INDEX

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01089R000100120001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 53
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: LIST

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A. Personal Questions
B. DDCI Role- CIA Mission
C. Relationships with Congress
1. Oversight
2. Providing Intelligence
D. Issues
1. Reorganization
2. DDO Cuts
3. Open Budget
4. Covert Action
(Including Reporting)
5. Rights of Citizens
6. Security
(Including Overclassification)
7. Internal Oversight of CIA (IG)
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A
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PERSONAL
Q. Why do you feel that you are qualified to assume the responsibilities
of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence?
Q. Do you see any potential conflict of interest in your serving as
DDCI and your holding any of your present financial interests ?
Q. If requested by this Committee, on the basis of conflict of interest,
will you divest yourself of any assets ?
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PERSONAL
Q. What do you think are your qualifications for the position of Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence?
A. As you may know Senator, the Communist press has claimed
that I'd been a CIA agent for years. I wish I could claim that time now
as background for the position to which I have been appointed. Those
allegations, of course, are not true. I rieve r.been on the payroll
ositions in
i
u
s p
o
of the CIA in any capacity.] ave , h, however, in my var
Vlaad a v IQ49- a a ne 'i -qL people in foreign countries . I might
say parenthetically that I have always a an ex re~&16 y"high regard for these
people and am pleased that I may have a formal and direct association with
them if this Committee and the Senate should confirm me. However, as a
Foreign Service Officer and as Ambassador and in other policy positions
which I have occupied, I have been the recipient of finished intelligence and
feel that I have some acquaintance with it and have some knowledge of how
finished intelligence can best serve our policymakers, both in the Executive
Branch and in the Congress. In my foreign assignments I have had a close
relationship to the input of intelligence. Aside from those specific
connections, I would hope that my background and experience in the number
of executive management and administrative positions which I have held outside
of the Foreign Service give me some qualifications as an executive and as
an administrator .
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Q. Ambassador, there is some concern that your previous involvement
in the foreign policy field and particularly your continuation as a member
of the Foreign Service Corps, as you hold the DDCI position, might make
you vulnerable to pressure from the policymakers to tamper with, or more
delicately, to tilt intelligence judgments and assessments in. the direction
most favorable to and most desired by policymakers. What assurances
can you give this Committee that this will not be the case?
A. Senator I guess that question resolves itself into one of
credibility and integrity. People have come into high positions in the
Intelligence Community from various walks of life, including the military,
political field and elsewhere and have successfully put the influences and
positions which they might have had in their previous positions behind them
as they entered into these high positions in our Intelligence Community.
I am absolutely committed to the proposition that our intelligence product
must be above reproach, must be objective regardless of the policy
or other implications of the facts as we see them. I am not easily
pushed around and I believe my record will show that and I believe that I
can take on this job and do it credibly and effectively. I believe this
Committee is going to have to pass judgment as the Senate will have
to pass judgment on my credibility in this respect.
B. I maintained my foreign service appointment when I previously
served as Director/Office of Economic Opportunity, Associate Director/
Health Education and Welfare, and at no time did I find it a conflict of
interest.
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B
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Q. Mr. Ambassador, what is the impact of FOIA upon the CIA and
how do you intend to respond ?
A. Mr. Chairman, I have no knowledge of the impact of FOIA upon
the CIA at this moment. However, I would intend to evaluate the
manpower burden and try to achieve as efficient a mechanism as
possible for responding to FOIA inquiries.
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Q. What is your concept of the objective of the CIA?
A. The intent of Congress in creating the Central Intelligence Agency
was to establish a focal point in Government whereby intelligence from
all producing agencies would be coordinated, correlated, evaluated, and
disseminated to the upper echelons of Government for the formulation
of national security policies. This centralization would assure that all information
vital to the formulation of such policies was provided. Further, under the
direction of the President and the National Security Council, the Agency would
carry out such other duties as deemed necessary in the national interest.
The objective of the Agency is to meet national security requirements.
as fully effyt
assets an3 res
any conderat
intelli nc a reporting.
ely and
ly as possible utilizing all intelligence
of Goverhment. The Agency must be unaffected by
which would in any way result in biased and unobjective
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DDCI-CIA MISSION
Q. What is the proper role of a secret intelligence organization in an
open society?
A. Organizations which must operate in secret contravene the spirit
of an open society to a degree, yet it is an inconsistency which nearly
all Americans recognize as essential. It is one that is well established
in the field of national defense, for example. The remedy to the inconsistency
is to insure that intelligence agencies are accountable to the established
institutions of Government. The agencies must act strictly within their
charters, and cannot operate so as to abridge or in any way infringe on
the constitutional rights of Americans
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DDCI ROLE - CIA MISSION
Q. What do you understand to be the extent of your duties and
responsibilities as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence ?
A. I will be assuming all of the duties and responsibilities of the
DDCI granted to me under the provisions of the National Security Act.
I will be responsible for the day-to-day administration of the CIA.
In the absence of the DCI, I expect to act on his behalf across the board.
e4-we d:ep ty system _:- .one-,for Lire--Oh ` sd-oxi for the-Cam un ty-..wffl
.mineral. Both Admiral Turner and I believe that a deputy can only
function effectively as an alter ego if he has across-the-board responsibilities.
This means that when Admiral Turner is away. I will assume his
Community-wide responsibilities as well as his CIA responsibilities.
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DDCI ROLE - CIA MISSION
How do you define the Director's authority over operations of the DIA
d
h
an
ot
er components of the Intelligence Com
munity
~\
components of the Intelligence Community e strengthened. So
should his authority to task those components . Day to day line control
over Community entities other than the CIA however sh&utj~ remain with
th
h
e
eads of those agencies and departments.
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G
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Q. How do you feel about the question of congressional oversight
committees having access to reports made to the Intelligence
Oversight Board?
A. This should be a matter for the Intelligence Oversight Board
and White House to decide. It is my understanding that at present it
is not olicy to have reports made to the IOB by members
of the Intel 'gence community automatically sent to the Senate Select
Committee n Intelligence . Surely, however, any illegal or
improper a t or mission committed by a component of CIA should be
made known o the oversight committee.
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OVERSIGHT
Q. Do you believe the GAO should conduct an external audit
function ?
At. Yes, assuming a formula can be found in which sources and
methods are protected. This process could take place as part of the
S ate'oversight process.
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OVERSIGHT
Q. What do you perceive to be your responsibilities to the Congress as
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence if you are confirmed for that
position?
A. It will be my policy to be as responsive as possible to the Congress.
I will respond to the best of my ability within whatever oversight
framework the Congress considers suitable and, as I said in my opening
statement, will cooperate with this Committee in exercising its oversight
responsibilities to ensure that the Executive Order is complied with. I shall
seek to develop a good working relationship between the Congress and both
the CIA and the Intelligence Community.
I will also make every effort to meet congressional needs for
substantive information, consistent with my responsibilities to the DCI, to
the President and to the National Security Council for the provision of
intelligence inputs on policy problems currently under cosideration.
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Q. What is your view of the degree to which Congress should oversee
intelligence activities ?
A. Congress has far-reaching legislative oversight and appropriations
responsibilities under the Constitution. Obviously, appropriate
committees of Congress must have knowledge of intelligence activities
so that they can exercise these fundamental responsibilities. I fully
recognize this, and I am committed to working with Congress in this
regard.
I think the American people want strong and effective congressional
oversight that imposes clear accountability on intelligence organizations,
while at the same time preserving the effectiveness of the U.S. foreign
intelligence effort.
Because of the sensitivity of much of the information involved,
I would hope that the Congress can see its way clear to concentrate its
oversight activities to the extent feasible and eliminate any requirements
that I provide the same sensitive information to a sizeable number of
different committees.
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OVERSIGHT
Q. What is your attitude on providing reports of the Inspector
General to Congressional oversight committees ?
A. My own feeling is that CIA must be able to hold within itself
certain confidential aspets of management. If the system of
inspection is to work, candid, privileged communications from the
Inspector General to the Director and Deputy Director must be
maintained. Inspectors, I hope, engage in candid discussions with
the employees of the organizational components of the Agency under
inspection, and report equally as candid and confidential to the
Director and his Deputy as to their findings and recommendations.
These reports are not distributed within the Agency, being intended
only to provide the basis for possible corrective action by top
management. Were it to become known that the confidentiality
of these reports could no longer be guaranteed, it could well be found
that sources would dry up or people being interviewed would cease
to be as candid in their responses. It has been my experience in the
Foreign Service that Department of State Inspector General reports
enjoy condifentiality and protection. This should,. in my opinion,
apply also to the CIA.
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Q. What policy will you follow in providing information to the
Congress and in keeping the Congress informed?
A. I clearly recognize that the Congress must be adequately informed
in order to make proper and informed judgments in matters of legislation
and oversight. Committees must acquire required information within
their jurisdiction to carry out these responsibilities. Information
provided by the Executive to the Congress which requires protection
under statute or Executive order must, however', be handled accordingly
by the Congress. Further, the Congress exercises its prerogative of
nondisclosure through executive sessions and other closed meetings.
Similarly, the ecutive must e rcise its prerogatives of nondisclosure
in matters ofj - t-tive privileg end clear statutory mandates.
I trust that an atmosphere of comity and understanding will allow
a mutual resolution of this problem and avoid confrontations . The
national interest must always be the paramount consideration.
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PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE
Q. What kind of substantive intelligence support do you believe
the CIA should provide Congress ?
A. I believe that a truly American system of intelligence must include
arrangements for providing intelligence information to Congress. The people's
elected representatives deserve the best possible information on which to base
legislative action, and to the extent that CIA intelligence is applicable
and helpful, I feel that it is important to provide it. In fact, there is already
and extensive program for providing intelligence support to the House and
Senate. As you know, the DCI and other top Agency officials appear before
various committees regularly and on request to assess political and military
developments of significance. In addition, CIA analysts provided 289 oral
briefings during 1977 to committees, Senators and Congressmen, and
staff members. CIA had a total of 727 requests for finished intelligence
publications (memoranda, reports, biographic reports). The number of actual
publications provided would be a good deal higher, since most
requests were for more than one document. It should be noted that
this number does not include publications provided to your committee (SSCI),
which for 1977 numbered 558. Nor does it include publications provided to
committees on a regular basis. The most important of these is the
National Intelligence Daily, CIA's current intelligence publication, which
now goes every day to eight committees. In addition, CIA filled 286 requests
for unclassified information, statistical charts, maps, etc., during 1977.
As you can see, the substantive support provided to the Congress is
considerable, and I will expand the present program wherever possible.
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01111,
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PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE
Q. Has the substantive intelligence support provided to Congress
increased over the last few years ?
A. Yes, indeed. In the case of oral briefings, for example, CIA
provided 188 in 1975, 244 in 1976, and, as I have already mentioned, 289
in 1977. In the case of written material, CIA had 204 requests in 1975,
446 in 1976, and, as I said earlier, 727 in 1977.
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PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE
Q. Do you see an increasing danger that CIA's analysis might
be tailored to fit the Administration's policy?
A. This is a fundamental problem, and one which CIA officials must
constantly keep in mind. The Agency has a long tradition of independent,
impartial analysis . I think it has been true over the years that the CIA
has called the shots pretty much as it has seen them. This is not to say
that Agency analysis has never been wrong; it certainly has been, and on more
than one occasion. What I do want to say is that CIA analysts have by and large
not been swayed by whatever policies an administration happened to be advocating
at a particular moment. It is supremely important that the Agency maintain
its reputation for independent analysis in the future. CIA has no business
making policy; its proper role is to provide accurate, unbiased information and
analysis for policymakers to use as they see fit. I intend to uphold the
Agency's position in this regard.
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Q. During the past several months it has appeared to some that
the Agency has come dangerously close to trying to influence events by releasing
unclassified publications on matters of considerable importance--"Prospects
for Soviet Oil Production," "International Energy Situation to 1985, " "World
Steel Market: Continued Trouble Ahead." Do you see dangers in releasing
studies like these to the public ?
A. I believe it to be very important for the Agency to share as much of its
analysis with the public as is possible. Much of what CIA's analytical shops do
is based in some part on open sources, and so there is often no security
problem in releasing it. In addition., many of these studies can make a very
real contribution since there is nothing available in the private sector that is
comparable. CIA's Soviet oil study is a good example of this; so is the
dollar cost comparison of U.S. and Soviet defense expenditures,
which was just released in January. Another good argument for releasing
as much as possible to the people is that they pay for all of this work with
their tax dollars . But you are quite right to suggest that there is a danger
there. If CIA releases a study, say, on oil production, there is bound to
be suspicion in some quarters that the Agency is in cahoots with the oil
companies. The way to allay such suspicions, I think, is to continue the prograr.
of public release, which as you know is quite new. Over time, it will be
seen that the CIA is not preaching any particular point of view or attempting
to push events in any particular direction, but is trying to contribute to the
public debate as accurately as it can.
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PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE
Q. Do you think the SSCI has a role to play in(mproving)CIA
analysis ?
A. I do, indeed. I understand that your Subcommittee on the
Quality of Intelligence is off to a good start. I have read with interest
your study of CIA reporting on oil developments, which was released publicly
not long ago, although I am told that the CIA didn't agree with much of
what you wrote. It seems to me that this episode shows what you and the
Agency should perhaps be striving for: the development of a constructive
dialogue. I am not at all bothered that the Agency and the SSCI do not
see eye to eye on a particular segment of CIA reporting. Honest
differences of opinion exist all the time. It seems to me that if questions
are raised and differences discussed, there is a good chance that the result
will be better CIA analysis in the future.
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PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE
Q. What do you think should be done to improve the quality of
CIA analysis?
A. I understand that a number of steps have already been taken in
conjunction with the establishment of the National Foreign Assessment
Center under Robert Bowie. There are several things that seem to me to be
important in maintaining and improving the quality of the CIA analytical product:
-- Steps must be taken to insure that intelligence
information is reaching the analysts it should reach in
the Intelligence Community. I have in mind here the
Pearl Harbor problem-- the problem of information being
available but not getting to the right place and consequently
being of no use at all.
-- The Agency must maintain its ability to provide
day-to-day, and sometimes, hour-by-hour, reporting
on fast-moving political and military situations (in other
words, its current intelligence function). It must also engage
in longer-term research. I don't mean ivory-tower research--
CIA is not the place for that--but rather studies of the most
important policy-related problems of the day. Both current
analysis and longer-term research must be done; one should
not be emphasized at the expense of the other.
?- Contacts between Agency analysts and experts in the
outside world- -which I understand have increased recently--
should be encouraged in the future.
-- Agency managers should ensure that quality analysis is
rewarded, so that the CIA can keep the good analysts it has and.
hire more high-quality people in the future.
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Y
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Q. What are your views on reorganizing the Intelligence Community?
A. Admiral Turner has already effected some organizational changes
in the Intelligence Community structure in establishing a National Intelligence
Tasking Center, a new structure for intelligence assessments, and a
Deputy Director for Resources. This centralizing of functional responsibilities
allows overall and direct supervision of community assets by the Director
as intelligence chief. The Administration under the new Executive Order
is establishing further changes. We will work closely with the Congress
in charter legislation decisions and we may "fine tune" existing structures .
I propose to work very closely with Admiral Turner in making sure that
the organizational structure of CIA and the Intelligence Community meets
our needs in the most effective way possible.
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Q. What are your views on the priority of technical means of
collecting intelligence over human collection of intelligence?
A. I do not see a general priority issue. The policymakers and
the Congress need the very best intelligence available. In some
circumstances these needs can be supplied by only one method of collection,
but I have found that a majority of types of questions facing our policy-
makers require intelligence from several sources, mutually supporting
one another by providing their own unique capabilities.
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Q. What do you understand will be your responsibilities as concerns
the Intelligence Community?
A. In addition to the day to day operation of CIA, under the direction
of Admiral Turner, I will have Intelligence Community responsibilities
as well, to include the National Foreign Assessment Center and the
National Intelligence Tasking Center. In the absence of the 'Director, I
will act in the exercise of all of his powers as required by statute.
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Q. Why is the Executive Branch leaving its decision up to Congress?
If no one has any objection to releasing a figure, why don't you do it
unilaterally?
A. The full Senate in 1974 and the full House in 1975 overwhelmingly
voted against release. In deference to the Congress, I believe the
Congress should participate in this decision, just as they must share the
responsibility to insure that no further disclosures are made.
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Q. Last year Admiral Turner testified before this Committee on the
subject of an open budget. He testified that this Administration would
not oppose Congress releasing a single budget figure encompassing all
foreign intelligence programs. Do you support this position?
A. This has been a controversial issue since 1974 when Senator
Proxmire first raised it. Since that time, there have been full Senate
and House votes against disclosure and a vote of the Church Committee
and this Committee narrowly in favor of it. In the same period of
time, the Executive Branch has changed from opposing release,
to not objecting. I support the present Administration's
position of not opposing the release of a single figure, as long as we
can be certain that the disclosure would not go beyond the one figure.
As in so many issues of secrecy versus disclosure, there are
trade offs. Unquestionably, the release of even one figure gives our
adversaries significant insight into size and scope of the intelligence
programs directed against them. If this is compounded by disclosure of
one figure over a number of years, I believe trends can be discerned
which will aid them further. On the other side, there has been a marked
trend toward more openness regarding intelligence activities and information
in recent years, which I believe has contributed to a greater understanding
by the American people of what intelligence is attempting to accomplish.
The release of a single figure would carry this trend one step further
without, I believe, significantly endangering any U.S. Government
intelligence capabilities. Therefore, I to would not oppose release
of a single figure.
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COVERT ACTION
Q. How do you view the role of CIA in covert action?
A. I believe CIA must maintain a covert action capability to be used
judiciously and after all appropriate authority has been received.
During my career, I have served at certain posts or in certain. positions
from where I could observe the activities overseas of CIA. I have been
generally impressed with the caliber, responsibleness and professionalism
of the CIA officers whom I have known, and with the job they are doing.
I believe they can continue to play a role in covert action in those select
instances when the President finds it in the national interest. The
notification of Congress of each such activity and the continuing congressional
oversight process should insure the responsibleness of this activity.
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Q. If confirmed as DDCI, will you inform this Committee in advance
of covert actions to be undertaken by the Agency?
A. Since reporting of covert action is regulated by law requiring the
involvement of the President, I certainly cannot make any commitments
to act on my own in this area. I understand the new Executive Order on
reorganization will require prior notification to this Committee and your
counterpart, the House Select Committee on Intelligence. I will, of course,
act in accordance with the law under the provisions of the Hughes-Ryan
Amendment and in accordance with the Executive Order.
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COVERT ACTION
Q. Mr. Ambassador, the President of the U.S. has endorsed the
philosophy of international human rights. How do you rationalize
the use of covert action by the CIA and the President's
human rights? posture on
A. The use of covert action by the CIA is reserved for those few
situations where diplomacy or military action are unacceptable
alternatives. All covert action efforts must, of course, be approved by
the President and prompt notification made to the Congress under
existing law. I would expect the President to weigh the issues of
human rights in every decision that he makes in international affairs.
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Rights of Citizens
Q. Are you aware of the bills to regulate electronic surveillance for foreign
intelligence purposes which are before the Congress and what is your opinion
of them ?
A. I have not yet had the opportunity to study the proposals in detail, but
fully intend to do so once I am confirmed. I do believe, however, that the
warrant procedure proposed by the Administration in S. 1566 and H.R. 7308
strikes the correct balance between protection of the rights of Americans and
this country's need for foreign intelligence information.
(For background: the Administration bills cover electronic surveillance
within the United States . The Central Intelligence Agency does not engage
in activities which would be regulated by the bills.., but it may at times provide
technical assistance to agencies performing the surveillance. In addition, the
bills do provide that the DCI will play a role in establishing the security
procedures which the courts will follow in safeguarding records and that the
President may designate the DCI and the DDCI as officers who can make the
certifications required as a part of a warrant applicati
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SECURITY
Q. Do you feel CIA overclassified information? If so, what can be done to
assure that information is properly classified?
A. The issue has been a proper balance to assure that the public is
informed and that national security is not endangered., As DDCI, I will
carefully review Intelligence Community programs to identify those
activities which require continued protection and those areas where a
broader disclosure will not be harmful. I understand that with the
issuance of Executive Order 11652 regarding classification and
declassification, the Agency has been able to reduce by 50 percent the
number of materials classified. I will periodically assess classification
procedures and strive toward the maximum dissemination possible
f consistent with national security.
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Q. Are CIA personnel overseas adequately protected? If not, what
can be done by the Executive Branch to improve this situation?
Do you support bills which have been introduced to provide criminal
penalties for disclosure of information leading to the identification
of CIA employees under cover?
A. I think it is important that the country protect the dedicated men
and women it sends overseas to engage.in foreign intelligence activities.
If these people are to be effective, they usually must not be openly identified as
intelligence personnel. I think there is much that both the Congress and
the Executive Branch can do to improve the "cover" arrangements made for
these people. For example, Congress might consider providing explicit
statutory authority for the Director to make adequate "cover" arrangements.
The exposure of individuals involved in the foreign intelligence
operations of the United States can seriously jeopardize their personal
safety and the safety of their families and associates . Although the
nation has already witnessed tragedy in this respect, groups and
individuals within the United States, whose avowed purpose is to destroy
the nation's foreign intelligence capability, are still attempting to
discover and publish the identities of intelligence personnel. In my view,
existing law is almost completely inadequate in deterring this kind of
malicious act. I strongly support legislation that will, strengthen
existing law in this respect.
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Q. Should Government classification of information be governed by
statute or Executive Order? Why?
A. The essential point is that whatever classification system is
adopted must afford sufficient protection for sensitive information.
Under the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence
is made responsible for the protection of intelligence sources and methods .
The continued success of our foreign collection programs rests on this
protection. Executive orders and court decisions concerning secrecy
have recognized this statutory responsibility and have granted
the Agency a degree of latitude and flexibility to mold its security
programs to assure the protection of intelligence sources and methods.
Any statutory classification program must grant an equal degree of
protection, and must be administratively workable.
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Q. Mr. Ambassador, do you intend to prosecute Frank Snepp?
A. I understand that this entire matter is presently under review by
the Justice Department and I would not want to make any comment
which would in any way prejudice their action. I fully support a
stringent security program to assure the protection of sensitive
intelligence information, and as I said in my opening statement regarding
the case of an expose' of CIA personnel by a former CIA employee,
"...I would appreciate an opportunity to have a dialogue with this
Committee on ways to deal with this type of cold-blooded irresponsibility
while still protecting the basic rights of American citizens."
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Q. How do you propose to make sure that the CIA is and remains
in compliance with law and operates in -a manner consistent with American
standards of propriety?
A. I was interested in Chairman Inouye's words when he stated
recently:
"There is no question that a number of abuses of power,
mistakes in judgement and failures by the intelligence
agencies have harmed the U. S. We, of course, hope that
these abuses are behind us and will not occur again.
These events did not happen in a vacuum. In almost
every instance, the abuses that have been revealed were
a resuTt-of direction from above, including Presidents
an Secretaries of ate.
This being the case, I feel confident that in this administration there
is no danger of "direction from above" of improper activities.
I associate myself with Admiral Turner's resolve that CIA will
remain within the bounds of law and propriety as he has expressed it
to you on various occasions in the past. I also am told that there is
a strong expanded CIA inspection system and office of legal counsel.
Not of least importance is the Intelligence Oversight Board and the
congresional oversight which surely serves as a useful control. In
these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine willful or successful
flaunting of law or propriety by any component of CIA.
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INTERNAL OVERSIGHT OF CIA
Q. How can you be sure you know what is going on inside CIA
so you may make determinations as to the propriety or legality of
such acts?
A. I would devote myself to making sure the line command has
adequately indoctrinated supervisors and employees as to what is
right or wrong or when to seek advice from the General Counsel if the
issue is not clear. The awareness, discipline and ethics of all
employees are at the heart of mission propriety. The inspection and
audit systems should, however, provide a necessary and valuable
double check and deterrent.
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INTERNAL OVERSIGHT OF CIA
Q. How can we be sure there will be no more historical
surprises such as MKULTRA unearthed?
A. I would not wish to make any guarantees on this score,
at least until I have had a better chance to examine the file,
storage and retrieval system of CIA. I would think that files
dating back 30 years could always contain surprises, but I
would hope and assume that by now all is being done which
can be done to uncover old business which should be made
known to this Committee or to the public. I am told that
the retrieval of old material, which predates modern
retrieval systems, now has a large task force manually
reviewing all old archives.
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Q. Do you support Admiral Turner's new policy of openness toward the
public?
A. I do. Only a well-informed public will actively support the activities of
its government. Intelligence cannot be aloof from the public which it serves.
Aloofness and secrecy are two entirely different things and I believe with
Admiral Turner that the American public has a right to know as much as
possible about what we do, how we do it and why.
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Media Relations
Q. Unless foreign journalists and foreign media are included the Agency's
policy on relations with the media, there remains the danger that information
or disinformation placed abroad by the CIA will find its way back to this country.
What can and should be done to prevent this?
A. I view that danger as no greater than the danger of material placed by
others, such as the KGB, finding its way into our media. In either case, the
soundest safeguard is the alertness and integrity of U. S. media representatives
gathering the news abroad. I cannot imagine a responsible U. S. journalist
picking up material abroad without checking its validity.
In this connection, I should say that in almost all cases when the CIA places
material in the foreign media it does so to provide a balance of truth to audiences
which otherwise would get only propaganda or tailored news.
We should all remember that most people in the world do not have the benefit
of a free press. I quote from a report made by Freedom House before last year's
annual meeting of the Inter-American Press Association: "The ultimate test of
the free-flow idea is whether the journalist himself can enter and leave a country
at will, have direct access to the sources of news, report what he learns without
advance or later censorship, fear reprisals neither against himself or his news
service, and then transmit a clear and balanced report. Fewer than one-third
of the countries permit such press freedom. "
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Media Relations
Q. The new policy issued by Admiral Turner regarding CIA relations with
the media does not extend to journalists working for foreign media organizations.
Do you feel this limitation is appropriate?
A. I do. The policy was adopted in recognition of the status afforded the
U. S. media under our constitution. In denying ourselves sources of intelligence,
we should draw the line at that point.
Any other line would be difficult, if not impossible, to define. I feel, for
instance, that we should not turn away a journalist from a hostile foreign power
who agrees to cooperate with us, But a blanket policy prohibiting the use of
foreign journalists would prohibit our taking advantage of just that kind of
situation.
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Media Relations
Q. There have been many leaks of classified information. Would you want
to curtail the media's right to publish such information?
A. Certainly not. The rights of the media in this connection are unarguable.
But I would like to see more soul-searching and self-restraint on the part
of the media. Only too often does one see the media reporting almost gleefully
that the information in a certain story comes from top secret government
documents. This is of great concern to me. It implies that the media are in
a better position than the nation's intelligence agencies to decide what should
or should not be secret.
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Media Relations
Q. Under what conditions would you, as acting DCI, make use of the
exception that is built into the CIA's policy on relations with the media?
A. I would avail myself of the exception when the information concerned
is vital. - Obviously someone has to make the decision on what is vital. I
view this as a most serious responsibility, and I am willing to shoulder it.
Hypothetical case: A Middle East stringer for a U. S. newspaper approaches
our Chief of Station in his country's capital and says his cousin, who belongs to
a terrorist cell has information that the terrorists plan to kill the American
ambassador or to blow up an airliner. The cousin is prepared to provide this
information for payment or promise of asylum. I feel we should not turn away
such an offer.
Hypothetical case: A stringer for a U. S. wire service has access to a
highly classified nuclear installation in his own country. He approaches our
station and volunteers information based on his observations. He offers to
cooperate on a purely voluntary basis to obtain additional information. I feel
we should not have to reject such an offer.
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Media Relations
Q. One potential danger in the CIA's new openness is that information can
be placed in the public sector selectively, that is, it can be published or
withheld as classified in an effort to support a foreign policy aim or in
furtherance of some other goal. What would you do to prevent such an
action?
A. The CIA is and should be a collector and analyzer of information useful
and indeed essential to those who formulate policy. If some of that information
can be made avaiable to the public, it should be. The public has paid for
it. But I would consider the use of such information for any other purpose
improper, and I would not tolerate it.
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Media Relations
Q. How can you reconcile the Agency's avowed policy of openness
with the necessary constraints of secrecy?
A. These concepts are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, I
believe that openness to the extent possible engenders public understanding
of that which cannot be open.
We must work hard at overcoming the Watergate syndrome of public
cynicism and distrust in government. Elected officials and their appointees
are in office because the public has placed a trust in them. They should be
given a chance to do their jobs and to provide that the trust be well placed.
But by the same token, I would find it abhorrent to use the stamp of secrecy
to hide an embarrassment. In the final analysis, what stands between proper
secrecy and the abuse of secrecy is the conscience and integrity of people.
A society that cannot have a measure of faith in these things and in a system
of oversight cannot have effective government at all.
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/~~l.l.ICEN
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Phone: [phone]
2 December 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEDIA: New CIA Regulations on Relationships
with U.S. News Media
New CIA regulations on relationships with U.S. news media
organizations have been approved by Admiral Stansfield Turner, the
Director of Central Intelligence.
The Central Intelligence Agency previously issued a public
statement regarding its policy on relationships with representatives
of the U.S. news media on 11 February.1976. That statement said:
"Effective immediately, CIA will not enter into
any paid or contractual relationship with any
full-time or part-time news correspondent
accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper,
periodical, radio or television network or
station. As soon as feasible, the Agency will
bring existing relationships with individuals
in these groups into conformity with this new
policy."
All existing relationships covered by that policy statement had
been severed by the end of 1976.
A number of additional and relevant points have been raised and
addressed since issuance of that statement.
. Admiral Turner consolidated these and incorporated them into
new regulations which he signed on 30 November 1977. A copy of the
new regulations is attached.
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NEW REGULATIONS APPROVED ON CIA RELATIONS WITH U.S. NEWS MEDIA
The Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Stansfield Turner,
ordered implementation of the following regulations on 30 November 1977:
1. Polio . The special status afforded. the press under the
Constitution necessitates a careful policy of self-restraint on the
part of the Agency in regard to its relations with U.S. news media
organizations and personnel. Accordingly, CIA will not:
a. enter into any relationships with full-time or
part-time journalists (including so-called "stringers")
accredited by a U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical,
radio, or television network or station, for the purpose
of conducting any intelligence activities. The term
"accredited" means any full- or part-time employee of
U.S. or foreign nationality who is formally authorized
by contract or by the issuance of press credentials to
represent himself or herself either in the U.S. or
abroad as a correspondent for a U.S. news media organization
or who is officially recognized by a foreign government
to represent a U.S. news media organization;
b. without the specific, express approval of senior
management of the organization concerned, enter into any
relationships with non-journalist staff employees of any
U.S. news media organization for the purpose of conducting
any intelligence activities;
c. use the name or facilities of any U.S. news media
organization to provide cover for any Agency employees or
activities.
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2. Limitations
a. The policies set forth above are not designed to
inhibit open relationships with journalists (as for example
contracts to perform translating services or to lecture
at Agency training courses) which are entered into for
reasons unrelated to such persons' affiliation with a
particular news media organization. Willingness on both
sides to acknowledge the fact and nature of the relationship
is the essential characteristic of the open relationships
into which CIA will enter with journalists under this
provision.
b. In addition, CIA will not deny any person including
full-time or part-time accredited journalists and stringers
regardless of profession, the opportunity to furnish informa-
tion which may be useful to his or her Government. Therefore,
CIA will continue to permit unpaid relationships with
journalists or other members of U.S. news media organizations
who voluntarily maintain contact for the purpose of providing
information on matters of foreign intelligence or foreign
counterintelligence interest to the U.S. Government.
c. Likewise, the Agency, through the Office of the
Assistant for Public Affairs to the Director, will continue
to maintain regular liaison with representatives of the news
media to provide public information, answers to inquiries,
and assistance in obtaining unclassified briefings on
substantive matters.
3. Exceptions. No exceptions to the policies and prohibitions
stated above may be made except with the specific approval of the DCI.
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