisdom of the Central
Intelligence Agency and all three
services, raises questions about that
thinking. It describes a furious Soviet
warhead expansion. from 6,000 in 1978
to perhaps 12,000 today and 20.000 by
1990 !see table). It notes a vast re-
search effort to locate subs at sea,
mount defenses against U.S. cruise
missiles and "stealth- bombers, and
extend the range of Soviet weapons,
possibly lasers. to vital U.S. commu-
nications satellites.
Offensive Weapon Production (1984)
Weapon Soviets U.S. NATO
1. ICBM
2. SLBM
3. SLCM
4. IRNF
5. SRBM
200
200
1350
150
350
80
665
70
0
_ . Key: 1. Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile, 2. Sub-Launched Ballistic
Missile, 3. Sub-Launched Cruise Mis-
sile, 4. Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces, 5. Short-Range Ballistic Mis-
sile.
Yes, there is such a thing as "su-
premacy." Assured Destruction
ceases to be Mutual if one side can
find the other's deterrent forces, wipe
most of them out and ward off any
surviving retaliatory missiles with its
own defenses.
Perhaps the most serious threat
concerns relatively obscure develop-
ments in submarine warfare. Many
MAD strategists assume submarines
are inherently invulnerable to attack.
Indeed, 11-3485 suggests that both the
Soviets and the U.S. need a break-
through in order to locate strategic
Subs at sea. Yet, as intelligence offi-
cials warned in testimony on 11-3-885
before a House-Senate hearing, "We
are concerned about the energetic So-
*iet research and technology efforts"
aimed at precisely this problem.
The Soviets have tested a "syn-
thetic aperture radar" that may soon
render visible the internal ocean
waves that submarines disrupt. They
used an SAR to track their own subs
from Salyut 7. In 1978, a U.S. SAR
mapped the ocean bottom at depths of
500 feet. In all. a dozen more exotic
detection schemes have been sug-
gested, from using blue-green lasers
in order to follow changes in plankton
behind a submarine to spotting ther-
mal, chemical or magnetic "scars" a
sub leaves.
Cruise missiles enjoy a similar pa-
tina of invincibility. Yet the Soviets
have already practiced intercepting
U.S.-type cruise missiles with look-
down, shoot-down radars on the Ful-
crum and Foxbat supersonic intercep-
tors. Given their sluggish battle-man-
agement computers. the Soviets could
not knock down every last U.S. cruise
missile should America launch a first
strike. But after a Soviet first strike,
the Soviet network of 2.500 planes and
13,000 surface-to-air missiles wouldn't
face all U.S. forces?just the fraction
that survives an attack. There would
be ample time for Soviet civil defense
to prepare for a counterattack by
slow-moving cruise missiles and
bombers. As NIE briefers said. "The
Soviets will be able to provide an in-
creasingly capable air defense for
Many key leadership, control, and
military" installations.
Of course, the U.S. will soon deploy
missiles and bombers with stealth
technology, which uses coatings and
electronics to " spoof radars. Yet
0100140001-3
stealth is one-directional: It cannot
yet evade multiple sensors. The U.S.
has tested detection of stealth systems
By bouncing radars off the ionosphere.
Stealth might also be countered by a
"passive infrared" sensor in space;
the U.S. is already building prototypes
of such a sensor.
This does not mean cruise missiles
or subs are inherently vulnerable.
Thermal or electronic sensors will be
countered by technologies to disguise
those signals. In turn, more sophisti-
cated sensors will learn to overcome
these muting techniques or to read
still other signals. And on and on.
Yet in this race, the U.S. carries
one severe handicap. To comply with
the 1972 ABM treaty, U.S. leaders are
holding back on the deployment of de-
fensive technology. The Soviets, de-
spite treaty constraints, have begun
mass production of a nationwide
ABM-X-3 system, according to 11-3-
885. As the U.S. adheres to MAD, try-
ing to match the Soviets offense-for-of-
fense, it will likely fall further behind.
Aside from obvious short-term limits
,on weapons-production capacity, there
may be political limits to how long a
democracy can compete in such a de-
moralizing race.
Thus, the U.S. needs not a few hun-
dred more warheads but a dramatic
increase in the security 01 8.000 exist-
ing warheads. The answer: Defend
those forces. Mr. Reagan already pro-
poses a shield to render nuclear
weapons obsolete. Early layers, based
on the ground, could be started now.
This would be a step away from MAD
and toward a multilayer shield for cit-
ies. It may be the only way to meet
the threat to deterrence itself.
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In7-1: 7 :727:73
WASHINGTON POST
27 June 1935
Soviets Would Add Arms
Without Treaty, Hill Told
Testimony Counters SALT'S Critice
By Michael Weisskopf
Washington Post Staff Writer
A top intelligence officer told a
Senate hearing yesterday that the
Soviet Union would increase the
number of warheads on its nuclear
missiles if unconstrained by the un-
ratified SALT II treaty, with the
United States.
The testimony of Lawrence K.
Gershwin, national intelligence of-
ficer for strategic programs at the
National Intelligence Council, con-
flicts with the views of SALT II
critics in the Reagan administration
who express doubts that the Soviet
Union would increase its nuclear
warheads even if the treaty lapsed
because Moscow already enjoys a
large strategic edge over the Unit-
ed States.
Asked by Sen. Dan Quayle (R-
Ind,) if there would be a "significant
difference" in the number of war-
heads deployed by Moscow in the
absence of SALT II. Gershwin re-
plied, "There would be some differ-
ence'and that's clear."
He cited the case of the SSX25
mobile, single-warhead missile now
being prepared for deployment in
the Soviet Union. Moscow, he said,
has "certain potential" to arm the
missile with multiple warheads if
not for limits imposed by SALT II.
President Reagan announced
June 10 that the United States
would continue to comply fully with
the treaty, siding with advisers who
argued that abandoning SALT II
would benefit Moscow more than
Washington. Each superpower has
The public
appearance of
intelligence officers
became an issue at
the hearing.
said it will avoid undercutting the
SALT II treaty as long as the other
does the same.
Gershwin and Robert M. Gates,
deputy intelligence director for the
Central Intelligence Agency, tes-
tified before a joint session of two
Senate defense subcommittees
called to review an unusual report
on Soviet strategic developments
prepared by the two officials.
The report, which concluded that
the Soviet Union is poised for a ma-
STAT
000100140001-3
jor expansion of offensive nuclear g
weapons and defensive systems, -
was derived from the usually clas-
sified National Intelligence Esti. ?
mate.
Parts of the estimate were de-
classified for public release yester-
day at the request of the White
House. Republican senators, frus-
trated over cuts in the administra-
tion's defense budget, had urged
Reagan to release intelligence find-
ings to document the extent of the
Soviet threat, according to Senate
sources.
The_public appearance of intel-
ligence officers who normally tes-
tify in closed sessions became an
issue at yesterday's hearing, with
Democratic senators calling the
move politically motivated and Re-
publicans defending it as a way of
keeping the public informed.
Sen. Gary Hart (D-Colo.) criti-
cized the administration for wthak-
ing partisan and ideological what is
central to the national security."
Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.) said
the hearing "seems to have more of
a political than intelligence pur-
pose" and asked Gates if his
appear-
ance did not "compromise theA
credibility."
Gates, saying he would not "ad-
dress motives of the White House,"
replied that professional intelli-
gence officers "face somewhat of a
dilemma."
"We're fully aware of the dangers
of a public presentation to the
tegrity and objectivity of our as..
sessments," he said. "We also rec-
ognize the value of making available
on a broad basis a commonly agreed
set of facts for discussion of Soviet
strategic force development."
STAT
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ARTICLE AFP
ON PAGE 26 June 1985
7R000100140001-3
STAT
Soviet Reported to Build Up Nuclear Arsenal
By BILL KELLER
spoud rt? rim York Times
WASHINGTON, June 25 ? The
Soviet Union is in the midst of nuclear
We510135boom that could dou-
ble its arsenal of nuclear warheads by
the mid-10's if treaty restrictions are
removed. to new forecasts
bi Government int gence agencies.
The report. to be nresented to a ,$en-
ate hetrine Wednesday by anoints for
-LLus sa
that -a 7137M - .)
strides" in developing missiles that
can travel by rail or roacEwith nearlYa
fourth of its warheads
expected to de-
the mid-1990's.
The report also predicts that Soviet
military =ending will grow by four
jamentage points more than the infla-
tion inflation rate over the next several
years. more than double the intelli-
gence agencies' estimates of Soviet
spending in recent veers-
A Pentagon official familiar with the
report cautioned that the internal:pm
agency forecaes "are projections. end
when you get 5 and 10 years off, they
can befaith shaky. There's probably a
lot oatly_auglaIng_d_rnjainforma-
tion_, in those estimates."
The intelligence report. based on the ?
classified National Intelligence Esti-
matu,nnrr_cgmaienjua distilled
from data compiled by all of the Gov-
eplinent's intelligence services. is te
be presented to an unusual public hear-
ing of two Senate panels Wednesday
morning.
--A-a7ance copies of the declassified
version were sent to lawmakers and
key aides today.
A Pentagon official said the decision
to report on the intelligence estimate in
a_p_iAlingjes&apprnmecuu_ihe.
White House and was designed toUs-
tr popular rthrlilerinnidellt'S
embattled military budget.
Another Defense Department official
added that the "bleaker picture" of the
;Soviet military buildup would help win
public and allied sump:1ft if President
Reagan decides to respond in kind to
what he says are Soviet arms control
treaty violations.
Report on U.S. Responses
The President agreed this month to
abide by limits on the unratified 1979
treaty limiting strategic arms, but has
asked the Pentagon for a mid-Novem-
ber report on possible American steps
If reported Soviet transgressions con-
tinue.
Conservatives in Congress have long
lobbied for =republic reporting of in-
telligence data, saying this would
counter attempts to cut the military
budget.
The new report, lb a statement that
goes beyond previous estimates. says,
"By the mid-1990k nearly all of the
Soviets' currently deployed interconti-
nental nuclear attack forces ? land
and Sea-based ballistic mingles arid I
heavy bombers ? will be replaced by
new and Improved systems."
The report added a number of detail*,
to the picture of Rtissian power con-
Mined in the Pentagon's annual publi-
cation, Soviet Militaty Power, released
in April. -
For example, the intelligence report
forecasts that?the Soviet Union will be
able to increase its arsenal of nuclear
warheads from the present 9,000 to
12,062 by 1990.
Possible Soviet Buildup
If arms-control limits contained in
the 1979 treaty are eliminated, the esti-
mate said, they could expand to be-
tween 15,000 and 21.000 deployed war-
heads in the mid-1990's.
The intelligence report said the
"most notable" trend is Soviet enipha-
sis on mobile missiles, which "repre-
sents a major resource decision" be-
cause such systems are costly to oper-
ate and maintain.
The new report says the Soviet Union
last year embarked on an accelerated
program for constructing new ham
for its SS-20 intermediate range mis-
siles, and that some of those bases were
being converted to house new SS-25
missiles, a single-warhead missile
capable of reaching the United States.
The Soviet Union is preparing to de-
ploy the SS-25 this year, and the 10-war-
head SS-24 next year, the report noted.
The SS-24, as has been reported before,
Is to be put in silos at first and then
based on railroad can.
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AnTINT r?Entlil
WASHINGTON TIMES
25 June 1985
0100140001-3
Soviets plans surpass limits called
for in missile treaty
By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
The Central Intelligence Agency
is expected to release its annual esti-
mate of Soviet weapons growth
tomorrow in what the Reagan
administration regards as the most
dismal projection to date of a U.S.-
Soviet military imbalance, accord-
ing to an administration defense
expert.
The estimate says the Soviet
Union is likely to deploy a nation-
wide mobile anti-ballistic missile
defense system in 1986, according to
the official.
The ABM modernization is
described as the "rapid deployment
of the ABM-3 mobile ABM system
on a nationwide basis in 1986," the
administration official said.
The Soviet Union has cited the
terms of the 1972 ABM treaty in a
propaganda offensive against Pres-
ident Reagan's Strategic Defense?,
Initiative. If SDI research moves to -r
the deployment stage, Moscow
claims the system would violate the
ABM treaty.
"The Soviets will have a nation-
wide ABM system operational by
1987, when the Moscow ABM-3 is
completed and the Pechora-class
[ABM1 radars are completed;' the
administration official said. Three
thousand mobile ABM interceptors
will be operational by 1987, the offi-
cial said.
Based on the new intelligence
estimate, the official concluded that
Soviet plans to exceed the ABM
treaty limits are "already visible."
A declassified version of the
National Intelligence Estimate,
numbered 11-3-8-85, is to be made
public tomorrow at a joint Senate
hearing of the Defense Appropri-
ations Subcommittee and the Armed
Services Committee.
The new study outlines the cur-
rent U.S. view of trends in Soviet
weapons developments, primarily
dealing with strategic missile and
launcher programs, the official said.
A product of the combined U.S. intel-
ligence community, it is produced
annually in order to provide the
president with an assessment of
Soviet military deployment and
development trends.
Besides the CIA, other intelli-
gence agencies contributing to the
estimate are the National Recon-
naissance Office, which handles sat-
ellite photographs. the National
Security Agency. the Defense Intel-
ligence Agency and several other
organizations.
Other key forecasts on strategic
weapons prograins include:
? By 1990, the Soviets will have
deployed 700 new SS-24 and SS-25
ICBMs, all with "rapid reload and
refire capability"
? The Soviets have begun mass
producing the new Delta IV ballistic
missile submarines capable of car-
rying 10-warhead SS-NX-23 mis-
siles. Typhoon-class submarines are
also entering mass production with
four new subs under construction.
? A new "stretch Yankee-class"
submarine capable of launching
supersonic SSN-24 cruise missiles
will become operational this year
Modified versions of the SSN-18.
SSN-20 and SSNX-23 are also
expected to be flight tested this year.
? over the next decade, the Sovi-
ets are expected to greatly expand
their strategic air forces by produc-
ing up to 140 Bear H Th-95 bombers
capable of delivering long-range
cruise missiles. Forty Bear bombers
have already been detected as oper-
ational.
? Production rates for the Back-
fire bomber will continue at 30 per
year through the 1990s.
?A production facility for the
Blackjack bomber is "almost com-
plete," and U.S. intelligence expects
production will begin sometime
before the end of this year.
? A new generation of short-range
and intermediate-range nuclear
missiles is undergoing flight tests at
a Soviet test range.
? In the next five years, "over
3,000" cruise missiles will be
deployed.
The new assessment projects that
Soviet spending on weapons will
increase by 4 percent to 6 percent
throughout the 1990s, according to
an administration official familiar
with the estimate.
By contrast, the Congress is ?
pressing the administration to
freeze Pentagon defense spending at
current levels.
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STAT
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DEFENSE WEEK
24 June 1985
What You'll Hear On The reat
BY PETER SAMUEL
The Reagan administration this week will make
public much of its latest estimate of Soviet strategic
developments as presented in classified form in a new
national intelligence estimate. Director of Central
Intelligence William Casey and national intelligence
officer Gary Gershwin are to deliver some of the key
judgments on Wednesday morning at a joint hearing
of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the
Senate Appropriations subcommittee.
Defense Week reported some of the findings of the
new intelligence estimate (June 17, 1985), and more
detail has now been made available by an informed
source.
The CIA reports that the Soviets are presently
deploying 100 SS-24 ICBMs and 200 SS-25s. The
SS-24 is a 10-warhead rail-mobile system; otherwise it
resembles the MX. The SS-25 is similar in size to the
Minuteman Ill, carrying three warheads, but is
mounted on a wheeled vehicle for mobility.
The CIA estimates that some 150 SS-17 missiles
will be replaced by silo-based SS-24s and that 200 rail
mobile SS-24s will be deployed by the end of the
decade. The projection is for 800 SS-25s by 1990.
Both systems will have rapid multiple reload and
refire capability. There is heavy camouflage and
concealment of SS-24 and SS-25 deployments.
The estimate reports "new evidence" that the
SS-24 has more throw-weight than the SS-19 and is
therefore a very heavy missile.
Flight testing is about to begin of the giant
SS-X-26 and the large SS-X-27, regarded as follow-
ons to the SS-18 and the SS-19 missiles respectively.
In addition, an improved version of the liquid fuelled
SS-18, the Soviet's largest missile, is being reported.
Modifications to the test versions of the SS-24 and
SS-25 haveteen sighted.
In the submarine branch of the Soviet triad, a new
Delta IV boat is reported carrying the long-range
SS-N-23 which is said to be in mass production now.
In addition to the two Delta IV craft launched, four
more are under construction.
Four lYphoon submarines are under construction.
One stretched Yankee class submarine converted for
cruise missiles is expected to be operational later this
year, carrying the supersonic and long-range SSC-N-
24 cruise missiles. Modification to the current
generation of submarine launched ballistic missiles,
the SS-N-18, SS-N-20 and SS-N-23 will begin flight
tests late this year.
Forty Bear H TU-95 bombers carrying the long
range AS-15 air launched cruise missile are produced,
and another 100 are expected over the course of this
year and next. Older Bears are being equipped with
the AS-4 air-to-ground missile.
The inventory of Backfire bombers is put at 260
and production is expected to continue at the present
rate of slightly over 30 annually into the 1990s.
The B-IB equivalent Blackjack bomber plant is nearly
complete and production is expected to begin later
this year, at the same rate as the Backfire, about 30 a
year.
Over 3,000 long-range cruise missiles for air,
ground, and sea launch are expected to be deployed
by 1990.
Three thousand is also the number projected for
mobile ABM missiles to be deployed before the end
of the decade as part of a nationwide ground based
ballistic missile defense. This will include the ABM-3
system and SA-10s and SA-12s (which are primarily
air defense missiles but could have some ABM
capability, especially against slower moving SLBMs
and Pershing us.) The Moscow ABM system will be
modernized and the network of Pechora class large
phased array radars are estimated to be complete by
1987. The SH-4 and SH-8 missiles associated with the
ABM system are reported to be in mass production,
so elements of an ABM breakout are, in this account,
reported "already visible."
Soviet defense spending is projected to increase
between four and six percent annually in real terms
based on evidence of production rates, factory
expansion, test range expansion and deployments
under way.
STAT
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ARTICLE APPEARED 17 June 1985
WAGE ir
Big Soviet Buildup Foreseen
U.S. intelligence is now predict-
ing a large rise in Soviet nuclear
warhead numbers?over a thousand
this year and possibly 8,000 more
by the end of the decade. These
numbers reportedly are contained
in the CIA series called National
Intelligence Estimate, the latest
issue of which is coded NIE-11-3-
885.
One usually reliable source says
the intelligence assessment?on
which President Reagan was
briefed recently?shows "the world
balance of power will have greatly
shifted by the 1990s."
In the past six months, the
United States has detected a num-
ber of new nuclear systems being
deployed by the Soviets. The Rus-
sians have also accelerated con-
struction of anti-ballistic missile
systems.
The report, for the first time,
alludes to a possible Soviet "break-
out" from the anti-ballistic missile
(ABM) treaty through the fielding
of a nationwide ABM system to
intercept U.S. missiles. This could
occur by 1990, the NIE reports.
The report comes during the
same week that President Reagan
unexpectedly decided to continue to
abide by the SALT 11 Treaty limits
beyond its scheduled expiration at
the end of this year. Reagan's
decision will require the United
States to withdraw a Poseidon
nuclear-missile-bearing submarine
within six months of the sea trials
of the Trident sub,. USS Alaska.
Those tests, off the Connecticut
coast, are scheduled for this fall.
As compared with the last offi-
cial U.S. estimates of 9,000, the
National Intelligence Estimate says
the Soviet Union will, by the year's
end, have 11,500 strategic missile
warheads. (The United States has
some 8,000 nuclear warheads, on
average each one-third of the
explosive power of the Soviet
warheads.)
In the. years 1986 to 1990 the
Soviet Union is projected by the
ME to add an additional 8,000
nuclear warheads to its arsenal of
11,500. (By contrast, the United
States plans at present only to
add modestly to its strategic
warhead numbers.)
BY PETER SAMUEL
Evidence of the big Soviet nu-
clear buildup through this year is in
the form of intelligence about the
deployment of the latest two Soviet
intercontinental nuclear systems,
the large SS-24 missile and the
smaller SS-25.
Twenty bases are being prepared
for the SS-25 missiles. At each
base, nine sheds with retractable
roofs are under construction, but
observation of the operations sug-
gests the plan is for 10 missiles to
be deployed at each base. The
Soviet plan for these road-mobile
missiles is for at least one missile
per base always to be in the field,
so the scheme is assessed as a total
of 200 missiles (20 bases of 10
missiles each). Though the SS-25s
have been tested as single warhead
missiles, one source says they are
actually capable of carrying three
warheads, and that the force being
deployed this year will therefore
add 600 nuclear warheads to the
Soviet arsenal.
The United States has com-
plained that the SS-25 tests with a
single warhead are deceptive be-
cause they use only a fraction of
the available "throw-weight" or
carrying capacity of the missile.
Under the SALT agreements, tests
with warheads are supposed to use
at least 50 percent of available
throw-weight.
Some SS-25s are classed in the
latest intelligence estimate as al-
ready deployed. An old SS-7 base
at Yurya, now used to base inter-
mediate range SS20s, has opera-
tional SS-25 missiles. One 55-25 in
its launching canister on its wheeled
launcher was photographed under
camouflage nets at Yurya recently,
according to the source. The other
operational SS-25 base is at Yash-
karola.
Also being deployed now by the
Soviets are 100 SS-24s, a large
10-warhead nuclear missile similar
in design to the long-delayed MX
missile. These SS-24s are being
deployed out of two bases in the An-
change! area, of northern European
Russia. Fifty SS-24s are being
deployed at the "test center"
00100140001-3
STA
of Plesetsk, alongside 200 single
warhead SS-16s. Another 50 SS-24s
are being deployed immediately at
Kostroma, where some have been
observed replacing SS-17s in exist-
ing silos. At Plesetsk, says U.S.
intelligence, there are signs that the
SS-24s are going to be deployed
immediately as rail-mobile missiles.
In this form they are carried in a
railroad freight train.
Another new development re-
ported is the addition of another 40
Tu-95 Bear H cruise missile carry-
ing bombers, which has increased
the number of Soviet strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles to 2,544.
President Reagan was, briefed on
these developments recently by the
CIA. The staff of the National
Security Council has said it sup-
ports congressional briefings on the
new intelligence. The Senate Armed
Services Committee and defense
appropriations subcommittee are
being urged by conservative sen-
ators to hold an unusual joint
hearing on the subject.
The White House has also hinted
that a declassified version of the
report will be made public shortly.
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r f
WASHINGTON TIMES
13 June 19?..5
STAT
00140001-3
New report credits Soviets with leap
in warhead count
By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
The White House is preparing to
release an unclassified version of a
national intelligence estimate, possi-
bly in a Senate hearing requested for
todav: which sh2ws a dramatic iumn
in Soviet ballistic missile warhead
levels, an administration defense'
expert said.
Yesterday, Sen. James McClure,
R-Idaho, requested an "urgent" joint
hearing with the Senate Armed Ser-
vices and Appropriations subcom-
mittee on defense to make public the
key findings of the study.
? Tfie national intelligence estimate
was the subject of a letter from Sens.
McClure, Jesse Helms, R-N.C., and
John East, R-N.C. to President Rea-
gan last week. The senators charged .
._
that information in the estimate
shows "the evolving [U.S.-Soviet]
military imbalance."
Sen. McClure, in a letter to Appro-
priations defense subcommittee
Chairman Ted Stevens, R-Alaska,
said the White House National Secu-
rity Council informed him that some
findings of the estimate are ready to
be released and asked him to request
the hearing. The letter was also sent
to Armed Services Committee
Chairman Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz.
A National Security Council
spokesman could not be reached for
comment.
"This year's National Intelligence
Estimate confirms Soviet military
supremacy" Sen. McClure wrote in.
the letter.
A spokesman for Sen.- Stevens said
the request had been received and
aides were attempting to schedule a,
hearing for today.
According to the administration
expert who spoke on the condition he
remain anonymous, one finding of
the new report shows that warhead
levels for Soviet ballistic missiles
now total 11,500 warheads.
The new figure represents an
increase in some 2,000 missile war-
heads from figures published two
months ago in the Pentagon's annual
assessment of Soviet missile war-
heads. The figures do not include
warheads? delivered on strategic
bombers. ?
Soviet deployments of the new
SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs account for
the increase, the official said. The
; new estimate, he said, indicates that
. the Soviet Union has begun deploy-
ment of approximately 200 mobile
SS-25 ICBMs and 100 large SS-24
missiles configured on railroad
track launchers.
Besides the new ICBMs, the
increase in missile warheads is also
attributed to an additional number
of warheads on the SS-18 ICBM, the
largest missile in the Soviet arsenal.
Each SS-18 was thought to carry 10
warheads, but is now estimated to
hold 14.
The Soviet deployments contrast
sharply with the U.S. missile mod-
ernization program. The original
proposal to deploy 200 MX missiles,
a counterpart to the SS-24, has been
cut to 50 by Congress. The only
mobile U.S. missile is the single war-
head Midgetman mobile ICBM,
which is being researched.
Previous reports on the ? intelli-
gence estimate said up to 20 bases
for the 5S-25s were sighted bv U.S.
intelligence. Each base contains
nine garage-like buildings with slid-
ing roofs.
The bases are expected to eventu-
ally hold 10 missiles each, with one
ICBM constantly moving and the
rest in buildings, the official said.
The new estimate indicates that
18 mobile SS-25s currently are
deployed and operational, the offi-
cial said.
The new estimate will also dis-
close that the Soviets have
completed testing of the SS-24 and
have moved the missile into its
deployment phase, the official said.
Intelligence experts, for the first
time, have sighted an operational
SS-24 under heavy camouflage on a
rail launcher at the Strategic Rocket
Forces complex at. Kostroma, he
said.
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ON PAGE
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10 June 1985
Soviets Said
To Hurry
Missiles
Reagan Expected
To Report Today on
Their Deployments
By Walter Pincus
washingion Pat Staff-Writer
U.S. intelligence agencies have
concluded that the Soviet Union is
moving faster than expected.to de-
y1 op ante: c mis-
s& *terns, according to informed
sources.
?Tie conclusions of a "National
Intelligence Estimate," which inti-
mates that Moscow may be poised
to begin an ambitious round of new
nussile_lieDloymeuis?wilLneinclud-
ed in President Reagan's report to
Congress today on future U.S. ad-
herence to the unratified SALT II
treaty, the sources said.
As reported earlier, the presi-
dent is expected to announce today
that the United States will continue
to adhere generally to the limita-
tions of SALT II but will make "pro-
portional responses" to what it de-
termines to be Soviet violations of
the pact.
Given the new intelligence esti-
mate, some sources say Reagan
may link continued U.S. adherence
to the SALT II limits after the trea-
ty expires at year's end to some
sign of Soviet restraint in these new
missile programs and to steps end-
ing what the United States consid-
ers Soviet violations of SALT IL
The new intelligence estimate
reportedly concludes that the
growth in quality and quantity of
Soviet intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles appears to be faster than an-
ticipated and that two additional
large missiles may be flight tested
within the next year.
One of the larger ICBMs is
looked upon as an updated version
of the 5818, but the other may be a
new type prohibited by SALT II.
The United States has observed
only testing of solid-fuel engines for
this second rocket, so little is
known of its eventual configuration.
A new solid-fuel Soviet ICBM would
violate SALT II.
IR any case, new ICBM produc-
coulil put the Soviet Union over
the SALT II limits relatively quickly
unless it takes steps to eliminate
large numbers of old silo-based
ICBMs and scrap older submarines,
as it has done in the past. In a letter
to Reagan last week, Republican
Sens. James A. McClure (Idaho),
Jesse Helms (N.C.) and John P. East
(N.C.) identified the National Intel-
ligence Estimate as NIE-1I-3-8-85
and said it indicated "a dangerously
worsening state of Soviet military
supremacy." The three legislators
called on the president to give it
"the widest possible distribution in
Congress. "
The Soviets increased the num-
ber of their ICBM warheads from
approximately 5,500 in 1979 to
about 9,200 as of last year, growth
that was permitted by SALT H.
They could add another 2,000 war-
'heads and still remain within treaty
provisions, according to a study by
the Federation of American Scien-
tists, a group that supports keeping
the SALT II limits.
The president has already
charged that Moscow violated the
SALT II agreement by producing
more than one permitted new mis-
sile and by hiding information on its
ICBM tests.
Reagan is expected to announce
the first "proportional response"
today?what will be done this fall
when a new Trident submarine car-
rying 24 strategic missiles goes on
sea trials, taking the United States
14 missiles over a SALT H limit.
Sources said .an older U.S. Po-
seidon submarine, the USS Sam
Rayburn, with 16 missiles, will be
removed from active service as a
launcher of ballistic missiles. But
the process of destroying the sub.
R000100140001-3
as required by the treaty, will not
begin.
Instead, the United States will
take advantage of the six months'
leeway tha: is allowed on destruc-
tion of missiles to determine what
the Soviets do in the Geneva arms
uegotiationF, and what they do with
their missile systems.
The announcement today is ex-
pected to settle, if only for the time
being, a basic disagreement be-
tween Secretary of State George P.
Shultz and Defense Secretary Cas-
par W. Weinberger.
Shultz initially proposed contin-
ued adherence to the treaty and a
supplemental defense spending re-
quest to Congress to show resolve
in the face of the Soviet violations.
Weinberger proposed that the
president announce that the United
States would let the treaty expire,
but would not make any immediate
change in the size of the U.S. stra-
tegic forces or the pace of their
modernization.
In the end, sources said, national
security affairs adviser Robert C.
McFarlane adapted an "adherence- .
with-exceptions" approach first sug-
gested by Paul H. Nitze, the pres-
ident's special adviser on arms con-
trol, and Kenneth L. Adelman, di-
rector of the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency.
Supporters of the Shultz position
pointed out yesterday that the de-
cision does not put the United
States in violation of the treaty for
the time being and, in effect, con-
tinues the policy of observing the
unratified treaty. it also allows time
for the Soviets to respond before a
next step is taken.
Weinberger aides said they were
disappointed that the views of the
NATO allies and Congress played
more of a part in the president's
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AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY
18 March 1985
CIA, Defense Intelligence Diverge
On Soviet Arms Spending Growth
ify Brendan M. Greeley, Jr.
wasbington?Central Intelligence Agency
estimates of a 1-2% Soviet rate of defense
spending growth for 1983 differ from the
5-8% estimated by the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency but do not indicate any
split between the two agencies, according
to Robert Gates, chairman of the Nation-
al Intelligence Council and deputy three-
tor for intelligence at the CIA.
The CIA figures became available with
the publication of a censored version of
testimony given by Gates before a closed
session of the subcommittee on interna-
tional trade, finance and security econom-
ics of the Joint Economic Committee of
Congress. The CIA believes that it is too
early to estimate 1984 growth, while the
DIA believes growth continued at the
same 5-8%.
Gates said that estimates of Soviet de-
fense spending are subject to great uncer-
tainties because analysts look at Soviet
defense hardware and force levels and fig-
ure the cost as equivalent to what it would
cost the U. S. to field a similar establish-
ment.
Because prices are determined by differ-
ent factors in the West than in the Soviet
Union, the comparisons are at best indica-
tions of relative, rather than absolute,
spending levels.
Both agencies agree that there was little
real growth from 1975 through 1982, al-
though Soviet defense spending remained
at a very high absolute level. "It is time
for Washington TO take official notice that
Soviet military procurement has been stag-
nant for the past seven years and to stop
acting like nothing has happened," Sen.
William Proxmire (D_-Wis.) said. "It is
true that military procurement has leveled
off at a rather high level, and the Soviets
have been able to add large numbers of
weapons to their inventory despite the
slowdown."
USSR Inventory
During the period referred to by Prox-
mire, 1977-83. the CIA lists the following
purchases by the Soviets:
? 1,100 intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles.
? 700 submarine-launched ballistic mis-
siles_
? 300 bombers, including Tu-22M/Tu-
26 Backfires.
? 5.000 fighters, including MiG-23/27
Floggers.
? 15,500 tanks, including T-72s.
? Substantial numbers of naval surface
combatants and submarines.
Gates pointed out that even though the
rate of increase slowed or stagnated dur-
ing the period, the Soviets were already at
such a high spending level that they were
able to . modernize and improve their
forces substantially.
"The best measure of Soviet military
capabilities for use by U. S. decision-mak-
ers is what the Soviets actually have
bought, are deploying and are develop-
ing?rather than an artificial reconstruc-
tion of what it cost them," Gates said. He
added that cost comparisons have value
only when used as analytical tools by ex-
perts who understand their very signifi-
cant limitations.
. Fighter Production
Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger
made the same point last year when he
said the Soviets were producing about 840
fighters a year while the U. S. was produc-
ina 350 (Aw&sT Feb. 13, 1984, p. 11).
Summarizing CIA testimony over the
years, Gates stated that Soviet economic
growth, which military growth closely
matches, was quite strong during the
1960s and the first half of the 1970s.
The mid-1970s marked a turning point
when the economy becan TO decelerate
and eventually fell below 2% growth
from 1979-81. Since then, it has rebound-
ed.
The Soviet gross national product is
very sensitive to fluctuations in agricultur-
al production, and the slump .in GNP in
the late 1970s is tied closely to poor i
bar-
vests n those years. Farm output rose by
63% in 1983, reaching an all-time high,
d 1984 should reflect similar gains.
Industrial production grew by 3.4% in
,1983, and a similar rate seems likely in
1984. The most significant improvement
,13as been in the production of raw match-
is and intermediate products. Poor per-
formance here in the late 1970s created
? bottlenecks, which affected the entire
eLonomy as requirements outpaced sup-
plies. In some cases, notably steel, imports
[
have been used to take up the slack.
Chemical output gains also contributed to
it g rowth.
0100140001-3
rFuel Concern
pThe energy situation in the Soviet
: Union remains a problem. Coal produc-
tion continues to fall and oil production
r shows scant growth. Gas production is
t' up, though, and electric power is becom-
ing more plentiful.
The CIA attributes the severity of the
late 1970s slump to a transportation sys-
!'jtem unable to meet demands placed on it
;7- in a country whose size requires an effi-
cient network.
A poor showing by the railroads during
this period is partly to blame, and im-
F-provements in this sector have helped the
L: industrial recovery.
The amount of gas transported by pipe-
line continues to rise at double-digit rates,
but traffic on highways and rivers has
declined.
The CIA estimates the iare of the So-
viet GNP allotted to defense spending at
13-14%, almost double that in the U. S.
This 13-14% share has remained relative-
ly constant since 1965 because defense
growth has matched economic growth.
Some key industries devote disproportion-
ately large amounts of their total output
to defense. For example, more than 25%
of all . machinery production goes to de-
fense as well as 20% of all metallurgy
production.
As examples of intangibles that increase
the burden of defense on the economy, the
military has priority access to:
? Highest quality raw materials for de-
fense.
? Transportation and distribution of
raw materials.
? Best industrial workers for the de-
fense industry. '
? National pool of research talent.
? Most advanced machinery.
As examples of intangibles that help the
economy, the CIA cites possible use of
troops and equipment in construction and
in helping with the harvest.
CIA estimates of the defense burden do
not consider the following:
? Subsidized weapon sales.
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APTINIMPKAM USA TODAY
? 3 A 12 March, 1985
Veil of secrecy to
to pierce
By Richard Whitmire
and John Hanchette
USA TODAY
While the world waited Mon-
day for confirmation of Kon-
stantin Chernenko's death, So-
viet television led off its morn-
ing programs with a feature on
baking pumpernickel bread.
It was the usual frustration
with Soviet secrecy for Krem-
linologists ? those who gather
information on the Soviet
Union ? and many intelli-
gence experts say the veil is
more impenetrable than ever.
One reason, say critics of
U.S. intelligence: We're relying
too much on computers. The
CIA and DIA ? the Defense In-
telligence Agency ? have "loSt
the sense of the classic analyst
with the green eyeshades and
soup on his tie," said Paul
Smith _ chief editor of the U.S.
Information Agency's Prob-
lems of Communism.
Another possible reason:
"The time of governmental re-
searchers is almost completely
consumed with short-term de-
mands from Congress and vari-
ous administrative offices,"
says Oberlin College President
S. Frederick Starr.
The U.S. intelligence effort
also depends on hundreds of
university academics, ex-gov-
ernment researchers and pro-
fessional "think tankers" who
pore over obscure bits of infor-
mation for clues to Soviet life.
For the CIA and DIA, satel-
lites "can flag every new fac-
tory building, every new road,"
said Harry Rositzke, who from
1946 to 1970 worked for the
CIA.
"The old signals like who's
standing on the Kremlin Wall
are still valid," said Jerry
Hough of the Brookings Institu-
tion. "But there are lots of
newer ones you have to pay at-
tention to ? who gets TV play,
which commentators are on
the most, which economists
are published ? shadows on
the cave wall."
STAT
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__ApproVed For Re!eat 2005/0111pAS q1)2CIRDM-0 1
20 January 11485
- By Joseph Lelyveld
OR FEE CENTRAL
Intelligence Agency
and its frequently
embattled leader,
William J. Casey,_
the start of the sec-
ond Reagan Admin-
istration is more
than. just the beltway mark in a mara-
thon: .Ronald Reagan is the first
President in 12 years to take the oath
of office for a second time, but it has
been 16 years since a head of the
American intelligence community
last managed to continue in office
from one -Presidential term to the
next_ On the previous occasion, in
1969, Richard M. Nixon reluctantly
gave in to an argument that be should
retain Richard M. Helms as Director
of Central Intelligence in order to
safeguard the nonpartisan character
of the office. There have been five di-
rectors since, and Casey ? whom no
one has ever called nonpartisan ?
has now survived longest of them all.
This can be regarded as a footnote,
a fluke, or an indication that the
? C.I.A. has essentially weathered the
investigations and stricture's of the
1970's, that it has recovered much of
its old effectiveness and mystique.
The present director, who would mina-
_
Joseph Lelyveld is a staff writer for
this magazine.
?
rally favor the latter interpretation,
has tried to function as if it were so,
casting himself _in the mold of Allen
W. Dulles and John A McCune, who
flourished in the 1950's and early 60's,
before serious questions had been
raised, on either moral? or pragmatic
grounds, about covert- action gti a
global scale. Like them, rather than
like his immediate predecessors, he
has been recognized in Washington
and beyond for having ready access
to the President. Like them, he has
not hesitated to make his voice heard
at the White House on policy matters
as distinct from intelligence evalua-
tions. (Indeed, he might even be said
to have surpassed them in this re-
spect, for, serving a _President who
values the Cabinet as a forum, he has
managed to become the first Director
of Central Intelligence ever to sit at
the table as a participating Cabinet
member.) And like Dulles in particu-
lar ? fondly known to his subordi-
_ nates as "the great white case offi-
cer" because of his consuming pas-
sion for espionage and related gimes
? Mr. Casey is believed to have im-
mersed himself deeply in the day-to-
day management of clandestine
operations.
Yet for an assortment of reasons ?
some personal, others having to do
with changing times and changed ex-
pectations of a director ? no one
would suggest that official Washing-
ton has learned to view William Casey
?
hi
Sc
tx
?Fm
1
137R000100140001-3
STAT
--
reliving his youth.
-Conservative members, who can be
nearly as harsh, tend to portray him
as the opposite of an activist director:
that. is, as a captive of a Langley bu-
reaucracy whose major objective, it
is alleged, is to shield itself from con-
troversy. The two images overlap, in
that neither takes him very seriously
as an effective Director of Central In-
telligence or an influence on policy,
either broadly on matters of national
security or narrowly on matters spe-
cific to the intelligence community
What is involved here is more rhAn
a clash of perceptions about Casey. It
is also a clash of perceptions about
what a Director of Central Intelli-
gence should be and, beyond that,
about how ready the United States
should be to intervene secretly ?
politically and, especially, militarily
? in the affairs of other countries. On
bath sides ? those who think this di-
rector is too active and those who
think he is not nearly active enough ?
there is a tendency to forget the fun-
damental insight that emerged from
the investigations of the 1970's: that
all directors, finally, are creatures of
the Presidents they 'serve. If Presi-
dents hear intelligence about the
world that conflicts with what they
would rather believe, they have the
option of setting it aside. But no direc-
tor can ignore the President's vials.
The different ways directors inter-
pret their jobs reflect differences
among the Presidents who picked
them. -
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II writ-4 r. tpc-,c7
riTkpproved For Release 2006/010'. agE1011-TOR1N1A3L7ROC
f-? . ? i J'anua 5
p,
1.1A
Letters to the Editor
Errors Espied
I am complimented that the Journal de-
voted a front-page article to me on Jan. 11;
however, it started out flat wrong with its
story that many years ago I tried to pur-
chase a house already promised to the Jap-
anese embassy and that the "brash Mr.
Casey didn't get the house." You got the
story upside down. Not only did I "get the
house" and live happily in it for seven
years, but the Japanese embassy had tried
to purchase the house that had been prom-
ised to me?not the other way around!
The article also claims that I sent one
particular estimate "back for revision nine
times." The record is that I saw and com-
mented on the last two drafts. What hap-
pened was that the analyst who drafted the,
estimate, based on his 20 years of experi-
ence in the region and months of research
and visits to the area, felt that deletions
made by another staff officer would alter
or suppress significant information and
? judgments at which the analyst had ar-
rived. My role was to restore some of the
deletions to ensure that, on a controversial
subject, the policymakers got the full
range of judgments prevailing in the
American Intelligence Community. The es-
timate was approved unanimously by the
heads of all the members of the Intelli-
gence Community. The production of this
estimate was reviewed by the House Intel-
ligence Committee, which concluded last
week in its annual report that: "dissenting
views were printed at the very beginning
of the study, a practice the Committee ap-
plauds."
While I cannot comment on your allega-
tions attributing certain covert activities to
me, your readers should know that any
such activity must be directed, authorized
and funded by those in the Executive
Branch responsible for our national secu-
rity and by the Congress as well.
WILLIAM J. CAsEy
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington
?
SIAI
0100140001-3
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TICLEAppALKoved For ReleasgARIMAO%tflA-RDP90-01137R000
Cr: PAGE__2& 6 October 1984
The Beating of trums,
tae i,inging of Bells
Washington.
ON Wednesday of this week, a Congres-
sional committee investigating the
bombing of the American Embassy in Bei-
nit professed its astonishment at the way in
which the responsible officials ignored re-
peated and credible warnings of the attack.
American fortifications in Lebanon had
By Lewis H. Lapham
been bombed on two prior occasions in the
last 19 months, and the probability of the
third attack was, in the words of the com-
mittee's report, "so unambiguous that there
is no iogica: explanation for the lack of ef-
fective security."
There is, of course, a logical explanation,
but it is non-partisan in character and not
one likely to attract either votes or ap-
plause.
As the committee well knows, the typical
informed citizen (like the typical congress-
man, newspaper columnist or military pro-
curement officer) really doesn't care much
for facts. If given a choice in the matter, he
prefers to believe in myths. Myths are, after
all, easier to understand and easier to
remember. They also eliminate the tire-
some chore of having to study something
other than one's self.
__Pre-sit-tilt Reagan, like most novelists
_ . ..?_ .
: and all actors, knows that stories move
from truth to facts, not the other way
,-
around, and that the tellers of tales seek to
convey not the details but the essence of a
thing. People like to believe what they're
told, to imagine the distant forces of history
speaking to them in a warm and human .
voice.
Mr. Reagan's delight in myths accounts
for his genial carelessness with respect to
numbers, dates, events and names. His in-
souciance enrages the officious people in'
the national media who berate Mr. Reagan
for the slovenliness of his memory. In the
phrasing of their editorial rebukes, they of-
ten sound like an exasperated mother tell-
ing her 13-year-old son to clean up his
room. They might as well be trying to teach
geometry to an elk.
Americans choose to see the world as ,
they wish to see it, not, as it is, and this bi-
partisan habit of mind (as characteristic of
00140001-3
Democrats as of Republicans) sets the
course of American foreign policy as well as
the terms of the national political debate.
By now it has become axiomatic that if a
coup d'etat takes place anywhere in the
world, the gentlemen at the Central Intelli-
gence Agency will be among the last to hear
the news, and the State Department will re-
spond with its customary expression of po-
lite surprise.
Certainly this was true in Iran, not only
with respect to the advent of the Ayat011ah
- Khomeini but also with regard to the sei-
zure of the American hostages. In the
course of the subsequent recriminations, it
was discovered that none of the embassy of-
ficials could speak Farsi. Six months before
Yuri Andropov died, the American Embas-
sy in Moscow lost track of his whereabouts
and, to the best of anyone's knowledge, no-
body in the American government ever
knows what the Israelis will do next.
A week ago, it was reported in Washing-
ton that the CIA had cashiered one of its
operatives because he persisted in sending
dispatches insultingly at odds with what his
superiors wished to believe about Mexico.
Precisely the same question ? about the
political- uses of intelligence data ? lies at
the root of the argument in the trial that
will begin next week in New York between
General William Westmoreland and CBS
News.
The indifference to facts shows up in so
many other American advertisements for
reality that it isn't fair to locate the genius
for myth in any one city or profession. The
book publishers in New York, like the
makers of television docudra_mas in Holly-
wood, routinely mix the elements of fact
and fiction in a compound substance malle-
able enough to fit the molds of whatever
images the public wishes to buy in large vol-
ume.
The ritual finding of facts belongs to the
category of religious spectacle. As the cam-
paigns increasingly come to resemble corn
or harvest festivals, so also the loud shout-, ?
ing of facts bears comparison to the beating
of drums and the ringing of bells. The old-
est and wisest members of Congress know
that if enough committees keep up an in-
cessant din for 40 days and 40 nights, ther.,
with the rising of the hunter's moon, a great.
spirit will descend and turn the facts into
myths.
Lewis H. Lapharn is the editor-of 13arp-
00W041183i0CIA-RDP9041137R0150100140001-3
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WASHINGTON PO5 I
ARTICLE kEDFEARED 5 Oct ober 1984
Oh FASE -
STAT
0100140001-3
EWERS TO THE EDITOR
Soviet Arms Spending
Ellen Goodman's column-on Sept.
25 ["Force Feeding," op-ed] is one of
several places where I have seen the
CIA's method of measuring Soviet de-
fense spending criticized_ According to
her, the CIA's method is to count up
Soviet military equipment ,and person-
nel and calculate how much it would
cost the United States to produce the
same amount of equipment and field
the same number of personnel. Obvi-
ously, this method does not actually
tell us how many rubles the Soviets
are spending on defense since, as
Ellen Goodman points out, the cost of
produting things in the Soviet Union
may differ from the cost of producing
them here. For this reason, she de-
scribes the CIA method as "fanciful,"
"bizarre" and "bogus."
If we do not know the actual Soviet
cost of producing a specific item, using
the U.S. cost of the item as an esti-
mate seems to me as good a method
as any other. Even when we do know
the Soviet cost, I think it is better to
use the U.S. cost. For example, she
notes that the CIA calculates the cost'
of a Soviet private at $573 a month
(the U.S. cost), even though the Sovi-
ets pay their privates only about $100
, per month. If the CIA were to. use the
actual Soviet cost, its calculations
would show that the United Stats
was "outspending" the Soviets on
military personnel even if the Soviets
had five men in uniform for every one
, of ours. Under the circumstances, to
use Soviet costs to measure their de-
fense efforts and U.S. costs to mea-
- sure our defense efforts would be dan-
gerously misleading.
WILLIAM W. CHIP
Washington
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Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-0113
7:7277.0 PORTLAND OREGONIAN
28 September 1984
/7tnalyst quit
In CIA dispute
6..orripiled from stall and wire reports
WASHINGTON ? The senior Lat-
in. America analyst at the Central In-
telligence Agency resigned in May af-
ter William J. Casey, director of the
CIA, insisted that he revise a report on
Mexico so it would support Reagan
administration policy, intelligence of-
ficials asserted Thursday.
7 The intelligence officials told the
New York- Times that-Casey -wanted
the report to portray the economic and
political problems of Mexico as a
threat to its internal stability, as well
as an indirect danger to the overall
security of Central America and the
United States. ? ?
. The officials said that when the
analyst, John R. Horton, refused to
revise the report on the ground that
intelligence data did not support such
an alarmist conclusion, Casey had the
rsport rewritten by another analyst. --
7R000100140001-3
STAT
-? A spokeswoman for the CIA, Ka- '
thY Pherson, said that Casey would
not comment on the Horton case and
that the agency could not discuss spe-
cific intelligence estimates because
they were classified. She confirmed
that Horton left the agency in May but
said he did so after his contract ex-
pired. Other intelligence officials said
Horton's contract would ordinarily
have been renewed but that he decided
to leave the agency.
"There is pressure from Casey on
slbjects that are politically sensitive to
jigger estimates to conform with poli-
cy," Horton said Thursday..
He
--- He declined to comment further
about his departure from the CIA, say-
ibg was preparing an article on Lis
views for publication next month.
Administration officials said that
?&sey wanted a tougher report from
rfprton:. in part to help persuade the
\liite House to approve a program of
covert and economic American pres-
sures on Mexico to induce its support
ferr.U.S. policies in Central America.
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PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (ME)
7 September 1984
7ealotry'calledCIAcrimp
By CLARK T. IRWIN JR.
Staff Writer
American policy in Central
America is being decided in an
atmosphere where White House
'zealotry" and 'very strong ide-
ological clamps" prevent full
discussion of options, a former
Central Intelligence Agency offi-
cer said Thursday in Portland.
- In his first interview since re-
signing as Latin American spe-
cialist on the National
Intelligence Council in May,
John R. Horton told the Press
Herald that "Where there's a
strong political feeling in the ad-
ministration, there's pressure to
skew intelligence estimates."
Horton was interviewed at the
home of his son, lawyer Mark
Horton, before a talk for the
World Affairs Council of Maine.
_ Despite his resignation,
Horton said tie has no policy
fight with the current adminis-
tration.
"I think our broad policy in
Central America is completely
correct," he said, describing that
policy as supporting a restora-
tion of democracy and civilian
government in El Salvador, re-
sisting rebels supported by Nic-
aragua and Cuba and "opposing
the attempt of the Sandinistas
(the Nicaraguan revolutionary
junta) to close their society up
completely."
His objection, he explained, is
to political pressures for intelli-
gence officers to massage their
"national intelligence estimates"
to f5Tlitiafli?
the "inferior quality of dis-
? culiicii-i"--res-uiting trorrithe
sqldiirTg -of-sompointe of
view.
-CIA Director William Casey
called Horton out of eight years
of retirement last year to help
prepare intelligence appraisals
of Latin American countries for
the National Intelligence Coun-
cir The council's members rep-
resent the CIA, the State
Department, the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency and the armed
forces.
As chairman of the team
doing Latin American estimates,
Horton gave Casey an estimate
on the political, economic, mili-
tary and diplomatic strength and
capabilities of a major Latin
American country important to
U.S. policy concerns.
But the CIA director "wanted
the estimate to come out a cer-
tain way" to strengthen the case
for administration policy.
Horton said, "and kept constant
pressure on me to redo it."
"I refused to do it, so he finally had the thing re-
written over my dead body, so to speak," at which
point Horten resigned.
That experience, he added, is not typical of the
estimating process, which he believes is producing
more and better readings than during the _Carter ad-
ministration.
The more general concern, he said, is that incom-
plete discussion of options for carrying out policy
could lead to decisions that will eventually harm the
country's intelligence services.
For example, he said, "It's no secret" that Cuba
and Nicaragua are supplying arms, communications
assistance and espionage data to the leftist rebels in
El Salvador.
.S._ce "Interdiction (military attempts to mit sup-
port)asn't worked and can't work," and since no
one is seriously proposing to remove the Sand iniita
regime in Nicaragua forcibly, Horton argued, it
might be prudent to discuss offering Nicaragua a
deal of reduced pressure if they stop supporting the
Salvadoran revolutionaries.
But Casey's final vote at National Foreign Intelli-
gence Board meetings ? this being a group which
reviews the National Intelligence Council's .esti-
mates ? and "constant crunching back and forth"
between the administration and "pragmatic people"
at the State Department tends to suppress such dis-
cussion, Horton said.
On the administration side, he said, there is a
group of 'very bright people" including U.N. Am-
bassador Jean Kirkpatrick, Casey and Undersecre-
tary of Defense Fred Ikle, 'who are either against
any type of compromise with the Sandinistas, or if
not against it, suspicious that State can't handle it.
"There's a real distrust of the State Department,"
Horton said, 'this feeling in the administration that
'State's soft.'"
Aside from the risk of the country's being given
flawed policy decisions because of unexamined op-
tions, Horton said, there's the "institutional risk"
that the CIA will be left holding the bag.
"At .some point," he continued, "Reagan and
? Casey are going to be in some other world or retired
from public life. If any cans get hung around any-
one's neck for Central America, it won't be Reagan's
or Casey's ? it's going to be the CIA's."
? That could lead to a repeat of the post-Watergate,
post-Vietnam backlash against the agency and again
impair the country's ability to supply its decision-
- makers with the best intelligence information and
analysis possible, Horton fears.
A registered Democrat, Horton also said, "I want
? to be fair about this thing.... It's not just this ad-
ministration."
When the Sedinistas seized power in NiceWA TINTL
r?
in 1979, he said, President Carter's National Securi-
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-011
37R000100140001-3
PRI- I CLE AVFLARED
Release 2006/01 to 9 -iF1l11l 37R000100
27 August 1984
Chemical Arms
In Terrorism
Feared by CIA
The gravest "clear and present
danger posed by chemical and bi-
ological weapons is not from ag-
gressor nations, which are re-
strained by fear of retaliation, but
from terrorists or lunatics who de-
cide to use these hideous weapons
for blackmail or to publicize their
causes.
A secret CIA "Special National
Intelligence Estimate," which had
the concurrence of eight other fed-
eral intelligence agencies, ex-
, presses concern that the use ofsoi-
son gas bx the Soviets and the
Iraqis who got the inz.edients
from West German companjesi
"could influence the attitudes of ter-
forists toward use of chemical and
biological weapons."
The report, which was reviewed
by my associate Dale Van Atta,
points out that chemical-biological
weapons are not yet popular among
terrorists?probably because
they're terrified of them. But it
warns that "one successful incident
involving such [lethal] agents would
significantly lower the threshold of
. restraint on their application by oth-
er_ terrorists.' "
In fact, these weapons have been
used in isolated cases by terrorists
and others. In 1978, for example, a
Palestinian group injected cyanide
into citrus fruit exported by Israel.
Huk guerrillas in the Philippines
poisoned pineapples destined for
export. In both cases, rapid and ef-
fective response to the discovery of
the poisoned fruit prevented fatal-
ities.
Similar incidents of 'consumer
terrorism" have been attributed to
individuals, like the person who in-
jected cyanide into pain-reliever
capsules, and the ex-convict in Aus-
tralia who threatened to infect
herds with hoof-and-mouth disease
last January.
The low cost of chemical-biolog-
ical weapons and their relatively
easy availability make them attrac-
tive to terrorists. Once they have
overcome their fear of the weapons
through training?by the Soviets,
for example?terrorists will see the
advantage of deadly agents that can
be smuggled into a target area vir-
tually immune from detection.
It costs hundreds of millions of
dollars to build a nuclear bomb,
whereas any reasonably intelligent
biology or chemistry student can
make a kilogram of deadly Type A
botulin toxin for $400, according to
Pentagon consultant Joseph Doug-
lass. He adds that with a forged re-
search permit a terrorist could get
,anthrax germs by mail for $35. One
supply house offers samples of five
toxins, including the probable lethal
40001-3
1/-k I
ingredient of "yellow rain," for less
than $100.
A group of experts told a United
Nations panel in 1969 that "for a
large-scale operation against a ci-
vilian population, casualties might
cost about $2,000 per square kilo-
meter with conventional weapons,
$800 with nuclear weapons, $600
with nerve-gas weapons and $1
with biological weaporit.: Inflation
may have changed the figures, but
not the deadly bargain ratio. "
The United States ,is wide open
to terrorists with chemical-biolog-
ical operations in mind. The only
federal agency that monitors the
sale of deadly pathogens is the Ag-
riculture Department. Universities
and other research laboratories are
poorly guarded, and the necessary
knowledge is easy to gather.
-Clandestine production of chem-
ical and biological weapons for a
multiple-casualty attack generally
raises no greater technical obsta-
cles than does the clandestine pro-
duction of chemical narcotics or
heroin," the CIA report concludes.
Among law enforcement agen-
cies, the Secret Service is partic-
ularly aware of the near-impossi-
bility of protection against chem-
ical-biological attacks. An expert
told the presidential bodyguards
that he could stroll through the
White House with a tour group and
leave behind an undetectable poison
that would kill all the building's in-
habitants by the next morning.
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ARTICLE AppEARgroved For Reims? M0glifaiLyAi-MAO-01137R00
ON PAGE 02_7 25 June 1984
Special Report
i. -? ???..,
Covert actions, such as mining of
Nicaraguan ports, make the headlines. But
developments elsewhere In America's secret
spy agency are even more far-reaching.
After a four-year program to beef up the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, the results can now be seen?a spy service
with new muscle and influence to match.
Flush with money and manpower, the CIA is back at
work worldwide, operating on a scale not seen since the
Vietnam War.
Even its mission has been expanded. On top of espionage,
intelligence analysis and covert operations, the agency has
joined the wars on terrorism, international drug traffickers
and Soviet theft of U.S. technological secrets.
One thing has not changed. CIA involvement in covert
operations still stirs passions and controversy. Congress is
threatening to bar funds to finance the "secret wax" against
the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.
The turnaround, pushed hard by President Reagan and
CIA Director William J. Casey, has elevated the spy unit
from a state of disrepute during the 1970s to a newfound
position of power and influence on foreign policy.
Central to the agency's changing fortunes is Casey,
whose close political and personal ties to Reagan give the
CIA the kind of White House access?and credibility?it
has not had for years. The despair that gripped the organi-
zation during what were called "the troubles" has lifted.
But some critics fear that the revitalized agency is be-
coming too influential arid that Casey has too much say in
the shaping of U.S. policy. Others warn that CIA Director C
covert actions will drag America into combat. cr_
Congress, while attempting to keep a tight
buildup of the organization even before Casey
rein on the CIA, actually began pushing the
took over and has strongly supported it since. g
This backing stems in part from a need for better. 8
intelligence about a growing Soviet military ca- I
pability. The CIA is also seen as providing Amer-
ica with a means of intervening in world crises
without sending in combat units.
Headquartered in the Washington .suburb of
Langley, Va., the supersecret agency, with up
to 18,000 staffers, has long been embroiled in
controversy. While most concern has focused on
covert activities, these are by no means the
most important part of a broader mission.
Clandestine Wars Return
Nowhere is Casey's influence more apparent
than in the revival of covert action?missions
Approved For Release 200
some of them filled
The effects of thi
being felt around th
? In Afghanistan,
support for Moslem
tion forces. Annual
the like?now is said
? In El Salvador,
political groups in th
Jesse Helms (R-N C)
in the victory of Jos?apoleon Duarte.
All told, says one official with access to inside informa-
tion, the agency is engaged in about half a dozen large-scale
covert operations overseas. The CIA may conduct as many
as 50 minor secret projects. That number, while far smaller
than in the CIA's peak years, nonetheless marks a signifi-
cant increase in covert action under Reagan.
Far and away the most eye-catching operation is in Nica- ?
ragua. Under Casey, officials report, some 73 million dollars
has been spent to build up anti-Sandinista contra forces to
12,000 rebels.
The CIA has coordinated airlifts, planned attacks and
built a sophisticated communications network for the larg-
est paramilitary action since the Vietnam War?activities
that have sparked charges that the agency's covert opera-
tions have gotten out of hand once again.
But Senator David Durenberger (R-Minn.), a member of
the Senate Intelligence Committee and a frequent critic of
the CIA, says: "The question is: Did Reagan leap in to start up
operations? And the answer is no. While the inclination to use
covert operations is stronger, there's still a great deal of care.."
Even within the staff at Langley, Casey's enthusiasm for
asey on Capitol Hill for hearings on secret operations.
Ar
Approved For Release 20W1/03 ? CIA-fDP90-01137R00
ARTICLE AFI'EA.-,31' YORK POS
ON PAGE 9- 1 9 March 1984
TS D
By-NILES-LATHEM
? ?Bureau
WASHINGTON -- The
..Soviet_ Ilnion has ne-arif
-doubled --the number of
missiles pointed at the
U.S. since -the SALT II
?treaty- arts, according
to a grim -analyebt by VS. "
Intelligence agencies.' - -
Senior 'Defense Depart-
ment -and-=Congressional
officials -told The Post -
that '-a _Nedra:al Int111- -
ence Estimate _preowned
the CIA .and the--De--
showed that-the soviet nu-
clear arsenal aimed at the
U.S. has increased by an
astonishing 80-85 per cent-
Amr,...S4oWa2acccst
'This is far greater than
? ? -
duringt.hiselection year. -
--= In a resent ippearence
. -Congress; ; Assistant'
:Secretary - of - DefenseRichard -,--Parle admitted
that rthe Size of the Krem-
lin -nuclear -force has
grown by roore . than 75
percent: _ ?
ut 1)ffic1alz who have
seen the CIA/DIA esti-
mate, completed this
_ Month-- Bay lhat the still
- secret figures. are more
-staggering- - than what
revealed. - -
According to these
Sourrea the Soviets - '
- ? Increased their total
number of nuclear war-
_ heads .pointed at the U.S.
from about -5000 in 1979 to
-19400.- .
- ? In cr -*abed -,the total
. number of missile 'winch-
era -to -nearly -2503 which
:of5ciaj5 -say violates a
EALTlimitot.ZZ25.'
? These figures include all
_subniaccine4aunched and
biteroontineotal ;ballistic
. 'They do-not in-
- dude . nuclear .warheads
from strategic bombers --
- an area where the U.S.-is
? known to have azi over
whelming edge.
theincreaseof the U.S. nu-'
_clear-weaqxxis targeted at
the-Soviet-Union-over the
samelime period. - ? .
Officials said ..that :the -
analysis . has sent shock-
waves -throughout . -the
White -Houae and the Na-
tional:. -Security 'Council
and.'poses major dl-
lemma for President'Rea-
? gan who ? is anxiously
? seeking -to - avoid confron-
, tationa with the ,Kremlin.
? Despite the Relegate'
ministration's inaasho, i
defense buildup over the
'past three years, the num-
ber-of U.S. :nuclear war-,5
? heads now aimed at the
,-. Soviet Union II about eC01
.. --At the same time,
totalznumber of U.&-inW
Biles- latuichers
cream front 1250 triabout
1300 next year;:to -eomply":
-with the SA.LT treaty, qtri;
cialsaayi- 7 :21
? -
?
mate 'conies on the -heels '4
of the 1 recent corepletionf:,
a 27$-page report of the --
Arms amnia' Diaarma- -
menf Agency wfdch de
?_Ulla -more than 40 Soviet 'F.
; violations oft4e EATAT_,n7
cord& ?
?
Although R4agan
said publicly in the past -
to months that he
heves the Soviets are tido- '
lating the SALT &Cowan, -
officials believe that if
? Reagan were to challenge
-the .Soviet Union and
?make a major' btsue Out of ?
these violations tt would
result in. a -new outbreak;"
. tensions with?the Dew
- Kremlin leadership.
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3
NEWS FOES:Waved For Release 2egtaim :CI .LN
A:RDP90- N01137R0001
CAL & tw.,EERING EWS
9 January 1984
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1?
00140001-3
U.S. claims it has incontrovertible proof the Soviet Union is involved in
use of toxin weapons, but evidence it has made public is tenuous
For years, and from faraway places have come reports of
death and sickness from the skies. The tales from
ruggedly independent and mostly illiterate mountain
people of Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan tell of
aircraft-, rocket-, and artillery-delivered clouds of yel-
lowish material that killed rapidly and grotesquely those
directly hit. Villagers more fortunate
and further away became ill, but with
a strange combination of symp-
toms.
Survivors often told tales of mys-
NEWS A
Lois R. Ember, C&EN Washington
flooded local embassies after alleged reilow rain attacks.
The mysterious toxic agent causing these symptoms re-
mained elusive to the chemist's probe for seven years.
Then on Sept. 13, 1981, in West Germany, Secretary
of State Alexander M. Haig addressed the Berlin Press
Association. In an otherwise unno table speech. Haig
said: "For some time now, the inter-
national community has been
NAL YSIS
terious yellow rainlike spots on or
near their villages that they called yellow rain and as-
sociated with deaths and illnesses. These tales spurred
U.S. investigations. First U.S. embassy personnel col-
lected the victims' grim stories. Then military physicians
examined these people, now in refugee camps, for signs
of chemical agents used. And finally, the U.S. launched
an intensified search for physical evidence.
? From the early surveys came the speculation that three
possible agents?a harassing agent, a nerve gas, and an
unknown chemical?were being used. Chemical anal-
ysis of collected material proved futile. No traditional
chemical agent?no riot control gas, mustard gas, or
nerve gas?could be detected. And still the reports of
skin irri tatioiApprblitticFrOr R6Ibilistd20o0117t/013 ?LICIA
vomiting, of dizziness and trembling, and of death
.:AnLlare 19E4
alarmed by continuing reports that
the Soviet Union and its, allies have
been using lethal chemical weapons
in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghani-
stan .... We now have physical evidence from Southeast
Asia which has been analyzed and found to contain ab-
normally high levels of three potent mycotoxins?poi-
sonous substances not indigenous to the region and
which are highly toxic to man and animals."
With these words, amplified the next day by under-
secretary of State for political affairs Walter J. Stoessel
and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane J.
Kirkpatrick, an obscure issue was thrust into the spot-
light.
The physical evidence that Haig referred to turned out
to be a single leaf and twig from Kampuchea. This veg-
etation was contaminated with parts-per-million
_RD4290.tilpp1sIRttogoictot4eobicene toxins, substances
produced by Fusarium fungi. This detection of fungal
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON RAGE 2 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
5 January 1984
US declassifies documents
on Latin America policy
Washington
President Eisenhower told his top !
advisers in 1954 the US was in Latin
America to fight "a war . . . against
communism," ac-
cording to docu-
ments declassi-
fied by the State
Department.
In a National
Security Council
meeting in No-
vember 1954, Ei-
senhower said:
"You must think of our policy in
Latin America as chiefly designed to
play a part in the cold war against our '
enemies. Russia would shortly step !
into any vacuum if we allowed one to
develop in Latin America."
One declassified .national intelli-
gence estimate, prepared under CIA
director Allen Dulles, warned that the
presence in Latin America of United
Fruit Company, which was influen-
tial in the Eisenhower administration,
was increasingly resented by inde-
pendent Latin American
governments.
3140001-3
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,?.?????=.?
? THE NEW REPUBLIC
ARTICLE APPEARRp -Led For Release 2006A10,s3sieGas-F111M01137
e
Casey's smart (and rich), but does he run a ft
R000100140001-3
TINKER, TINKER, TINK1
BY MORTON KONDRACKE
UNITED STATES intelligence apparently had an
idea that the so-called Party of God, an Iranian-
connected, Syrian-protected Shiite Moslem group that car-
bombed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut last April, was plan-
ning an attack on U.S. Marines. But U.S. intelligence
did not have agents inside the group and therefore could
not warn with precision that it was planning the truck-
bombing that killed more than 230 Marines on October 23.
U.S. intelligence knew, too, that Cuba and the Soviet
Union were militarizing
Grenada, but again the
United States had no in-
telligence agents on the
island and underestimat-
ed Cuban troop strength.
The U.S. had not pene-
trated Maurice Bishop's
New Jewel Movement,
and did not know that
Bishop's colleagues were
planning to oust and kill
him. And when Prime
Minister Eugenia Charles
of Dominica reported to
the White House press
on October 23 that "we
noted with great interest
the movements between
Soviet Embassies and
known activists" prior to
Bishop's assassination, it
also was news to White
House policymakers.
On the other hand, the
Central Intelligence Agency did predict correctly that the
Soviet Union would not invade Poland in 1981, but would
crack down through Polish authorities instead. Using its
superb technical capabilities, U.S. intelligence was able to
develop a precise analysis of how Korean Air Lines' Flight
007 was tracked by the Soviet Union, lost, found again,
and shot down. And, several months before Leonid
Brezhnev's death, the director of Central Intelligence, Wil-
liam Casey, reported to President Reagan that Brezhnev
likely Would not be succeeded by a collective leadership,
as agency analysts had concluded. "Chernenko peaked
too soon," Casey wrote Reagan in a memo. "Kirilenko
faded in the stretcl
bet money, I'd say
across the board."
Casey's prescier,
lance, is likely to lx
ing to well-informi
more disturbingtm
tell the President I.
dropov had pushe.
DRAWING BY VINT LAWRENCE FOR THE NEW REPUBLIC
Approved For Release 2006/01/03:
Zler was Klanappea oy
the Red Brigades in Italy,
the C.I.A. dug hard to
discover who had him
and where; but U.S. offi-
cials say that in general,
journalists like Claire
Sterling have put togeth-
er a better picture of in-
ternational terrorist net-
works than the C.I.A.
When Turkish gunman
Mohammed Ah Agca
shot the Pope, they say,
the President found out
more about Soviet and
Bulgarian involvement
from Reader's Digest than
from U.S. intelligence.
The C.I.A. can't know everything, but the Republican
Party correctly declared in its 1980 election platform that
''the United States requires a realistic assessment of the
threats it faces" and "must have the best intelligence capa-
bility in the world." The platform said, "Republicans
pledge this for the United States." Three years into this
Republican Administration, the United States certainly
has a better intelligence capability than it did in 1980?it
could hardly fail in that?but overall it is still far from the
best in the world. Can William J. Casey make it so? Well,
he gets credit for trying?even from his adversaries--but
there's reason to doubt that he can.
LONTIIVUED
CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3
ARTICLE APPEARED LOS ANGTTYS TIMES
ON PAGE 4.2_ 26 November 1983
Nicaraguans May
Vote on Assembly;
CIA Assesses Rebels
MANAGUA, Nicaragua (Ai?This country's leftist
junta is expected to announce the date for long-prom-
ised elections on Dec. 4. But political sources said Friday
that the balloting probably will be for a constituent
assembly, not for president.
"There exists a great possibility that (junta coordina-_
tor Daniel) Ortega will announce Dec. 4 the date for
elections for a constituent assembly," said a political
source who spoke on condition he not be named.
"The plan for a constituent assembly could be stalled
only if some last-minute delay or problem comes up,"
another source said.
Rafael Solis, deputy commander of the Council of
State, told journalists recently that Ortega would
announce the election date Dec. 4., when the council,1
which now serves as the nation's legislature, completes
its Mx-month session.
The political sources said that the constituent
assembly would probably write a new constitution to
outline future presidential elections. Nicaragua has not
had a constitution since the 1979 ouster of the rightist
regime of the late strongman Anastasio Somoza:
The leftist Sandinista National Liberation Front, in
power since the revolution, has said repeatedly that
elections will be held in 1985. The Sandinistas' critics,
including President Reagan, charge that the gov-
ernment has reneged on promises to hold early elections
and develop a system of political pluralism.
The Reagan Administration is providing covert aid to
rebels fighting to overthrow the Sandinistas. Washing-
ton contends that Nicaragua helps infiltrate arms to
leftist guerrillas in U.S.-backed El Salvador.
CIA Appraises Rebels
The Washington Post reported Friday that the CIA
has concluded that U.S.-backed guerrillas in Nicaragua
lack the punch to topple the Sandinistas. Quoting
congressional sources, the newspaper also said there are
indications that Washington is beginning to give some
thought to how the war by the counterrevolutionaries
can be wound down.
The CIA says the rebels lack the military capability,
"financing, training and political support to overthrow
the powerful and well-entrenched Sandinistas, the
newspaper said.
ST1T
(In Washington on Friday, a senior Administration
official told a reporter that the CIA assessment "has
been overtaken by events." He said that the CIA
analysis "goes back to last summer. Since -then the
'resistance' forces (contras) have become much stron-
ger, the population has become much more supportive in
parts of Nicaragua, and the weaknesses of the (Sandin-
ista) regime have become much more apparent.
("The Administration is clearly in favor of continued
support for the resistance forces. It is not at all their
?purpose to overthrow the (Sandinista) government, but
to try to bring about change," he said.
(Asked if recent Sandinista overtures to the Roman
Catholic Church, business and the press, provided
evidence of such change, the official replied: "We are
not interested in cosmetic changes. But it is clear that by
diverting their energies, they are forced _to reduce the'
amount of aid to the Salvadoran guenillas.")
Interior Minister Tomas Borge said Thursday that
Nicaragua would be willing to get rid of its Cuban
military advisers if Honduras and El Salvador get rid of
their U.S. military advisers.
Withdrawal of all foreign forces in Central America is
a cornerstone of a proposed regional peace treaty
drafted by the So-called Contadora Group?Mexico,
Venezuela. Panama and Venezuela.
Citbans Reported Leaving
Government Sources say that 1,200 Cubans of the
more than 8,000 here?most of them civilians?already
have left for home. The United States has 55 military
trainers in El Salvador and about 200 in Honduras.
An Interior Ministry source said Friday that Borge
plans a 10-day tour of the United States to lecture at
universities and meet with congressmen, religious
leaders and the news media.
- Meanwhile, the publisher of the newspaper La
Prensa, an important voice of opposition to the
Sandinista government, said Friday that the newspaper
will suspend publication indefinitely Dec. 7 for lack of.
paper.
"Our paper reserves are running out and the
shipments of paper that friendly businesses in the
United States and Canada have promised us cannot
arrive before Dec. 7," publisher Pedro Joaquin Chamor-
ro said at 'a meeting with the newspaper's more than 200
employees. "Therefore we are obliged to close the paper
indefinitely."
La Prensa, which has clashed frequently with the
leftist government, has had problems with newsprint
supply for the past two years.
Financially strapped Nicaragua has only limited
foreign exchange to buy such foreign-made goods as
newsprint, and the government_ recently reduced
newsprint allocation to Nicaragua's three daily papers.
They now can print only 10 pages on weekdays and 14
on Sundays. Because of this, La Prensa asked for
donations of newsprint from newspapers abroad. _
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Approved For Release 2006/01/03:
ARTICLE AFTEARED
021 PAGE ki WASHINGTON POST
25 November 1983
U.S.-Backed Rebels Can
Nicaraguan Regime, CIA Finds
By Patrick E. Tyler
Wroihington Post SUff Writer
The CIA has concluded that there are no
circumstances under which a force of U.S.-
backed rebels can achieve a military or polit-
ical victory over the leftist Sandinista govern-
ment of Nicaragua, according to congressional
-sources.
In addition,, there are indications that the
administration, despite its tough public pos-
ture, is beginning to give some thought to how
the war could be wound down and how an am-
? nesty "for the American-supported forces could
? be arranged.
In a National Intelligence Estimate provided
to the congressional oversight, committees this
fall Coinciding With crucial votes to continue
funding to the rebel forces, the CIA said the
US-hacked 'contra" forces made up of 10.000
? to 12,000 guerrillas lack the military capability,
financing, -training and political support to
overthrow the powerful and well-entrenched
Sandinista government with its relatively large
and well-equipped standing army of 25,000
soldiers and even larger militia forces.
The CIA analysis, according to these
sources. Concludes that the Sandinista leader-
ship is controlled by hard-line Marxists who
will not give up in any kind of military con.
frontation with the contras. In addition, the
CIA has concluded that the U.S.-backed -
counterrevolutionary forces have not -been
able to win enough support in the
Nicaraguan population to overthrow the
Sandinistas, who seized power four years ago
after ousting Gen. Anastasio Somoza.
? Administration officials said on previous
occasions that they did not think the U.S.-
backed force was strong enough to overthrow
the .Nicaraguan -government, but the rapid
growth of the rebel army .from its original
500-man level authorized by Congress and
. the loosely defined administration goals left
many Members of Congress uncertain as to
President ..Reagan's true intentions in Nic-
aragua.
,
With the new CIA analysis, Reagan has
also stated for the first time that he wants a
general amnesty for U.S.-backed rebels who
have been fighting the Sandinista govern-
ment as part of the CIA-directed force. Rea-
gan included the amnesty provision in a se-
cret document justifying the covert action to
Congress. The amnesty provision would be a
precondition to a cessation of hostilities,
sources said."
The document, a presidential "finding"
under the National Security Act., was
presented to the congressional committees in
September by Secretary of State George P.
Shultz and CIA Director William J. Casey.
The amnesty provision is not spelled out
in any detail in the finding, and a number of
questions have been raised in the congres-
sional committees as to how it would he ap-
plied and enforced. It is not clear whether
exiles who are fighting the Sandinistas would
be allowed to return to their homes in Nic-
aragua or win back property seized by the
?government:
But the most recent discussions between
the administration and Congress have cre-
ated the impression that the administration
is giving careful thought to how to end the
2-year-old secret war against Nicaragua. The
amnesty provision addresses an issue that
has been unresolved in two years of private
consultations between the administration
_
and congressmen fearful that Reagan and
the CIA were slowly committing the United
States to thousands of Nicaraguan exiles
whosef would b uncertainif a ne oti-
ated settlement of regional tensions were
reached in Central America.
Last spring, Casey warned in private of a
potential "bloodbath" if Congress withdrew
_ support from the U.S.-backed rebel force_,
? House cut off funding for the covert '
operation twice this year, but in a compro-
mise with the Senate, legislators ended the
session by approving $24 million to fund the
covert paramilitary operations at least until
June under a mandate to keep military pres-
sure on the Sandinistas until they stop sup-
porting leftist guerrillas fighting the govern-
ment of neighboring El Salvador. .
The CIA has concluded that paramilitary
harassment from the U.S.-backed contras, '
who have been operating from bases in Hon.
duras since early 1982, has caused the San-
dinista government to reconsider its support'
for the Salvadoran guerrillas and may even-
tually persuade the Sandinistas to abandon
the Salvadoran leftists altogether. According
to one congressional source, who spoke on
the condition he not be identified, there is a
bipartisan consensus, especially in the Sen-
ate, that the covert policy of the Reagan ad-
ministration for the first time is consistent
with publicly stated policy goals of the U.S.
government and the governments of the
Central American region.
Under this view, many members of the
congressional oversight committees report-
edly have beeome convinced that the admin-
istration is willing to end its secret war
? against Nicaragua as soon as the Sandinistas
give concrete and verifiable assurances that
they will no longer give aid, commend and
control and logistical support to the Salva-
doran- guerrilla movement.
Doubt remains, however, among members
who were surprised by an administration
effort during the summer to redraft a pres-
idential justification for the covert operation
in terms that some members believed would
have committed the U.&-backed forces to an
all-out victory over the Sandinista govern-
_ _ _ _
ment if it was not willing to rriake substan-
tial political and diplomatic concessions.
In this draft presidential "finding," the
administration said the secret war was nec-
essary to stop the spread of revolution from
Nicaragua to other countries. It also stated a
necessity to .keep up covert paramilitary op-
erations until Nicaragua returned to a dem-
ocratic form of government, reduced its level
-of armament and guaranteed press and re-
ligious freedoms. Many members considered
the latter demands as diplomatic goals, not
suitable for inclusion in the secret justifica-
tion as preconditions to cease hostilities.
frgYIEVVED
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AMC:LE ILATTEARM
PAGE_L-11__
WASHINGTON TIMES
1 November 1983
mustache, -chaps and a
By Tom-Nugent:-- horse . and he was the lam in
? Josephine-County!
e's a retired U.S. Army "joe Rutsela. His picture
general: He's .the for- hangs on the wall of the county
rner chief of the U.S. courthouse-, even today. Sitting
Defense Intelligence on his horse, and glaring_ And
Agency- And he's the cootrover- you knew that you didn't want
? siai creator of "'High Frowzier" to get crosswise o( the law . .
Wasizingron-nased public "Well, I lived with hi= for a
interest group which hopes to 'couple of years. I was just a kid.
end the threat of nuclear war And one day I walked iI5Z0 that
by piacing non-nu-clear wear'- cabin . . I'd just gotten into a
Das in outer space. fist fight with a half-breed
? A rather, imposing back- ' [Indian] kid named Sonny
ground, you -would think at Thompson, and be was a lot
first- . tougher than L was, and he
Butif you want to understand. thrashed.lne!."
:Dan- . Grahaz*, - He-laughs a-gahr-here.. It's a
i.-stand: Dan Graham., then you raspy sound, since be smokes
have to Kan someplace else. all the time, like a saw going
You have to start, a.s a matter th rough dried lumber.
of fact, with his grandfather's "HARRGGIMA" and yessir,
thandleba_r mustache. " he's having a good tune, this
."POW!" three-star American general,
You have to start with:the for- remembering the pounding- he
naer three-star general, now,-.5i,,oncerj,!?took.-. "Viell,",- recounts
years .sittua- gin. his... dowrL,,,CT.raham._'ff I camein pretty well
Washingicat,-office and-IL-binged-up, anti-hi-Wing:. And.'
pounding his--Tiglitiistirito.hisF;:badthezaisfortimeAn. TUII- intp 7
4eir,palmrtt.P0WT,7;,:,-ts ::2,-./4'.,-trandfatlaeglii.Stead of -my
lAizid then:- he laiighsoiitiouctf:;,--I'.,-:gi-atidmother Arkthe said:. !Ypu-._
, !.?My4 maternal-, gTandfatherrri.a-fightr.: .
-
remernbering_his.iktyhooddast ttDid-you get;whippedr"
ac-roSs--thietCabin!".
tlCoUpty,' our_tbereiiii.southerri ' N,CO3-ithe generalleans- iritn
,,Oregon... And
?
-
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ARTICLE APP
ON PAGE
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10 Oetoiber 1983
America's Secret W
Under William Casey, the CIA is back in business wit
n a string of Turk-
ish cities and towns,
agents of the Central In-
telligence Agency have
arranged covert support
for Iranian exile groups
seeking the overthrow
of Ayatollah Khomeini.
Two thousand miles away, in the Pakistani
cities of Peshawar and Islamabad, other
undercover operatives are coordinating the
how of money and materiel vital to rebel
tribesmen battling Soviet invasion troops
across the border in Afghanistan. The agen-
cy also supplies secret aid to friendly forces
in Chad, Ethiopia, Angola and the Sudan?
and has launched the massive campaign of
-espionage, air strikes, propaganda and oth-
er support for a now notorious "secret war"
against the leftist Sandinista regime in Ni ca-
ragua. Clearly, the cloaks and daggers have
come out of cold storage at CIA headquar-
ters in Langley, Va. For better or worse, the
Company is back in the business of covert
action?with a global scope and an intensity
of resources unmatched since its heyday 20
years ago.
Under the most unlikely director of cen-
tral intelligence in the agency's history?a
mumbling, often maddening tax lawyer and
businessman named William I. Casey (page
40)?the CIA has found its ranks expanded,
redirected and re-energized for covert con-
frontation with hostile forces around the
world. Casey also has streamlined basic
analysis and reporting functions, helped
swaddle the agency in a cocoon of contro-
versial new secrecy orders and moved it
forcefully into two areas of stepped-up na-
tional concern: the fight to keep tons of
deadly drugs from coming into the United
States each year and the battle to keep
scores of critical high-tech advances from
being pirated out. Casey's ability to get
things done stems in large part from his
close and frequent contact with the presi-
dent (at least two meetings each week, plus
frequent phone conversations) and with fel-
low members of the cabinet (Casey is the
first DCI with cabinet rank)._
5iusbroorne: Still, the increase in covert
action has raised old questions about the
wisdom, propriety and effectiveness of
American intelligence activities. Critics on
and of Capitol Hill say Casey shows an old
cold warrior's insensitivity to the potential
embarrassment and diplomatic danger that
secret missions always pose?and a high-
handed disregard for the role of congres-
sional oversight in this most sensitive area.
-"Weare like mushrooms," says California's
Democratic Rep. NorrnwpOloved.4-talie
Permanent Select Committee on Intelli-
gence. "They keep us in the dark and feed us
a lot of manure."
The most dramatic showdown so far
came this past summer when the House
Intelligence Committee voted to cut off all
funds for further covert support of the anti-
Sandinist contra rebels in Nicaragua?a
largely symbolic act, since the Senate never
a
Wally MeNprneo?NEwsrotaK
THEDCLATLANGLEY: A covert clientele
concurred. The national debate will fiare
again in the next. few weeks as Congress
begins to consider the nation's 1984 intelli-
gence budget, which is reported to have
grown at a rate of 17 percent annually for
the past three years, faster even than Penta-
gon spending, to regain the level it held
before big cutbacks began back in 1973. The
prospects for making any substantial cuts in
the face of new Soviet aggressiveness?both
the shootdown of a Korean Air Lines jet-
liner and Moscow's hostile rejection of the
latest U.S. arms-control proposals (page.
26)?"are not promising," concedes com-
mittee 'chairman Edward Boland of Massa-
REOLVSes24000V1130: EMPRORSOf-0121
JOhn lionglatid?Gornaka-Lieisoral
NICARAGUA: Anti-Sandinista contras
events vital to our national security inter-
ests, a capability which only the United
States among major powers has denied it-
self," it proclaimed, in pointed reference to
the decimation of CLA. undercover ranks
under President Jimmy Carter and CIA
Director Stansfield Turner (operatives were
pared down to perhaps_ 300 from a high
3700001001)40061-81 the early 1960s).
00+7.277Att1710;-:
RADIO TV};(11.rPvQ1;201.--FeaigNk6/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3
4) EAST 42n STREET. N y
FOP.
PROGRAM
:ENTRAI INTELL2EENCE AGENCY
NEWS
STATION
STAT
CNN-TV AND THE
CABLE NEWS NETWORK
DATE CITy
OCTOSER E, 19E3 ? B PM NEW YORK
-IiRDADC4k7 EXCERPT
W c, :: A c. 7 ET F.', ! The C. 2 . A. tea: s :in e..e C76 ecy . 7 n Et
h1._,ciness. Repo7ters,'-,. fo:Llows, have a touch trile 1--. ritno out
C . .72 :1 :7 a or .i rste :. a . A. hestouarte7s . But ah..e.oe,e
ele"..-67- DEvad Vise ha'S EL-771EO Of SOME per-sonne] moves not wacei\:
7--,:eo ejSE,"'he:-E. ! ni has COrarTiente-7y ter:.Loht. WE SL!aaeetS
1,::-.EI 2mo1acat.lcns those Moves ;COLI1O have.
7-.L v 7. n? 't,,'`i Q. c- : LOveran0 a- Sec7 et il-lt.E.1 a
_. 6 hoe 'aa enC \ a
_tt -ie -: -_-:e Ca \...er _nc-.. the 1-(Tem.:-i 7 7hev don't tE2k much. E:Dcut
,..:nat haa,c-,ens f,r1s.,_de the as. Sc. re!:acte:-.S have to C.7.6 EW
r: a- n a a u S. I- o riS f :OTT a att." e th;LT--ic. .1 ..ke who shows U .6.-? a t ii Li b 2.1 :::
w!--,at Shft5.'..'n dersonne.:. r6ea6..av Mean.
ECCE27rOec.
In the same :ts VEjLEE tO E p SOrne OL1': E
chaeL,..,.. that have occurred _inside the E.I.A. Lat_te C7 nothano
r-EF been SELC CUrl'ICy about 7.mese chances, out wC7t has E wEy
cut to those who watch the waffls,
In chEnDe C. a . A. D.7-ect ri E. e h
tac,ceo two forme: caancestane operat:ives to hEnte the aoencv's
ceELf7,cs thOcnoress and the press. =. W:L.Thm DcsetI. E
fc.7,7mE7 Richmond pubc .:.-eatons man wnc heated EEsev's
2OnC7ESE:10fle'l and press 7eial'ons, riEc, left Case? sp2'
thec?-,t6.., :in two. He named C'jzir- EecTge, unta]. now the second-
hfohest c-anbestdrie opera-to: :in the ecency, to handle Ecnoress.
He p.ut Geo:9e Laudel-, anothe: forme spook., dr cha7Qe of putaft
affaLrs.
hants deny that the zoency's te.sare to shore up
and pubIc suppc.:t for Ht.s covert oper on n
lx.Lc-ET-aCua Ihese Trioves.:
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TAthE 4-, , SHINGTON POST
25 Tuly 1983
100140001-3
U.S. Envoys Hini
At Possible Latin
Naval uarantine
By George Larclner-Jil:,
and Fred Hiatt ?
7-71-aixin5it iairtiietlinted-St.ates
washrroaraPps's""hmem-4;:z-54--
_
US. Ambassador -to Nicaragua ;
Anthony Cecil Eden Quainton
-terday refused --tor;rule out tbei-pos,.:
sibility of a navaLuarantinec-aimed---;
sat reducing the !?`.sulast.a.ntiarfiow of;
arms and supplies to guerrillas in-El
Salvador
- ?._-, :
' His stance followed by a day iJS
Ambassador to the United Nations
? Jeane J. Kirkpatrick's suggestion
that-a demonstration of U.S.-ability
?, to interdia arms shipments on .the
seasthigtit be-salutary. -
Also yestertbay:,la top Pentagon
official who reqUested anonymity.:
said that the United States is play:?
ing a little 4:at-and-mouse-game" -
; with the Nicaraguan government;
and that a quarantine in the near
future is 'most rolikely? - 7?-
? Another top-ranking Pentagon
official said yesterday that the time
is going to come"- when a quarantine
would begin if Nicaragua does oot
slow what. the United States claims
is a massive military, bilildup: -How-
ever, he said there 'is no timetable
for escalating . planned U.S. ? naval
maneuvers into a quarantine " -
Appearing on "This Week With -
David Brinkle?" - (ABC.,"1; WJLA);
Quaint= was pressed to-sliellL
out-
U.S. goals in Nicaragua'
"Our policy," he said, 'is-hot-to -
topple the Sandinista government
Our policy is to try and modify its
behavior in some substantial ways
which are consistent with our inter-
ests and our vital :security concerns
throughout Central America?
saidudc
L mixed economy._ antV-a- trtily non-
aninterview on Cable
::INewe Network; Kirkpatrick said she
thought it would b4aseful.to
mind that'they do
otlaveitriiOnofsafOlferae in the
:J-Are 'we. shOWing 'them that . the
? United States - could . . blockade
'Nicaragua?" -1Cirkpatridk .was asked.
"Maybe," "Ivlaybe
zemindAhem brthat Mayb?
rrwe're :also doingsOmething relevant-
: to interdittinverms7because they
use--they-'do -a lot of exporting arms
. into:El:Salvador ?-by*ay of that Pa-
Re-Tgan was visited. if;fret)orteis uponhia
return yesterday -to-the White House from
Camp David, "What-about more advisers for
El Salvadorr.WaVing'fbff_.gueitions;iii:tgi-7.
plied, "Not todity17-Z.-,,:::
: One top sPentsigOill4itficitZ risterda3;5-said
he believes theta quarantine is most unlike.:
ly" ;in the nearluture.--He said officials iire
leavingthe-p)Open for a reason,"--.4-1-4,.
"Were playing a-little cat-and --mantle? -
genie-with squeezeian;--
? making them viondet'what's going to happen
next," the official-said. "Ultimately, the idea
is to convince them that,allowing the El Sal- ,
vador guerrillas to use Nicaragua for --their
_headquarters for revolution -is not a -good
idea if they want to keep their oval damn
-irevoltition?, .
However, US.-intelligence officials Alive
concluded that the-leftist .Sandinistaoregime
in Nicaragua faces little danger of being,top-
? pled without a much greater exercise of
cific corridor along the coast" force several sources indicated.
- _
-____ _ __________ .. ____ ----? ,.
The blunt hints on a series of weekend: ,., The latest National Intelligence Rstimate
television interviews were matched by grow- on the troubled region, a composite study
! ing expressions of alarm from several con- reflecting the views of the U.S. intelligence
1 gressional Democrats. They protested that agencies, reportedly was completed June-30. -
sending-troops to Honduras for joint military ; "h was interesting," one source said, 'for
1 exercises andStationineU.S. battleships, oai- the scenario, it played out about where do
; riers and jet fighters off Nicanagua's 5''',6.. you go from here. There are no good choices
- could'7iolatethe War-Powers Actz--- : . :. ? -,- --down the Toad.", - , -,- '
' The Democrats?Sens. 'Daniel Patrick - Another -source described it as blunt and
. Moyrisi.han- =fN.Y.i) -and Christopher J. Dodd i _confirmed ow it had no? dissenfttng- ;foot-
(Corint):And Itep.-Micl D Barnes iMd-)-H- L "Doigff,;r:;:l.::i..,-;:"-:2-::;-l'L'-''-:'; ' '
also:-:Were*itiial=o14--pf:nding P;entagon Te-
quest!,==tomore-':thW-2dOtilale the -number of i
U.S.inilitaryadviierain El Salvador from its -
longstanding but-unofficial lid of 55 to 125.
Pentagon officials yesterday confirmed
that Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinber-
ger sent that recommendation to the White
House last -week: On Saturday, a White
House spokesman said that such a request is
not pending before President Reagan.
Moynihan, who vice chairman of the
Senate Intelligence- Committee, and Barnes,
who is chairman of the House Foreign Af-
fairs subcommittee-on Western Hemisphere
affairs, yesterday expressed similar ? conclu-
sions, but without naming administration
documents they had in mind.
hi his appearance on "Face the Nation"
(CBS, WDVM), Moynihan contended that
the United States ought to _get tough with
the Soviet Union instead of fumbling around
in Central America._ He advocated an ulti-
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rialerZZLIZ
i,..PPFApptoved For Release W5lid0/1/%10kA-RDP90-01137R
20 July 1983
House. in secret ?reportedly
hears covert action criticism
By David Rogers
Globe Staff -
-WASI-LT_NGTON - The House, beginning debate on a
resolution to cut off -covert military aid to Nicaraguan
insurgents, went into .a rare closed--door session yester-
day in which opponents -of the Administration's policy
cited 2 recently completed CIA study criticizing the effec-
tiveness of the operation. sources said, .
The National intelligence Estimate. dated June 30, is
one of the most detailed. high-level analyses yet within
the intelligence community, and the critical tone of the
classified document is seriously damaging to the Admin-
istration's case, the sources-said.
The four-hour closed-door meeting yesterday marked
only the third time An -more than -a century that the
7HO-1:Ise has gone' into secret silsion,
-.arid' the resolution is an unprecedented -chal-
-:-Ienge to President Ronald Reaga.riS policy in:
Central America. -
No votes on the-reSolution are expected 'Until
. next week, but there appears to be increasing
. unity in the Democratic leadership behind the
resolution to cut off aid, which is sponsored by
Rep. Edward P. BOland ID-Mass.), chairman of,
the House Intelligence Committee, and Rep. :
_Clement Zablocki. (D-Wis.): chairman of-the For-,
eign Affairs Cominittee. ? . .
-*When it comes down tolt, I will be with Be-..
land-Zablocki." said Majority Leader Jim
Wright (D-Texas). After participating in private
talks with the Administration over the past
month. Wright said there is a "remote" chance
that a compromise can be reached before the
House vote.
''It is really a question of what we want to be
as a country." said Wright in one of his sharp-
est ci'iticisms yet of the covert aid. "Do we want
to be sneaky country or a straightforward coun-
lry. . We ought to tell the truth:"
; A united party leadership will strengthen So-.
Jand's hand on the floor, but the Springfield
_Democrat. is faced?with what appears to be ']
000100140001-3
strong Republican opposition and
the risk of major defections from
conservative Southern delegations
such as Florida's. "It look g like a
close call, really." said Boland.
While most of yesterday's four-
hour meeting was intended as a
classified briefing by the Intelli-
gence committee for members,
some of the speakers drew ap-
plause, reflecting the continued
partisanship seen earlier in com-
mittee votes.
- "The applause was partisan."
guessit was predictable but_it's not
good.' ?
-.-From the outsetof the covert op-
; eration the firstyear of the-Ad;
.'.'-ministration? leading 'members- of
.'.Fthe Intelligence -Committee have
? questioned the operation. As the in-
- surgent forcelui.sgrown,s6has the
_oontroversy ?surroundinLit: Ar
part of a classified annex to the
1983 'Intelligence Authorization
? Act, Congress ?attadhed language
last year to prohibit any aid for the
purpose of -overthrowing the San-
dinista regime. The same -restric-
tion was made law in December as
an amendment to an appropri-
ations bill. ; - '-. ?
Though-the Administration has
I-said the operation is within the
law, the insurgents have made no
-secret of their hope to overthrow
the government, and Reagan him-
self has referred to.the anti-Sandin-
ista guerrillas based in Nicaragua
and neighboring Honduras as
"freedom fighters."
71 have no doubt in my mind
_
that.that amendment has been vio-
lated." said Boland recently. He
has criticized 1.1-ie effectiveness of
the operation in meeting its stated
goal of interdicting arms ship-
ments from Nicaragua to leftist
guerrillas in El Salvador.
Rep. Bill Young (R-Fla.), a mem-
ber of the Intelligence Committee.
said there is "hard" evidence that
these shipments have been les-
sened. But according to sources.
the National intelligence Estimate
report-reflected a consensus within
intelligence branches like theCIA
and the-Defense intelligence:Age:n-7.
-cy seriously allenging4;be,
-grain's effectiveness
ItQiiis:some very. -verY1:013-g
l?stuff.2iairinne source. -Itrqxii;ed-__,-7.
ly provided the framework -forti:-.;
strongattaelE by RepEguiii-
:member
,genceandorelgriAffairiairnmit-.- ,
tees, whotook the lead witftolancl
An-supporting the resOlutiorL.,A7;
Young_ xepresented the 7-441117.-:
tion on. the IGOE' side -with:41.cp. _
Henry Hyde membersa:02e-
Poreign Affairs Corrira1ttee.7---::
_
? Though ? attendance :dwindled
after the first two hours. members
? said that-dose to two-thirds-of the
"House ;was present -to beat: the
? opening !iemarks.
_Minortty Leader Robert Michel
dismissed reports last-week
that the CIA is preparing for a force
between 12,000 and 15,000, but'
yesterday an aide acknowledged
that the numbers had "credibil
ity."
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ARTICLE APPEARnM3proved For Release 20919194f941{9142WAM137R00
ON PAGE SUMMER 1983
Angelo Codevilla is a professional staff
member with the Senate Intelligence
Committee. Previously, he was a foreign
service officer and a fellow at the Hoover
Institution, Stanford Univessity. Dr.
Codevilla has written widely on European
polities and in the field of intelligence and
military policy.
0100140001-3
STAT
STAT
Angelo Cocievilla
STAT
By focusing so exclusively (
rules and standards of
operations, the intelligence
debate of the mid-1970s did
answer the fundamental
question of what the Uniteis
States expects of its intellige
services or what they are to
accomplish in order to meet
challenges of the 1980s.
The Substance and
the Rules
Since the early 1970s, this country's intel-
ligence agencies have been asking, "What
does the country expect of us?" That ques-
tion had not arisen in the postwar period be-
cause the American political system had left
the agencies to the total discretion of those
appointed to lead them. In the early 1970s,
factional conflict among those leaders spilled
over into a national debate about what
America's practitioners of intelligence ought
to have foremost in mind. That debate con-
tinues.
Recently, Admiral Stansfield Turner,
_ President Carter's Director of Central Intelli-
gence, and his former special assistant,
George Thibault, published an attempt both
to answer that question and to indict the Rea-
gan administration's handling of intelli-
gence. The author's answer seems to be that
the American people expect their intelligence
agencies to be as innocuous as possible.
They charge that the Reagan administration
is undermining the agencies by loosening too
many restrictions. The authors thus contend
that for our civil liberties' sake, and for the
sake of the agencies' own standing in the
country, the agencies ought to concentrate on
formulating for themselves the right kinds of
rules and restrictions. However, bne would
not suspect from Turner and Thibault% arti-
cle,,that the rules by which intelligence offi-
cers live ought to flow from the intelligence
profession's substantive requirements_
Nevertheless, in intelligence as in other
areas of government, the American people
rightly want their employees to accomplish
the functions for which they are paid. This
author will argue that Stansfield Turner is
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ARTICLX Azrraamt)
WINC.TO ?DE
2 j 9E3
lic-Lck Anderson
.War?
With Bi.ter:
President Reagan-and the allied ieaders meet-
ing in WilliProstrurg haven unparilieled oppor-
tunity waiting to -beTrasped.'1f they play ? their'
*carcis-righi, they.-cansocripple-theSoviet."bnion
economicsity itiattheKtexulin WilLhavemo choice
tto-ezut back on itszaulitary-spending.";z4,---',
One serious contributing lactor_intleCriiiet
,.. 'economic _mess . is the huge pereentagevillthe ?
countri.''s gross national.producteatehitip.nithe
arms race. The Kremlin-las reached :..thelimits
ofrits guns-and-butter balancing -
. The hawks in the Illeagan -ad.' ministration
., hope to push the Russians beyond their 'ico-
.nomic capabilities by -forcing them either_ to
spend billions in -response to our new :weapons
-systems or to cry-uncle and come to-the megoti--
atinz table for serious disarmament talks, ' r-
l-iov--much better it-would be all around to
flip the other side of the coin -and -force the
Kremlin to disarm by driving it to therwalheco-
nonaicaliv. Tne president might even 'consider
unleashing the CIA for little covert-action?
on the economic front
_
All it would take, -really, -is seeing- -that
world oil pns stay ciovon?or-fall even riower.
Aside from gob?whose price has also been4e-
pressed late?the Soviet Union musrsell-cill ior
the hard carrencv -it .needs AZ buy grain 4irid
Western technolou. The Russians ars -already
underaming OPEC prices in their desperation to
keep the dollars and deutschemarks coming in.
The CIA showed a hint of the Soviet's precari-
ous economic situation?and its potential
ploitation by the West-4.o surface in a :Special
National implliFence Estimate ISNLE, _! pro-
bounced "Snee''). It's classifiedsecret, but a copy
was obtained by my associate Dale Van AtI8-: . -
In the 1970s, the report not.,, "rapid increase
in Soviet imports from -the 'West . : _Nes made
possible by large-windfall gains in expontarnings
due to the-surge in oh prices-and the--wiliingoess
of Western countries to provide large 'credits,
most of which were government guaranteed."
But today the Soviet Union "is encountering
growing economic difficulties, which will make
it more difficult to increase its imports frorn.tbe
West in the future.''
But there is one exceptiorrnatural.ges.:
STAT
0100140001-3
"Moscow's, best hope _of -improving its
-strained hard-currency position in the longer
::run is to secure the cooperation of Western Eu-
'rope in building large new pipelines for the de-
livery of additional natural gas in thelate 1980s
.:or in the 1990s", the CIA concludes, "With
enormous pis reserves-and a _Powerful incentive
to earn more hard currency, Moscow is .pre-
-,pared to sell as much gas as the West Euro-
'pearls will-accept.'"
The inevitable result? "Making Western
militarv-relatee technology, -subsirli7ed credit
nd incked-insas markets available ..helps the
r.lSoviet -build 'military buildup,' the -CIA esti-
'7-ziaate-warns , .
theother hand., the CIA explains, "short-
in Soviet hard currency-earnings. _ would
force 'further cuts in imports of machinery_ and
equipment." The report adds: -"Moscow fears
that reductions in food imports :would use
-.popular unrest_
? In other -words, selling the Russians grain
_idoesn't help -their military machine, it hurts it,
:by eating up precious hard currency that could
? otherwise go for guns.
?, Finally, the CIA points out,--the combination
of 'restricted Western technciloz' exports and
ithe Soviets' shortage .of hard currency -would.
;raise the-cost of Soviet military rnociernizatior,
while at-the-same time weakening the -industrial .
base for military, production:"
.
Unfortunately, -:..Atnerican business interests
? many of them multinational corporations
more loyal to the dollar than to the United
? Statat-- want to do business with the Soviets
and abhor the ides of economic 'warfare.
Maybe Reagan will be able to resist the
powerful forces. Maybe he'll be able to per-
suade the European leaders to go along with an
economic squeeze on the Soviet Union instead
of a costly military buildup.
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ILT-1 I I :II; 1.1.111-.L.t=
0N
-PARADE MAGA ZINE
WASHINGTON POST
13 MARCH 1983
FlY
7R000100140001-3
HE U.S.
has eves and ears all over the globe. Yet
our Presidents often act like someone
who is blind and deaf. They seldom ,
seem to anticipate world events of mo-
mentous importance. They have been
caught napping by revolutions, inva-
sions and other developments of awe-
some consequence.
Why is the President invariably so
late to act that he can only react? I. can
tell you that it's not from only
of sound
information. He is served by profession-
als who spend their lives sifting fact
from fantasy. truth from propaganda.
They produce stunningly accurate as-
sessments?which are routinely ignored
by the White HouseA Vida O'g Fka
examples of warnings Ye' gobe -
unheeded:
.114Jack Anderson
? President Richard Nixon could have
prevented the ruinous 40-fold jump in
oil prices had he heeded the available
warnings. The federal government, with
all the agencies that watch over the oil
industry. had an immense early-alert
system.
? President Jimmy Caner could have
spared the nation .444 days of humilia-
tion if he had j1.15 paid attention to the
State Department's Iranian experts. With
startling prescience, they warned of the
likelihood of an attack on the embassy
and the seizure of hostages.
? President Carter could have stopped
Fidel Castro from shipping Cuba's crimi-
nals and crazies to Florida. where they
have aggravated the crime rate. The
CIA submitted at least five advance warp-_ ;
ings of C.astro's intentions.
? President Carter might have dissuad-
ed the Soviets from invading Afghani-
stan, thus preventing the breakdown of
detente. if he had acted on advance
information. He seemed to be the only
one in high places who was surprised
by the invasion.
? President Ronald Reatan might have
been able to avert the Falkland Islands
-mess had he reacted promptly to intelli-
gence reports that the Argentines would
invade. Indeed, the AnentineEVseries
istitilethWIROitfflikisgqkti3P ; Yrikig
sion would have his blessing.
? President Reagan could have dealt
ments that an Israeli invasion was "in-
evitable." Earlier, the Israeli attack on
Iraq's nuclear reactor also was forecast
precisely.
In each of these disasters. a President
had access to information that would
have enabled him to take preventive
actions, rather than blunder along. May-
be the-correct intelligence never reached
the President. Maybe it had been so
twisted or toned down that it was easy
to ignore. Yet in some cases, I had
published the warnings long before events
got out of control.
Of course. a President gets bad ad-
vice as well as good. Conflicting infor-
mation comes in from various confiden-
tial sources available to him. The real
pros among those who provide informa-
tion have been able to forecast or antici-
pate events with far more reliability than
any President has ever done. The prob-
lem is that the politicos around the Presi-
dent either don't know who the reliable
experts are Or prefer to ignore them.
How doescrucial information get cut
off at the pass? First, let's examine how
a President reaches his decisions.
Though different Presidents have asked
for intelligence in different forms, each
has received what is known in the intelli-
gence communiry as the PDB. or Presi-
dent's Daily Brief. The idea is to give a
President the most sensitive informa-
tion U.S. intelligence agencies have
37R00(0)al he can read in
L
Ott=
ON PAGE
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WASHINGTON TIMES
MARCH 1983
ARNOLD BEICIEVIAN
STAT
Does the CIA know
what it's talking abotru:
_
11; ..The only experts on the Soviet and intentions and strategic weap- the CIRs estimates of Soviet weapon
Unionare those who sit onthe Pont- onry and over-all military effort." expenditures were implausibily low
buro in Moscow. The rest of us have "Beginning in the 1960s," said the and failed to reflect the rapid quan-
varying degrees of ignorance." authors, "theCIA embarked upon a,i? titative and qualitiative improve-
Malcolm Mon, former U.S. ambas- . consistent underestimation of the ments which we were seeing in
sador to the Soviet ICBM buildup, missing the Soviet weapons systems and teclino-
_,
? mark by - a wide margin: Its esti- . logy" - _
mates became progressively worse ' Said Parker "My own estimate,,
'!Estimating is What' you do when on the law side. In the mid-1970s, supported by those of Most Military
you do not know." Sherman. Kent;:,-,-:: the intelligence community_ under- unelhgence organizations; inditated,
_
former chief of the CIA National J.,::.,..estimated the scaleand effectiveness that the real value of Soviet iveap-
Intelligence Estimate. ? = .of.. the Soviet's multiple .indeperi- ons production was growing at
?-?.- roughly10 percent per annum; While
:fdetitly targetable re-entry -vehicle
(M1RV)program. Even mareimpor- the agency put the figure variously
:tent Soviet warhead accuracies that between 2 iand 4.5 percent 'per
page-one itoryiriYesterday's have already been achieved and
New York Times -about the '1-7-..thathave equalled US.. accuracies What Rosefielde has done hi abril-'
-
Central Intelligence AgencY had been estimated by American Rant technical and statistical wady-
-
. and the Soviet arms buildup could, intelligience to be unobtainable by sis is to 4emostrate the inconsis-
- if true, help make mincemeat of the Moscow before the mid-1989s." tencies in CIA, estimates of Soviet
1Reagan administration's' defense How could such mis-estimates production- costs,- inconsistencies
; budget. Unnamed CIA specialists, have happened not only -_under which ,arise from a CIA methodol-
according to the story, claim the Democratic but also under Reputdi- ogy which "systematically under-
Soviet military spending growth rate can administrations, right up to the states technological growth and
has been over-estimated for the last :present Reagan presidency? , ? biases the agency 'S. estimates'
six years. Ellwsviorth and Adelman; who downward"
Instead of a 3-to-4 Pereent annual awaits a Senate vote on his itornina; UntilPresidentReaganperithdes.
increase, corrected for inflation, the . tion as Reagan 's arms negotiator;' the CIA to adopt his view Of Soviet:
growth rate "may have been no more ? said that the source of the problem intentiOns towards the US. and the ,
: than 2 percent," the Times reported. lies "within the bowels of the intelli.2 Free World, estimates of Soviet
miti-
It went on to say that estimating- gence bureaucracy itself!' ' " tary spending will be subject Wall .
Soviet military spending "is an inex- American intelligence "has long kinds of anti-defense propaganda.
act art, based on incomplete infor- been stultified by the domination of CIA optimism about Soviet inten-
mation, subjective assumptions, and a clique," which has prevented the tions leads to one kind of interpre?
difficulties in translating Sovietupgrading of the National Foreign tation, Reagan's pessimism or
ruble costs into dollar values." Assessment Center. CIA Director realism about Soviet intentions
The real story about CIA's analy- William Casey has tried to do some- . demands a different kind of inter-
sis and estimates branch is that it thing about it by involving himself . pretationaboutSovietarnis expend-
has had a dismal track record esti- personally in the National Intelli- tures.
. .
mating the growth of Soviet mill- gence Estimates machine. But it has .. Alexander Solzhenitsyn recently.
tary 'power. It has systematically , taken a long time to take even the. ? wrote in National Review that "Wei.
discounted Soviet military expen- first step. ? ? would understand nothing .about ?
ditures. CIA analysts also were The real bombshell which- could communism if we tried to coinpre,.
wrong in their predictions about the . destroy the CIA methodology for hend it on the principles of human.
stability of the shah of Iran's estimating Soviet military procure- reason. The driving force of .com-. ,
kingdom, right up ,.to the shah's ment expenditures has just gone off._ _ munism, itwas devised by Marx,
downfall. _ - It is a recently published book, False is political power, power at any cost
I am no admirer Of -President Science: Understanding the Soviet and without regard to human losses
Carter but he was surely correct _ ATMS ,Buildup, by .Prof.. Steven? orapeople's physicaldeterioration." ?
when he sent off a handwritten memo Rosefielde (Transaction Books, 1982) . In estimating Sovi et. mil i ta ry
to his top security advisers in 1978 published under the auspices of the expenditures, the CIA might be well
which began: "I am not satisfied National Strategy Information advised to base its conclusions ori"
with the quality of political intelli- Center - ' _ what, perhaps, we might call .
gence." . , The preface to Rosefielde's book' zhenitsyn's Law.
In an article in 1979, Robert is by Patrick Parker, who was dep-
Ellsworth and Kenneth Adelman uty assistant secretary of Defense Arn-old Beichman. a Viiitingl
described in Foreign Policy "stag- for intelligence a decade ago. Scholar at the Hoover Institution iS
likrinestungia' 2 -1... .yz oo6imsr: .1?Aii14FiwougihtRozfo.olempigrotri be
mr of the Consor-:'
Tryeaw
ernment service, discoverea tmt- hum or t e study of Intelligence..
STAT
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ase 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3
IE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
January 1983
By Philip Taubman
illiam J. Casey, the Director
of Central Intelligence, sat at
the end of the mahogany con-
ference table in his office.
Outside, the late afternoon
sun played across the trees
that ring the Central Intelli-
gence Agency's headquarters
in northern Virginia. filling the windows with a
fresco of autumn colors. A short stack of docu-
ments, some stamped SECRET, rested at Mr.
Casey's lett elbow, and a yellow legal pad on which
he had penciled several notes was positioned to his
right.
"The reason I am here is because I have a lot of
relevant experience and a good track record. ," Mr.
Casey said, alluding to comments that he was un-
qualified for the job and had been appointed only
because he was Ronald Reagan's campaign man-
ager. Mr. Casey, an imperious and proud man, had
....been fuming over the criticism for months, accord-
ing to his friends, and now, in his first comprehen-
sive interview since taking office, he wanted to set
the record straight.
Be flipped through the papers and extracted a
yellowing clipping from The New York Times that
extolled his record as chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission from 1971 to 1973. Next,
he provided several pages copied from a book about
Allied intelligence operations during World War II;
he had underlined a glowing assessment of his con-
tribution to the Office of Strategic Services. The
final clipping was a story that appeared in The
Washington Star in the summer of 1980, describing
Mr. Casey's role as Reagan campaign director.
The headline: "Casey, the Take-Charge Boss."
It was an oddly defensive performance for a man
who, according to classified budget figure; pro-
vided by Government officials, is overseeing the
biggest peacetime buildup in the American intelli-
gence community since the early 1050's. Because
intelligence expenditures are secret, ft is not widely
known that at a moment when the Reagan Admin-
istration is forcing most Government agencies to
retrench, the C.I.A. and its fellow intelligence or-
ganizations are enjoying boom times. Even the
military services, which have been favored with
substantial budget increases, lag well behind in
terms of percentage growth, although military-run
intelligence agencies are growing almost as
quickly as the C.I.A. Spending figures for intelli-
gence agencies, including the C.I.A., are hidden
within the Defense Department's budget. With a
budget increase for the 1983 fiscal year of 25 per-
cent, not allowing for inflation, compared with 18
intentions, ? integrity percent for the Defense Department, the C.I.A. is
and capabintinved For Release 2006/01/03 : Q1A-RIDEBOg631?4241ii48,0011tae Federal
Government, according to Administration budget
officials.
trrrs,
LIZTICia. Lk p, For Release 2006k4/691X"F'90-0113
9 JANUARY 19: 3
ce,E
?
'000100140001-3
C.I.A. Says Soviet Can Almos
By BERNARD GWERIZMAN
spEcii ten* New Yost TilDM
WASHINGTON, Jan. 8?The Central
Intelligence Agency, in a study of the
Soviet economy, - concludes that the
Soviet Union's ability to live without im-
ports is much greater than that of most,
possibly all, other industrialized econo-
mies.
The report, delivered to the Joint
Economic Committee of Congress on
Dec. 1 by Henry Rowen, chairman of
, the C.IA.'s National Intelligence Coun-
cil, seems to support the argument that
American trade embargoes against the
Soviet Union have only limited effect
The Reagan Administration has
sought to tighten Western controls on
trade to the Soviet Union to bring politi-
cal pressure on Moscow, a policy often
at odds with European allies and with
some American businessmen.
?
Capital, Technology and Food
The C.I.A. report said that for the last
decade the Soviet Union has used trade
with the West to help modernize its
economy and make it more efficient. It
said that the Russians bad relied on im-
ports of capital and technology to in-
crease or maintain production of some
raw materials and that food imports
bad "become critical" to maintaining a
quality diet.
Imports of pain and other agricul-
tural products, it said, meant primarily
to prevent a decline in meat consump-
tion, cog the Russians $12 billion in
1981, or 40 percent of their hard-cur-
rency purchases that year.
But Mr. Rowen said that "despite the
large-scale expansion in agricultural
imports, the Soviet Union remains basi-
cally self-sufficient with respect to
food."
He said the average Soviet citizen
consumes ablaut 3,300 calories a day, as
against 3,520"f or an American. The re-
port showed that the Soviet diet consists
of far morgill-in?and potatoes than the
American diet, but less fish and meat
and less sugar. And Mr. Rower' said
that grain production in the Soviet
Union "is more than sufficient to meet
consumer demand for bread and other
cereal products."
The report said trade with the West
amounted Wordy 5 percent of the Soviet
gross national product. But it seemed to
agree with some Administration policy
makers when it said the Russians would
. have to import 15 million to 20 million
tons of steel pipe in the next seven years
to build the pipelines it has planned, and
will need "sophisticated" exploration
equipment, for its oil and natural gas
fields. The Administration has tried to
block those exports in particular,
provoking feuds with Western govern-
ments that have contracted to provide
? the equipment.
0 U
Imports from the West, Mr. Rowen
An Ability 'to Remain Viable'
said, "can play an important role in re- I
lieving critical shortages, spurring
technological progress and generally j
improving Soviet economic peform-
ance." But he added that "the ability of
the Soviet economy to remain viable in
the absence of imports is much greater
than that of most, possibly all, other in-
dustrialized economies."
"Consequently," he concluded, "the
susceptibiity of the Soviet Union to eco-
nomic leverage tends to be limited."
The Soviet Union has always put
great emphasis on self-sufficiency. This
dates from the earliest days after the
1917 revolution, when most foreign
countries did not recognize the Soviet
regime, and it continued as a result of
the isolation the country experienced in
World War II.
Mr. Rowen's report was prepared at
the request of Senator William Prox-
mire, Democrat of Wisconsin. .The
Senator, who is vice chairman of the
subcommittee on international trade,
finance and security economics, ad
asked for "a balanced assessment" of
the strengths and weaknesses of the
Soviet economy.
This was the second C.I.A. report in a
month to point out strengths in the
Soviet economy.
Approved For
rrtports
; Mr. Rowen said tneC.I.A. agreed
with Mr. Proxmire that "confusion sur-
rounding the Soviet economy abounds."
"Western observers have tended to
describe Soviet economic performance
as 'poor' or 'deteriorating' at a time
when Soviet defense spending continues
to rise, overall Soviet gross national
product in real terms continues to in-
crease and Soviet G.N.P. is second in
size only to that of the United States,"
he said, noting the apparent contradici-
tons.
As a result of recent declines in the
rate of growth, the gap between per-
formance and expectations, and the
lack of economic efficiency, "the
record compiled by the Soviet economy
in recent years has indeed been poor,"
he said.
"Results that are unsatisfactory
when measured by this yardstick, how-
ever, do not mean that the Soviet econ-
omy is losing its viability as well as its
dynamism," the C.I.A. official said.
"In fact, we do not consider an eco-
nomic 'collapse' ? a sudden and sus-
tained decline in G.N.P. ? even a re-
mote possibility," he said.
The C.I.A. projects, he said, that
Soviet economic growth "will remain
slow but positive," averaging 1 to 2 per-
cent "for the foreseeable future." al-
though per capita consumption might
level off or drop slightly.
Energy Production Rises
Mr. Rowen said that natural gas pro-
duction had continued to increase at a
rapid rate, 8 percent in 1982, and that
energy as a whole was increasing, with
oil up by about 1 percent and coal 2 per- ,
cent in the past year. The Russians -
have also improved their trade with the
West, cutting their deficit from $4
lion in 1981 to $2 billion in 1982.
The Soviet gross national product in
1982 was estimated at $1.6 trillion, or
$6,000 per-capita, roughly 55 percent- of
the American gross national product.
The C.I.A. estimated Soviet gold re- I
serves at 200 million troy ounces, giving
32
lk it 35 percent of the world total. Produc-
tion in 1981 was estimated at 5 tons
and its stock at about 1,900 tons. worth '
over $25 billion at current prices.
The report said a major weakness in
the economy was the declining growth -
of the work force, with only 9 million ex-
pected to join in this decade as against
19 million in the 1970's.
Agriculture remains the weakest
link. Grain production achieved a
record high of 237 million tons in 1978
but has not reached 190 million tons
since then. The report also highlighted
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on; bkoetci
railroad system and depletion of many
I mineral reserves.
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_
ARI CLE APPEARED
PAGE /
Rebuilding US. Intelligence
LOS ANGELES TINES
3 JANUARY 1983
STAT
Casey Shapes Up CIA,
Survives as Top Spy
.7.0BERT C. Toni, Times Staff Writer
WASHINGTON?Last summer, Casey's midterm report card
several months before Leonid L shows that: - - - -
Bret-I:my died, the Central Intelli- ?The country has expel-jerked no
gence Agency produced a study of known "intelligence failures" or
Kremlin leadership politics almost "intelligence abuses" during his two
40 pages long. It predicted that a years.
cluster of Soviet officials would ?Intelligence budgets, up 20%,
succeed- Brechnev, not . a - strong have grown even - faster -.than
individual leader. ? Pentagon budget:-
After reviewing the top-secret ?Output at analytic studies his
report before it was forwarded to jumped a remarkable fivefold over
the White House, Central Intelli- the last years of-the Jimmy .Carter
gence Director William J Casey Administration. . --
concluded that President Reagan ?Covert activities have dropped
-would never wade through it alL So, somewhat in number, but individual
in a brief covering letter couched in operations have grown in size.
race-track parlance, he boldly pre- ?And "intelligence guidelines,"
dieted which Kremlin contenders which are the do's and don'ts of the
would win, place and show. -community, have been shortened
Kirilenko peaked too soon, Casey drastically.
told Reagan, and Chernenko faded Casey's former deputy, retired
in the stretch. Ancleopov is in the Adm, Bobby R. -Inman, believes
lead, perhaps challenged by -Usti. Casey will be rated "ver/ high" as a
nov, with Gorbachev the dark horse director of intelligence for "totally
and a future corner. overhauling the process of making
national intelligence esti-
mates?sharply increasing their
number, making them shorter and
more focused on problems That
policy-makers grapple with?plus
winning the President's support for
rebuilding the intelligence .commu-
nity."
Substantially Better'
On the Massey , -
? As it turned out, Casey was right
on the money: It was Yuri V.
Andropov, not a committee, that
succeeded Brezhnev as general sec-
retary of -the Soviet Communist
Party. But the episode is less Wiper-
tent as a measure of Casey the
Kreralinologist than as a measure of
tu
es, eve y has "moved
the CIA backward" in restricting
the release of information and in
resurrecting its covert action capa-
bilities. And some conservatives,
who asked not to be identified,
complain that Casey has not shaken
up the intelligence community as
the Republican Party platform of
1980 promised a Reagan Adminis-
tration would do. ?
Be that as it may, Casey?a
veteran of American intelligence
operations during World War 11, a
multimillionaire with an entrepre-
neurial bent and a former senior
federal official in financial and eco-
nomic areas?has no intention of
leaving the job. .
"I'm enjoying it," he said in an
interview, "and-we're making prog-
ress. I intend ta stick with it."
Twelve months ago, it was _far
from obvious that Casey was either
enjoying the job or was going to
keep it long.
At that point, he was reeling from
his early and almost disastrous
decision to hire a fellow Reagan
campaign worker, Max Hugel, as
chief of the CIA's clandestine
operations?a "very conspicuous
mistake on my part," Casey later
called it. Hugel quit after private
financial irregularities were alleged
Casey the CIA director and of the "Under Bill, things are substan. in the press, but three senior Re.
methods Casey has developed to rim tally better than the public image publican senators called for Casey's
the multibillion-dollar-a-year U.S.-suggests," Inman said in an:-inter- resignation.
intelligence commtmity. view. - - . The Senate Intelligence Commit-
Casey ?a scrappy, sometimes ar- Ray S. Cline, a former senior CIA tee re-examined Casey's financial
regent, bulky 69-year-old who re- . official, has praised Casey for seek- background-1.00.h grudgingly con-
tains a trace of his native New York ing to balance, with equally high -
accent?has surprised admirers and priority, the need to !provide accu-
critics dare by surviving as the _ rate, in-depth analysis with the
nation's top spy through the first need to make it. timely and useful in
two years of Reagan's tenure. Even helping to answer the hard policy
more, he has managed to set and questions of government.
maintain a careful but significant On the other hand, liberal _critics
pace for rebuilding the nation's L/ such as Morton Halperin, director of
intelligence capabilities. - - _ the Center for National Security
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L'aVI2IVUTLEZ
STAT
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00
'RADIO TV REPORTS, IN
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEW CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068
100140001-3
STAT
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAM
DATE
SUBJECT
Jack. Anderson Confidential
December 18, 1982 7:30 PM
The CIA and Banking
STATION WJLA TV
Syndicated
Washington, DC
JACK ANDERSON: This is Wall Street, the center of the
international banking system, a system on the edge of a crisis so
severe that the Central Intelligence Agency is preparing drastic
measures. Something must be done to avert the breakdown of the
Free World's monetary system. ,
The crisis developed after $600 billion in risky loans
were made to 40 Underdeveloped countries, countries too poor
to pay them back.
Richard Dale is a visiting scholar at the Brookings In-
stitution in Washington. The CIA came to see him because he's
one of the foremost authorities on international banks. He spoke
with my colleague Terry Repack.
RICHARD DALE: Well, as I understand it, the CIA takes
the view that the momentum towards collapse is already far ad-
vanced and that the political will to anticipate the problems
that may arise is simply not there. And I think they take .2
rather skeptical view about the whole problem; namely, that
governments will not act until, in a sense, it's too late. And
that is one particular interpretation.
So I think they say, right, we will not solve this
problem ahead of events; we will have a global bank holiday
before anything is done, and that will be the stimulus to get
governments to act and cooperate to pull us out of this.
But, of course, the CIA's job, if I may say so, is to
look at the downside risks. They're always looking for the worst
case. That is the nature of their job. So that was their focus.
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3
? OFFICFS IN- WASHINnTnN rir NFVJ vrok? enc Al\P-Zgl rzg a ? ruir-erem r?,..7rine-wr ?
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00
AaEEARED
ON PAGE
-
PLAYBOY MAGAZINE
December 1982
0100140001-3
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Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137
ART I CLE 1*--iNLREI) NEws?TEEK
ON PAGE
22 NOVEMBMD, 1 982
PERISCOPE
The FBI Investigates the Freeze Movement
President Reagan's charge at his press conference last week that
Soviet agents are involved in the domestic nuclear-freeze move-
ment was based on a secret Federal Bureau of Investigation study.
The White House has identified the Reader's Digest and State
Department reports as Reagan's sources. In fact, after reading one
Reader's Digest article outlining a Soviet link with the freeze
movement, the president asked the FBI to confirm the charge. The
bureau reported that there is hard evidence that Moscow has tried
to infiltrate and exploit the U.S. peace movement. But according to
one bureau source, the report does not contend that the Kremlin
inspired the movement or controls its leaders. FBI counterintelli-
gence chief Edward O'Malley's recent testimony on the subject
before the House intelligence committee is under review for possi-
ble declassification. Freeze advocates, including Republican Sen.
Mark Hatfield of Oregon, have challenged Reagan's accusation.
Similar charges were made repeatedly against the anti-Vietnam
War movement: no significant Soviet involvement was ever proved.
The PLO's Missing Members
Israeli intelligence says it has discovered that the camps in
Tunisia that accommodated 1,000 PLO guerrillas after their evacu-
ation from Beirut are now empty. Israeli officials suspect that the,
fighters have made their way back to the Mideast?either to Syria
or Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. American Mideast specialists say that
Syria has recently tightened its border watch to prevent PLO
fighters from sneaking back into Lebanon; they speculate that Syria
is fearful of provoking an Israeli attack.
How to Stop Soviet High-Tech Spies
Washington's campaign to stop the Soviet theft of technology
may handicap American businessmen more than the secret-snatch-
ers, according to a Senate study to be released this week. The
Senate's Permanent Investigating Subcommittee reports that the
Commerce Department tries to protect so many high-tech com-
modities that its 'limited resources are spread too widely to be
effective. The proposed solution: having the intelligence agencies
work harder to pinpoint the particular innovations that Moscow
covets most; security measures could then be concentrated on those
areas. The panel also recommends that customs officers be given
'broader powers and that the federal wiretap law be expanded to
permit easier surveillance of suspected poachers.
00100140001-3
STAT
The 'CIA In Fro)...
The Central Intelligence Agency has boosted its influence to new
levels during, the Reagan administration, by at least one measure.
Under Director William Casey, the CIA has sharply increased its
production of National Intelligence Estimates. Based on both
public and secret information, the NIE's address such topics as
Soviet nuclear strength, international terrorism and world oil
reserves. The reports are designed to be used by policymaking
officials, but they are often ignored. Nonetheless, the number of
NIE's can be a rough indicator of the CIA's standing. When Jimmy
Caner was president the CIA turned out about 12 a year. That
number more-than tripled during the first year of the Reagan
administration and will probably reach 60 in 1982.
(China Arms Iraq
China has set up a stall in the Middle East arms ba7aar. United
States intelligence officials say that China is now a major source of
military supplies for Iraq. According to a new report, Iraq buys one-
quarter of all its weaponry from China; that accounts for half of
China's arms-export total. Most Chinese weapons are based on
Soviet models, which makes it easy for Iraq to integrate the Chinese
equipment into its largely Soviet arsenal.
ERIC GELMAN with bureau reports
4
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7 ? -rit ?
1,-zdiarn.Anguish: Being Ordered to Lie
STAT
Mississippi colonel explains how it feels to cover u and to tell the tnith
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ON PAGE C. -
THE WASHINGTON POST
14 INIC VEMBER 1982
STAT
0100140001-3
Gains Hawkins is the administrator
? of the Dugan Memorial Nursing Home
? in West Point, Miss., and chai.7-'inan of
the Clay County Republican Party.
Order of battle intelligence, broadly speak-
ing, is everything one must...know about an
ememy's military force. .his knowledge
comes from studying the units of that force;
By Gains B. Hawkins
A FAMOUS LADY columnist Who writes
.n..for The Washington Post called the
other day and asked if I had any regrets
about participating in the making of CBS'
controversial documentary on the mis- or
uncounting of the enemy in Vietnam ? the
documentary that has led Gen. William C.
Westmoreland to file a $120-million libel suit
against CBS. In a state of mild shock at being
called by a famous lady newspaper columnist,
1 could only mumble something about "Yes"
and "No:"
With all my wits intact could have an-
swered a bit more eloquently, "Yes, there is
some anxiety ? a
to be a fink or a ra
concern that I will appear
scal, or a sensation monger
or worse; and some private annoyance that
-life in relatively quiet retirement in this little
community of -West Point on the black prai-
rie of nort-heast Mississippi will never be the
same again.
But, no, too, M
said), there is a
iss Mary (1 should have
compulsion here, a tardy
realization that the tale must come out no
matter what the personal pain or annoyance.
In truth, the retelling is somewhat like the
war itself, Miss Mary. If hurts, and it is larger
than all du&
When the deception began is not clear in
my memory. Years have passed and memory
can be like the smoked glass through which
one is warned to
when the deceptionm
look at an eclipse. Even
?
was going on there was a
wish not to remeber, as if the not remem-
bering would somehow belie the happening
itself. But it began to happen sometime dur-
ing the last three or four months of my 18-
month tour of duty that ended in the early
part of September: 967.
The tour began in February 1966 as a reun-
---
ion and a challenge. The reunion was with
then-Brig. Gen. Joseph A. McChristian, the
chief intelligence officer of the U.S. Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam. I had served
under the general before when he held a simi:
'Jar post at the Army's Pacific headquarters in
Hawaii. There, under the tutelage of Gen. appreciated the pay, which was much better
NIcChristian. this AtikerrouinVieence than that4 of Mississinni school teachers. I had
challenge of an area of military intelligence of my home.
of battle.
where exactly they are located; how many
people are in them; what types and how
much equipment-and weaponry they possess;
their organization or command structure;
their supply system; their tactics; their state
of training; their state of morale, or will to
fight; their actual -effectiveness in combat,
and probably most important, the quality of
their leadership, from cornmandel-in-chief
down to squad leaders. This is a slow, deliber-
ate way to study a military force. It is .also a
technique we needed to use to try to under-
stand the Vietnamese communists.
During the quarter century I spent wearing
the Army uniform, intelligence was my prin-
cipal endeavor. Drafted in early 1942 out of a
tiny teachers college in the Mississippi Delta
to serve in The Big War, I was later commis-
sioned a second lieutenant and did my thing
in Europe as a very junior intelligence officer
(where I served briefly with then-Col.
McChristian).
Discharged as a captain in the Army Re-
serve in 1946, I returned to Delta State
Teachers College to complete my degree,
taught high school English and somehow
managed to earn a master's degree in English
at Ole Miss just in time to be drafted again
?
for service in Korea.
The Army was good to me. It paid me well
and held out the promise of security in retire-
ment at a fairly youthful age. It taught me
Japanese, sent me to Asia, then launched me
permanently in the area of intelligence by
sending me to Stanford University to concen-
trate on the countries of the Far East.
I held no pretensions of finding a place on,
the Army's fast track to a general's stars. I
was happy as a duck on a pond doing the aca-
demic work of an intelligence analyst, and I
officer had first cis vere ame 211,q?toikcpni., RP 9,-9144AT qiNtO
17:
Vietnam was the ultimate test for
professional intelligence officers.
There field commanders could not
draw circles around hilltops or towns
and make them military objectives
simply because they were important
pieces of real estate. In Vietnam the
critical problem was not real estate,
but finding and destroying the
'enemy's military force. Intelligence
officers had to find the enemy before
?the enemy could be confronted and
.destroyed.
And so it was that in early 1966,
bored with a job as an intelligence
personnel officer at Ft. liolabird in
Baltimore, I had sent a note to Gen.
McChristian in Saigon offering my
services. A few weeks later I was sa-
luting him at his desk insideyths
MACV compound. ?
Considering our previous relation-
ship in Hawaii, I was not surprised
when the- general told -me I would
oversee the production of order of
battle intelligence. In his words, I was
"Mister Order of Battle." This was
the challenge.
The title was reiterated again and
? again during the months I served
-him. And I have always believed
there was a special motive for these
persistent reminders by the general.
to his staff, to visitors and to every-
one else up and clown the line.
There were almost as many vocif-
. erou.s estimates of the enemy force in
:-Vietnam as there were interested
:parties. But Gen. McChristian wasn't
: interested in journalists' guesses or
?-? field commanders' "gut feelings." He
demanded a plodding, painstaking
? analysis of the bits and pieces. This
? was to be my responsibility.
I - -
Keeping the books on the cornmu-
nist force was a complicated task be-
cause the force itself was Byzantine.
0 ajleui *re the North, Vietnamese
Army units. There was the massive
infiltration effort which provided
ditinnAi raciriaroc arNr1
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I :"
ON ?LG.=
THE ATLANTIC
November 1982
CHOOSING A STRATEGY FO
WORLD WAR III
BY THONLkS POWERS
IN THE YEARS SINCE 1945, DISCUSSION OF STRATEGIC
nuclear policy in the upper reaches of the American
government has centered on a single overriding ques-
tion?what to do If deterrence fails." The phrase is char-
acteristic of the rigid etiquette that governs official talk
about nuclear weapons. It means war, and especially a big
general war between the 'United States and the Soviet
Union?war of the old-fashioned, all-out sort. in which
even fear of The Bomb would take second place ' to the
straggle. Officials have learned to be wary of talking in
public about nuclear war. It just gets them in trouble. But
in private they talk about war all the time. None of them
wants such a war. In truth, none of them expects. it?now
or ever. But deterrence could fail. What do we do then?
For the general public, nuclear war means something
like the end of the world?a single burst of destruction in
which cities would be flicked of the face of the globe in a
whirlwind of fire. That is not the way military men look at
things. They may vaguely threaten to scrape Russia fiat
down to the primeval gravel, but that's mainly fer show, to
put the other side in a serious frame of mind. When the
balloon goes up," as they sometimes say, the time for
threats is past. Then you have got to fight, not just kiss
the kids good-bye and push the button. The general public
may be content with the awful either/or, but the military
instinctively rebels against the idea that the end of deter-
rence is the end of everything else.
When war comes, armies fight with the weapons at
hand. Nuclear weapons are a prominent feature of the ar-
senals of both sides. How are they to be used? What should
we point them at? How many should we fire in the opening
salvo?
In the early days of the nuclear era, the bombs were so
cumbersome, so hard to deliver, and above all so few that
they were reserved for only the most dramatic targets. As
a practical matter, that meant cities. In 1945. it meant
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the late 1940s, it meant Mos-
cow and Leningrad. In the fall of 1948, for example, the
United States had about 100 bombs, but the early bombs
took two days to assembe by a team of twenty-four. We
didn't have teams enough to assemble them all at once.
STAT
STAT
times didn't even know how many bombs we had. Until
1948, the only airplanes that could deliver the bombs were
specially modified B-29s, slow craft, vulnerable to attack
en route, so limited in range that they had to be based in
Europe. Military targets tend to be small, numerous, pro-
tected, hard to find and hit. For purely technical reasons.
then, the first nuclear weapons were pointed at "strategic"
targets, that is, targets the loss of which might affect the
morale or the War-making potential of the enemy. The
wars of the late 1940s, if they had taken place, would have
lasted a few weeks, and would have consisted of devastat-
ing blows on Russian cities, ports, and industrial sites.
By the early 1950s, these problems had been solved. The
AEC agreed to let the Strategic Air Command (SAC) keep
, bombs on its airfields. We had afleet of new intercontinen-
tal bombers to deliver them. The bombs themselves had a
much longer "shelf life" and didn't have to be assembled
from scratch immediately before use. Above all, they were
more numerous. We had entered, in the phrase used by
professional strategists, -the era of nuclear plenty"---in
which we still find ourselves. It is also the era of choice.
When you've got only three weapons, as we had in July of
1945. it's not hard to decide what to point them at. When
you've got thousands, as we have now, and when you can
hit anything in a known location on the surface of the
earth, as we can now, and, above all, when the Soviets can
retaliate in kind, then you have to think hard before decid-
ing what to hit and when to hit it. The decisions impiy the
course of the war we are likely to see If deterrence fails."
When Jimmy Carter entered the White House, in Janu-
ary of 1977, he probably would have done away with nucle-
ar weapons altogether given the choice. This may sound
like the inevitable preference of any sane man, but none of
Carter's predecessors had shared it. Nuclear weapons
solve certain kinds of problems; in particular. they are
cheaper than men and tanks. Carter's predecessors had all
chosen nuclear weapons rather than press Congress or
NATO allies to come up with money for men-and tanks
enough to face the Russians on what is called the -central
front" in Europe. Eisenhower's first secretary of defense,
Charles Wilson, once said, "We can't afford to fight limited
Such bombs as wel-140e6tked1friftrkei6aiV?R/66%1W: CIAlitapar. -15itISti4Noti ht a big war, and if there is
e I 9
it Energy Commission (AEC). which was reluctant to turn one, that e n tN'f . .11farter was a stranger
th over to the Air Force in advance. The generals some- to V'ashinetori in 1977: he had not been over and over this
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001
fr.:77.7.=0"7:;-
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
28 October 1982
By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
STAT
00140001-3
Washington
"The Soviets," says the bespectacled round-faced man who looks more like a
stockbroker than America's top spy, "got virtually a free ride on all of our research
and development."
He's talking about secret agents ? from the Soviet bloc. And, he says, they
plundered America's technological secrets because our own spies weren't watching
them.
The speaker is William C. Casey, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency
and coordinator for all intelligence gathering for the United States. He indicates
that things are likely to become much tougher for the Soviets in the world's intensi-
fying spy wars if he has his way.
After years of controversy and cutback, America's spies are finally getting a
break.
The Reagan administration is putting more money and manpower into the busi-
ness of spying, and into countering Soviet bloc spies both at home and abroad.
Exact figures on recruiting for the spy trade and on the money spent on the
intelligence agencies are kept secret. But it is clear that after years of decline,
spying is now a "growth industry." One of the few government insti-
tutions which is hiring new employees in this time of recession is the
US Central Intelligence Agency. ?
In the view of some experts. the effort comes none too soon.
"We've got to strengthen HUMIN"T," says oneof the experts who
has access to sensitive intelligence reports, speaking in the peculiar
argot of professional spies. He means "human intelligence
gathering".
"Our SIGINT (signal intellegence) and photo intelligence are
among the best, but in HiTMIN'T . . we're lucky if we're among the
top 10."
The Reagan administration took power some 21 months ago deter-
mined to strengthen intelligence collection, analysis, and operations,
and the dozen agencies that make up what is known in the trade as
the "intelligence community" are benefiting.
Take the Federal Bureau of Investigation, for example. According
to one high-ranking intelligence officer, FBI money and manpower
was once stretched to the point-where the bureau had to stop surveil-
lance of certain known Soviet spies, who, together with European
surrogate spies, were operating in an increasingly sophisticated and
aggressive manner in this country.
The FBI has become increasingly concerned over the loss' to So-
viet spies of American high technology information. Although pre-
cise figures are closely guarded, it is now clear that the FBI is get-
ting more in way of resources to conduct a more aggressive
counterespionage program. '
Mr. Casey argues, however, that the intelligence agencies are not
so much increasing their budgets as they are building back to where
they were before they got cut during the 1970s.
In a more than hour-long interview with the Monitor, Casey said
that because of these cuts in money and manpower. intelligence re-
porting on an increasingly turbulent third world and on a variety of
other problems had been drastically reduced. According to Casey,
major intelligence analyses. known as "national estimates" often
failed to cover third world developments.
US intelligence: focus on the Kremlin, third world countries
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Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3
CROSS nza CiA 3, 03e //9 Els-77/2,1,97-ES 61/1E)
For additional information on 'the above, see:
FTLES DATES
0?, n/ A// /
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Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010
r;.:2,53
71I EELL
L OCTO3LR 1982
Cr'",r
1140001-3
U. S. Vigilance Over Soviet
Space Activities increased
Washington?The Central Intelligence
Agency and other U. S. intelligence orga-
nizations are increasing their vigilance of
Soviet s7.-.ace program capabilities at the
ura'ing of the new U. S. Air Force Space
Comman d.
"We will push for more attention and
understanding for operational space intel-
ligence so it gets at least the same treat-
ment as the missile, air, ground and naval
threats," Gen. James V. Hartinger, who
heads both Space Command and North
A.rnericam Aerospace Defense Command,
said
Hartinger said he has discussed this is-
sue with CIA director William Casey. Ca-
sey "agrs that the operational space
intelligence area should be a national in-
telligence estimate placed in a high-priori-
ty position?now it's going to be," he
said.
Soviet Launch Rate
Continuing high . Soviet military space
launch rate coupled with new Soviet de-
velopments that will increase Russian ca-
pabilities during the 19S0s has recently
prompted Defense and other officials to
highlight the threat posed by this Soviet
de-:eloprnent push.
National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration deputy administrator Hans
M. Mark told an Air Force Assn. sympo-
sium here that he wanted to comment on
the Soviet Hlitary space buildup at the
recent United Nations Conference on
Space held in Vienna (Aw,ksT Aug. 16,
p. 16).
He was overruled by the State Dept, he
said. and in Vienna the U. S.. was criti-
cized for space militarization, not the So-
viet Union.
Under secretary of Defense for research
and engineering, Richard D. DeLauer,
told a Senate Foreign Relations subcom-
mince that the Soviet Salyut space station
program "engages in military activities
and may be the .forerunner of a weapons.
platform.-
Under secretary of the Air Force, Ed-
ward C. Aldridge, Jr., told the Air Force
Assn. symposium that Defense Dept. is
concerned xl-th Soviet development of a
Sat:n5-:]ass ]auncher capable of placing
an anp7c:ii-:-.2ie 300,000 lb. payload into
? In addition to space station launch,
Aldridge said Defense Dept. is concerned
this new heavy booster could be used to
launch large high-energy laser weapons
systems. "We will be watching this closely ,
and make sure we have the proper. re- !
sponse," Aldridge said.
"We are going to provide the operation-
al pull to go with the technology push
that has dominated space flight since its
inception," Hartinger said. "We are going
to develop space 'doctrine and strategy.
We are going to strengthen the weakest
link in space systems development?the
statement of operational need procedure."
The new command plans to insure that
U. S. military space assets participate rou-
tinely in military exercises like those 6:in-
ducted by other elements of the military
services.
"We have been exercising everything
else but not space. We are going to now,"
Hartinger said.
Hartinger cited milestones toward
bringing Space Command to full capabili-
ty:
a Activation?The command was acti-
vated Sept. 1. This will be followed Jan. 1
by activation of the 1st Space Wing at
Peterson AFB, Colo., near NORAD head-
quarters at Colorado' Springs. Space Com-
mand's Communications Div. will be
activated also on Jan. 1, and on Apr. 1,
Space Command will take over Peterson
AFB from Strategic Air Command.
The USAF Space Div. that remains un-
der Systems Command was to activate the
Space Technology Center at Kirtland
AFB, N. M., on Oct. 1. The Space Div.
and technology center will be closely
aligned with Space Command, although
they will remain under Systems Command
control.
Command Heads
While Hartinger heads both NORAD
and Space Command, the head of Air
Force Space Div., Lt. Gen. Richard C.
Henry, is also vice commander of Space
Command. This is designed to form close
ties between developmental and operation-
al Air Force space enns.
? 1st Space Wing?The new organiza-
tion will be responsible for world-wide
space tracking and missile warning-sen-
sors that Space Command will be acquir-
ing from Strategic Air Command. ,
The new wing will have 6,000 Air
Force personnel and 2,000 contractor per-
sonnel spread between four primary bases
at Peterson AFB, Colo.; Sondrestrom Air
Base, Greenland; Thule Air Base, Green-
land, and Clear An, Alaska. The north-
ern bases have missile early warning
sensor responsibility.
Lt. Gen. Henry, vice commander of
Space Command, said at the symposium,
"Every operational Defense spacecraft in
orbit is either national in character or
provides support to more than one service
Or agency.
"My point is that spacecraft are gener-
ally strategic in nature and our depen-
dence on them is such that we should
start thinking of their deployments as stra-
tegic issues,"
He posed several questions for Space
Command to answer:
? How vulnerable are we to spacecraft
attrition by failure or combat?
? if a spacecraft should be lost during
launch, how do we recover the lost capa-
bility?
? How do we address orbital selection?
"We know some orbits are less vulnerable
than others. Do we have an orbit strate-
gy?"
? "If we define an orbital strategy that
can absorb combat losses, do we have the
supportive procurement and launch strate-
gies?"
"Our mission in space is to deliver from
on high to our operational forces the elec-
tronic bit stream, the written message,
oral conversation, a picture or navigation
situation wherever the forces need it,
whenever they need it and with total cer-
tainty," Henry said.
"Space Command's job is to define the
orbital strategy and force structure needed
to make this come true," according to
Henry. 0
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CY.
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PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
12 SEPTEMBER. 1982
Military. game
Scary leaks calculated to
STAT
win weapons fundiriv-
- Ironically, as U.S intelligence.-
gathering and analysis have become
more Sophisticated, the translation
of threat assessment into budget re-
ality-has become more frantic.
Despite the Reagan ? administra-
tion's commitment to a five-year, SIS
trillion increase in military spend-
ing. blossoming budget deficit pro-
jections have convinced Pentagon
planners that they should get new
weapons systems approved quickly,
before congressional support for big
defense budgets evaporates.
As the Air Force competes for
funds with the Navy and the Army.
defense analysts say, leaks have be-
come more profligate.
"In the old days there were few
leaks. and -there was always a guy
frem -the FBI in my office the follow-
ing morning trying -to -find, .the
leaker," says retired -Gen:-Daniel 0.
Graham. former head of the Dense
?Intelligence Agency - (DIA). 'Tell.
now it's gotten se rampant I. don't
think they bother ? with that any-
more."
Briefings offered
. Compounding the problem --4or
Congress and the public is the gov.
ernment's penchant for stamping
nearly all intelligence analyses "ton
secret." As a result, the editor of a
respected military journal says, inde-
pendent verification of leaks has be-,
come more difficult.
The Pentagon does offer classified
briefings on such issues to members
of Congress, but the sessions are not
normally well attended. And the pub-
lic has no access to such briefings,
which. could give better perspective
to issues that have been the subject
? of selective leaks.
Even ..expegienced congressional
staff members wittiliciifitrtleare-
ances say they are haying increased
difficulty digging information out of
The Pentagon. "You tend to go to
your friends over there." one aide
says: "The problem is that your
friends tend to share your ideology,
and sometimes I feel I'm not getting a
,"balanced picture."
In the resuliant-cauldron of leaks
and rumors, rational, calm and inde-
pendent thinking on defense often
gets short shrift. That is unfortunate
BY David Wood
ARteLeS 11~.3 Serftf-t
WASHINGTON ? During a break-:.
fast session with reporters recently,
Gen_ W. L Creech, commander of the
Tactical Air Command, unexpectedly
disclosed that the Soviet Union had
developed three new fighter planes
that might- out-perform the best
fighters currently in the US. arsenal.
The result was alarming headlines
in newspapers ? and success for the
Air Force with a time-honored Wash-
ington ploy: the calculated leak. .
Earlier, the Air Force had asked
Congress for 52.3 million in the fiscal
1983 budget to begin development of
a new-generation fighter. Classified
intelligence analyses of the new So-
viet threat had been available to key
members of Congress, but the re-
quest was in danger of falling victim
to the pervasive budget-cutting mood .
on Capitol Hill.
Two weeks after Creech disclosed
the previously secret assessment of
the new Soviet aircraft, however.
Congress voted to let the Air Force
go ahead with research and develop-
ment for the U.S. fighter.
The incident illustrates a bureau-
cratic maneuver common enough in
the past but becoming increasingly
prevalent since the Reagan adminis-
tration took office: selective leaking
of intelligence and other informa-
tion to tilt decisions on important`
defense questions.
It is a trend that some military
analysts fear may fritter away Penta-
gon credibility and help dissolve na-
tional support for building a stron-
ger defense_
It always has been difficult, even
under the best of circumstances, to
assess accurately the threat posed by
the Soviet Union or either potential
adversaries and to shape the budget
to meet such challenges. And the
pressure from American military es-
tablishments always has been tre-
mendous.
Indeed, President Eisenhower and
Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khru-
shchev, according to the Soviet lead-
er's memoirs, glumly acknowledged
during informal talks-at Camp David
23 years ago that neither was able to
resist the demands of generals who
First, the high technology in-
volved in modern weapons systems
has dramatically lengthened the
time it takes to bring new weapons
from concept through production
into use. The budget decisions Con-
gress mikes this fall will shape the
American defense posture well into
the 21st century.
Second. because of a slowdown in
defense spending in the 1970s, dos- .
ens of major weapons systems will
become obsolete within a few years.
Thus. the nation faces decisions now
on a wide variety of important mili-
tary programs, ranging from the MX
missile to the 600-ship Navy and a
fundamental re-equipping and re-
training of the Army;
Look for evidence
Between "selective" intelligence
leaks and the increasing classifica-
tion of thorough intelligence ana-
lyses, it is becoming -clear that
military intelligence personnel tend
to look around for evidence to sup-
port their causes.
It was precisely to avoid this prob-
lem that the .process of gathering.
analyzing and collating intelligence
data into official "threat assess-
ments' was created.
Under the system. reports on Sovi-
et military technology, weapons pro-
duction, defense spending, strategy
and other subjects are analyzed by
the CIA zed its Pentagon counter-
part, the DIA, as well as by -Nagy.
Army and Air Force intelligence
branches. This work then is gath-
ered into one National Intelligence
Estimate.
The estimate -is supposed TO rise
above the instintional biases of the
individual services and intelligence
agencies.
But according to former and cur-
rent intelligence executives, the pro-
cess has gotten seriously skewed, '
with the more "aggressive" DI?kgain-
ing an edge over the more treelll'on-
ally cautious CIA. ,
Graham, who as DIA director. engi-
neered the agency's rise in infkience
in the White House and netigel se-
curity circles, dates the beginiseag of
the DIA's ascendancy to theaarly
had intelligence repom about ypii 1970s. when the CIA was widely-crib-
the other side was tifeFIENRVI4Pikor Release 20.601/1331sCWRDP290t01137R0001611fatecieizlY underestimate
doing. perilous now for two reasons: mg sovier mi nary power. ,
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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE ?
Capital Tactic
entagon
Joins Itsel
ilk Lea
By DAVID WOOD, s
Times Staff Writer- -
-WA.SlifitGTON?During a
breakfast ses_gicin with reporters re--
"cently, Gen: W. L. Creech; coth-
-.gander of the Tactical Air Com-
mand, unexpectedly- disclosed that:
-_the Soviet Union had. developed
'three new fighter planes that -might-
out-perform the best fightersfighters cur-
,rently in the U.S. arsenal. *: ;
7 The result was alarming 'head-
lines in newspapers?and 'success:
:for the _Air Force with a tiine-hon-
;cored Washington ploy: the caleulat 1
s_..ed leak. - s ' ? , ?
Eg_rlier, the Air Force had asked
:Congress for $23 million in the fiscal
19'63 budgettto begin development
a new-generation fighter. Cla.ssi-
fie,e. intelligence analyses of the new
Sovita threat-had been available to --
key members of Congress, but the
reqeiest was in danger of falling ?
tim to the pervasive budget-cutting
mood on Capitol Hill.
Two weeks- after' .Creech went
public with:. the previously ilieskaret
assessment of the new Soviet air;
-craft, however, CongressVoted to,
-let the Air Force go ahead with re- --
search and development 'for, the
new U.S. fighter..
_
More Common Practice
The -incident illustrates
bureaucratic, maneuver common
enough in the past but becoming in-
creingly prevalent since the Rea-
gan Administration took office;se-
lective leaking of intelligence .and
-other information to tilt decisions on
important defense questions. It is a
? trend that some defense analysts
fear may fritter away Pentagon
credibility and help dissolve nation-
LOS ANGELES TIMES
12 SEPTEMBER 1982
I.Tnderjhe best of circumstances-,
:accurately -assessing the;. threat
'posed by the Soviet Union or-ather
:potential adversaries and shaping
:the budget to meet such challenges
always-has been' difficulL: And the
pressure . from American military
establishments: ? 'always has .:,been'
tremendous. - ?
".... Indeed, President a_ Dwight 11
.Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Ni-'
kita -S. -,.I.Ehrushchev, according; to
:the.Soviet leader's merrioirs, glumly
? :acknowledged during informal talks
.at Camp: David 23 -years ago that.
..neither Was. able to resist the de-
snands Of generals waving .intel-
-,ligence reports about what the oth-
er side was believed.to be doing
_ . . .
Inaccurate teaks in 19Os?
Nor is the calculating,' budget-
'manipulating' government . official?
new on the scene_ :
:the 1950s, the -jobs..of.:14,000
?.
'people in seven states arid congres-.
.sional appropriations of More than
$1 :billion to develop in-- atomia-;
-powered boniber were sustained in
part by: Official leaks about:Soviet
construction of such a plane._Intele
ligenee eiperts, now agree, howeV
.er, that the leaks were not true:
Ironically, as U.S. intelligence:-
gathering and .analysis' have be-,.
come' more sophisticated, -the ra?
tional 'translation of threat assess- '
_ment into budget -reality7has -be'.
come more frantic. ?
Despite the Reagan Administra-
tion's commitment to a five-year,
$1.5-triliione increase iri -defense
spending, blossoming budget deficit ?
projections have convinced Penta-
gon planners that thy had better
get new weapons systems approved
? qi:lickly, before congiassional sup:-
port for big defense iudgets eva-
porates.
,?
As the Air Force empetes for
.4arce funds with the Isavy and the .
Army, defense analyst say, leaks
17ave become more profigate.
? 1"In the old days then were few
? ltaks, and there was alVays a guy
ftom the FBI in my offie the fol-
liv.ing morning trying b find the
Iral.zer,? said retired Gen_Daniel 0.
Graham, former head of the Defense
? Iptelligence Agency. "Hell now it's
gcetten so rampant I don't think they ?
that an ymore." -
al support for building a stronger ,bother v;ith
defense... ?
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0140001-3
STAT
Conipounding the pro em for
Congress and the public- is the
gavernment's penchant for 'Ttarnp-
itg nearly all intelligence atalyses
top secret_ As a result, the edtor of
respected- , military jourhal_says,
i$dependent- verification - of Aeaks
has become more difficult:
.1 The Pentagon does offer elaasi- .
fed briefings to members of Cm-
&ess on such issues, but the., fes-
' eons are not normally well attend-
ed. And the public hasno access az!
sich briefings, which could give
better, perspective to issues thaa
liave been the subject of selectivaks
,.
? - -
. An Unbalanced Picture
And even experienced congres-
sional staff members with security:
clearances say they are having
creased - difficulty prodding infor-
mation out of the Pentagon. "You
tend to go to your friends over
there." one aide said. "The problem
is that- your friends tend to share
your ideology, and sometimes I feel
I'M not getting a balanced picture."
In the resultant cauldron of leaks
and rumors, rational and calm inde-
pendent thinking on defense often
gets sideswiped_ That is unfortunste_
any time, but it has become more
perilous for two reasons:
First, the high technology in-
volved in modern weapons systems
has dramatically lengthened the
time it takes to bring new weapons
from concept through production
0J7sITLVVED
Approved For Release 2q0SEIg-thatoiClikIREW90-01137R00010
10 September 19 82
SALT violations, continued
Fresh evidence arrives almost daily that
the Soviet Union is violating numerous and
significant provisions of the SALT I and SALT
II agreements.
A member of the Defense. Intelligence.
Agency has told The Washington Times that
the Soviets have constructed between 40 and
220 SS-16 mobile ICBMs now operational at
the Plesetsk r4issile site.
The National Intelligence Estimate of?
Soviet Strategic Forces,as reported by John
Lofton, states as an agreed U.S. intelligence
judgment that "the Soviets will break out
of the SALT I and SALT II agreements this
year." The paper reveals that the Soviets
will increase the number of MIRVed mis-
siles to 920. overshooting the SALT II ceil-
ing of 820 missiles by 12 percent in a single
year.
These are just two more bits of evidence
in a growin2 mound. The Kremlin, it seems,
has violated the letter and spirit of SALT on
every major provision, from ABM testing
and construct2on limits to missile and bomber
ceilings an d nen-interference with U.S.
verification.
Most disr_lrbing of all, information reaches
us that the P;rms Control and Disarmament
Agency L3 al)out to declare that the Soviets
are still "in fundamental compliance" with
the SALT aczonis.
The report. fo:.-a congressional committee,
will take no: of the various allegations, but
0140001-3
STAT
dismiss them as either insignificant or
unproven. It looks like the kind of cover- up
the Republican platform of 1980 pledged to
end.
It isn't all ACDNs fault, of course. Despite
the heroic efforts of a handful of congress-
men, both the SenateForeign Relations Com-
mittee and the House Armed Services Com-
mittee have refused to open hearings on the
matter. Despite its helpful attention to Soviet
violations of other agreements?the chemi-
cal weapons ban and Cuban missile under-
standing, for example ? the administration
is still reluctant to give up publicly on Soviet
good faith.
What ACDA needs is a clear directive from
the White House to admit that the violations
are violations. Convincing the public won't
be easy. The president's critics will shout
all the predictables; the cowboy, we'll be
told, is just looking for an excuse to scuttle
talks with the Soviets altogether. The presi-
dent was insincere all along on arms control,
they'll say. No matter how hard the evidence,
the media organs of the Left will pronounce
it not hard enough.
However, even the polls cited by the nuclear
freeze lobby show that Americans do not
trust the Russians to keep any agreement
that isn't airtight ? and SALT I and II are
not. The evidence of Soviet violation must
be examined with great care. If it holds up,
though, the American people need to know.
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ARTICLE AP:EpRED
ON PAGE
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WASHINGTON TIMES
8 SEPTEMBER 1982
JOIN LOFIDN'S JOURNAL
Reagan spends less
than Carter on arm
Ronald Reagan has caught a lot
of flak, and many Republican
candidates are being put on the
spot, because of the president's
alleged massive increase in the
defense budget But, a close
look at new data reveals that real
defense spending ? in terms of
constant comparable Reagan dol-
lars ? is less than it would
have been had Jimmy Carter been
re-elected_
Furthermore, under President Reagan, defense
spending is likely to be significantly less in 1983
than it would have been under Carter. Also, in terms'
of real defense spending or outlays in 1981 and
1982, the Reagan administration has spent slightly
less than Carter planned. Thus, there has not yet
been a real increase in U.S. military capabilities.
In fact, Reagan's highly touted military buildup
is still largely a promise and will occur ? if at all ?
only in the future.
? While it's true that in each year the president has
'requested defense budgets higher than Carter's,
he also has supported congressional cuts. .
The new data that compare and contrast the
Reagan and Carter defense budgets comes from the
Congressional Budget Office. What the CBO has -
done is convert the last Carter five-year military
budget into constant comparable Reagan dollars.
This provides a realistic, fair comparison between
Reagan and his predecessor. Here are the figures:
In 1981 outlays, Carter proposed spending $160.1
billion; Reagan's figure is $156.1 ? which is $4
billion less than Carter. In 1982 outlays, Carter
proposed spending $181.7 billion; Reagan, $182.7
? which is Si billion more than Carter. In 1983
.outIaye, Carter proposed spending $203 billion;
Reagan, $215.9 billion (requested as of April of this
year).
STA I
? For 1983, Congress would have appropriated S203
:billion for Carter; for Reagan, $207.4 billion_ For
:1983, under a continuing resolution, Congress would
:have appropriated $203 billion for Carter; $182.7
billion for Reagan. Thus, under these figures, Carter
:would have spent $23.3 billion more on defense
:than Reagan.
? So, regardless of what you've heard or read ?
'as things stand now ? Ronald Reagan's defense
:budget is actually smaller than the defense budget
:projected by Jimmy Carter. This is undoubtedly the
'reason why such hardline Reaganite groups as
;The Committee on the President Danger and The
:Heritage Foundation have criticized Reagan's
'military budget as inadequate. Says Robert Foelber, a
:Heritage defense expert:
"So far the FY 1983 defense budget debate has
:focused almost exclusively on the economics of
'defense. It is now time to consider the budget in
:terms of military requirements, stable deterrence
:and the realities of the Soviet threat. As they stand,
.the administration defense budgets cannot reverse
:the West's decline'
This new information from the CBO is not the
;only astounding information regarding the adminis-
-tration's military policy. A National Intelligence
'Estimate on Soviet strategic forces ? issued this -
:past spring ? reveals that if the Russians
continue to kuld their MIRVed (multiple independently
:targeted re-entry vehicles) ICBMs (inter-continental
.ballistic missiles) at the same rate, by the end of this
year they will be massively violating the SALT H
treaty.
.?_.. _
- - - -
This information was available to the president
when he announced this past Memorial Day that the
United States would, de facto, be adhering to his
pact even though our Senate has never ratified it. On
June 29, Reagan declared: _ - ?.
"As for existing agreements, we will refrain from
actions which undercut them so long as the Soviet
Union shows equal restraint."
But, the spring National Intelligence Estimate
shows no such restraint. Projecting the existing
growth rate for Soviet MIRVed ICBMs, it saS,,s that
if this continues, by the end of 1982 the Russians will
have 920 MIRVed ICBMs, which is 100 more than
the SALT II limits allow.
.csflivirNvEat
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Soviets to Meet Goal,
? CIA Analysis Finds
By Dan Morgan
wureei. Smr f wziter
A classified memorandum pre-
pared by the Central Intelligence
Agency in August concluded that the
Soviet Union will meet its gas deliv-
ery commitments to Western Europe
"through the 1980s," despite the
Reagan administration's efforts to
delay construction of the Siberian
pipeline.
The memorandum, classified "se-
cret" but circulated widely in the
government, undercuts a central ad-
ministration argument that the sanc-
tions, divisive as they are proving to
be within the Atlantic Alliance,
eventually will pay off by depriving
. the Kremlin of western currency
needed to support its lagging econ-
omy and its miliary buildup.
For this reason, middle-level of-
ficials at the 'n:ational Security
Council, and the Szate, Defense and
Commerce departments are reported
to have challenge-6. the CIA conclu-
sions and pressed for a Special Na-
tional Intelligence Estimate, or
"SNIE," of the issue by the entire
U.S. intelligence community.
The interagency critique of the
CIA memo was reviewed last week
by State Deeiertment counselor
James L. Buckley and sent to the
National Security Council. NSC of-
ficials, however, declined to discuss
the matter yesterday.
The CIA analysis, based on infor-
mation as of Aug. 6, expresses the
view that Moscow has "a wide range
of options" to accomplish its goal of
increasing natural gas deliveries to
Western Europe, including the fol-
lowing:_
-7..e:ete......7e-er
7R000100140001-3
? "Deliveries could begin in late
1984, as scheduled, by using existing
pipelines, which have excess capacity
of at least 6 billion cubic meters an-
nually."
0 "-Using some combination of So-
viet and West European equipment,
deliveries through the new export
pipe:ine could probably begin in late
1985 and, reach nearly full volume in
1987?about one year later than if
the sanctions had not been im-
posed."
? "At substantial cost to the do-
mestic economy, the U.S.S.R. could
divert construction crews and com-
pressor station equipment from new
domestic pipelines to the export
pipeline, or even dedicate a domestic?
pipeline for export use to ensure ca-
pacity adequate to meet contractual
delivery obligations."
Only this last choice of relying
primarily on their own resources
would cause the Soviets much dif-
ficulty, the memo said. It could force
Moscow to cut back its domestic
pipeline construction program, forc-
ing a reduction of domestic gas de-
liveries by as much as 30 billion
cubic 'meters a year.
That possibility has faded in the
last few days as French and British
companies have loaded key pipeline
components on Soviet-bound
freighters in defiance of President
Reagan's order June 15 forbidding
foreign firms utilizing U.S. licenses
from delivering the equipment. But
European governments have unan=
imbusly rejected these controls and
ordered their firms to proceed with
deliveries.
The practical problem facing the
administration is that enough U.S.
built equipment is in Europe to
allow European firms to ship the
Soviets as many as 23 complete tur-
Vac* of the 125 ordered.
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STAT
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WASHINGTON QUARTERLY
THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATION2W
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY,
Autumn 1982
00140001-3
Rayinond L. Garth:ow, o retired Foreign
Service officer and ambassador. is a senior
fellow at the Broolungs Instinthon. In 1962.
serving as special assistant for Soinet Bloc
Paiitico-hlilitai7.- Affairs in the Deparanenr
af State hr participated acoyeh in the
Cuban titiLsile crists deciston-nsaing
process. -
Using his own recently
declassified memos, this former
senior State Department official
examines the military
considerations behind U.S.
decision making during the
Cuban missile crisis.
The Meaning of
the Missiles.
Raymond L Garthoff
One of the crucial considerations in U.S.
decision-making during the Cuban missile
crisis in October 1962 was our evaluation of
the military significance of the Soviet de-
ployment in Cuba of medium-range ballistic
missiles (MRBMs) and intermediate-range
ballistic missiles (lRBMs). This fact is obvi-
ous, yet at the same time far from clear. It is.
for example, well known from several in-'
formed accounts that then Secretary of De-
fense Robert McNamara had said from the
outset that the military significance of the
Soviet missile deployment was not unman-
ageable, and could be offset without having
to remove the missiles?whether by compel-
ling Soviet withdrawal or. if that could not
be done, then by U.S. military action. Not
all military leaders agreed with that judg-
ment, but the question was quickly set aside
W-14
because of President Kennedy's concern
over the political consequences, troth inter-
national and domestic, if the United States
were to acquiesce TO the Soviet deployment
in Cuba. McNamara did not question that
judgment or decision, and he did not deny
that there was military significance to the de-
ployment. The actual impact of the missiles
on the military balance, therefore, did not
become an issue of contention. Indeed, it
was no: even fully analyzed in the hectic
week of initial decisions. But it remained a
factor throughout the 13 days of the con-
frontation until Khrushchev agreed to dis-
mantle and remove the missile systems.
Beyond the narrow circle within the ad-
ministration dealing hourly with the crisis,
the question of what political and military
measures of coercion?or concession?
MISSILE CRISIS +20
1 The Meaning of the Mulles
Royrnonel L. Garthoff
8 The Cuban Blockade:
An Admiral's Idientalr
George Anderson
13 A CIA Ilerniniscenee
Ray S. Chne
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LaT 111-77.EARLI
ON PAG Z, I
THE NEWSDAY MAGAZINE (N.Y.
11 July 1982
HI case
Heim:
uietiy in Co
By David Wise
Photo by Ken? Spencer
Some -weeks ago, an interesting
piece of information began circulat-
ing in the intelligence community
the closed, spooky world of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, Defense
- Intelligence Agency, National Secu-
rity Agency, Federal Bureau of In-
- vestigation and the other spy
agencies in and around Washington.
The word went out that William J.
'Casey, the director of central intelli-
gence, had bought an expensive
house in the exclusive Foxhall Road
section of Washington. .
To men and women accustomed to
working with fragments, piecing to-
gether minute bits of intelligence to
form a larger mosaic, the report was
immediately seen for its true signifi-
cance. Better than any official- an-
nouncement, it meant that Bill
Casey, a Long Islander who has a?
home in Roslyn Harbor, was plan-
ning to stick around as CIA director.
There have been times in the past
stormy year and a half when it was
not at all clear that Casey would sur-
vive as the DCI, as the spies refer to
their chief. There was a series of di-
sasters. First, Casey named his for-
mer political aide, Max C. Hugel, as
head of the CIA's cloak-and-dagger
directorate. Hugel was soon forced
to resign as the result of disclo-
sures in the Washington Post
about his questionable business
dealings. Then the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee, responding to a
barrage of publicity, began probing
Casey's own financial past. And
Sen. Barry GaikkraivredliFeritiilease 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001
chairman of the intelligence com-
mittee, once a Republican presiden-
_ -
_ --
point-blink for Casey to resign
All of that took place last year
Casey's first year on the -job. Thi
storm subsided. The Senate panel
in a backhanded way, found Case
`not _"unfit" to serve. And through
all, the CIA director Ronald Rea
gan's campaign manager in 1980 ?
? managed to preserve his close per
sonal relationship with the Presi
dent. ("I still call him Ronnie,
?Casey has said.) . .
Among those who must surel
have heard the report ? about th
house off Foxhall-Road was Casey'
deputy, Adm. Bobby Ray Inman
..who Sen. Goldwater and a lot of oth
.er members of Congress bad openl
hoped would be Reagan's origins
choice for CIA director. Blocke
from the top job, wooed by privat
industry with job offers in six fig
ures, Inman in April announced tha
he was quitting.
In Moscow, the KGB has no doub
already heard about Casey's nec
house. Very likely, Vitali V. Fedor
chuk, the recently appointed chair
man of the Committee for Stat
Security, better known as the KGB,
has already informed President Leo-
Brezhnev in the Kremlin.
And the report is true. J. William
Doswell, director of the CIA's Of-
fice of External Affairs, a smooth,
Richmond, Va., lobbyist and former
newsman whom Casey brought in as
his top public relations man, con-
firms it. Doswell said that Casey
and his wife, Sophia, moved last
month from their apartment some-
where in Washington to their new
home off Foxhall Road.
career who has managed to stay one
jump ahead of trouble, barely avoid-
ing -entanglement with the Iles of
Robert Vesco during Watergate.
For example, - Sen. Joe Eiden of
Delaware, a Democrat on the Senate
Intelligence Committee and Casey's
most vocal critic, refused to endorse
the panel's findings on the CIA di-
rector, declaring. "Mr. Casey has
displayed a consistent pattern of
omissions, misstatements, and con-
tradictions." And Casey's critics also
charge he is not really qualed to
run the CIA, since his intelligence
iqffige-qiates from World War
II, when he worked for the Office of
Strategic Services (the OSS was the
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00
:.? -
ARTICTZ APPEABID-
ON PAGE T6,
NEW YORK TIMES
5 JULY 1982
Q&A I Bobby R. Inman
Assessing Government's Ap
to Intelligence
Simla. to TX tieVYadenisug
WASHINGTON, July 4 ? Adm.
Bobby R. Inman startled Washington
in April when be announced his inten-
tion to resign as the Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence. He said he
wanted to go into private business, but
associates asserted that the real rea-
sons for his departure were policy dif-
ferences with the Reagan Administra-
tion and mounting frustration over
dealing with the White House National
Security Council staff. His retirement
from the Government and the Navy
complete, Mr. Inman sat down last
week to discuss intelligence issues.
Q. Is the Reagan Administration.
- using intelligence information as a
neutral basis for foreign policy formu-
lation, or, as some critics have
charged, is it twisting intelligence
data to justify policies?
A. It's been very rare in my experi-
ence when an Administration makes
an effort to deliberately twist the in-
telligence to support policy, but there
have been efforts over the years to
force us to say-more than the
intelli-
gence professionals believe is safe in
terms of protecting sources and meth-
ods. I believed we found the proper
balance earlier this year on the issue
of Cuban and Soviet involvement in
Central America. The debate was not
with the intelligence but with the poli-
cy. I don't believe that the Cuban and
Soviet threats were being exaggerat-
ed. For years we had a minimal effort
dedicated to Central America and did
not detect in a timely way the com-
mencement of the training of prospec-
tive guerrillas in Cuba. We were slow
to recognize the breadth of insurgen-
cies that we were. going to face. When
we finally aaaimulated A large body
of rawdatsi:iiitif Understood the scope
al-Cuban activiefeTearly undertaken
with full Soviet support, there was a
taeclency-to- react with shock. That
mayieell havecome acttes as overre-
action. The language used to describe
-Cnbanacrivity may have been a little
more shrill than it would have been
had we detected the activity from the
outset.
?
Q. How has the Reagan Administra-
tion changed priorities in intelligence
collection and analysis?
1100140001-3
STAT
A . Early in the Reagan Administra: dens" on verification. There are sev-
non, increased emphasis was placed eral ways to deal with that. There are,
on gaining a knowledge of events in for 'mance, forms of on-site inspec.
Central America and the Caribbean, tion that would increase verification?
the causes of terrorism and the Prob. capabilities, but if you insist on abso-
lem of the transfer of American tech- lute certainty, if you insist on the ca-
nology to the Soviets- and Comenmist pacity to detect every violation, you'll
bloc. Over a longer period of time, ? never have an arms control proms.
there's been a fools On improving You have to take some risks. The key
knowledge acress_the_third world. ? is being confident that you will detect
Q. Has the Reagan Adminatation; anyserious cheating.
placed a greateerellance on the use of ?
covert operations than recent admin-
istrations?? Q. What is the state of United States'
' A I know of no way that I can talk intelligence ozPabilities?
? sensibily in public about specific coy- A. The United States intelligence
t ert operations. By their nature, there community, as currently structured .
Is nothing unclassified about them. I Intel warmed, is marginally capable to
believe historians would agree that deal with the world of the late Ilea's
every administration ultimately tarns and 90's. That judgment is-shaped by
to the use of covert operations when my view that this country's primary -
they become frustrated about the lack problems in that period will be found
of success with diplomatic initiatives la the competition for raw materials,
- and are unwilling to use military ? natural resources, and markets in all
farce. Some may begin by being more unstable world with the potential far
eager than others. I Wouldn't care to minor conflicts that couldssealate 1n
characterize any of the administra- re* hie we now have little or no
dons I've watched. In the Icing years intelligence effort. I do not believe we
of drawing down intelligence ameba- can do less than.we are doing against
itics, we almost completely disman- our principal adversaries, and there
tied the nation's capacity to conduct are areas where that effort isn't as
covert operations. The impression good ag it should be, specifically Intel-
that we're running around the world ligence on economic and political
conducting covert operations is plain ? developments in the Soviet Union. The
false. I would add that concern about major strengths of our system involve
the extent of covert operations is not military matters. Our major weak-
just found in Congress- It's also found nesses include a minimal effort both
? in substantial depth among intelli- in collection and analysis about many
gence professionals. They are over. of the non-Communist countries. We
whelmingly concerned about the qual- lack the encyclopedic effort that will
ity of this country's foreign mtaui, let us understand trends before we get
? gence, and they worry that covert to the level of a crisis.
operations, especially when they are ?
exposed and criticized, impact' ad- Q. Over recent decades, there has
verseiy on the more important job of been art increasing reliance on elec.
foreign intelligence collection and t tronic and other technical means of
analysis.
si collecting intelligence. Has the result-
ing neglect of human sources dam-
? - 1. . aged overall collection capabilities
Q. When the Carter Adaninistratifet and quality?
negotiated the second strategic armsA. A myth has grown up from state-
limitation treaty with the Soviet merits of some officials that we are too
Union, opponents said the United ! dependent on technical collection.
? States lacked the ability to verify such t There was a period of time when deci-
agreements. Is that true? sion makers believed that satellite
A. We have tried over the last dec- photography was going to answer all
ade to improve the nation's ability to our needs. We're all a little wiser new.
verify arms control treaties. There No analyst should be left dependent on
was valid criticism in Congress that a single means of acquiring intelli-
the resulting capability was thin. The gence. Human collection runs the risk
requirements for verification with re- of relying on someone who wants to
?
Approved For Releackartgadednite4J-01:01719Millatftilcamss-
whelming. ? A more complex treaty Scatectlo cecinr-
arN72-11\ 722-L7
will place substantial additional bur-.
STAT
Isigagffor Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001001
ART ICL:F, THE WASHINGTON POST
PAGZ__11.2_
9 April 1982
By Michael .Getler. .
Wa5h4ngton Pont Staff Wer
'Government. spkialists :say that -a ?
:string of recent. press reports alleging
: the Soviets have .violated the SALT:
111 strategic arms- agreeraent by -
Oloyi ng . the - 6-Utley:Kt,SSit mobile:
; missile are Wrong.7
'
But They acknowledge thit-There
is still --snine Uncertainty and dis-
-
agreemerrt .as. to the intended role
and . present.. deployment .oL this
1-eapon',. which has. been the subject
dispute within intelligence 'circles
for many years. . , ?
Informed official&. in several
eriiment agencies' say -;that-' a- top--
iiecre_t; just-published_p,S, pailonal
intelligence estimate concludes there..
has been no violation thus far of the
SALT 11 au?reem6nt by-- Moscow;
even though that- 1979 -agreement_
'igned? by President Carter and So
- Piet_ President- 1?eonidrI. Brezhhev-,
tias never been :ratified by the US,
and has. been. -all ?but?-clis-
avowed by the Reagan.administra--:,-.
tlOfl
there-- is still so-me- .ambig,U---
'Sty abotit the status. of the. 5516, of-
ficials Who witch-such-matters closee:
agree .that.it is-not-deployed. in a
mobile -fashion. which would;be, a
alolation ofiSALT-; -and that . if-the
aRussians ever_ doe deploy a -,new-_-rno.',
,f,bile missile-it isnot likely to be,the
Secret depfoyinent:.pf mobile
ISS1q ?wood . already
state of- tension_ between _the two su.,
-;.perpoWers..on ?nuclear:-,,w_eaporks:
iS-
SUes
3othcountriekthus.far,:have
tinued - infcgmally -4.14 adhere_ ,toJbe
`-_SALT.JI prtivisionS,-. apparently with
,;.11e.!"-e5cpectation:f!that -:some -new
round of arms-eoritrol talks-covering
.jstrategic -frcontinent-spanning
atomic
..eventually take place
Approved For
- ? . ?
The-SALT. It treaty a_nd stii-Called
? "carninori.? understandings" reache? d
between the United. States- and. So-
viet Union that acCgrd specifically
require that Moscow not "produce,
test or :deploy ICBMs of the SS16
type," which are-,mobile weapons
carted axiiiinclzthe- countrysidon-
wheeled vehicles they are
be verY bard. for
;U.S. picture-taking satellites to spot
:.and thus very_harct to count and .ver_-
. .
ily .in foiy. arms control. agreement.
They. would also be hard to attack in
_ ?
a wart-e.y ?
with detailed knowledge
ofjhe situation say there has been
oine: dispute -about the SS16 ever
:sincetest models began to appear in
the. mid-1970s. The Soviets test-fired
the missile frtinra test range at Ple-
i setsk in 1976 but stopped the testing
:-.1ter the 1979 SALT agreement was
signed and --hati? not tested it since
, then, the sources say -
One authoritative . official rs.',says
':-..that the heart of the latest digcus-1
sion and the Catiie for some disagree-
-Anent about, the missile within the
-top echelons Of U.S: intelligence is-a
inew,"belief".:tliat the Russians, back
the 1970s,-actually produced a lot
SS16s than US. spy Satellites
ever observed being tested.: The '-dea-
tral iuestion s What has- become of
_
,,these, if in fact they were produced
Are ..they being Used for training Or:
Are-theY.,being secretly deployed in
fixed sites9 1'hese are -questions
being aked, one official said,:. While
stating that there is no evidence :.t 4-
deploythent..
? .
'fare'f:sOrliei thil
? -_.-SS16sline- well placed official put
'-the number at less than twti dozen?
still, at .the:PleSetWrange:Mbiare
said to bAin "tixed' positions and
i,!`ertainly jtot es another
tofficial
time that theie
21e:iwidespread agreement, pi
aeliantaRritigttqltle're_":416.
The
t.
f,intelligerie7Foinniiiiiiti"....:.thfieth
01
)7-'"One 'eiperienc Official ileicribiS
-,the Missiles At sPlegetsk as "devices
at -a' test range'and in Various
?stages of readiness But there is no
'Proof that it'-'haSjeVgi-- been `de-
'ploYed and tocal1. it a real'sy-s-
Win is stretching it-.7:F? ? -
But on April ;3, - The New York
Post; citing reported
that "three Soviet Mobile missile -reg-
iments,- -each equipped with 12. eu-
in
are- Pojsed
the frigid wastelands near Perm"_
- in the Soviet. Union.
On April .5;:the.syndicated colum-
nists Rowland Evans and: Robert
Novak reported that there-is "a new,
still-secret consensus . among U.S.
intelligence -agencies, folloiving
-;months of bitter dispute, that the
;Soviet:Union has -deployed -?lm
aost
200 mobile intercontinental missiles
'In-violation of the SALT II treaty..
.The next day;' State DePartmenf.
.spokesinan Dean Fischer publicly_
-denied thos.e'?-reports,stating :that
.'"our intelligence information:: does
not Support. these Staterrients."-:
But; imMediately
iThe Baltithoie Sun' repOrted that
,"other [unnamed] officials; indignant
at the' denial" made _by Fischer;-irei
!,?Affirmed the?-thain point -1--nade:h5!
the
One sourciFiaYilhatthere seeii
-
,!t6'.12e,"something or somebodYn-thil
[has-chosen :to' heighten concern thief'
[the 5516 recently, although a?toP5
-ranking specialist calls the public -de.;
;--scriptiona of the .situation-, that -hake!
appeared thus far !'mostly garbilietf
The reports began to Appear after;
'President Reagan, at a new?ktonfer4
'ienceiclaimed that the Soviet Unionl
;does have a definite marg,in supel
rioritr 7 nuclear : --Weapons.: SomJi
4ficialiSPeculate .that circulation al
the SS16 -feports may be meant' tO
f.jadd-' ere:def.-lc-T.:to' that
'they tress they haile;:rnd.7-:idealof
'whether' this-:particular issue was
the. back of the PresidentknitrAZ;,-.
137R0001ed fa-Orr
?
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010
Ara ICIE AFFEARIO
ON PAG-4 .51? ,
Taylor Branch
THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY
April 1982
N POLITICAL B
n August 1955, John Prados tells us,* the CIA's
Richard Bissell went to the White House to show
President Eisenhower some pictures that had
been taken from an airplane more than ten miles
above the earth. Greens, fairways, and sand traps
were clearly visible in the aerial shots of the Augusta
National Country Club in Augusta. Georgia, which was
not only the home of the Masters but also Ike's favorite
golf course. The photos clearly impressed the president,
who recognized the topography of certain memorable
holes_ Then Bissell played his trump card. He pointed
out that the pictures actually revealed the presence of
golf balls on some of the greens, as well as the flags in
the cups. This truly impressed Eisenhower, who must
have reflected that sometimes he had trouble seeing the
cup when standing over a ten-foot putt. Bissell, on the
strength of the demonstration, asked for permission to
develop a U-2 spy plane that could produce such pic-
tures from even higher altitudes, and Eisenhower, who
was normally skeptical of new military gadgets, heartily
approved. Thus, through crafty persuasion and awe-
some technology, the CIA won its battle against the air
force for control of a new spy system.
With technology that has long since made Bissell's
U-2 obsolete, the secret services now stand on perma-
nent watch against nuclear attack: Simultaneously, they
grapple clandestinely with their adversaries in localized
conflicts that policy-makers want to keep quiet, fearing
Armageddon. These two functions have brought spy
organizations to the forefront of modern politics since
, World War H, as intelligence activities have expanded
on both the highest and lowest of roads. The same
Richard Bissell who showed Eisenhower thegolf course
photographs planned the Bay of Pigs invasion.
The Soviet Estimate is a readable and even-tempered
chronicle of the higher road?the effort of the CIA and
military intelligence services to keep track of the Soviet
nuclear arsenal. Prados has assembled the first compre-
hensive record of American performance in this field,
matching predictions of Russian strength against what
ends up actually happening in the arms race. Working
from National Intelligence Estimates that, ironically,
are the most sensitive and yet the most publicly debated
spy products we have, he labors to separate the contri-
butions of hard fact from those of prejudice, and he
makes convincing judgments about the bureaucratic
wars within the intelligence community.
The human element of intelligence mistakes was
more easily exposed during the early years, when the
spy network was relatively unsophisticated. Shortly be-
fore a 1955 Soviet-American summit meeting, the Rus-
sians invited Colonel Charles E. Taylor, the air force at-
tache in Moscow, to watch an aerial parade at Tushino
Field. Sitting in the reviewing stand, Colonel Taylor
Taylor Branch is a contributing editor of The
Washington Monthly.
was astounded to watch 28 Bison bo
succession of formations. As Prad
twice the number of Bisons attribut
only a few months before and four times the number of
B-52s then in existence. Taylor's alarming report quick-
ly became the basis for another drastic upward revision
of the National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet stratte
bombers.
What Colonel Taylor had no way of knowing at the
time was that the Russians were so insecure about the
American lead in nuclear weaponry that they had cir-
cled their few Bisons repeatedly over the airfield as a
blustering show of strength. The Russians fooled the
Americans?especially the air force, which was eager to
be fooled so that it could build more 13-52s--and there-
by helped create the "bomber gap," which was the first
major hoax in postwar strategic intelligence.
Several years later, about the time the CIA and the
army and navy managed to push the air force back
toward reality on Soviet bombers, the Russians
launched their Sputnik. They also tested some ICBMs
before they were expected to, causing a wave of appre-
hension in the United States. The 1958 National Instill-
ge.nce Estimate predicted that the Russians would solve
all their test problems almost instantaneously, and that
Moscow would produce and deploy up to 1,000 ICBMs
by 1961. By contrast, the United States had only ten
ICBMs in 1960. This was the "missile gap." There was a
great public scare, and the shape of the weaponry in-
volved encouraged journalists to imply that national
manhood was at stake, along with survival. The Alsop
brothers reported that the Eisenhower administration
was about to "flaccidly permit the Kremlin to gain an
almost unchallenged superiority."
As is well known, John Kennedy was elected on his
virile pledge to change that with a greatly accelerated
ICBM program, but by the time he took office the mis-
sile gap was revealed to be a larger hoax than the
bomber gap. The CIA, joined by navy and army intel-
ligence, now realized that the Russians had produced
no ICBMs at all. The air force, after a Strangelosian
campaign of resistance during which Strategic Air
Command generals went so far as to claim that Cri-
mean War memorials were actually Soviet ICBMs in
disguise, finally conceded.
The result of all this confusion was the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency, Secretary of Defense Robert McNarna-
ra's well-intentioned but ultimately counter-productive
effort to end public disputes between the military intelli-
gence services. To McNamara, such squabbling was
inefficient a s well as politically embarrassing. He. wanted
a unified, accurate military position on intelligence mat-
ters. In the DIA, however, he got an agency that tended
to produce brokered intelligence compromises tha t were
STAT
*The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and
Flissian Military Strength_ John Prados. Dial, 517.95.
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R00010
ART I C LE AI'PEARED ' THE ATLANTIC
ON PAGE
April 1982
BUT NEVER
DANGER TODAY
BY THOMAS POWERS
THE SOVIET ESTIMATE -
by John Prados.
-Dial, $17.95.
. .
? wrong? The question of honest
diately posed by the tenclenc
lysts to reflect the views and
hopes of the institutions they represent.
In the late 1940s and early 19503, for ex-
ample, Air Force intelligence consistent-
ly predicted a huge Russian bomber.
building program. Army and Navy
intelligence just as consistently derided
these alarms. When the Russians finally
did unveil a new long-range bomber, at
the annual May Day parade in 1954,
something like panic swept the upper
echelons of the American government.
The. CIA's Board of National Esti-
mates was badly buffeted in those years
by conflicting claims. In theory its paper
(the generic term for finished intelli-
gence reports) was supposed to repre-
sent the mature conclusions of the intel-
ligence community after all the hard
evidence had been soberly analyzed; but
as a practical matter, it had to sound as
worried as the officials who were sup-
posed to read its estimates. "Our an-
swer," said one board chairman at the
time, according to another BNE official I
met a couple of years ago, "is to say
nothing is going to happen in the fore-
seeable future, and say it in the most
alarming way possible." The, result of
this approach was one National Intelli-
gence Estimate (NIB) after another ad-
mitting that we were still ahead for the
moment but predicting a huge Russian
bomber fleet down the road. --: ." -
But the Russians never Produced
long-range bombers in any numbers.
? They concentrated on missiles instead.
- The BNE was slow to catch on, at least
? partly because the Air Force wasn't in-
terested in missiles. It was run in the
1950s by World War II bomber generals
? who liked to fly. They grudgingly funded
a low-level missile-research program,
largely to _ensure that the Navy didn't
take-over the job and steal away by de-
grees the Air Force's strategic-bombard-
ment mission. But deep down in the Air
Force there were missile colonels con-
vinced that rocket propulsion offered a
cheaper, more effective way to deliver
nuclear warheads. In love with missiles,
the colonels concluded that the Russians
were, too. In the intelligence business,
this is called mirror-imaging. - -
One of those colonels recently told me.
that during the Korean War,' when R&D
fruih-RiaReQtDe la321119Q414614141MIP 1'3
that nothing 'would budge his Air Force
superiors but fear Of a Russian missile.
To PRADOS'S FEST history of the in--
t)
telligence wars, The Soviet Estimate,
is certain to become a standard work in
.the field. It's hard to think of an impor-
tant intelligence issue in the past twen-
ty-five years that Prados does not cover;
- the 'missile - gap," Galosh, the Tallinn_
"upgrade" problem, the A Team, B Team
controversy, and other flurries of con-
cern over "monster missiles" and alarm-
? ing-holes in the ground areall there. In-,
telligence professionals will consult his
book to find out what's in the public
domain and what's still secret. Students
? of the national-security community will
. mine it for data on what we knew and
when we knew it.
But ordinary readers probably wont
use
use it. at all. They will find it too hard,
too dense, too dull, too filled with num-_
bers and acronyms, too obsessive in its
attempt to gather in one place all the:
- facts and echoes of contention in the
strategic-intelligence business as they
have ;appeared over the -years in the
: professional literature and in congres-
sional hearings. Prados's excellent bil-
Ii.ography, the _ most comprehensive I
have seen; lists hundreds of items. It is
Lone of the curses of research in this field
to read the same facts and figures over. -
...and over again; How .Prados survived _
his ordeal in the library I do not know. It
:_must have involved years of stupefying
tedium. But the result has justified his
; devoted efforts. Well-thumbed copies of
She Soviet Estimate will be at the right
hand of everyone who tries to under-
? stand why the United States and the So-
. viet Union elected to build enough nucle-
ar weapons to break the back_ of our
I:- Prados's _comprehensive: book raises
two great_ questions about strategic in-
telligence. First; Is it honest? And sec-
the . analysts so: often.
i-vtsti-...ail-T440 20081/0
iiidhis;:of:The;1}1:17.WliO"
ic?t Kept_ the Secrets, is at lurk ("1.a hiitory of
STAT
1140001-3
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22 March 1982
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?-1 N "Ci I- il't-Ft.11t. hrt- EiFt
Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP90-01137R00010
AF.T CLE APP7 tia.D
TFE WAE-',HDIGTON T72.2,S
ON PAGE...4 20 July 1982
140001-3
STAT
Queen's protector quits;
homosexual tie exposed
LONDON (AP) ? The queen's police offi-
cer, Commander Michael Trestrail, has
resigned from the police after acknowledging
"a homosexual relationship over a number
of years with a male prostitute," Home Sec- .
retary William Whitelaw told a stunned House
of Commons yesterday.
Whitelaw's brief announcement came an
hour after Scotland Yard had said Trestrail,
52, was resigning for "personal reasons,"
which Britons assumed were connected with
the security breach that enabled an intruder
to find his way into Queen ELizabeth II's
bedroom at Buckingham Palace 11 days ago.
The news came as the state prosecutor's
office announced that prowler Michas el Fagan
will not face charges for the July 9 bedroom
intrusion because there was no evidence of
criminal intent. Trespassing is a civil, not a
criminal, offense in Britain.
Trestrail, head of police at the palace and
the man directly responsible for the queen's
safety, resigned on Saturday, the Yard said in
a short statement.
Scotland Yard is investigating the secirity
lapses that enabled Fagan, a 31-year-old
drifter, to enter the queen's bedroom before
7 a.m. on a Friday and chat with her for
nearly 10 minutes before an astonished cham-
bermaid discovered him and summoned help.
Fagan, appearing at Bow Street Magistrates
Court, was sent for trial at the Old Bailey
Criminal Court on three charges: trespassing
at Buckingham Palace on June 7 and stealing
a half-bottle of wine, a June 26 assault on his
stepson and a June 16 car theft. He was
ordered held-without bail.
' Fagan claimed he was the son of Nazi war
criminal Rudolf Hess, who has been in prison
since 1941 when he flew to Britain from
Germany.
State prosecutor Stephen Wooler said the
palace break-in in which Fagan stole the wine
"was one of a series of irrational acts on his
part connected with a deterioration in his
matrimonial situation." -
Addressing Magistrate Ronald Bartle,
Maurice Nadeem, Fagan's lawyer, said, "Let
us remember what this case is about. It does
not relate to the later incident when my client
was in the queen's bedroom?' ? -
From the dock, Fagan shouted: "I told you
not to mention- anything about the queen's
--bedroom. I don't want her name brought into
it. I would rather plead guilty than have her
name mentioned in court."
Fagan was led into the packed courtroom
amid tight security, accompanied by his wife,
Christine, and his parents, Ivy and Michael
Fagan Sr.
According to British press reports, which
-have been confirmed by the government, all
of the palace's guards and electronic
secu-
rity devices did not prevent Fagan from
entering Buckingham several times.
In another development, Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher promis to tell the House
of Commons about security at the secret
British center which monitors radio and tel-
ephone communications.
Mrs. Thatcher will speak today on the mat-
ici she is likelyasive a "broad assess-
ment" rather than provide details, Press Asso-
ciation reported.
The center. called the Government Com-
munications Headquarters. is in Cheltenham,
109 miles northwest of London.
The center. like the U.S. National Security
Agency outside Washington, eavesdrops on
communications around the world, trying to
glean information useful to British intelli-
gence. It has cooperative agreements with
its American counterpart and thos_e_
allied nations.
The affair began last Thursday when a
Ch-e:tennam man. (Jeottrey Arthur Prime.
44. was arraigned at nearby HeretorTon
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.Ti'T.:;:e gravest possible nature.
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AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY
8 March 1982
STAT
Intelligence Estimate Revealed Unintentionally
Washington?A secret U. S. intelligence estimate that the Soviet Union could have the
capability to deploy a space-based, high-energy laser weapon station within a year
was unintentionally revealed In a House P.med Services Committee hearing in late
February, confirming earlier AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TecHeoi.oav reports (May 25, 1981,
p. 40; July 28, 1980; p. 32). _
The USSR's accelerated space-based, high-energy laser program was described in
a secret_ statement to the committee. by Ricard DeLauer, under secretary of
Defense for resea- rOh7= and engineering. It" included : the assessment that the Initial
operational capability of Soviet laser battle station could be as early as 1983, or as
late as 1988.f;7:-.4.i..:.;4:
Rep.1Ken:Kramer:(11;COlo.Va'meMber-Of the committee read aloud in a House
: Armed Services hearingearlier-lest' 'Many- by DeCauet:given in a closed session that:
provided an insight into Soviet laser weapon development activities.
? . ,
- That assessment ; based on intelligence community InforMatIon, concluded that the ,
_ . ?
laser space station couldprovide an- antisatellite weapon Capable of destroying U.S.
surveillance._ spacecratt;'-communioations-satellitieS or, early; warning satellites that
operate at geosynchronous ? -
?
By the early1990silaccording to DeLauer's statement,:.the Soviets-COuld'have a
- large space tcomple>=7, in Orbit-Capable -ot: attacking e:yariety. of targets-within. the
-
Earth's atmo-sphere-frOm
Kramers_ -,:;VOrdsi-diiring-theO43en--h-earin'g were labeled inadvertent' by staffmerr;--
hers, who Said that he believed:the hearing to be-a closed session. ? -
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Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-0113
JIT.TICL;}Zr.'2E.-C,MED
ON PAC: ?1"., _
STET JOTECAL
1 idarch 1982
Asian Refu
1- ?-?
By Vinitaai KUCEWICZ
SANTA ANA, Calif.?In 1976 Yang Ying
started a new life in this Los Angeles sub-
urb. He and his family fled their besieged
native village in the hills of Laos, and were
lucky enough to be among the 53,000 fellow
? members of the Hmong tribe to be admit-
ted to the security of the U.S. With the help
of a local Hmong community group, he
learned English. acquired a trade in elec-
tronic component assembly and got a job.
On Friday evening Dec. 12, 1980, Mr.
Yang returned from work, ate dinner with
his extended family in their small two-fam-
ily house and took his two young .children
for a short stroll. For the rest of the eve-
ning, he sat around the table talking with
his father and brother and went to bed
about midnight. Around 4 o'clock in the
morning his wife awoke to the sounds of
her husband gagging and gasping for air.
She called- his father and brother, and
someone called an ambulance_ But within
minutes Mr. Yang, at the- age.of 25, was
dead.
Mr. Yang's relatives say he had been in
perfect health until the day he died; he had
never even been in a hospital. An autopsy
by the Orange County coroner could not de-
- termine the cause of death other than to
say his heart failed. To -this day no one
knows what caused Mr.- Yang's untimely
death. '
But whatever killed Mr. Yang has
reached epidemic proportions among
young. male Hrnong refugees here. At the
end of 1981, the U.S. government Centers
for Disease Control in Atlanta had re-
corded 39 cases of "sudden, unexpected.
nocturnal deaths."-..-- Of tl3ese.-, 26 were
Hmong, eight othersvLaotian,Aour Viet-
- namese and one Cambodian; Only. onewas
? a woman. In addition to the 39, seven new-
"suspected" cases have been reported so
? far this year. The =calculates that dur-
? ing the last year the death rate for young
Laotian males was 87 per 100,000, compar-
able to the sum of the four leading causes
of natural death among U.S._ men of simi-
lar age.
Unable to Identify a Cause
" T hi s'is a strange and fascinating oc-
currence," says Dr. Anthony C.onta.zerro of
the University of California Medical School
in San Diego,- which runs_ a referral pro-
gram for Southeast Asian refugees. There ?
have been at least seven cases of nocturnal
deaths in the San Diego area, but neither_
the coroner's office nor doctors at.the Med-
ical Center have been able -to, identify, a,
cause. _.
- In December the Centers for Disease
Control published an initial study. conclud-
ing "the deaths reported here share sev-
eral features that suggest
tute a distinct-syndrome: . .
:night or in the early moiningliOurs dart%
? sleep and -involved mostly app
_ _ ? _ . .
R000100140001-3
STAT
syrnptonisiptions? Of , the terminal
events suggested that the transition from
apparent-health to death occurred, within
minutes."
--The only- publicly suggested Cause for
the deaths - his been that. the-men were-
frightened to death by nightmares. Similar
deaths have been reported among. young
-.?
- Tests of "yellow rain" samples have
identified the killer as mycotoxins of the
"trichothecene group. which are poisons
produced naturally by _fungus on grains.
Most natural outbreaks of this toxin have
occurred in the Soviet Union, though some
cases have been reported in the U.S. and
Japan. Scientific studies continue on the ef-
-The report does not mention the fact that the Hmong
n _Laos have been initnary victirns of biological taxm
_ weapons,- cornmonix,called 'yellow rain!. .
!Japanese and Filipinos in their own coun-
tries, and witnesses have sometimes intera'
ipreted the-terminal groans as-signs of ter-
rifying _dreams: However, the CDC report
:says "careful questioning of the witnesses
in the United States indicated- that the ter- s
jninal sounds were those that lare. often
I heard following cardiac arrest".
- The CDC. report concludes that the
;heart's-natural pacemaker mechanism has
suddenly failed for some mysterious rea-
son. "The abruptness of the deaths re-
:ported here is compatible with cardiac dys-?
rhythmia, but the underlying mechanism
remains unclear." As close as it comes to
an explanation is the speculation "there
might be a genetic or an acquired disorder,
predisposing these persons to: 'sudden
. death." ?
What the report does not mention islhe
_
? fact that the Hmong in Laos ha-' been pri-7
mary victims of biological toxin weapons,
, commonly called "yellow rain." .
' These hill tribe people, many of whom
fought alongside the U.S. in the Vietnam
war, have been a traditional center Of re-
sistance to the Communists in Southeast
:
Asia. After the fall of Laos; the Commu-
i nist Fathet Lao tried to resettle the.
Hmong in the more controllable lowlands.
-Those Hmong :villages that .resisted were
attacked. Since 1975 the Hmong have been
fleeing across the border into- Thailand
and telling stories to anyone .Who cared
r? to listen about. "yellow rain.", This ye!-
lowish powder, dropped over villages- and
fields by Communist aircraft; causes blis
tering of the skin, vomiting and? massive
hemorrhaging, with the victim often chok--
Lag to death on his own blood. ?
The U.S. government and independent
- analysts have confirmed the use of "yellow
rain" by Soviet-backed troops in Southeast
Asia. According to a still classified Special
Nation-al Inte ence Estimate, TbeTLS.
now nas communications intelligence
. shows direct Soviet involvement in the use
.of these obscene weapons which are sup-
posed to be banned under international
law. Secretary of State Alexa -in
Re I eirta 2006071/03' ftltICiliRlY10'9010nPF
combatant icasualties from triese,weapons
,range in the r"scores of thousands.Liaii.-;?.?:.:
feCts of these mycotoxins on laboratory an-
imals. Little is known, however, about the
long-term effects on man of low-level expo-
sure to these fungal poisons. -
Many of the Hmong are convinced that
-the current, sudden- death syndrome is
Somehow connected to the use of these tox-
his or other_ Poisons in Southeast Asia.
"This never happened to our people before.
:Never. We've never seen anything like it in
the past," says Xeuvang Vangyi. executive'
director of Lao Family Community Inc...
which runs resettlement and training cen-
ters in Los Angeles and more than a dozen -
other cities in the U.S.
"We've complained already to CDC to
.scheck" into a possible connection between --
"yellow rain" and the sudden deaths:, says
, Gen. Vang Pao, who led the lirnong troops
in the Vietnam war. He is now president of '
the Lao Family organization and is also
considered chief spokesman for Hmong.
srefugees But CDG "won't or can't do any-,
thing to help that proof for the people," he
adds. ? ? 2"
, "It's something we've looked into" as a
possible, cause, _explains Dr. Roy Baron; an
epidemiologist in charge of CDC's study of
these sudden deaths. However. "in the pre-
: Ihninary reports of the manner of death,'
nothing suggested toxic substances should
be proposed" as a likely- cause, he adds.
The center interviewed families of 2501 the
- 39 victims of this sudden death syndrome.,
"Only one had a history of definite expo,
sure (to yellow rain), and two might have.
: This -is a similar proportion of the control
t. group" of young refugees now being moni-
: Cored, Dr. Baron says. -
The lirnong here complain, however,
that ' they can't be sure they have never
been exposed to "yellow rain." They ex-
'plain that the trek out of the hills of Laos
to refugee camps in Thailand takes weeks
,01.' ?walkini, through unfamiliar territory
;that may have been previously contami--
nated. If not yellow rain, they add, other
poisons are also being used in Asia. They
tell of cases of-persons,becoming Ill and
7ROORBAX116141-rilted-water,
salt, peat:
,CONTIVETED
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NEW YORK TDES
ART I CLE, APPEARED 24 JANUARY 1982
ON PAGE
STAT
40001-3
US. Says Pakistani's Nuclear Pate. ntial Is Growing!
By JUDITH MILLER ? _?_?;;.?L- -
test stems partly from President Mo-
spedanormsewvarknmes hammed Zia ul-Haq's unwillingness to
WASHINGTON. Jan. 23? An intelli- jeopardize the Reagan Administration's
gence report has concluded that Pald- six-year, $3_2 billion military and_ eco-
Stan will be able to detonate a nuclear nomicaidprograrn. : : . -
device within the next three years, but is The study also contends that Pakistan
not likely to do so, according to Adminis- is likely- to continue developing and
tration and Congressional officials. , stockpiling fissile material that could be
This conclusion is contained in an used in a nuclear device. Continued
; analysis, known as "Special National_ development of Pakistan's nuclear pro-
Intelligence Estimate 31-81." prepared gram, analysts argue, is likely ,to
by the Central Intelligence Agency and prompt increasing suspicion and hos-
completed lest rnont. ? - ? tility from India. As a result, according
Intelligence officials assert that Paki- to the ,report, Pakistan could face a
stares reticence to Conduct an atomic growing threat of a Dre-emotive strike
Iby India against its miclear installations
by the end of this year:-:
India and Pakistan i'ill hold talks in
New Delhi next Friday on a security
pact. Foreign Minister Agha Shatii Of
Pakistan is expected to discuss propos-
als for a "nuclear-free zone" in South-
west Asia with his Indian counterpart,
P. V. Narasimha Rao. t -,_- ._. .. . _-..- .
-
.-:.. 1-2- 'Irregulares! Reported ? :.
_
The discussions are being closely fol-
lowed by officials at the International
Atomic Energy Agency, based in-Vien-
na. which monitors nuclear niants..The
agency has been pressing Pakistan =-
successfully for several months to per-
mit the installation' of; additional cam-
eras and measuring devices to improve
safeguards at Pakistan's 135-megawatt
nuclear reactor, nearKarachi. --:- - :-?
? . The- agency made itS7request after it.
detected "anornaliesand "irregulari-
ties";-aethe reactor,-which is capable of
producing plutonium for atomic weep,
ons.-There is no evide.nce-that.Pakistan
has been diverting fuel from its civilian-,
-reactor for nonpeac-eful purposes.-?But
the agency expressed concern at- a -pri-
yate meeting last September. that the
current monitoring arrangements were
no longer adequate, given Pakistan's
'ability to produce its own nuclear fuel.-- --:
The '- India-Pakistan talks --and , the-
agency's effort to improve safeguards-
are of concern- to the Reagan AdrnJ
tration, Which persuaded Congress last
month to approve $100 million in aid fo
Pakistan; a downpayment on the six-
year program.. In addition, the United
States is selling Pakistan 40 F-16 fighte
planes on an accelerated schedule. The
Administration says Pakistan needs the
planes to help withstand Soviet pres-
? sures horn neighboring Afghanist' an,
' Pakistan had previously been barred
? from receiving American aid by a law
that prohibits assistance:- to pountries
that pursue nuclear Weapon-programs.
Conesasiispended-raict In 1979 on-the
basis- of evidence that Pakistan had es:,
I ?tablished a -worldwide network of pur:
:chasing agents; including bogus comps-
. nies and intelligence operatives, to ob-
tain_ccurnonnenta fnr-xurreiliurn_e
1fuge enridiment plant-pat: coulcIA-
? ' used to make fuel for weapons:: -: ?e-=
'--- -
7, - ; ? India Detonated DeVice in 1974 *---;
r India detonated an atomic device-
1974, but maintained- that its test was
"peaceful nuclear explosion,'" a distin
...,
' tion the United States does not ancept. 'i
-? :- The -,. Reagan -Administration:. _ hai
.argued that Pakistan' can only be digi
?I suaded from conducting a nuclear test ?
Iit would jeopardize a strong, security'
' relationship with the United States. Mei
. new estimate tends- to ,.support.
? claim. . : f :,2:3-.,..,;-,11 ..-
' ...' - The estimate's ceoclusionila priVatelyi
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-011 3711110N 11913660131bgligaleucy.
?lysts, Nirbo doubt that Pakistan will
willing to? forego- a- demonstrable- mg3.1
iclear weapons opticet.i ittliglit loti.theil
STAT
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? '-::N.I.LRED
THE WASHINGTON POST
22 February 1982
00100140001-3
:...:!-:Giotesque' Evidence Reported
? . ? -
I; On Soviet Chemical Warfare
r Assodated Prrs3
secret intelligence report
..;,:psepared for the White House
p:ovides "very? grotesque" evi-
i,dence that the--.- Soviet Union
--usetl chemical warfare to kill
;1fiousands of people in Southeast
asia d Afghanistan, 'sources
.?-
The classified National lntel
-!?,":14,;erice Estithate by the CIA con-
tains additional "hard evidence"
-;:lit:Soviet use of, potent chemical- _
Iiiapons including so-called "yel-
-;.;lolv, rain," sajr the sources, Who
r;kliclined to be- identified: -
SecretarY of State -Aleiander
Haig Jr.. charged -:last week
t'atat the United States has "in-
;4ritroyertible evidence" that the.
?'',Soviets' are using- chemical weap-
?s in Afghanistan; 'Laos and
Cambodia
. -
The sources' said "sanitized'
-
-.?,A.'ersiort of the intelligence report,
111- be made public within the
t _several weeks to., provide
riCifther support for the charges",
triade by 1-faig and -other U.S.
?
One official familiar with the
report said, "A lot of this evi-
dence is very grotesque stuff."
But he declined to go into detail_
--- Casualty estimates are diffi-
cult to come by, but they range
from-5,000 to 30,000 people, the
sources said.
,The official Said the classified
report is a two-volume document
totaling several hundred pages.
The version to be released pub-
licly; he said, will contain-"every-
thing that you've -ever wanted to
knoW?abOut yellow rain?and
thak,We 7-..can, tells you- :without
compromising :sources or meth-
' "-
-,MeinWile, i Islambad, Pak-
istan; Cen.-Esmat Ezz, the
- head-of a United Nations group
investigating whether; chemical
weapons are being used against
insurgents in Afghanistan, said
l'..rtheje have drawn no rconclusions
in: a two-week .tour of ,refugee
camps and medical facilities
Where inore than 2.5 million :MI':
,ighans- fled after the Soviet inva-
sion- in December,- 1979: T. ?
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? f th t ?. 'nary weapons, w ig a vetwo . e
ministration wants to produce
poisonous substances that con3e from'i
' 'el -- 1 ii- ? The ad
_ vide further stipi3Ort for the charges I' CIA--study; Ili? -
e- sources sai , mc u ing ? .
hal- components separately packaged.
They combine to form a toxic Agent after,
some fungi nor Indigenous to Southeast: e weapon is fired. .1 f
Asia or Afghanistan -, ' .- . ,..e , -..... - .
STAT
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100140001-3
..P31 7: I CLE APPE.LRED
PAC-E
CHICAGO TRIBUNE
22 FEBRUARY 1982
WASHINGTON (AP)-A secret Central
Intelligence Agency report prepared for
the White House provides 'grotesque"
evidence that the Soviet Union used
Chemical warfare to kill thousands of?
people in Southeast Asia and Afghanis-
tan, sources said Sunday. -
The National' Inteiligence -Estiniate
contains additional "hard evidence" 'of
Soviet use of potent chemical weapons,
. ?,
riled using chemical weapons and have
said the United States is making such
charges as propaganda.to win support for
? the Reagan administration's plans to re-
sume production of chemical weapons.
nteeds to resume production of chemical
' Some of the-most lethal chemical I. weapons.
weapons that the Soviets are said to ----------------------- .
used are called _"yellow rain" because : In , budget, Reagan
. :they - are released from airplanes as a 'Proposed spending $705 million for cheini-
yellow- powder that covers the ground.' ',cal programs, ccimpared with '53 mil- 1
, includuag _so-called "yellow rain;" the , Symptoms include dizziness, severe itch- -lion in the current budget.
- ?
The weapor.s would be produced at the
sources; who declined - tste be identified, ' ing or tingling of skin with small blisters,
said: - ? .-::. : . - , nausea, choking, vomiting of blood, shock Pine Bluff, Ark., ' arsenal. Senate oppa-
Secretary_ of State- Aleyeeiider Haig and death.: -, e- IL. . . nents came within two votes last year of
charged list week that the United States ?Haig' s comments indicated the report defeatinga - - 'mill'
request for $20 ion to
.has "incontrovertible evidence" that the. may include physical evidence of use of install production equipment at. Pine
Bluff. ? ? ' '
Soviets are using chemical weapons in chemical weapons in Afghanistan. Previ- Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger ,1
, Afghanistan, Laos and Cambodia_ , -?.e .--Tously? there has been little proof of the
, . - in his annual report to Congress, said the
In a television interview Feb: 14, he . use of such weapons there; although U.& -
Soviet Union is "much better prepared"
officials last fall disclosed some physical
' said the poisons have- killed "scores? of ' for chemical warfare than the United
' thousands of noncombatants-in. all-three evidence of "yellow rain" attacks in Laos
States.-
target areas." :' " - and Cambodia. - -"-- = -,- . l'-,-
. ? , _ And in his message to Congress,
re THE SOURCES Said-4 "kanitiled"..Ver.; . CRITICS HAVE SAID the charges ' Reagan reaffirmed the longstanding -poll-
Sion of the intelligence: report_ Will ? be I should be backed up with more detail cy that the United States will net use the'
,
made nublic within several weeks to pro- : , That "hard evidence" is part of the weapons first.
. ? .
hh nonl t-
-.:-.made by Hai#, and other U.S. officials. h 1 1
One official familiar with the report
, said "a lot of this evidence is very grot-
- tesque stuff," but he-declined to go intO'
detail
Casualty estimates : to
- come !:;y, but they_ range froth 5,000 to'
30,00a people. - ??-???-?
- _
The classified repoi-t is said to be a
two-volume document totaling several
hundred pages. The versioneto be re-? '
leased publicly will contain "everything
that you've ever wanted to know about
yellow rain,' and that I We can tell yell,
? without compromising-sources ,or
methods," the- source said...1. -
CIA.tooknman Dale Peterson detlieed,
comment on the report- 'Ieer
The preparation or the: report: begari7r,
"e. after the U.S. charges were first made
l :
east fall. ? On.: Sept. 13, Haig said the:',
United ? States' had the evidence, but thee:
?.
States Department later termed it "pre-::
liminary." -
November, Richard Burt; director of}
the State Department's 'Bureau 'of-
Politica-Military Affairs, told a Senate-
Foreign Relations subcommittee that the:
,-,'United States was. "certain" the Soviets'
were using the weapons. sHe said "we:,
nevi have the srnoking gun" that include
"physical evidence" of such weapons in
THE SOVIETS have consistently de- Indochina, but said, "we do not, as yet,
_
physical evidence" for Afghanistan4
- ON FEB.'S, President Reagan Officially,
z,lotifiedgongreesethet_the,administratioke
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Approved For Release 2006/01/-03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001
APTICT,71 APPEARED
ON PACE
On November 4, I9130., Ronald
Reagan. was elected President of the
Unia:ai States?a foregone conclu-
sion, one of those little events that will
be seen in retrospect to be much more
sianifiCant than realized at the time.
- Team A began tea pack its bags for
? the return home. .
heir denarture from the Carter
_administrationas that government
-began to make way fonts successor?
marked one of the more sensational
develonraents in the history of Ameri-
can intelliaence. For in the space of
Election Day 1980, Team A, the
national security and intelligence
bureaucracy that had on Jimmy
Carter's behalf formed Washington's
intelligence perceptions; was in effect
voted out of office. And Team B?the
lobse terra for a coalition of critics of
American military, policy?became
ascendant.
It remains to be seen whether Team
B will do any better than Team A.
_
Arguably, there is some feeling that it
can hardly do any worse; the fact is
that by the time of Reagan's election,
American intelligence was a mess. As
we have seen earlier in this series of
articles, the intelligence community
was increasingly beset by bureaucratic
politics and other problems through-
-out its early history, reaching a climax
of sorts during the Kissinger years,
when Kissinger's National Security
Council bureaucracy virtually
.usurped intelligence agency functions.
Combined with the problems of
Watergate and a series of damaging
congressional investigations during
the 1970s, the intelligence community
came very near to falling apart.
Certainly, it was not functioning
very web, and by 1976, there was
consensus that something was not
quite right?a conviction reflected in
the squabble over whether American
intelligence had badly underestimated
MILITARY SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
VOLUME 1, NO. 6
1981
INTELLIGENCE
how well intelligence, partieularl) the
CIA, was doing _its. job.
By the summer of 1976, the hue and
cry about intelligence was in full blast,
acceritilated by the debate over the
projected SALT 11 treaty and pro-
nounced Soviet foreign- policy ag-
gressiveness. As the political pressure
began to Mount, President Ford
decided on a. tried-and-tree rpolitical
expediency t':. take the heat off: He
appointed: an "outside panel" of
intelligence and military experts to
review the performance of the Amen- -
can intelligence community in esti-
mating the size and threat of the
Soviet military apparatus. Before
long, this outside panel?known more
formally as the Preside-nt's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board?became
known as "Team B" to distinguish it
from the national security establish-
ment it was reviewing, known in turn
as "Team A."
It is difficult to imagine a more
tenseful situation:- Headqeartered itt
the CIA's Langley headquarters,
Team B members were paid out of
CIA funds (which is the faint equiva-
lent of paying an-IRS auditor to audit
your taxes) and were given total
access to CIA intelligence. Tension
also was due to the fact that every-
body was perfectly aware of Team B's
predilections, which happened to be
outright skepticism that the American
intelligence community was accu-
rately gauging the Soviet Union.
The Team B leader was Richard
Pipes, a noted Russian history pro-
fessor from Harvard whose sym-
pathies were regarded as distinctly
conservative. The members of the rest
of the group were much better known
in the intelligence community, in-
cluding Paul Nitze, an ex-Pentagon
official; Paul Wolfowitz, a former
strategic analyst with the Arms Con-
trol-and Disarmament Agency; Army
STAT
00140001-3
"
agence
"
by Ernest Volkman
i6.Amelicara
te2ligence began
to badly tanderes-
tiena,.,a the Soviet
SLFRA prir,p733113
arid by iS37 the
Underestimate was
pretty s-evere."
the size and dimensionekpimizobSdIEtnr RelGasen20a6itti1100.: GlRDP9ilti1r137R000100140001-3
military build-up. This, in turn, led to head of the Defense Intelligence
a whole series of questions on just Agency (and whom the CIA eon- la-
Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000
Early in 1969, not long after he had
assumed the post of National Security
Adviser to President Nixon, a dis-
pleased Henry Kissinger sat in his
White House office reading a current
CIA National Intelligence Estimate
? (N1E). With obvious disgust, Kissinger
finished reading the document, and in
large letters, wrote across the top of it,
"Piece. of crap!"
Of such little events are major
controversies often made, and that
angry little scrawl by Kissinger turned
out to be only the opening shot in
what finally became a bloody bureau-
cratic battle in which American intel-
ligence was the battleground. Ul-
timately-, dozens of careers were
ruined, the intelligence community
became bitterly politicized, and
Atherican intelligence suffered an
-unprecedented crisis of confidence.
Indeed, the effects of that battle are
still being felt today in the American
intelligence community, which has
.
never quite recovered_
In this series of articles on the
problems of American estimative
intelligence, we have taken some
pains to point out the debilitating
effect of politics (and its handmaiden,
bureaucratic politics) on the intel-.
ligence process. From the first Soviet
atomic bomb test through the Cuban
Missile Crisis to the great .
missile debate . of the 1960s, the- in-
vidious effect of politics can be seen
again and again. It is possible from ?
this, in fact, to postulate a First Law
of Intelligence: Where Politi Tread,
Intelligence Becomes Oatmeal. Not
very inspiring, perhaps, but it makes
the point.
Which brings us to Henry Kissinger?
or, more accurately, a period during
which. American intelligence became
MILITARY SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
VOLUME 1, NO. 5
1981
INTELLIGENCE
first moment he assumed office,
Kissinger soright (and very shortly
accomplished) total domination of
Amehcan stratezic policy, mainly
because. he wore two hats?chief
?security adviser to.the President and
chief progenitor of American foreign
?
That is the sort of anomaly guar-
anteed to cause.trouble, and there was
trouble very early on. First, there was
the problem of the Nixon adminis-
tration's stated goal of an "era of
negotiations," meaning that both
Nixon and Kissinger had set strategic
arms control agreements, among
other bilateral goals, as the first
foreign policy priority. There was an
intelligence implication in such a
policy, since any agreements had to
carry a vital prerequisite: verification.
And -verification itself was a political
code word meaning that the-Ameri-
can military and certain members of
Congress would not buy any bilateral
agreement without a firm guarantee
. that we would be able to detect any
? cheating by the Soviet Union. Was
the CIA up to this task?
Of course, argued CIA Director
Richard Helms, but he was dis-
quieted by the. question. An old hand
at Washington infighting, Helms was
perfectly aware of the fact that the last.
thing he wanted the agency to get
? involved in was the-political minefield
? of verification. As Helms realized, it
was a .no-win proposition: If the CIA
agreed that verification was feasible,
then it risked angering congressional
conservatives who felt that the Soviet
Union would never live up to ? any
arms agreement. On the other hand, if .
the CIA dragged its feet on the
verification question, then ,it risked .
incurring the wrath of Kissinger
blik I
pn ?
L
tzt-1
Kis.singer's
plprra?114
Coup
by Ernest Volkman
so politicized, it can scarcely be said it (and by extension, his boss). The CIA
even functioned, certainly not as it alteady felt uneasy with Kissinger,
was designed to do.A rov
In a s-nse- of? .ease Av_honchwtosce,t
Rpea r or Kei 01A-RuP9d3di Elb7R000100140001-3
course, the politictz ton was in- wanting to create his own intelligence
.. evitable, given the fact that from the organization more subject to _hisIt-
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7pPLE 2E 'D
i? GEjLL_
MILITARY SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
VOLUME 1, NO. 4
1981
INTELLIqENCE
STAT
ONTELLEGEN_
? TO PLEASE: .
the ABM
by Ernest Volkman
"With this rocket," then-Soviet ligence series, politics plays the most
Premier Nikita Khrushchev was fond destructive role in the formulation of
of telling visiting heads of state to intelligence estimates, since politics
Moscow in 1962, "we can hit a fly in has the most invidious effect in
space!" warping intelligence judgments.
Khrushchevian hyperbole, almost Nothing will destroy objectivity faster
certainly, but even the severest doubt- than the introduction of "political
ers in those days had cause to wonder. factors" into an intelligence debate;
After all, the Soviet Union had al- where politics tread, misjudgment is
ready orbited the first space satellite, sure to follow. '
and had followed that up with a series ' The background to the ABM con-
of impressive stunts, including or- troversy was the Soviet-American
biting dogs, a spider (and her web), arms race that began-to reach its most
not to mention mankind's first human dangerous level by the beginning of
in space. Was it possible that the the 1960s. Like the trickle of sand in a
Russians had also discovered a missile huge hourglass, the future of that race
so accurate, it could indeed hit the seemed inevitable: production by
unlikely target of a fly in space? both sides of bigger and better ICBMs,
Many people believed it, but the increasing accuracy of strategic wea-
fact was that Khrushchev's claim, like pat's, advanced missile attack de-
so many of his other boasts about the tection systems, and, probably most
superiority of Soviet technology? ominous of all, development of the
space and otherwise?had very little first anti-missile defenses.
relation to the truth. :win other words, it was an extremely.
In fact, the missile the Soviet leader? unstable "strategic arms equilibrium,"
was bragging about?known to the as the nuclear strategists liked to call
west as the Griffon?was hardly it, marked by a constant race between
capable of hitting any small target in offense and defense. All the while, the
space. Indeed, there is some doubt "delicate balance of terror" became
whether it could even hit the target even more delicate.
the size of a house in space. Still, the The intelligence community, of
Khrushchev boast unwittingly played a course, played a vital role in this
large role in one of the nastiest delicacy, since that community was
American intelligence controversies responsible for the two key sources of
of all time, a controversy whose information without which neither
implications echo to this day. side could exist:
In its simplest form, it is known as
U early warnings about the latest
the ABM controversy, shorthand that
technological developments, and
obscures a whole series of complex
equations that came into play. Most ? probability of future developments.
significantly, there was a political
APItrpifidrFgESeliPareit2MigollfigtalCIA-RDOtikOsithl
ATAKLQ-CiaD 0,14PPA11114 tea
equation that Ultimately was to trans- before, does not take place in a
form the ABM controversy into a vacuum. It takes place in the context
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ARTICLE _APPEARED
CO PAGE
? It -was .an anguished David
Lilienthal of the- Atomic Energy
Commission who wrote in his diary
on June 30, 1948: "The thing that
? rather chills one's blood is to observe
what is nothing less than lack of
integrity in the. WaS- the intelligence
agencies deal with the meager stuff
they have.":
.For Lilienthal, later to become
. chairman. of the AEC,:hisgovernment
experience?especially his relation-
ship with the American intelligence
community not only angnish7.
ing. bui. very_ nearly frightening, as ?
well. As Lilienthal and a few_. other:
people in the government were aware.
American intelligence was a joke:th-e
estimating process, partictilarly,, was ..
little better than ofthand guess Work,
there was a nearly total dearth of hard
data, and what little data existed was
the focal point .cif ajuvcnihe scris'- of
__arguments between the
ligence services and the newly-created:.
civilian Central Intelligence, Agency.
Lilictithars diary effl&v tQ
in.the midst .of what
an absurd -argument. Earlier. th,O.yea-rs:
Lewis Strauss; _ AEC-- chairman,,, had.
-met defeat, in. his attempt Ili begin a
large-scale 'monitoring. program joi-
-det.ecting PbsSible- Soviet- nuclear
testing. :As r.noted'- in _ the.. preceding-.
article irOhis- series, Strattss.:had
argu- ed ,thatonIy' such --a' prolirIttn.
would be-able:to detect the,existence.-..f.
of a Soviet atm id weapons prograin..
SiBCC at least one open-air test was
neeessar3--to--j..-prove7z-..-Ife6 weaponsj'-?
-To no avail,:::StraUsinsistedi that
without, a mbnitoring- program,: this:
-country. would have no idea of the,"
_ level of the r-Soviet., program?and,,_
most importantly, Whether th
. can intelligence- community was right
in assuming the gussigns would need'
-.about twenty years to end the American
atomic?weapons.'monopoly.
._ Lilienthal watched the bureaucratic.'
. jockeying in-this little argument with
growing unease: the smug reports to-
congressional .coinmittpprdypdtEprRe
;intelligence agencies which confiL.'..-
. _
_ ? ;
MILITARY SC1E.,NCE_,' & TECHNOLOGY
VOLUME 1, NO. 3
1981
N.TELLIGENCE
dently predicted an American atomic
monopoly far into the future were ;
based, as Lilienthal knew, on the
flimsiest of evidence. Worse,, Strauss
was being balked in his attempt to get
a monitoring program by the very
same smugness: since the Russians
- would take so many,years to develop -
an atomic bomb, why waste money
monitoring something that did not
: exist?: Appalled, -Lilienthal realized r:
. that the American: intelligence- corn-
.
. munity had nO, clotnes
, As. things turned out :Strauss' fi-..
nallY did get his monitoring program.
. but only after he 'shifted money-
.-.secretly from his agency to the Air
". Force, which carried out the actual
Jnonitoring._ In September of.: 1942;
one; of_the Air Force .monitoring
. planes detected . the irrefutable_ evi-
dence that the Russians had carried -
-out at /east one opert-air test:of an-:
.atornic bomb.
..I?The fact that Strauss and the AEC.- -
ivere: vindicated (notjo.mentioo
?
Scientists Who had been- predicting a ,
Russian .atomic capability by:1949)
turned rout to be almost meaningless,::_
? .ibecauSer the intelligence community :2
seemed to have learned nothingfrom
? its mistakes. In-fact,r-they were abont.
to commit an .equalViv'rong-headed
thi? time on the oppositeend
of the scale. TO be morepr.ecise-, theyr-:14
were about to create the Bomber Gap
...,.-' and the Alissile Gap- 1-lowt those two,
,serious'..intelligence failures developed
tells --uS, a great deal 'about ihe.prob-
-44
lems of estimative intelligencef.--
The,--:diffictdty: with the bombers
sten-tined directly from the imbroglio:
:1 surroundiig 'the. first Soviet: atomie-:.?
.* test.. As we have seen; that failure was
primarily :orunderestimationi
judging the Russians as-technological-
.primitives incapa e- of carrying-out
? massive: and difficult feats as!
- producing; an atomic: weapons pro-