NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER ESTABLISHED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01137R000100030001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 12, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON. A. C. 20505
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Phone; [phone]
12 October 1977
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER ESTABLISHED
The CIA's Directorate of Intelligence and the Office of the
National Intelligence officers have been merged to form a new
organization, the National Foreign Assessment Center. The change was
effective 11 October 1977. Robert R. Bowie, Deputy to the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) for National Intelligence, has been appointed
Director of the Center. The Center is located in the CIA Headquarters
building where personnel involved in the merger had worked previously,
i.e., no movement of people has taken place.
The merger is designed primarily as a streamlining move, combining
under one person all of the DCI's subordinate elements involved in the
production of finished intelligence. No major internal realignments or
changes in personnel are contemplated. The merger is another step in
implementing the Presidential Directive concerning reorganization of the
Intelligence Community announced on 4 August 1977.
The National Intelligence Officers have been responsible for the
production of National Intelligence Estimates for the President and the
National Security Council. These studies provide the best information
and judgment available to the U.S. Government on major trends and events
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 Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP90-01I37R000100030001-5
-2-
abroad that affect the security and foreign policy of the United
States. They are products of the entire Intelligence Community.
The Directorate of Intelligence has been responsible for
intelligence analysis and production within CIA. In addition to its
contributions to National Estimates, it issues a wide variety of
periodicals and assessments for the use of policy officers at the
national level, ranging from daily current intelligence summaries to
in-depth analyses of foreign developments requiring the work of many
analysts over months or years.
The National Foreign Assessment Center will continue both of
these missions. No change is contemplated in the procedures for
producing National Estimates or for Community participation in their
preparation. Departments and agencies will retain the same voice in
reaching the conclusions of these estimates that they have had for the
past several years. Their right to dissent from the findings expressed
in National Intelligence Estimates remains assured.
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 In the CIA1 says Ralnh MoGe
you have to do is tell the truth.
Ralph McGehee '50 joined the Central struggle was a losing one. Of all the
Intelligence Agency in 1952, shortly after countries in the region, today only
he was'cut from the Green Bay Packers- Thailand remains allied to, the West_
He's not sure why the CIA approached McGehee thinks he knows why our side
him, but during his intelligence training he lost the rest.
met so many other pro football dropouts In 1965 McGehee directed an intelli-
that he suspects the agency considered gence gathering effort in a province in
the National Football League. a prime northeast Thailand where a Communist
recruiting ground. insurgency was beginning. After a
When the Korean War ended in 1953 detailed, yearlong study, McGehee re-
orted that he had found a popular
tine
l
d
'
p
es
an
s c
McGehee joined the agency
operations section as a case officer. Over movement so broad, pervasive and deeply the history of intelligence, and it is the
the next two decades he served in the rooted that purely military measures were rock on which Ralph McGehee
Philippines, Taiwan, Japan, Thailand and unlikely to defeat it. foundered.
Vietnam. He did the routine work of an McGehee submitted his findings to the After he submitted his dissenting
intelligence officer: recruiting agents, agency but, -after a brief period of praise report, McGehee's career tool; a nose-.
conducting investigations, and maintain- for this work, he ran into an official wall dive. He was shuttled from one low-lev
H
i
d
b
h
ing liaison with the local police and
intelligence organizations- _
During that era the CIA's main
struggle was against Communist
insurgency in Southeast Asia. That
e was prom
se
er.
to anot
in Washington. - jo
His findings, he explains, ran counter promotions but never received them.
to the official Washington view that He was frustrated as he watched his
Communist insurgency was a form of country wage the wrong kind of war in
and orders from outside.
McGehee maintains that intelligence
pants who were duped or forced into
joining guerilla units who took their arms
clandestine invasion, and that the Southeast Asia, one he knew was
natives involved were unwilling partici- .. doomed to failure. He did what he coul
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February 1982
information often is politicized.. In
theory, the agency provides accurate and'
unbiased information to the President so-
he can make wise decisions regarding
national security. In practice, when a
President is firmly committed. to a
particular policy (such as military
victory in Vietnam), the agency shapes i
its information to conform to that policy J
Bad or. even inconvenient news is
unwelcome. That is an abiding theme in
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RICHMOND NEWS--LEADER
26 November 1981
07n. .402%
abrua.
The advertisement, which appeared Mon-
day, said the agency is seeking applican .swith
training in computer sciences, economicsen-
gineering, foreign area studies, languages,
mathematics, photographic interpretations
and physical sciences.. McCann said..mast of
the jobs,. especially those in the foreigiiassess.-
ment, field, require advanced degrees, such as
a master's or doctor of philosophy.. - , _
He_ said that radio recruitment advertise
ments have been used in Denver; Atlanta and
Salt Lake City and that adrtisements have
appeared in several national magazines. and
professional journals. -
Peterson said the CIA never has had prob-
lems in filling its job vacancies, even during
J he Vietnam war and the Watergate in zestiza-
tions, when the agency was the subject of
The CIA is "an equal-oppoity,'aa_
tive-action employer," according to its adver
tisement
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By ANDREW ? PETKOFSKY,;
The.CiFr, it recruiting employees in .the
Richmond area.
In a large advertisement that appeared in
The News.Leader_this week,: the- government.
'agency said it is "looking for. inen and women .
who want a career with a challenge, and
rewards to match.:
The advertisement said-the available jobs
require advanced. education,. "intelligence,
skill, initiative..: a willingness to take charge
(and) the ability. to piece together information
-from many sources... " But the ad did not
ay precisely what the jobs are: -
CIA spokesman Dale L Peterson said today
that the CIA is looking..fgr "operations offi-
.cers" to gather information abroad.
"We don't use the word agent," he. said.
Another agency spokesman, John McCann,
chief of the Washington area recruitment of-
fice, said "scientific types' and people to work
.in the National Foreign Assessment Center in
Washington: also. are being sought
The CIA has.been advertising for job appli-
cants in variousp of the country for about =
two years;:Peterson said, becau the end of
the'mWtarjrdraft._tied-.ug; tite~iraditianal .
`source of recruits
He said .the?jobs require persons wha have;
had advanced _edecation` but also have been-
through a "rnatnring expenence'_of working,::
-l especiallyr overseas:- whila_ the . dra f twas
effect, largemunbers of?yonng persvnsserved
in the military;rmatnred,-.and. then went to
college..The CIA then would recruit an college
campuses;axioong studs who had service. in
the military'_
"The people ar ioger'availible on the
campuses,-.' Peterson-said:. -.
He said the CLa..now has torecruit people!
who have. bad advanced .training in science,
foreign languages,.raathematics, engineering
and other technical fieldsand have been work-
ing for at.least_ a couple of years. To reach
those people, the CIA must advertise, he said. !
McCann said a similar recuiting advertise-
ment that appeared in The News Leader in }
August 1980 produced about 125 applications.
He said 15 or 20 of those applications were I
chosen for- interviews. As- for the :number
hired, McCann said-that information is not the
sort the CIA gig out,. 5~_ ! .. :.. , :. _
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0 PAC:
-1 I;Ap~
NAT..T iAL J^UC:AL
21 November 1981
Reagan's Effort to B.,.'esha
May Revive Debate over Agt
The President is about to sign an executive order on the Cly
delicate question of how to balance national security wil
BY DOM. BONAFEDE CIA" will be like the old CIA, which in a D-N
torrent of headlines in the 1970s was nent
he Reagan Administration, intent on exposed for illegally spying on American sent
revitalizing the U.S. intelligence ap- citizens, exhibiting a cavalier disregard that
paratus, is seeking to assure . that the for civil liberties, participating or conspir- cone
changes conform to President Reagan's ing in overseas assassination attempts and tiviti
goals---to combat international terrorism masterminding a host of bizarre, costly by
and other perils to national security. and embarrassing James Bond-like plots- pout
After several false starts, Reagan will Adm_ Bobby R. Inman, the deputy A
shortly disclose the revisions in a new CIA director, publicly declared in March men
executive order-the third . presidential that while the reins on the agency may be Pres
directive governing intelligence activities eased, the scope of the proposed changes their
tram J_ Casey, director of the Central should Reagan persist in "unleashing" issut
T
trative and organizational measures to tainly would be to revive the highly Hot:
aegis. the intelligence community in a free Inte
pushing legislation to exempt the CIA The President has already been put on The
from Freedom of Information Act stria notice by the intelligence oversight com- Lou
tures and is supporting a bill that would mittees in the House and Senate that the tion
prohibit unauthorized disclosure of infor- overwhelming majority of their members ordt
mation identifying U.S. intelligence oper- are opposed to any proposals that would met
atives. - allow the CIA to conduct covert domestic aga:
Each of these steps is part of a con- operations. C
certed effort to strengthen the nation's On Oct. 30, the Senate Select Commit- atio
intelligence machinery in keeping with tee on Intelligence, headed by Barry Hot
Reagan's hardline defense posture and Goldwater, R-Ariz., sent its recornmen- witl
his political ideology. dations on the .proposed executive order mat
Reagan's new executive order, cover- to : Richard V- Allen, assistant to the on t
ing the CIA and a galaxy of sister. President for national security affairs. a cc
intelligence agencies, could nonetheless Allen and an assistant, Donald Gregg, p
provoke an intense national -debate over director of the National Security Coun- met
the delicate balance between individual tit's intelligence cluster, are handling the hea__..o
rights and national security. Two earlier issue for the White House. Although the mittee on Constitutional Rights. Rodino
draft proposals. leaked to the press by committee's report is confidential, it is and Don Edwards, D-Calif., the subcom
antagonists, were purportedly designed to known that the members, in a bipartisan mittee chairman. contend that the execu-
expand the CIA's jurisdiction to include agreement, dissented from proposals that tive order falls within their purview be-
domestic counterintelligence, lawfully would permit the CIA to engage in cause it would diminish the authority of
the province of the Federal Bureau of domestic operations and offered several the Attorney. General and the FBI in
Investigation- modifications. An addendum attached to domestic intelligence matters. Both the
That raised the specter of surreptitious the report included the views, mainly in Justice Department and the FBI come
entries, nail openings, electronic surveil- opposition to particular provisions of the under the committees jurisdiction.
lance and infiltration1 pVb l pRelm it 4tt42fdbDf Cl3fAl lPtSI ~~P113 b~,bl1l` how far the
and even legitimate business organiza- members. order goes, wards said. "We're trying
Lions. It has triggered fears that the "new On the same day. Edward P. Boland, to let the American people and the media
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ARTICL P .u L1
ON PAGE
THE WASHIUIGTONIA5
NOVE+IBE2 1981
By Donald Lambro
?' Best Spies
William J. Casey: The CIA director has
overcome an inauspicious start. The in-
telligence community didn't like his ap-
pointment, because he had no experience
in modem clandestine work. Casey named
a crony, businessman Max Hugel, as
director of covert operations; Kugel was
implicated in allegations of stock ma-
nipulation and abruptly left the CIA.
Nevertheless, Casey has shown the
same skill in running the CIA that he
displayed as Ronald Reagan's campaign
manager and, before that, as chairman
of the Securities and Exchange
Com-
mission. He inherited an agency weak-
ened and demoralized by his predeces-
sor, Admiral Stansfield Turner, and he
has improved both its performance and
morale.
"Morale is certainly higher at the
agency than ever before," says an agency
source. "Casey has been making the right
moves. He's getting us back on track-"
John McMahon: Unlike Casey's own
appointment, his choice of IVIcMahorr to
run the CIA's National Foreign Assess-
ment Center was applauded. A career
agent, McMahon is one of the most highly
regarded senior officials within the CIA_
He spearheaded a CIA expose of the
Soviet Union's worldwide disinforma-
tion and forgery activities-
Casey was alarmed by apparent weak-
nesses of the agency's analytical output,
and told McMahon to shape up the di-
vision quickly so government policy-
makers would get accurate insight and
analysis on a broad range of strategic
issues. Intelligence sources credit'
McMahon with instituting changes long
overdue. "We can already see an irn-.
provement," one reports.
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 Approved For Release 2001/12/05: CIA-RDP90-011
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON YALE `~ THE PUBLIC HISTORIAN
I.li n-f.-
1 901
r
The mstorian as Fore
Policy Analyst: Th
Challenge of the Q.
PROFESSIONAL msxoaLAn s and the institutions of Amen
policy have been engaged in increasingly fruitful relal
years since World War 71. rust as individuals like Geoa
and Herbert Feis have. linked the worlds of diplomacy and his-
torical research, so the profession has established, `institutional
beachheads"x in the historical offices of the Department of State,
the military services, and in smaller numbers, the Departments of
Defense and Energy. In these offices historians working as his-
torians have applied rigorous scholarly standards in editing pri-
mary sources, most notably the Foreign Relations of the United
? This paper is a revised version of a talk presented at the?anniial meeting of the
Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association, University of Southern
California, August 1980.
This material has been reviewed by the Central Intelligence Agency to assist
the author, in eliminating classified information. However, that review constitutes
neither CIA authentication of material presented as factual nor a CIA endorsement
of the author's views or those ascribed by the author to. others (including current
or former officials of any nation).
L The concept is taken from Otis L. Graham., Jr., "Historians and the `World of
(Off-Campus) Power," The .c Lbiic Historian, Volume I, Number 2 (Winter 1979),
34.
15
?1983. by the Regents of the University of California
0272-3433/81/010015+11$00-50
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 ARTICLE !FFEFA roved For Release 2001/12/05: CIA-RDP96-0113fM6610003
ON PnGE
PHI iiELPHIA xN zJI-RER
5 October 1981
1 f are economic woes coming for
;,,da
ledA_ ;s- mss[ year, more than 120,000 Cu=
IVASHLNGTN A CIA 'anal sC . bans fled to the. United States: in a
y boatliftsanctioned:by Castro.- ."'
bays serious economic problems. and; "Castro- would-probably: prefer to
Internal 1?discresidentontent may prompt negotiate'a long-term, orderly depar-
..Fidel Castro to- tune for- some One-to- two million
encourage a new, large-scale exodus Cubans on the periphery of the?revo-
? pf- The refugees forecast wa is count=y. lution, -but he is not above threaten-
was in.a compendium .. lug a new large-scale exodus to
hattons eleasedester~n hemisphere achieve his goal," Swanson said. "In
yesterday by the : addition, growing numbers of Cu-
jCommittecongressional . Joint Economic bans could take it upon themselves to
Analyst Russell- Swanson ? of-' the leave illegally and thus escalate bi-
CI .,. ....,:... -.
ssessment-. _ lateral tensions.' ,
A's National Foreign: A _: ._
;Center wrote` that in coming years Swanson said Cuba's:, economie
`the Castro `governmentr_faces.-its slowdown was ' reflected" in? the
most serious, economic, challen a growth rate of -its national budget;
;since the transition from capitalism which dropped from about' 10 per
to socialism in theearly 1960x." -= .:, ..Cent a year between- .tote mi4.1960s
Despite. improvements in -areas and mid-1970s to k:3 tperce - 'otin1980.
Swanson said tha led- ving Mal-'
.such
such as. health and education;' Cu gr
; have: experiences a decline arse and despair have e led- to- serious-
ince-the- mi 1960x-in_'per-' capita.' declines in- labor prSlowdovitp
,supplies of clothing and key staples through deliberate work slowdowns and such as sugar, rice; beef and coffee,: black market absenteeism. v the a d: other e,
end, the. housing--shortage has-gone black activities and other-
from bad to worse; Swanson said.. ? economic crimes have been increas-
"Reolutionary fervor among both ing"
the young and the old is on the wane Although the 'e'conomic situation
because of continuing consumer is not an immediate threat to the
austerity," Swanson said. "At the Political security of the Castro gov_i
same time, the prospects for dynamic ernment," he said, it is likely to lead
economic development are Politi
cato "major systemic economic
at least the next decade." : ( changes,"- which would amount to'
Facing such deep-rooted economic I, abandoning certain fundamental!
problems, he wrote, "Havana could Marxist tenets.
again,,seek to defuse internal discon. Swanson's portrayal.of the Cuban
tent `through-large-scale emigration economy. contrasted sharply ciaa
atactic employed"successfully on recent assessment by Cuban offaficials,
three previous Occasions in the past who argued that the economy has
enjoyed substantial growth despite'
the. U.S.. trade embargo and. would
become even. stronger in the next -
five years.
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 ed For 2/05 . emA-RE)PS0110 1191?
-
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMEI
Last spring I notified Herb Hetu that
Lafayette College wanted to do an article on
me and my employment at CIA in their Alumni
Quarterly. The article has been published,
and I think you ought to have'a copy of it in
case you get any questions. I doubt very much
that you will.
DD/NFAC
 -'T1C, ,p i H. elease 2001/ 5y:C@4 bPg0-01137R000100
27 SEPITMBERi 1981
25X1A
Reflections, on Kremlinolog- Y
BYDAVID BINDER
5peaal tOT' N WYOTk Trmes
ALEXANDRIA, Va., Sept. 26 ti It
may be only a footnote in the world of
real estate, but a report that the entire
Soviet analysis division of the Central
Intelligence Agency was moving from
C.I.A. headquarters up the road about 10
miles to Vienna, Va., stirred a wave of
reminiscence in Marion G. Shaw, who
formerly headed the agency's Soviet in-
terrialpolitics branch..
She will not comment on the move
from headquarters in Langley, Va.,
which apparently is a purely adminis-
trative housekeeping matter. But she
recalled that in the old days at the agen-
cy, before the advent of The Computer,
she and her fellow analysts 'kept their:
arcana about the Kremlin officialdom:,'
on 3-by-5-inch file cards- In those days:
the C.I.A. was housed in wartime bar-
racks buildings north of the Lincoln Me.
morial, near the present day Kennedy
Cente
-
r
. One day in the late 1950's there was a
flood warning along the Potomac and all
the C.I.A. officers were ordered to
evacuate with what they could carry to
higher ground. Miss Shaw, an analyst
who kept her Kremlin file cards in old
shoe boxes, caused "great guffaws"
that day among her colleagues by.
emerging with her arms full of her
oblong cardboard boxes, looking like
she was about to deal with a picky cus-
tomer in a fancy bootery. An admiring
fellow Kremlinologist at the State De.
partment, Paul K Cook, says fondly,
` Marion kept the best shoe boxes in
town-" -
A Return to Back Rooms
Twenty years ago, at the height of the
cold war, hers was a vaunted craft.
Now, with easier access to the Soviet
Union and somewhat more informaticm
-appearing in the Soviet press, the art of
'Kremlinology, like that of clock repair-
ing in a throwaway society, has retired
mote as the czar's palace fortress for I -'A
1
h
w
ich it is named.
A Vassar graduate who had studied
~e briefly foandhad served
r State De-
partmert, Miss Shaw joined,t'he C.T.A.
in 1950 and was immediiately assi
ned t
g
o
Soviet?Internal Politics, a.k.a. Kremli- nrem"I felt at home," she recalled,
nology- The term was already in wide ivrth a twinkle in her light blue eyes. Did
use in intelligence circles when she it changeher mind? "No."
started, but did not appear in print until Since,early 1979, when she retired,
about ].9M. Her first boss, a World War 'I Miss Shaw has experienced fits of pa;:
11 intelligence hero, described World War sionate nostalgia, when one or another
nologyas"the last ero horizon," change occurs in the Kremlin. "I die
"He showed me the intellectual fasci. overthat, she said.
_It was like reading a totally spellbind-
s new clue.-- .
'Signs and Symbols' Pondere d
In those early days, she said, the scar-
city of information about the men inside
the Kremlin was such that Western stu-
dents of-Soviet politics were largely re-
__"I could do it, but I was never a classi-
political system became more open
Among the newer instruments were
the study of what she calls "old boy net-
works" of party officials who were con-
temporaries in the same region, the cor-
Wat would affect the careers of officials;:
trictmirtay~r~ anders.~~V -
-, Sbae Box s Help Predictlans. - -
munity, that Dmitri S. Polyansky, then.:
considered a possible successor to Khru-
h
s
chev, way alydybeingdowngraded.
C LA. _-a_ u,e'
mss'. in 1973 that President.
f.,4.I care desperately about whatlilid,
Jo= That same year, her 23d on the job,
the agency discovered that Mi
'Sh
ss
aw
. had never set foot in the Soviet !Union,'.
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floe o tr
ist-- a venture not entirely without peril
since "they knew who I was"
-and see
Novels of le Came
"It's not the leaving but the not know-
ing. But I'm cut off because it's classi-
fied "
In retirement she has found time to
read, among other things, the spy novels
of John le Carre, whom she admires as a
great astronomer of Bureaucracy
Soviet and American.
"I learned about Soviet bureaucratic- I
politics by watching C.I.A. bureaucratic .I
politics," she said, and then emitted a
raucous laugh before adding, "alloca_
trans of money
power of a
i
,
ppo
ntment
and the threat of removal."
of a retired, g woman
hard-drinkin
that type - I knew several of them,,,
she said.
Now Miss Shaw is applying the?skills
h
d
l
s
e
eve
oped over 30. year to her. own
family history, rooted in Colonial times
around Charlottesville, Va. One anger
-
tor,-Martin Luther Smith, a Civil war
general out of West Point who fo';ght
with the South, fascinates her, since he f
came from New York. She is fillinh
oe
boxes again. g.
 1/
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ARTICLE APPEARED THE NEW YORK TIMES
ON PAGE 2 21 September 1981
WWAS INGT TAL
K P,E'4 UNOL.OGISTS are trying.
not to read too much into the : .
fact -that- their own- section. of-,;
overt Soviet inte 1igence analysis is
being.moved off the grounds of tine
Central Intelligwce Agency s main of
fice campus in.tbe Virginia suburb-of:;
Langley. A plot of sorts -a blueprint
for additional office space -- is the
mundane reason gvea fo'r the move to'.
another C.LA. site in the Virginia bed- -
room community of Vienna- Some of
the more irrepressible analysts ` are=-'
wondering whether the change-was
dictated by Williaml. Casey, the new
C.I.A. director and an old hand in the-
busitmss-
One profeseic ial says the Sovietseo-
lion relates crucially to the other intel- -,
ligence unitsr like the shaker to: the
:cocktail, with various specialists wan-
dering down the Langley halls-for:'!,
casual business chats with the Moscow
chaps. "I can think of a lot of others
who aught to be defenestrated first,"'.;
said the analyst, reluctant to go out,
into the cold of crosstown traffic..-?':
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 Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP90-01137Ff@00100030001-5 25X1A
ICLE -APP ' ' D NEW YORK TIMES
h1,
C.LA. Says Terrorism Is on Rise,
With 760 Acts Counted Last Year
WASHINGTON, June .16. (UPI) - A
new report by the Central . Intelligence
Agency says that the number of terrorist
activities around the world have risen
dramatically and that American busi-
nessmen and diplomats- are the terror-
- ists'favorite targets.
The 22-page. report, prepared, by the
agency's Nationai:Foreign .Assessment
Center and made public yesterday, said
that 6,714 international terrorist acts had
been counted from 1968 through 1984, in-
cluding 780 last year. Since-a new system.
of counting was used, the agency said, a
comparison with,the numbers in a sirrii-
Iar report last-year would: not-be accu-
rate. ;;;...,
American citizens, especallybusiness-
-targets of terrorist attackE;?'the a_qlficy
said, citing six, Americana killed ' ' 1-
Philippines, and. one in the-Israeli
piedWestBank: .'? =4w;.
The next- "most-vicitmized national-
sties" were listed as Russians, Turks, Ira-
qis, French, Iranians and Israelis.
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 Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP9O-01137
OFFICE OF POLICY AND PLANNING
This week I have made two organizational changes which will bear
importantly on the improvement of national estimates, on the
administration of CIA and on our relationships with the media,
Congress and other elements-of the government.
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL (NIC)
For intelligence to play its crucial role as policy is formulated, our
work must be relevant to the issues at hand and it must be timely.
There have been shortcomings for some time in this relating of
intelligence efforts and. activities to the policy process. Moreover,
the process of preparing national intelligence estimates has become
slow, cumbersome and inconsistent with providing the
policymaker with a timely, crisp forecast that incorporates clearly
defined alternative views- - -
To correct this situation, I am restructuring the role of the National
Intelligence Officers (NIOs) and the procedures for having the Na-
tional Foreign Intelligence Board and its members make their in-
puts to national estimates. The MOs, constituting jointly the Na-
tional Intelligence Council, henceforth will report' directly to the
DCI and DDCI. The Chairman, of the NIC will function as chief of
staff -in directing and coordinating the work of the NIOs. The NIOs
will continue to be the DCI s principal representatives in policy
forums, and will continue to support the DCI in his role as member
of the the NSC and the DDCI as Intelligence Community repre-
sentative to the Senior. Interdepartmental Groups (SIGs)-working
through the Director of NFAC for analytical support and
assistance.
The National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC) will continue to
be the, analytical arm of CIA and the DCI and carry primary
responsibility for the production of finished foreign intelligence.
I have decided that organizational changes are needed to improve
Agency-wide administration and to shift direction in certain areas
now that the difficulties of the past decade are behind us. These
changes will reduce staff positions and return a number of intel-
ligence officers to the collection and production of intelligence.
I am establishing the Office of Policy and Punning to ensure that
plans and policies submitted for DCI/DDCI consideration are
consistent with Agency-wide objectives and priorities and that they
are reviewed in the context of overall Agency needs. The Office
will further develop and coordinate CIA's long-range planning ef-
fort, review materials submitted to the DCI/DDCI that concern
Agency administration, personnel, analytical operations and exter-
nal affairs policies, and coordinate preparation of briefing papers
for the DCI and DUCT for MSC and SIG meetings as well as meet-
ings with heads of other agencies. The Office of Policy and Plan-
ning also will centralize in the immediate office of the DCI/DDCI
responsibility for all external affairs, including interdepartmental
relations, liaison with the Congress and public affairs.
With respect to external affairs, the Office of Legislative Counsel
and the Office of Public Affairs were created at a time when the
Agency was still encountering considerable criticism in the media
,,and in the Congress and when it was important to expend consider-
able effort to explain the Agency= s mission; to justify our activities
and to defend the quality of our work. The magnitude of effort
devoted to these purposes has significantly decreased, and I believe
the time has come for CIA to return to its more traditional low
- 'public .profile and a leaner--but no less effective-presence on
Capitol Hill. Our emphasis from now on should he to maintain and
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 Approved For Release 2001/12/05: CIA-RDP90-01137R
.4p X7D
IGLE .iPP
ONP4GE
SOVIET.. AID- DISPUTED
IN -TERRORISM STUDY
A Draft.- C . I.A:::Report, K. ow-Being
Reviewed, Finds lnsut fie6
.,.
Evidence-of Direct Role
By JUDITH MILLER`
WASHINGTON, March 2a-A draft re-
port produced by the Central Intelligence
Agency has concluded that there is insuf=
ficient evidence?to substantiate Adminis-
tration charges that the Soviet Union' is
directly helping to foment international
terrorism,- Congressional. and Adminis-
tration sources said today: :::.:: ?
William J. Casey, :Director of Central
Intelligence, has asked his analysts,. the:
sources said, to review their conclusions;
given the substantial opposition t&the re
The draft estimate,. produced :.by.xhe
C.I:A.'s - National Foreign Assessments
Center, has stirred debate within'Admin-
istration foreign policy circles, as foreign
affairs spokesmen have publicly accused
the Soviet Union of training, equipping,-
and financing ?. international terrorist
groups. ;.;_ _ ~,?: ::::...
The review. of the draft=estimate has
once again raised questions about the
relationship between intelligence offi-
cials and policy makers, with some C.I.A.I
officials concerned that the agency - is
coming under pressure to tailor its analy-
sis to fit the. policy views of theAdminis.
. tration. -~ _
Charges in Last Administration:
similar charges. were made during the
.Carter Administration -and resulted in.
frequently bitter exchanges , between
policy makers andintelligence officials.
Bruce C_Clark, who heads the agency's,
assessments, or analysis unit, is retiring
from the C.IA in April, in what officials
said was a personal decision unrelated to
the dispute over the intelligence estimate
onterracism w;:cam:
r: rL" W YORK TIMES
29 PARCH 1981
One official said that a successor hat
current director of the -agency's opera
tions unit, John McMahon.
The special national intelligence esti
mate on terrorism was begun soon afte'
the Administration took office,- official
said. Secretary-of State Alexander N
Haig Jr. said on Jan. 28 in his first new
'conference, that the Soviet Union, as par
of a "conscious policy,". undertook th
"training, funding and equipping" of it
ternational terrorists.,
The Administration has subsequentl:
said that combatting international ter
rorism is one of its key. foreign policy of
jectives:
'Ample Evidence' on Soviet Role
::,'In addition, Richard V. Allen, Pres-
dent Reagan's national security adviser
said in an interview with ABC News thi
.week that "ample evidence'''" had been ac
cumulated to demonstrate the Sovie
Union's involvement in international tei
rorism. Mr. Allen also said that the Soviet
?.Union' was "probably".`supporting the
Palestine Liberation Organization, which
be. said must be identified. as a terrorist
organization, through , financial assist-
ance and through support of: its "main
aims ,t . _ -;a:_ ......*; k.--
Finally,- Allen: concluded that Is-
raeli air raids into southern Lebanon
should be generally recognized as a "hot
pursuit of a sort and therefore, justified."
Officials said that the draft estimate
contained some factual evidence to sup-
port charges that the Soviet Union was di-
rectly aiding and abetting terrorist
groups, but that. in-many instances the
evidence of such involvement was- either
murky or nonexistent. - --
.- The estimate, which was circulated fort
comment to the State- Department, Na-
..tional Security Council, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security
Agency, stirred .angry debate and re-
sponse~.. s... _. S; _
commented-"
Other:! Administration and Congres-
sional officials; however, voiced concerns
that the-agency was once again being,
asked to tailor its views to fit the public1
rronouncements of senior Administra-
?unofflcials..
"There would not have been a review if
the estimate's conclusions had totally
supported _ . -. the-. .' Administration's
charges," the official said.-. ti tee.
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 25X1A
Approved For Release 3W12/Q5F~,QP90-01137R000
{29 March 1981 jj~
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 Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP90-01137
7
C:.
NO2:,JICH 3ULLETIN(C I )
8 March 1981
This tl'.r part BLtI e ?s 1es ot,. O Ye~aa of CIA
t;iG
estimates of Soviet '.'?~L'.7^:11ttia$ _ .1 e,V3
decades of ch:tr7.e, that j-,. e the early I is the CfA.
.e yatr1Z- - `t,3 1 L[ ~ J T1~i e'd F-017 .! mi Iter'y
Viending, technical c?zau ?:3s a,_d 2a ors, deploy-
*n ziz.t.
icaay's ffi--st irwta.? . "11 e Security Blanket
'? qt = eilec!:' e:plor? onje --i the blunders as
aeon by a num ni ~r.erts.nho have analyzed the
reppcts dui bctiz R ablican and Democratic
Admi ' r ohs.
Oco rT I :
I
T hQ secu- 1 b;zt, k e t Thai f.aH ed
.BY W LTLL , ii x PA IE-IL
Bul.Ie}in S~.aii Writer
WASHINGTON - The U-S. government has wasted
billicr'9 of dollars over th past two decades on
inaccurate estimates and forecasts of Soviet military
spending and cagabiliries, according to present and
former (J.S. intelligence and wleieruse officials.
Ever since the Soviets encouraged the U.S_ in the late
1951?s to overestimate Soviet deployment and accuracy
of intercontinental ball,:--tic niussiles_(IC.6Ms) which led
to the famous "missile gap", U.S. Presidpr%3 and
Congresses have reached arms limits agreements with
the Soviets and have determined U.S. defense invest-
ments on the basis of hiaccurate intelligence about gnat
the Soviets were spending on defense and whata,
they were'planning. to deploy, strategically as well as
tactically, The Bulletin has 1?arned.
The inaccurate int:?lilgence has-... iii the subject of
often heated debate. within. the- intell.igccr'-ce community
since the mid-1,56-Ds, wit? some critics claiming they,
were forced out of the CiA for q esaio Ting the agency's
figures. Recently, mcre ominous gi:.estior, have been
raised about p cssi)ale explanations for the errors.
Was it simply the result of bureaucratic bungling or
stubborness on the. part of t1:r i-evolved, some of the
critl,cs- ask.- Or was it the result of Soviet deception
possibly including "moles" or Soviet agents in high
positions in the U.S_ goverweeut'
Whatever the cause, it -is beginning to - dawn on
Capitol Hill and tYirougrout the new Adnwrsti=ation that
the money. wasted tint the poor estimates may be only
the tip of a very unpleasa&it iceberg.
Ann even more significsni: ,-livelihood:and: in'
some cases even their lives on the linen
in providing thformatiom'"`:"i ". 7"
e' The? ? CIA's' - personnel 1' director.
Fm2m- xanney; said .in an'-affidavit
that the campue'contaets`are.neeese
sary toproperlY-P" tect national seen.,
city. He. said.ia many.. fields`- it is;
"absolutely. essential that the- agency
baM'available-to it the single greatest
somrca of: e:pertlae; theAmerican? aca?
.deEi comzniuiity:" . - i yr;,
C .analysts at4 its.
National Pored
Asaastraneat Center-.consult,. rly_
wins fhe s. orr:., an,,
"tafoxataI and personabasis,often - by -1
;wh_ th&:mWerstanding
that the.contacts will be. confident
Janney: said;-: without': specifying-
that scholars whose, CIA contact have.:
become public were subjected to bar..
'asmment and ridicule -by students and
-other faculty. members...
`There -is also evidence ? that. such.
-scholars, despite recognized standing
in their fields of expertise, have beert
;subjected to professional disabilities,
including. denial of tenure and- dis-
missed from theirs positions as a result
of acknowledging such informal con-
sub the CIA," Janney said.
The Senate Select Intelligence Comel
inittee_ said - in an April 1978 report
`that many of the. CIA's contacts with i
academicians are not dangerous but'
that the "operational use" of academe.
class raised serious questions about
preserving the integrity of academic
institutions. __ _
According to the committee, several
hundred American academics, 'In ad.-
dition- to providing leads, and, on De.
casion, making introductions for intel-
ligence purposes, occasianauy write-
books and other material to be used
for propaganda purposes abroad.
yond these, an additional- few score.
are usedin an unwitting manner for
minor activltie9." - - - ... -
` In suggesting that all contacts with
academics be open, the senators said::
`? : _ If the. CIA is to serve, the initel--1
ligence needs of the nation, it must.
have unfettered access to the best ad.
vice and judgment our universities.
can produce. But this advice and eai
pertisa' can - and 'should be. opew
sought-.and.openly given:" .. __ 25X1 A
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 Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100
IIIIIII'~iani
 25X1A
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U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
21 November 1977
=,s-ft h 1 n
Sources close to the intelligence chief
have been quick to answer these
charges. They say that of the 820 jobs
being eliminated in the clandestine ser-
vice, only 13 are overseas billets. The
rest are staff slots at CIA headquarters in
Langley, Va.
The point is made that the end of the
Vietnam War left the clandestine ser-
vice enormously bloated, with hundreds
of redundant agents recalled from the
Far Fast.
Furthermore, congressional reaction
against covert operations over the past
UU
Nam,
AtCA
A DRAMATIC CHANGE in the way
America's espionage system oper-
ates around the world is being signaled
by a purge involving hundreds of clan-
destine operators.
- What the housecleaning at the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency reflects . is, a.
sharp downgrading. of covert actions---
the "dirty tricks" operations that have
embroiled the organization in a series of
scandals and official investigations over
the past three years.
Analytical approach. The emphasis
now is shifting to intelligence analysis--
political and economic as well as mili-
tary. The aim is to insure that the mass
of information pouring into the CIA
from spies, reconnaissance satellites and
open sources reaches the President and
other policy makers in a usable form.
This marks the end of an era for the
Agency-30 years during which the or-
ganization was preoccupied with covert
actions aimed at overthrowing govern-
ments and otherwise influencing politi-
cal developments abroad.
From 1961 to 1976,
roughly 900 major covert
operations were carried
out--such as the ill-fated
Bay of Pigs invasion of
Cuba and financing of op-
position to the Marxist
Allende Government in
Chile. In addition, there
were several thousand
smaller projects. -. _
- Significantly, all of the
820 CIA officials on the
purge list are officers with
the. Deputy Directorate
- for Operations--the- so-
called dirty-tricks-depart-
ment. Approximately 200 have just re-
ceived their- walking papers. The _
remainder will be given the choice of
retiring or resigning in the months
ahead. When the retrenchment is com-
pleted, the Deputy Directorate of Oper-
ations will be cut by about 15 per cent
from a strength of roughly 4t500.
. Some officials among the purgees
charge that America's espionage oper-
ations overseas are being crippled. They
allege that the CIA Director, Adm.
Stansfield Turner. is obsessed with satel-
- - - - -
COVERT ACTION
Where It Paid Off
The large-scale purge of clandestine
officers is only one part of a wide-rang-
ing program that Turner has instituted
to revamp the structure and the prior-
ities of the U.S. Intelligence community..
In another move to strengthen the
community's analysis role, he has estab-
Iran: 1953 .
CIA-promoted demonstrations result in overthrow of pro-
Communist Mossadagh Government, return of Shah.
lished a National Foreign As-
sessment Center. It is run by
Robert Bowie, a professor at'
Harvard and former official
of the Department of State.
The Center is staffed by
1,200 intelligence analysts
from the CIA and a group of
high-ranking specialists who,
in the past, were responsible
for producing national intel.
ligence estimates. These
studies provide the Presi-
dent and other policy mak-
ers with the intelligence
community's assessment of
major trends and events
abroad that affect U.S. secu-
=- tional Security Agency, which handles
electronic intelligence, and the National
Reconnaissance Office, which pperates
spy satellites. 2 : -
The aim is to minimize costly overlap-
ping by the various agencies and also to
insure that these units actually concen-
trate on the information that policy
makers need. - _ _? -
..- Taken together, the reorganization
-and the purge of specialists in dirty
tricks are changing the face of America's
Guatemala: 1954 - the criticism of a Senate committee's
Leftist Government led report that the CIA for 30.years had
by Col. Jacobo Arbenz neglected classical analytical intelli-
Guzman is ousted in Bence work because of its preoccupation
.
armed uprising orga- with covert operations abroad.
CIA
b
y
nized
covert-ac- - In another move to streamline the
tion agents. Col. Carlos entire intelligence tem. Turner has
Castillo Armes, left, lead- er of the coup, sets up a? setup a National Intelligence Tasking
pro-American regime. Center under the command of Lt. Gen.
responsible for assigning tasks to the
cies. These include not only the CIA. but
... also the Defense Department, the Na--
Yw aaaac.au~v.aa.c. w- -..a? , 9~~ r^ i2 nDAn~ I I_~ -
spies who can assess yoI-nRel arb~G~mrtrf~s'[`teigmre0aia~7 914ut whether it proves
tentions and not just his capabilities. take-over by U. Gen. Mobute Sese Seko. - more effective remains to be seen-
 Approved FoAWNsb 20OIK12/05PX1A-? 9l9 q 7R0001
31 October 1977
CIA Merges Directorate, Office
Washington--Central Intelligence Agency, in another effort to streamline Internal
intelligence gathering efforts, has merged the Directorate of Intelligence and the Office Q
of the National Intelligence Officers Into a new organization called the National Foreign..
Assessment Center.
According to the CIA, the merger Is designed primarily to combine under one person
all of the directorate's subordinate elements involved in the production of analyzed
Intelligence. Robert R. Bowie, deputy to the director of central Intelligence for national
intelligence, has been appointed director of the center.
The National Intelligence Officers were responsible for the production of national
Intelligence estimates for the President and the National Security Council. Compiled
by the entire intelligence community, these studies provide the government with
information on major trends and events abroad that affect the security and foreign
policy of the U. S., according to the CIA. The Directorate of Intelligence has been :
responsible for Intelligence analysis and production within the CIA. - -
Under the reorganization, the new center will continue both these functions. In:
announcing the move, the CIA noted that no change Is contemplated in the
procedures for producing national estimates or for Intelligence community participa--?
tlon In their preparation. -~.
In a related matter, the CIA also notified aerospace companies dealing with top
security matters to tighten procedures concerning the usage and transmission of U. S.
top secret codes, according to U. S. officials (s.was7 Oct. 17, p. 20). The new procedure
calls for two persons .to be present when codes are being used, instead of one. In
addition, movement of U_ S. codes now requires two couriers Instead of one as was
previously required. The new code procedures are part of Increased emphasis on
Security to prevent leaks and possible dissemination of Information. - -
In another internal development, the CIA also recently decided to cut 800 to 820;,
persons from its Directorate for Operations, which Is responsible for the agency's ?
covert activities. The staff reduction has been under consideration by the CIA since
the wind-down in the post-Vietnam War period. The cutback Is being spread over a
26-month period to allow for the impact of retirements and other procedures that
would reduce the need for layoffs, according to a CIA official.
Approved For Release 2001/1-2/05 : CIA-RDP90-01137R000100030001--5 -
 AVIATION tti'r_EK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY
31 October 1977
Approved For Release 2001/12/05 : CIA-RDP90-01137R0001000
25X1A
CIA Merges Directnrnta Offic
e
Washington-Central Intelligence Agency in a
th
no
er effort to stli i
,reamnenternal r
Intelligence gathering efforts, has merged the Directorate of Intelligence and the Office
,
of the National Intelligence Officers i
t
n
o
a new organitilld
Assessment Center.zaon cae the National Foreign
According to the CIA, the merger Is designed primarily to combine under one person
all of the directorate's subordinate elements involved in the production of analyzed
Intelligence. Robert R. Bowie, deputy to the director of central intelligence for national IF
Intelligence, has been appointed director of the center.
- The National intelligence Officers were
responsible for the pdti
roucon of national
intelligence estimates for the President and the National Security Council. Compiled
by the entire intelligence community, these studies provide the government with
Information on major trends and events abroad that affect the security and foreign
policy of the U. S., according to the CIA. The Directorate of Intelligence has been
responsible for intelligence analysis and production within the CIA.
Under the reorganization, the new center will continue both these functions. 1W
announcing the move, the CIA noted that no change is contemplated In the
procedures for producing national estimates or for Intelligence community participa?-
tlon In their preparation.
In a related matter, the CIA also notified aerospace companies dealing with top
security matters to tighten procedures concerning the usage and transmission of U. S.
top secret codes, according to U. S. officials (Aw&ST Oct. 17, p. 20). The new procedure ,
calls for two persons.to be present when codes are being used, Instead of one. In
addition, movement of U.S. codes now requires two couriers instead of one as was.: j,
required
The new cod
.
e procedures are patf i
r oncreased emphasis on
security to prevent leaks and possible dissemination of information. - -
In another internal development, the CIA also recently decided to cut 800 to 820:,
persons from its Directorate for Operations, which is responsible for the agency's -
covert activities. The staff reduction has been under consideration by the CIA since
the wind-down In the Post-Vietnam War period. The cutback is being spread over a
26-month period to allow for the impact of retirements and oth
er procedures that
would reduce the need for layoffs, according to a CIA official.
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 25X1A
18 October 1977
ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS
Two important organizational steps have just been completed in furtherance of
the Presidential decisions on the Intelligence Community:
(1) On 3 October, Lt. General Frank A. Camm, US Army (Ret.), became the
Director of the National Intelligence Tasking Center. General Camm comes
to us with a superb record in analytic work, military operations, and
engineering, and I am most happy that he is joining the Intelligence
Community. His initial work will be to organize the National Intelligence
Tasking Center (NITC) established by the Presidential Directive. Organi-
zationally, this will have only minor impact on the Agency. In time, the
tasking function of the NITC should be beneficial to our Agency collection
functions by coordinating them more closely with those of, other agencies.
(2) On 11 October, the DDT and the NIO were merged to form a new
organization under the DCI, the National Foreign Assessment Center
(NFAC). Mr. Bowie will head the new Center and Dr. Stevens will be his
deputy. NFAC will receive its support from DDA and other CIA elements.
With these changes our organization will look like this:
Ap
Approved For Release 2001/12/05: CIA-RDP90-01137R00
Director of
Central Intelligence/
CIA
Deputy Director of
Central
Intelligence
Public
Equal
General
Legislative
Inspector
Affairs
Employment
Counsel
Counsel
General
Opportunity
Support
Deputy
Deputy
Deputy
Deputy to
Deputy to
Deputy to
Director
Director
Director
DCI for
DCI for
DCI for
for
for
for
National
Collection
Budget and
Operations
Administration
Science and
Intelligence/
Tasking/
Evaluation
Technology
Director,
Director,
Director,
National
National
budget and
Foreign
Intelligence
evaluation
Assessment
Tasking
Staff
Center
Center
No. 13
 ! - S
i? i 1T t
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ti J
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