CONFIRMATION QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01089R000100090002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 293
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: LIST

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CONFIRMATION QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
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Office of the White House Press Secretary
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THE WHITE HOUSE,
???????
STATEMENT 13Y THE PRESIDENT
I have received the report from the committee which I appointed on February 15
to review relationships between the Central Intelligence Agency and private
..krne rican voluntary organizations. This committee consisted of Under
Secretary of State Nicholas Ka.tzenbach, as Chairman, Secretary of 17-,alth,
Education, and Welfare John Gardner, and CIA Director Richard He
I accept this committee's proposed statement of policy and am directing all
agencies of the government to implement it fully.
We will also give serious consideration to the committee's recommendation
"that the government should promptly develop and establish a public-private
'mechanism to provide public funds openly for overseas activities of organiza-
tions which are adjudged deserving, in the national interest, of public support."
To review concrete ways of accomplishing this objective, I am requesting
Secretary Rusk to serve as chairman of a special committee which will include
representatives from the Executive, the Congress, and the private community.
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Dear Mr. President:
The committee which you appointed on February -15, 1967 ha.s sough,-
ssassuant to yeur request.:
- -7-To review relationships between government agencies, notably the
Central Intelligence Agency, and educational and private voluntary organiza-
tions which operate abroad; and
To recommend means to help assure that such organizations can
play their 'proper and vital role abroad. -
The committee has held a number of meetings, interviewed dozens of individuah
in and out.of government, and reviewed thousands of pages of reports. We
have surveyed the relevant activities of a number of federal agencies. And
we have reviewed in particular and specific detail the relationship between
CIA and each relevant organization.
Our report, supplemented with supporting classified documents, follows..
In summary, .the committee offers two basic recommendations:
. 1. It should be the policy of the United States Government that no federal
agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or
? . indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. I/
? 2. The Government should-promptly develop and establish .a public-private
mechanism to provide public funds openly for overseas activities of organizations
which are adjudged deserving, in the naconal interest, of public support.
1: A NEW POLICY
The years immediately after World War II saw a surge of communist activity
in organizations throughout the world. Students, scientists, veterans.
Women and professional groups were organized into international bodies
4 which spoke in the cadences, advocated the policies, and furthered the interests
if of the communist bloc. Much of this activity was organized, directed, and
!imanced covertly by communist governments.
.American organizations reacted from the first.. ,The young men and women
who founded the United States National Student Association, for example, did
so precisely to give American youth the capacity to hold their own in the
international arena. But the importance of students as a.,--force in inteInational
events had yet to become widely understood and NSA found it difficult to.
attract private support for its international activities. Accordingly,. the United
States Government, acting through the Central Intelligence Agency, provided
Support for this overseas work.
We have taken NSA as an example. While no useful pvrpose Would be served
by detailing any othor CIA programs of assistance to private Arn,:_.rican. voiuntz?.:-;
.Organizations, one fund?,mental point should be clearly stated: such a.ssf,s:anc-,
was, given pursuant to National Security Council policies beginning .in
1951 and with the subsequent concurrence of high-level senitir
review committees. in the. last four Administrations. In December"; .1960/?in
Classified report submitted after a year of study, a publicapriyate?Pre-sidential
dommittee on Information Activities Abroad specifically endorsed both. overt
_and covert programs, including those assisted by CIA. ?
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stud!,,, undertaken at .a later time, discloses new developments which
suggest that we should now re-examine these policien. The American public,
for example, has become increasingly aware of the importance of the complex
forms of international competition between free societies and communist
r,tates. As this awarene fis has grown, so have potential sources of support
for the overseas work of private organizations.
There is no precise index to these sources, but their increase is suc,;gested
by the growth in the number of private foundations from 2, azo in 1955 to
18,000 in 1967. Hence it is increasingly possible for organizations like
NSA to seek support for overseas activities from open sources.
just as sources .of support have increased, so has the number of American
groups engaged in overseas work. According to the Agency for International
Development, there has been a nine-fold increase just among voluntary
organizations 'which participate in technical assista.n:le abroad, rising from
24 in 1951 to 220 in 1965. The total of private American voluntary groups
now working overseas may well exceed a thousand.
The number of such organizations which has been assisted covertly is a
small fraction of the total. The vast preponderance have had no relationship
with the government or have accepted only open government funds -- which
greatly exceed funds supplied covertly.
5
The work of private American organizations, in a host of .fields, has been of
great benefit to scores of countries. That benefit must not be impaired by
foreign doubts about the independence of these organization. The committee
believes .it is essential for the. United States to underscore that independence
imrs19_,..diassly and decisively_:
For these reasons, the committee recommends the following:
STATEMENT OF POLICY
1 No federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance
or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational
or private voluntary organizations. This policy specifically
applies to all foreign activities of such organizations and it
reaffirms present policy with respect to their domestic activities.
Where such support has been given, it will be terminated as
quickly as possible without destroying valuable private organizations
before they can seek new means of support.*
We believe that, particularly in the light of recent publicity, establishment
of a clear policy of this kind is the only way for the government to carry out
two important responsibilities. One, is to avoid any implication that .govern-
mental assistance, because it is given covertly, is used to affect the polirAes
of private voluntary groups. The second rezponsibility is to make it
all foreign countries that the activities of private American groups abroad-
. , .
are, in fact, private.
.The coMmittee has sought carefully to assess the impact of this Statement of
Policy on CIA. We have reviewed each relevant program of assistance
out by the Agency in case - by-case detail. As a recult of this scrutiny,
committee is satisfied that application of the Statement of Policy will not
. unduly handicap the Agency in the exercise of its national security re ::,pensibil-
ities. Indeed, it should be noted that, starting well before the appearance of -
*On the basis of our case-by-case review, we expect that the process
;oftermination can be largely -- perhaps entirely -- Completed by December 31,
-11967.
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recent publIcity? CIA had initiated and pursued efforts to disengage from
certain of these activities.
The committee also recommends that the implementation of this policy be
supervised by the senior interdcpartxneetal review committee which already
pa;:ses on proposed CIA activities and which would review and assist in the
process of disengagement.**
2: NEW METHODS OF SUPPORT
While our first recommendation seeks to insure the independence of private
voluntary organizations, it does not deal with an underlying problem -- how
to suort the national need for, and the intrinsic worth of, their efforts
abroa.d.
?
Anyone who has the slightest familiarity with intellectual or youth groups
abroad knows that free institutions continue to be under bitter, continuous
attack, some of it carefully organized and well-financed, all of it potentially
dangerous to this nation.
It is of the greatest importance to our future and to the future of free institu-
tions everywhere that other nations, especially their young people, know and
understand American viewpoints. There is no better way to meet this need
than through the activity of private American organizations..
The time has surely come for the government to help support such activity
in a mature, open manner.
Some progress toward that aim already has been made. In recent years, a
number of federal agencies have developed contracts, grants, and other forms
of open assistance to private organizations for overseas activities. This
assistance, howover, does not deal with a major aspect of the problem. A
number of organizations cannot, without hampering their effectiveness as
independent bodies, accept funds directly from government agencies.
The committee therefore recommends that the?Government should promptly
develop and establish a public-private mechanism to provide public funds
openly for overseas activities of organizations which are adjudged deserving,
in the national interest, of public support.
?
0*. If the Statement of Policy is to be effective, it must be rigorously ?
enforce.d; In the judgment of this committee, no programs currently would
justify any exception to this policy. At the same time, where the security of
the nation may be at stake, it is impossible for this committee to state
categorically now that there will never be a contingency in which overriding
national secdrity interests may require an exception -- nor would it
credible to enunciate a policy which purported to do so.
We therefore recommend that, in the event of such unusual- contingencies,
the into rdePartmental review committee be ps.../..zaitted to make excentions.
to the Statement of Policy, but only where overriclin2 nationrli sec.tr'j',-
intere.sts renuire? only on a case-by-case basis; only where open source.;
of support ard. shown to be unavailable; and only when such exceptions
receive the -specific approval of the Secretaries of State and Defense. In no
event should any future exception be approved which involves any educational,
philanthropic, or cultural organization.
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Such a mechanism could take various forms. One promising propoeal,
,D.theanced by Mr. 'Eugene Black, calls for a publicly funded but privately
administered body patterned on the British Council.
Te British Council estal,15shod, in 193,1, operates in 80 countries, edmin-
istering approximately $30, 000, 000 annually for reference libraries,
exhibitions, scholarships, international conferences, and cultural
exchanges. Because 21 of its 30 members are drawn from private )ife, the
'Council has maintained n reputation for independence, even though 90 percent
of its funds are governmental.
According to the UNESCO Directory of-Ceiltural Relations Services, other
nations have developed somewhat similar institutions. The Indian. Council
for Cultural Relations, for example, is entirely government-financed but
operates autonomously. The governing body of the Swedish Institute for
Cultural Relations consists of both government and private members. This
institute receives 75 percent of its funds from the government and the
remainder from private contributions.
The experience of these. and other countries helps to demonstrate the
desirability of a similar body in the United States, wholly or la.rgely
funded by the federal government. Another approach might be the establish-
ment of a governmental foundation, perhaps.with links to the existing Federal
Inter-Agency Council on International Education and Cultural Affairs.
Such a public-private body would not be new to the United States, Congress
established the Smithsonian Institution, for example, more than a century
ago as a private corporati6n, under the guardianship of Congress, but
governed by a mixed public-private Board of Regents.
The committee began a 'preliminary study of what might be the best method
of meeting the present need. It is evident, however, that, because of the
great range both of exiting government and private philanthropic programs,
the refinement of alternatives and selection among them is a task of
:considerable complexity. Accordingly, we do not believe that this exclusively
'governmental committe is an appropriate forum for the task and we recommend,
instead, the appointment of a larger group, including individuals in private
life with extensive experience in this field.
The basic principle, in any eve nt, is clear. Such a new institution would
involve government funds. It might well involve government officials. But a
premium must be placed on the involvement of private citizens and the
? exercise of private judgments, for to be effective, it would have to have -- and
be recognized to have -- a high degree of independence.
t; The promPt creation of such an institution, based on this principle, would
fill an important -- and never more apparent -- national need.
Respectfully,
1st John W. Gardner'
'Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare
-
/6/ Richard Helms
? Director of
Central Intelligence
/s/ Nicholas de.B. Katzenbach
Under secretary of State,
- Chairman
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Background Information Used in Preparation
of Statement
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Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
I am grateful for this opportunity to share with you my views on
President-Elect Carter's decision to nominate me for the post of
Director of Central Intelligence.
I did not lightly accept this assignment. I recognize that the
successes of the Intelligence Community, including the CIA, remain
largely unknown while its errors are roundly assailed; that it is often
accused, both at home and abroad, of deeds it never committed or
undertook at the insistence of higher authority; and that it often cannot
publicly defend itself against these attacks.
But I accept this assignment because I regard the intelligence process
as second to none in its importance to our national security. I regard
intelligence as our indispensable first line of defense. Without reliable
foreign intelligence, this country cannot properly estimate the threat of
war or the prospects for peace. Without reliable foreign intelligence, this
country cannot properly determine the strategic arms limitations it can
accept, or the strategic weapons systems it requires. In world affairs,
knowledge is power. This country can be secure only if it knows what other
court ries are thinking and doing particularly when most other societies are
far less open than our own. I could not refuse the challenge to provide
to President Carter and his policy makers the best foreign intelligence
to help him build a more peaceful world he and we all seek. I also accept
the challenge to strengthen our intelligence agencies in this new era of
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public accountability.
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I was raised in Nebraska as the son of second-generation Americans
who taught their children to love this country and to participate in a
never-ending effort to protect and improve it. After graduation from
the University of Nebraska College of Law in 1951, I spent nearly 13 years
here in Federal Government, a period of service that was capped by 3 years
as Special Counsel to President Kennedy.
I want to make clear my foreign policy experience in that position.
After the Bay of Pigs fiasco of 1961, about which I knew nothing whatsoever
in advance, the President asked me to attend National Security Council
meetings as an observer; and in that capacity I received each day the
reports and estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency. The President
also requested my participation in various crisis management sessions,
including most notably the Executive Committee of the National Security
Council during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. At no time did I know of
any plots to assassinate foreign leaders or subvert foreign governments,
nor was I privy to any discussions or decisions concerning CIA covert
activities.
Three months after President Kennedy's death, I left the White House,
first to write a book and then to engage in the practice of law in the New York
firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wha4on and Garrison. The bulk of my
practice has been in the international arena, involving negotiations with
the leaders of dozens of countries around the world, particularly in Latin
Am.eriAllpegghcFacar kkieKtdi665hi'Pi8tciAYrtf0?RAHg6oi(Riadbbififccasions
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the Governments of Iran, :/ aire (when it was still the Republic of
the Congo), Sierra Leone and Newfoundland in various commercial
negotiations. None of these had significant bearing on U.S. foreign
policy decisions. In no country did I have any connection with or firsthand
knowledge of any activities of their intelligence agencies or our own.
During this period I wrote extensively on international questions for
Foreign Affairs, the Saturday Review, the New York Times and others;
and I was also invited to deliver lectures in several countries, including
New Zealand, Israel, West Germany, England, Ireland, all four Scandinavian
countrv and the Soviet Union. I do not believe that anyone who heard the
lecture I delivered to Moscow's Institute of the United States could accept
ScA_Sc ,A
for one moment the 5.* ,-that I am "soft on communism." Believe
me, Mr. Chairman, my study of foreign systems of governments and my
travels in all kinds of countries has served continually to increase the depth
of my devotion to our own nation and to its system of government.
Allow me now to outline briefly what kind of Director of Central Intelligence
I believe is needed at this particular time, the kind I would, if confirmed,
strive with your help to become.
First, the Director should be an individual well known to and completely
trusted by the President. Only in this way can the Director have the direct
and continuous access to the President that is essential. to his role as the
President's principal foreign intelligence adviser. Only in this way can he
report to the President the hard, unvarnished facts produced by an independent
intelligence process, and report them whether or not the President wants to
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hear these facts. Only in this way can the members of the Intelligence Community
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feel certain that their final product is getting through to their principal
customer. And only in this way can the Director refuse to take orders
from the White House or elsewhere that he regards as unlawful or improper,
whether they involve the undertaking of questionable covert operations, the
altering of intelligence conclusions, the yielding of necessary functions or
the concealment either from or by the Director, of information that should
not be so conc
1
d. President-Elect Carter has generously expressed that
kind of faith in me; he has promised me that kind of access; he has promised
to accept whatever unpleasant facts I bring; and I have in turn promised
to know all there is to know about the activities of my subordinates and to
make certain he knows as well.
Second, the Director should be an individual who can continue the
restoration of public trust and support that the Agency needs to succeed. If
the American people lack confidence that the Agency serves their interests and
obeys their laws, if they ever again believe that it is the personal instrument
of the President, unaccountable to the Congress, then it will be unable to
obtain either the talent or the funding or the period of relative calm needed
to carry out its work. To reach this goal of public trust at this time of gehieral
distrust, there is merit in adopting the Murphy Commission's recommendation
that the Director be an "outsider" who is free from personal and departmental
ties to the Agency. Nor is it inappropriate that the Director be a lawyer,
sensitive to the rights of Americans at home and abroad. I pledge that under
my leadership, the CIA and the Intelligence Community will endeavor only
to conduct activities that our productive, ju,stifiable and fully within the
bounds of American law.
ThircIARtIlieviMiWtiNetflIstg9Miligtega-PSWe9CM9t8RWAWN@Wndence required
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to protect the integrity of the intelligence process. Whatever you may
think of any particular Director's views, his job is not to make policy
but to direct the collection, processing, analysis and presentation of
foreign intelligence. If he permits outside pressures and politics to
influence the integrity of that process, if conclusions are altered to fit the
policies of the President or the wishes of the Secretary of State or the
programs of the Secretary of Defense or the preconceptions of the Congress
or even the previous findings of the CIA or the prejudices of its Director, then
the results are no longer intelligence but propaganda. Analysts must keep in
AN,e-
touch with the raw data and the real world; they must use services of human
intelligence sources when technology cannot give insights into a foreign
government's intentions, and they must draw upon the wisdom and judgment
of military, diplomatic, scholarly and other experts inside and outside of
government. But the final product, containing dissents from those who
disagree, should be neither a watered-down compromise nor a reflection
of institutional bias. It should be the most objective, accurate, reliable
intelligence estimate possible, delivered in time and in a form that will
make it relevant and readable to the President and National Security Council.
I would hope that my experience as a lawyer, writer and White House counsel
would enable me to maintain that kind of standard; for intelligence reports which
are unread or unreliable or irrelevant are simply a waste of superior talent,
precious money and brilliant technology. Director Bush has faithfully prevented
hint of partisan political bias in the intelligence analyses and estimates issued
during his tenure, and I can assure this Committee that I intend to adhere to
that stanfrAfAvecNI8PFike%sqe2IMSPIP2V11CIA-RDPV6M611ZCW61461Riththf2t-vitY and
electoral ambitions while serving in this sensitive post.
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Fourth and finally, the next Director of the CIA must be able to lead.
.that Agency into this .new era of 'accountability without subjecting it to
further demoralizing .disruptions. If confirmed, I will be the fifth Director '
in little more than four years. The Agency has been through a series of
investigations, reorganizations., reductions in force and reshuffling of
personnel. The creativity of an analytical mind--and I have found the
intellectual quality at Langley to be of the very highest--.now needs a period
of relative stability. For that reason, I have assured President-Elect Carter
of my intention to serve a full four years if confiimed; I have recommended
to him that Hank Knoche, Admiral Dan Wirphy and the other top professionals,
with whom I am much impressed, be continued in their present positions
and I have further recommended that no drastic reorganizations be
unde)taken at this time.
This is not to say that the effort to improve the kntelligence process
and adapt it to today's world is not a continuing one. We oeed to place
our emphasis on improving the quality and timeliness of the analytical
product before we are swamped with the overflow of technolokical collections.
We must keep'abreast of the constantly in creasing need LOT intellig(nr_e or
etonemics-and energy, Third World developments, international terrorism,
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nuclear proliferation and a new generation of world leaders. We must
maintain vigilant safeguards to make certain that we do not oppose our
adversaries by adopting their methods or philosophy.
Above all, the Intelligence Community must achieve the goal of true
democratic accountability by working closely with the Congress and this
Committee. I pledge, if confirmed, to keep this Committee and the other oversight
committees of Congress fully informed on a timely basis with respect to all
intelligence activities, not merely covert operations. Mr. Chairman, I
promise this Committee truthfulness, without playing games if information
is sensitive and without waiting for you to ask precisely the right question.
I also look forward to working closely with you in developing a stronger and
more suitable statutory charter for U.S. foreign intelligence activities.
In my opinion, the Director as the head of the Intelligence Community
should be in effect, the Chairman of the Board. He should set priorities,
demand performance, insure compliance, draw upon and coordinate the
machinery of the Intelligence Community and represent it with the President,
the National Security Council and Cabinet, the Congress and the general
public. The Director need not be concerned with day-to-day management
of the CIA. Under Executive Order 11905, the day-to-day management of
the CIA is delegated to the Deputy Director. Although I have much to
learn and will count on this Committee helping me learn it, I sincerely
believe tAlarcradlYgkellesaie?argAir2tit:trai-hMeOxlioghedaqgab&elile me
to fulfill my responsibilities as Director.
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Before concluding, Mr. Chairman, I want to give this Committee
answers to two questions which have been raised concerning my fitness
for this particular post.
First, questions have been raised about affidavits that I submitted
in the New York Times and Daniel Ellsberg cases involving the publication
of the so-called Pentagon Papers. In those affidavits I stated my belief
at that time that the Executive Branch frequently and routinely overclassified
documents, and kept them classified long after there was any arguable
national security interest or legitimate secret to protect. I further noted
that it was common practice in Washington for Government officiais to take
such documents home for review, and that it was not uncommon for
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such officials to leak classified information selectively to the press.
On more than one occasion I was directed by the President to doSo MYSelf.1
So far as the Pentagon Papers themselves are concerned. I noted that
.information of incomparably greater importance to the notional, defense
had been leaked to thepress, afid that no criminal prosec.u1::-:ns had
ensued.. I also recognized, let:me emphasize, a true need for secrecy
in the conduct of government business in certain clYcumstances, including
those relating to military personnel, confidential foreign qovernment
communications and candid reports and advice to the President on
governmental and military affairs.
-
Having last week reviewed these affidavits for the first time in,
several years-,71'believe they were factoallyiaccurate and 1-make no -apology--
for standing by the general principle of greater Executive Branch disclosure
to the Congress and public. But as Director of Central Intelligence,
can assure you that my views and practices would be consistent with
thecpg.t744f that office, with my oath as Director, and with my
statutory obligation to insure the eFfectiveness of our intelligence
activity by protecting all sources and methods.
might add, howev er, that a sensitivity to the dangers of over-
classification, and a demonstrated regard For the rights of the public
and Congress to be informed, are 'not in my judgment disqualifications
for that office.
I also stated in my affidavits that various classified papers
were among the documents that I removed from the White House at the
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conclusion of my service in February 1964, and I explained that
had simply followed a long-standing practice among White House officials
in this regard. That practice was based not only on custom but also
on the legislative histories of the Presidential Libraries Act of 19,55.
and the Federal Property and Administrati've Servfces Act of 1949:
As I understood it, there was unquestioned acceptance of the proposition
that White House papers belonged to-the occupants when their terms'
of service ended.
The essential facts respecting my own removal of classified )apers
from the White House, and subsequent use of those papers, were as
follows: Following President Kennedy's death, I arranged to have my
files removed to a General Services Administration depository in the
---:Bostbn area. These arrangements were made through GSA and the Office
of National Archives. Ultimately I donated most of my files to the
Kennedy Library. Before doing so, however, I selected from the GSA
depository those papers, including classified papers, that were necessary
for the preparation of my book. These selected papers were kept safely
in my home, were not circulated to others, and upon completion of my
book were returned to GSA. No information that I. considered classified
was reproduced #n my manuscript, although I drew on such
information for background and context, I took the additional precaution
of submitting my manuscript, for review and clearance, to individuals
?<
who were then serving or had previously served in high national security
positions in government. To th best of my knowledge, no ona has .ever
suggested that my book revealed any national secrets or
disclosed any classified information.
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Th 6 second-matter upon which I ore this complittee a full answer concerns
my draft status. 1 The Facts are that I registered for the draft
upon becoming 18 years-of age in 1946., and shortly tiv:reafter expressed .
the philos*ophy of non-violence with which I had been reared by two deeply
'idealistic parents by-reque.sting, not an avoidance of military duty,
not an a'imidance of hazardous duly, but military service in a .
non-zcombatant capacity?preferring, by way of illustration, to serve
on the battlefield as a medical corpsman saving lives instead of taking -
lives'," My aCtiOri was largely symbolic, inasmuch as our country was not
-- then at war or expected to:go:to war;-por.did-L ever see:military service,
having been inelig.ible during the Korean War first for physical and then...
- for family reasons. -As previously .not-ed, however, I did serve in the -
,
-
U.S. Government as a civilian from 1951-1964, including participation
on the National Security Council!s Executive Committee during the
' Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962; and at no time did I or, to-the best of,
..?
. my knowledge, any of my colleagues ever feel that my f3OrsOnal preference
. .
.for non-violence .inhibited in any way my advice to the President on "-
?_the choice of military or other actions.
As Director of Central Intelligence, my principal role would be
to provide intelligence to the policy-miikers who are considering the
military and diplomatic alternatives available to the United .l.ates. I
would never have accepted this nomination were I not determined to strengthen
our country in cv.2ry y appropriato to iny po,;ition and to implement. all ?
1awf01 orders and policies of th President, whatever Lhdt may involve, without,
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permitting my private religious and philosophical beliefs to I
intrude into public policy. I doubt that this qualifies me
. . .
today for the label of conscientious objector; but I earnestly
hope that I will be a conscientious Director of Central Intelligence,
Thank you for this opportunity to set the record straight.
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3-ai-W Lc_
r&ic:A) Sii/J
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STATEMENT
THEODORE C. SORENSEN
DIRECTbR- DES I GNATE OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
17 JANUARY 1977
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r A, ?
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
I am grateful for this opportunity to share with you my views
on President-Elect Carter's decision to nominate me for the post
of Director of Central Intelligence.
I did not lightly accept this assignment, and some of my friends
have suggested that anyone agreeing to take the job lack either the
sanity or the common sense necessary to fulfill it. I recognize that
the successes of the Intelligence Community, including the CIA, remain
largely Unknown while its errors are roundly assailed; that it is often
accused, both at home and abroad, of deeds that it never committed or
that it undertook at the insistence of higher authority; and that the
Agency and its employees are often unable to defend themselves publicly
against these attacks.
But I accepted this assignment because I regard the intelligence
process as second to none in its importance to our national security.
This country cannot properly evaluate either. the threat of war or
the prospects for peace, either the strategic weapons systems it
needs or the strategic arms limitations it can accept and monitor,
without reliable foreign intelligence. In world affairs, knowledge
is power; and this country can be secure only if it knows what is
going on in other countries, most of which have societies far less
open than our own. To strengthen our intelligence agencies, to
maintain and improve their effectiveness in this new era of public
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Accouptability, to provide to President Carter and his policy-
makers the objective intelligence estimates needed to build the
more peaceful world for which he has called, all this represents
-a challenge which I could not refuse.
I was raised in Nebraska as the son of second-generation
Americans who taught their children to love this country, and to
participate in a never-ending effort to protect and improve it.
After graduation from the University of Nebraska College of Law
in 1951, I spent nearly 13 years here in Federal Government, a
period of service that was capped by 3 years as Special Counsel
to President Kennedy.
I do not want to exaggerate my foreign policy experience in
that job. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco of 1961, about which I
knew nothing whatsoever in advance, the President asked me to
attend National Security Council meetings as an observer; and
in that capacity I received each day the reports and estimates of
the Central Intelligence Agency. The President also requested
my participation in various crisis management sessions, including
most notably the Executive Committee of the National Security Council
during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. (At no time, let me add,
did I know of any plots to assassinate foreign leaders or subvert
foreign governments, nor was I privy to any discussions or decisions
concerning CIA covert activities.)
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Three months after President Kennedy's death, I left the
White House, first to write a book and then to engage in the
practice of law in the New York firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
-Wharton and Garrison. The bulk of my practice has been in the
international arena, involving negotiations with the leaders of
dozens of countries around the world, particularly in Latin
America, Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. On brief
occasions I represented the Governments of Iran, Zaire, Sierra Leone
and Newfoundland in commercial disputes or negotiations. In no
country did I have any connection with or first-hand knowledge
of any activities of either their intelligence agencies or our
own, nor do I have now any obligations or prejudices regarding any
foreign country which would interfere with my new duties
During this. period I wrote extensively on international
questions for Foreign Affairs, the SatUrday ReView, the Nei York Times
and others; and I was also invited to deliver lectures in several
countries, including New Zealand, Israel, West Germany, England,
Ireland, all four Scandinavian countries and the Soviet Union.
I do not believe that anyone who heard the lecture I delivered
to Moscow's Institute of the United States could doubt for one
moment my rejection of communism and all that it represents.
Believe me, Mr. Chairman, my observations of all kinds of systeniS.
and my travels in all kinds of countries has served continually
to increase the depth of my devotion to our own nation and to its
system of government. I might add that the Ford White House invited
me down fast year to consult with me on changes that should be made
in PiND row:eared r Offileflametwitituni 4011-60M1041,113806t0111Of1080002-2
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With that brief sketch of my background, allow me now to
outline what kind of Director of Central Intelligence I believe
is needed at this particular time, the kind I would, if confirmed,
strive with your help to become.
First, the next Director should be an individual well known
to and completely trusted by the new President. Only in this way
can the Director have the direct and continuous access to the
President that is essential to his role as the President's principal
foreign intelligence adviser. Only in this way can he report to
the President the hard, unvarnished facts produced by an independent
intelligence process, and report them whether or not the President
wants to hear these facts. Only in this way call the members of
the Intelligence Community feel certain that their final product
is getting through to their principal customer and only in this
way can the Director refuse to :take orders from the White House or
elsewhere that he regards as unlawful or improper, whether they
involve the undertaking of wrongful covert operations, the altering
of intelligence conclusions, the yielding of necessary functions,
or the concealment either from or by the Director of information
that should not be so concealed. President-Elect Carter has
generously expressed that kind of faith in me; he has promised
me that kind of access; he has promised to accept whatever unpleasant
facts I bring him; and I have in turn promised to know all there is
to know about the activities of my subordinates and to make certain
he knows as well.
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Second, the next Director should be an individual who can
? continue the restoration of public trust and support that the
Central Intelligence Agency needs to succeed. If the American
..people lack confidence that the Agency serves their interests
and obeys their laws, if they ever again believe that it is
merely the personal instrument of the President, unaccountable
to the Congress, then that Agency will be unable.to obtain either
the talent, or the funding, or the period of relative calm needed
to carry out its work. In order to reach this goal of public
trust at a time of general distrust, there may be some merit in
adopting the Murphy Commission's recommendation that the Director
be an "outsider" who is free from personal and departmental ties
to the Agency. N2r is it inappropriate that the Director be a
lawyer, sensitive to the rights of Americans at home and abroad.
It is President-Elect Carter's hope that many of today's critics
of the CIA will feel over time somewhat assured that the Agency
under my leadership will not return to improper domestic activities,
political assassination plots, unlawful mail openings and other
abuses of the past; and that covert operations, while not being
abolished, will go forward only in extraordinary circumstances,
and only after having been reviewed by senior Cabinet officials,
including the Attorney General, and authorized in writing by the--
President upon his determination that the operation is justified
by important national security interests. Further, scrupulous
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. ?
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attenti94 must and will be paid to the requirement, imposed by
iawi that the appropriate Congressional committees be informed
about such operations in a timely manner. It is also essential
to reexamine such operations periodically to make certain that
they are still productive, still justifiable, and still within
the bounds of American law. It would be my hope through such an
approach to help repair some of the damage that has been done to
the good name of both the USA and the CIA.
Third, the next Director of Central Intelligence must have
the degree of intellect and independence required to protect the
integrity of the intelligence process. Whateverl you may think
of any particular Director's views on policy, his job is not to
make policy but to oversee the collection, processing, analysis
and delivery of foreign intelligence. If he permits outside
pressures and politics to influence the results of that process,
if conclusions are altered to fit the policies of the President
or the wishes of the Secretary of State or the programs of the
Secretary of Defense or the preconceptions of the Congress or
even the previous findings of the CIA or the prejudices of its
Director, then the results are no longer intelligence but propaganda.
Intelligence analysts, of course, cannot be so shut off from the
real world that they lose touch with the raw data; they must
utilize human intelligence sources where technology cannot discern
a government's intentions; and they must draw upon military,
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diplomatic, scholarly and other experts both inside and outside
Of government. But the final product, containing dissents from
those who disagree, should be neither a watered-down compromise
nor a reflection of institutional bias, but the most objective,
accurate, reliable intelligence estimate possible, delivered in
time and in a form that will make it both relevant and readable
to the President and National Security Council. I would hope
that my experience as a lawyer, writer and White House counsel
would stand me in good stead in striving to maintain that kind
of standard; for intelligence reports which are unread or unreliable
or irrelevant are simply a waste of precious money, manpower and
brilliant technology. Director Bush has faithfully prevented any
hint of partisan political bias in the intelligence analyses and
estimates issued during his tenure; and I can assure this Committee
that I intend to adhere to that standard and, also like George Bush,
_
renounce all political activity and electoral ambitions while
serving in this sensitive post.
? Fourth and finally, the next Director of the CIA must be able
to lead that Agency into this new era of accountability without
subjecting it to further demoralizing disruptions. If confirmed,
I will be the fifth Director in little more than four years. The
Agency has been through a series of investigations, reorganizations,
reductions in force and reshuffling of top personnel. The creativity
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.a.the.:analytical mind--and I have found the intellectual
quality at Langley to be of the very highest?now needs a
period of relative stability. For that reason, I have assured
President-'Elect Carter of my intention to serve a full four
years if confirmed; I have recommended to him that Deputy
Director Hank Knoche, Admiral Dan Murphy and the other top
professionals with whom I am much impressed be continued in
their present positions; and I have further recommended that no
drastic reorganizations be undertaken at this time.
This is not to say that the effort to improve the intelligence
process and adapt it to today's world is not a continuing one.
We need to place our emphasis on improving the quality and
timeliness of the analytical product in order to match the
increasing flow of technical collections. We must keep abreast
of the constantly increasing need for new intelligence on economics
and energy, Third World developments, international terrorism,
nuclear proliferation and a new generation of world leaders.
We must maintain, as earlier indicated, vigilant safeguards
against abuse to make certain that we do not oppose our adversaries
by adopting their methods or philosophy.
Above all, the Intelligence Community must in this next four
year period as in no previous four year period achieve the goal of
true democratic accountability by working closely with the Congress
and this Committee. I pledge, if confirmed, to keep this Committee
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and the other appropriate committees of Congress fully informed
"
on a timely basis with respect to intelligence activities of every kind, not
merely covert operations. I.promise you complete truthfulness
in all appearances before you, without playing games if information
is restricted and without waiting for you to ask precisely the
right question. I also look forward to working closely with
you in developing a stronger and more suitable statutory charter
for all U.S. foreign intelligence activities.
Leadership of the Intelligence Community in all these areas
does not, in my opinion, require that the Director be an experienced
manager. Under Executive Order 11905, the day-t9-day management
of the CIA is delegated to the Deputy Director. The Director
should be, in eff_ct, the Chairman of the Board, not the Chief
Operating Officer. He should set priorities, demand performance,
insure compliance, draw upon and coordinate the machinery of the
Intelligence Community and represent it with the President, the
National Security Council and Cabinet, the Congress and the general
public. Although I have much to learn and will count on this
Committee helping me to learn it, I sincerely believe that my
previous government and legal experience will enable me to fulfill
these responsibilities.
Before concluding, Mr. Chairman, I owe this Committee an answer
to two questions which have been raised concerning my fitness for
this particular post.
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First, questions have been raised about affidavits that
I. submitted in the New York Times and Daniel Ellsburg cases
involving the publication of the so-called Pentagon Papers.
in those affidavits I stated my belief at that time that the
Executive Branch frequently and routinely overclassified documents,
and kept them classified long after there was any arguable
national security interest or legitimate secret to protect. I
further noted that it was common practice in Washington for
Government officials to take such documents home for review,
and that it was not unconunon for such officials to leak classified
information selectively to the press. On more than one occasion
I was directed by President Kennedy to do so myself: So far as
the Pentagon Papers themselves were concerned, I further noted
that information. of incomparably greater importance to the national
defense had been leaked to the press, and that no criminal prosecutions
had ensued. I also recognized in these affidavits, let me emphasize,
a true need for secrecy in the conduct of government in certain
circumstances, including those relating to military personnel,
confidential foreign government communications, and candid reports
and advice to the President on governmental and military affairs.
Having last week reviewed these affidavits for the first time
in several years, I find considerable fault with their wording,
although I believe they were factually accurate; and I make no
apology for standing by the general principle of greater Executive
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Branch:Aisclosure to the Congress and public. But as Director
of Central Intelligence, I can assure you that my views and
practices would be consistent with the perspectives of that
office with my oath as Director, and with my statutory obligation
to insure the effectiveness of our intelligence activity by
protecting all sources and methods. I might add, however, that
a sensitivity to the dangers of over-classification, and a
demonstrated regard for the rights of the public and Congress
to be informed, are not in my judgment disqualifications for
that office.
I also stated in my affidavits that various, classified
papers were among the documents that I removed from the White
House at the conclusion of my service in February 1964, and I
explained that I had simply followed a long-standing practice
among White House officials in this regard. That practice was
based not only on custom but also on the legislative histories
of the Presidential Libraries Act of 1955 and the Federal Property
and Administrative Services Act of 1949. As explained to me by
GSA at that time, there was unquestioned acceptance of the
proposition that White House papers belonged to its occupants
when their terms of service ended.
The essential facts respecting the removal of my own papers
from the White House, and my subsequent use of those papers, were
as follows: Following President Kennedy's death, the GSA arranged
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for my files to be removed to its National Archives depository
-
in thelSOston area, and for me to select therefrom those papers,
including classified papers, that were necessary for the preparation
of my book. These selected papers were kept safely in my home,
not circulated to others, returned upon completion of my book
to GSA, and ultimately donated with all the rest of my Nhite House
files to the Kennedy Library. To the best of my recollection, no
communications intelligence or documents of a similar classification
were included in these papers. No information that I considered
classified was reproduced in my manuscript, although I drew on
such information for backgrcund and context. I took the additional
precaution of submitting my manuscript for revietv and clearance to
individuals who were then serving or had previously served in high
national security positions in government. To the best of my
knowledge, no one has ever suggested that my book revealed any
national secrets or disclosed any classified information.
The second matter upon which I owe this Committee a full
answer concerns my draft status. The facts are that I registered
for the draft upon becoming 18 years of age in 1946, and shortly
thereafter expressed the philosophy of non-violence with which
I had been reared by two deeply idealistic parents by requesting,
not an avoidance of military duty, not an avoidance of hazardous
duty, but military service in a non-combatant capacity--preferring,
,?
by way of illustration, to serve on the battlefield as a medical
corpsman saving lives instead of taking lives. my action was largely
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symbolic inasmuch as our country was not then at war or expected
?.:
to go to war; nor did I ever see military service, having been
ineligible during the Korean War first for physical and then
for family reasons. As previously noted, however, I did serve
in the U.S. Government as a civilian from 1951-1964, including
participation on the National Security Council's Executive
Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962; and at no
time did I or, to the best of my knowledge, any of my colleagues
ever feel that my personal preference for non-violence inhibited
in any way my advice to the President on his choice of military
or other options.
As Director of Central Intelligence, my principal role would
be to provide intelligence to the policymakers who are considering
the military and diplomatic alternatives available to the United
States. I would never have accepted this nomination were I not
determined to strengthen our country in every way appropriate to
my position and to implement all lawful orders and policies of
the President, whatever that may involve, without permitting my
private religious and philosophical beliefs to intrude into public
policy. I doubt that this qualifies me today for the label of
conscientious objector; but I earnestly hope that I will be a -
-%
conscientious Director of Central Intelligence.
Thank you for this opportunity to set the record straight.
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4.)
Statement sent to SSCI 14 January 1977
This Statement not read
during Committee hearing.
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THEODORE C..SORENSEN
DirectoEmatglgnate of Central Intelligence
Personal and Finantial Data
A. BIOGRAPHICAL
January 13, 1977
,
1. Name: Theodore Chaikin Sorensen
2. Addresses:
3.
4.
5. Names and Ages of Children:
Residence:
Mailing:
345 Park Avenue - 29th Floor
New York,
New York
10022.
Date and Place of Birth:
May 8, 1928
Lincoln, Nebraska
Marital Status:
Married, Gillian Martin
- June 28,
1969
Eric Kristen - 24 years
Stephen Edgar - 23 years
Philip Jon - 21 years
Juliet Suzanne - 3 years
6. Education:
University of Nebraska
1945-1951
BSL - June, 1949
LLB - June, 1951
STAT
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7. Employment Record:
Attorney, Federal Security Administration (now Deptr
of H.E.W.); 1951-1952; Washington, D.C.
Staff Member, Joint U.S. Senate - House Committee on
Railroad Retirement; 1952; Washington, D.C.
Assistant, Sen. John F. Kennedy. (D-Mass); 1953-1961;
Washington, D.C.
Special Counsel, President of United States; 1961-1966;
Washington, D.C.
Author and Lecturer (self-employed); 1964-1966; Cambridge
Osterville, Hyannisport, Mass., and Washington, Dee.
Editor-at-Large, Saturday 1966-1969; New York,
New York
Partner, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison;
1966-1977; New York, New York
Visiting Lecturer, Princeton University; 1966-1968;
Princeton, New Jersey
Commentator on National Affairs, T.V. Channel 5
(Metromedia); 1971-1973; New York, New York
8. Government Experience:
See Item 7 "Employment Record" -above
Also:
Member, Temporary State Commission on Constitutional
Convention (N.Y..); 1969-1970; New York and Albany,
New York ?
9. Memberships:
Bar of the United States Supreme Court
Bar of the State of New York
Bar of the State of Nebraska
Bar of the District of Columbia
National Executive Committee, Lawyers Committee
Civil Rights Under Law 1966-1976 (resigned
December 31, 1976)
Trustee, Medgar Evers Fund- 1969-1976 (resigned
December 31, 1976)
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.: 1969-1976
(resigned December 31, 1976)
Member, Board of Overseers, College of the Virgin
Islands 1966-1976 (resigned December 31, 1976)
Member, American Council on Germany, Inc.- 1970-1976
(resigned December 31, 1976)
Member
Ap p r9,ygl OleWasr4OgatiktRbi5981-tlia0 ?140681141013 9 Oki0222ner ly
un on&o1 Center). 1975-1976
(resigned December 31, 1976)
for
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10. Honors and Awards:
Member, Phi Beta Kappa 1949
Member, Order of the Coif 1951
Editor-in-Chief, Nebraska Law Review 1949-1950
U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce, one of Ten
Outstanding Young Men of the Year for 1961
Brotherhood Award, Massachusetts Committee of
Catholics, Protestants and Jews 1965
Honorary Doctorate, University of Canterbury 1966
Honorary Doctorate, Alfred University 1969
Honorary Doctorate, Temple University 1969
Honorary Doctorate, Fairfield University 1969
Honorary Doctorate, University of Nebraska 1969
Listed in:
Who's Who in America
.Who's Who in American Politics
Dictionary of International Biography
Contemporary Authors
International Authors and Writers Who's Who,
11. Published Writings:
(a) Books:
Decision Making in the White House (Columbia
University Press, 1963)
Kennedy (Harper & Row, 1965)
The Kennedy Legacy (MacMillan, 1969)
Watchmen in the Night: Presidential Accountability
After Watergate 1975)
(b) Selected Magazine Articles:
PImproper Payments Abroad: Perspectives and
Proposals", E2I._!ign Affairs, July, 1976
"The Case for Jimmy Carter", Skeptic, September/
October, 1976
"Most-Favored-Nation and Less Favorite:kations",
Foreign Affairs, January, 1974
"Why We Should Trade With the Soviets", EaE2lan
Affairs, April, 1968
"Watergate and American Foreign Policy", The World
Today: Journal of Royal Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, Winter, 1974
2,2 -
WeOW e gV210%5PIIIMI8j!kitg-i4A740074JRCietaCiOaaWu sc eselischaft Fur Auswartige Politik,
Winter, 974
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(c) In addition to the foregoing, I have written regular
columns for Saturday Review from 1966-1969 (while I
served as Editor-at-Large of that publication) and
occasional columns for The New York Times "Op-Ed"
page and other periodicals. Other articles of mine
have appeared or been reprinted in numerous other
periodicals including those of foreign nations (most
recently, England, Brazil, Australia and Denmark).
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Theodore Chaikin Sorensen
Former Special Counsel to the President. Born in Lincoln,
Nebraska, on 8 May 1928; son of Christian Abraham and Annis
Chaikin Sorensen. B. S. in Law, University of Nebraska, 1949;
LL. B. , 1951; LL. D., 1969; LL. D., University of Canterbury,
1966, Alfred University, 1969, Temple University, 1969,
Fairfield University, 1969. Married Camilla Palmer, Septem-
ber 8, 1949 (divorced August 1963); children: Eric Kristen,
Stephen Edgar, Philip Jon; married Sara Anne Elbery, June 3,
1964 (divorced 1969);.ma.rried. Gillian Martin, June 28, 1969.
Admitted to Nebraska bar;- 1951; New York bar, 1966; D. C. bar,
1971; also U. S. Supreme Court. Attorney, Federal Security
Agency, 1951-1952; member of the staff, Joint Com. Railroad
Retirement, U. S. Senate, 1952; assistant to Senator John F.
Kennedy, 1953-1961; secretary, New England Senators Conference,
1953-1959; Special Counsel to the President, 1961-1964; member
of the firm Paul Weis, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, New York
City; editor-at-large, director of Saturday Review, 1966-1969;
commentator on national affairs on Metromedia Channel 5, 1971 to
present; Democratic candidate for New York Senate, 1971.
Named by Junior Chamber of Commerce as one of ten Outstanding
Young Men of the Year, 1961. Member Nebraska Bar Association,
Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the Coif. Editor of the Nebraska Law
Review, 1950-1951. Author: Decision Making in the White House,
1963; Kennedy, 1965; The Kennedy Legacy, 1969. Office: 345 Park.
Avenue, New York City 10022
Also listed in Who's Who are two brothers: Philip Chaikin Sorensen,
a lawyer who lives in Columbus, Indiana; and Thomas Chaikin
Sorensen, listed as a business executive, partner in Sartorius &
Company in New York City.
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IN 'rift ',.TED STAT
CENTAT. n.M"..:70RTA
tNITDF.TATES OF RICA,
Plaintiff,
S
ANTNONY JOS:PH RUSSO, JR.,
.DANIEL ELLSBER',7,
-.Defendants.
9373 -('D
)...
REPORTERS' TRANSCRIPT-OF?PROCEEDINS
Los AncTeles,. California
Thursday, March?15,1.973
15,954 - 16,10E.
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ROT.3flRT I. KILLION, CSR
DON NEHLER,' .CSR
Ofririal Court Rp.-_,-*,?rs
110 U. S. Court House_
312 Nc,rth Spring Street.
Los Anoe, Califrnia 90012
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Sorensen - Direct
16,167
TI-JEO9ORE C. SORE N=,
called as a witnes-s hy the defendants, having been first
duly sworn, was examined and tc,,,stified as fol7:
THE CL'ER;.: State and si.-)11 your fu11, true
name for the record: please.
, THE TNESS: My name is Theodore C. Sorensen, 1
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DIRECT EsAr-n NATION
BY MR, BOUDIN:
0 Kr. Sorensen, what is your present occupation?
A I'm a lawyer.
9 Have you bean employed by the Government of
the United Sates?
A Yes..
0 Would you state when you were first employed
y the .Government?
A In 1951.
O In wh. c.apacity?
A T. was then a counsel- for what is nowthe
Department of Health, Education. and Welfare.--
-0 . And your second period of employment?
A . I was then a counsel for a congressional
committee studying railroad-retirement legislation.
?
0 And your third -- what ye;,k17 was that, sir?
? i
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A That was in 19 -- the firft was in 51, the
second was in '52.
111.at was your next con fon with the Govern-
ment?
I then was employed in ,3anuary of 1953 by
the Senator from Massachusetts, John P. Inned::
0 In what capacity?
A
As: his legislative assistant_
9 And did you remain working for then-Senator
Kennedy until he became President of the United S*ates2
1 did, yes.
THn COURT: What is a 1e7islative assistant?
THE WITNESS: A legislative assistant covers
a multitude of duties I worked with the then-Senator
on the preparation of his legislation, on his speeches on
domestic and foreign policy, and ultimately in his poIlLical
campaigns.
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Sorensen - Direct
When Senator Kennedy became President of the
11:
31; United States, what poon were you given in connection
6
7 (i
With. his office?
A
i2resident.
w"s appointed special counsel to the
What were your responsibilities as special
0 counsel to the President of the United States?
o ?
911 . A . My task was primarily to work with the.
(;?
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President on the formulation of his policy and program.
That covered a wide range, with special emphasis on domestic
12 policy, because Mr. Bundy _was his special assistant on
foreign policy, but it also involved foreign policy, not
? 14 only the speeches, but also participation in meetings of
h
15 the National Security Council, meetings of the cabinet,
1
16 meetings with the President alone on the whole range of
7 issues that faced him as President..
Did the time come when you became involved
more actively in defense and foreign policy matters?
A Yes. My original emphasis had been on
t domestic policy, although I was working on the defense
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budgets, on. the foreign a.(1 ',Program, and on other legislative
matters.
The President had originally assumed
that T would be outside the scope of foreign policy activities;
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Sorenson - Direct
however, after the Day of Pigs fiasco, which the President
agreed that it was, be asked Attorney General Kennedy and
myself to take a more active role in foreign policy, because
he wanted to have the judgments of those whom he knew very
well taking part in that important area of policy 1:aking
as well.
Q
Would you indicate to the jury what the
9 Bay of Pigs incident was?
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A The Bay of Pigs was the occasion- when the -
anti-Castro exiles, supported by the United States and the -
CIA, attempted to invade Cuba to overthrow Castro and were
and failed.
Was a committee formed to investigate that
matter?
Yes. There was a committee formed to
investigate that matter.
Who werethe members of the committee?
A It was led by General Maxwell Taylor and by
Attorney General Kennedy.
0 Did you have any connection with it?
A I-had no official connection with it, but, as
was true of a great many activities n the White House in
those days, I was unofficial liaison withthat committee
as and whatever other assignments the President gave to me.
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Q
16,171
Sorensen ?.Direct
Did you receive, in the course of your duties
as counsel to the President, daily intelligence briefings
and other intelli9'encc reports?
A Yes. The CIA puts out each day a mall
E? summary of all of the important intelligence material which
?
they have produced or collected during the preceding day,
--
Ei'1 and that is put on the desk of each of those in the White
'
9: Housewh )
o has responsibility in this area. I was one of
-10ri those ? receiving that material. ?
11 0 Did you have occasion to examine NIE's
? 12L regularly?
A Yes. ?-The NIE's -- National Intelligence
1,0
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Did you attend meetings of the National
17J
Estimates -7 put out and coordinated by the CIA also came
to me in that capacity.
Security Council?
?BP? A I attended, after the Bay of Pigs, virtually
19111 all of the formal meetings of the National Security Council.
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T was not a statutory member, but was asked by the President
to sit in and observe.
I rarely participated actively in those
meetings, but was asked by the President to give him my
views in informal get-togethers at the end of the day.
Did you have other meetings with the
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President?
A
16,172
Sol:enSen - Lirect
Yes. In the course of a day or a week I
would see ,the President a great many times. By that time
we had had a relationship of eight to ten -- eventually
eleven years, so that we often talked about a wide range
of issues, often at the end of the day after his regular
schedule was over, and I would drop in on a very informal
9 1 basis.
10 I Q Would you go on trips, foreign trips with the
11 1 Prcfsident?
j
12}I A Yes. I accompanied him to Vienna when he met
17,i! with Soviet Chairman Krnshchev, to Paris when he met with
14.
1511
1611
General DeGanlle, to London where he met with then Prime
Minister MacMillan.
went with him on his trip to Berlin
.171i two years later where he made his famous speech,.."Ich bin.
1E1 em n Berliner," to Ireland and on other trips.
19 Were you involved in the preparation of
20
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speeches on foreign policy by President Kennedy?
A Yes, I was. That was one of my special
responsibilities to take part in those meetings in the White
House, which were the basis for major Presidential decisions
on foreign policy, and then to put together the evidence
and the arguments that were the basis for that decision in
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a draft speech for the President to communicate that decision -
.to the American people or to the Congress or to the
-United Nations, as the case may be.
Can you indicate several of the matters upon
, which you worked in connection with preParation of the
Presidential speeches?
A Yes, of. course. The President's inaugural
? 911 address and his first State of the Union address both bore
10 heavily on foreign policy, and he asked me to helo on both
1111 of those.
1.!
also worked with him on hisspeech
13 at the time of the Berlin crisis in the summer of 1961, his
14.!? speech reporting on his meeting with Khrushchev during that
15: same summer, his speech when the Russians resumed nuclear
?16i. testing in August of 1961, his speech to the United Nations
17', in the fall of 1961, his speech with respect to the
1E3 United States resumption of nuclear testing in 1962.
-
.19r One of the most important, of course,
was the Cuban missile crisis speech to the American people
. 21i in October of 1962; another important one was the so-called
22i
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American University speech in June of 1963, which proposed
-a detente a getting together with the Soviet Union, and.
the speech on announcing a nuclear test ban treaty and
- advocating its approval by the Senate in the fall of that.
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same year.
Q
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Sorensen - Direct
76,174
Did you, attend meetings of the cabinet?
Yes, I did.
Regularly, frequently, infrequently?
7 attended all mectingc, of the cabinet.
With respect to the National Security Council
meetings, were these meetings at which, invariably, importantl
matters of foreign policy were determined by the National
1
Security Council?
A Na. P:-:esident Kennedy, very frankly, regarded :
the National Security Council formal meetings as something
of a formal bore. He preferred to make real decisions on
foreign policy in smaller sessions with those officials whom
he regarded as being particularly informed and particularly
concerned.
The National Security Council meetings,
therefore, became a kind of formal ratification of what had
already been decided in order that it could be communicated.
? -?
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Sorensen - Direct .
Did you attend a National Security meeting
following the Tavlor-Iostow report?
A Yes. In the fall of 1961 General ?aylor and
Mr. Rostow returned from a visit to Indochina and made
recommendations to the President, and a National Security
Council .meeting, which I attended, was held on those
recommendations.
Did you attend. a National Security 'Council
meeting in October, 1963?
A Yes. That followed another meeting -- another'
trip by General Taylor and Secretary McNamara, and on
October 2, 1963, a meeting was held with rescect to what
Vietnam options lay ahead.
Is that a meeting that led to the statement
with respect to the withdrawal of a thousand men?
A That is correct.
Were you generally involved, during your
term of Presidential employment or service, with the subject
of Vietnam?
A Only peripherally. To be frank with you,
this was partly because Vietnam was not a central issue to
1.?
the President during most of his period in the White ',louse.
241 Berlin, Cuba, even Laos were of much more.;
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importance to him in the foreign policy area, and it was
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2 i!? partly because, as I said, the formal NSC meetings which
Sorensen - Direct
16,176
I attended rarely took up any of the real substance of
A I Vietnam.
When did you leave service of the government?
A Three months after President Kennedy's death.
t7; That was roughly February 22, 1964.
ErdQ Did you remain With President Johnson during. .
P.-
? 91: those several months after President Kennedy's death in the
10ii same capacityas counsel?
-F
- 11') A Yes,
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During the period o your government service',-
. did you do public writings aside from. the writings you we-r-e-.
doing for the. President -- -that is., writings in your own
name?
I delivered a series of lectures at
Columbia University which were published by the University
18,1: as a small book.
15 Q And the subject?
23A That was called "Deeinion Making in the White
House."
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In what year?.
A That was in the fall of 1963.
After you left the position as counsel to the
25 _President, did you do writings-on-the subject offoreign'
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16,177
Sorenson - Direct
A I first wrote a book on President i,,ennedy.
and on my years with him,,which I -- which was cdlled
"Kennedy," and which certainly included a thorouh reicw,
I hope, of his actions and attitudes in the foreign policy
area.
When did you write the book?
0 I wrote it from -7- beginning after my
1,
-h
1(-) departure from the government in early 1964 .and completed
in the late summer or early fall of 1965.
12d Would you describe the process by which.yom
,gathered materials on which the book was based?
14 A When I left the White ruse, I -took with me ?
151 ?the sum --
16!i MR, NiSsEN: I think, your Honor, that there
17 is no relevance to how a.book that is. not in issue ? in this
is involved,
19: THE COURT: Sustained.
0
4,4
MR. BOUDIN: I refer your Honor to the offe,-
of proof that your Honor has before him.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
BY MR. BOUDIN::
When you left the White House,, did you take
with. you materials which you yourself had written?
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q ? MR. NISSEN: Same objection.
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y ' THE COURT: Sustained.
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Honor.
Sorensen - Direct
A Yes.
MR. ',11-SSEN: Objection; immaterial, your
? TIJI: COT,Ta:, Overruled.
BY MR. BOUDIN:
Did you take with you materials which other
-persons had written for the government?
0
BY MR. BOUDIN:
-1 9 ?
1,31.;
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A
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. Did you take with you materials which bore
classification marks?
MR. NISSEN: Same objection.
THE COURT: The objection is sustain-2d. The
line of inquiry --
nR. BOUDIN: Your Honor has --
THE COURT: -- is --
Ma. BouDTN:
-- your Honor will cocIsider over
the night the offer cf proof which I have idade in the.
Sorensen affidavit? ?
THE COURT: believe I will resolve it after
We are through.
? MR. BOUDIN: ? That will be satisfactory. Quite.'
THE COURT: I think Mr. Sorensen 's answer may ;
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have been incomplete.
You said that first you wrote. Was
there some other hook that you wrote?
THE WITNESS.:
Thank you. I did write another- .
r: book entitled "The Nennedy Legacy," which involved the
foreign poncy attitudes of both John and Robert Kennedy,
and I have also written a consi6eaUle? number of articles
r;Cri on foreign policy which have appeared in the Foreign Affairs
Quarterly, the New York Times,. the Saturday Review, and other
lly publications.
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ibit 8?
DY MR. BOUDIN:
MR. BOUDIN: May the witness be given
t
- THE COURT: Yes., he may
(Whereupon Government's Exhibit
8 was placed before the witness.)
Mr. Sorensen, will you look at
THE COURT: While that is before the witness, ?
would like to see counsel at side-bar.-
Me following further proceeding's
were had at the bench, in. the presence
and out of the hearing of? the jury:)
THE COURT.: I have.? a couple of things.
Mr. Boudin inquired of my clerk about attempting to finish

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So-enson -
Mr. Sore sen this evc Ctng no hc,.- can return to the East. That
possibilic.y, it seems, nil, I Yould say at thi.; point.
I have sug(Trsf:-.i.i teat I would CO :Later
if it could be done, but I thi.n1-: it does jnconvonienee the
very si..1,stantly, so we will ouit at about the same
time.
8 ? On your offer eL proof, it is impossible
for me rule as to the relevance and materiality of all
10 facts that are set forth in this affidavit. I am not
11 sure, Mr. Nissen, if
should make the statement,
12 guess, that counsel has stated that he is making.an.offer
1.3 of proof in the affidavit which was -filed by Mr. Sorensen -
in the earlier motion for a hearing on the question Of
discriminatory prosecution.
The offer of proof on that issue is
17-1 denied, but it is impossible for me to say -- I don't want
81: to be ruling and will not rule that all the facts in that
- affidavit are immaterial and irrelevant, because some of them
may be on varying issues.
will not prejudge it line by line. -I
am saying, so you will 3-,flow where to limit your inquiry,
that, as to the question of discriminatory prosecution, or
broadening it to administrative practice, that that offer
of proof is denied, and I will have to rule as we go along.
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Your Ircmor.? cn understand
Ply r else fanoto o re ;?? ti on s ? rei he n your
Honor oppo e
THE COLTi..!:r : I undcrst and.
th ro 1.1g h t.11,?-1
1$OUDIJ Iwil1 have to weave my wav
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MR. WEINGLASS: So the record is clear,
there is one additional issue to which we offered this
proof, and that is the administrative practice respecting
the ownership of. copies of documents which are. in the
possession of Government employees when they leave service.
?Your Honor will recall -.in my opening I
indicated to the; jury that the quetion of the ownership..
of the Pentagon ,Papers study, Volumes 1 throughI 13, Was
an issue very much in doubt because ? of th acceptable
practice of former Governmt employees to take .copies.
of the material that ware generated in their offices with
them when they left Government,
I believe this Witness would offer affirmative
proof of the fact that that was the 131-;Actice,and, ndeed,
he engaged in it, and that is in addition to the other
areas to which that evidence goes. . , It goes,. as well,.
to the issue of ownership -of the documents,
TE COURT: I will consider that an
independent off,er of proof that you just made. As to
that offer of proof, it also is denied.
As to the tning that I mentioned -- we might
as well complete it now.
As to the thing I mentioned on
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? the other witness offer of proof, if you can, get that
Z5
to me in the morning so I can generally look at It to
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S or ens en e:cct
'prepare myself.
?
16,1c3
It will be in camera, mr. NiE'en, until
the witness
MR. WT,INGLASS: We will have it.
MR. EOUDIN: How long are we going to go,
until 4:30?
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men.
you?
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THE COU11`11:
4:30 or a little after .
(The following proceedings were had
in open court in the hearing of the jury:)
THE COURT: Excuse me, ladies and gentle-
Mr. Soresen, do you have the document before I
THE WIT1!ESS Yes, I do.
THE COURT: Exhibit 8 is before the witness.
17 BY MR. BOUDIU:
18
Have you read Exhibit 8?
19:' A Yes, I have, Pr. noudin.
20
Would you mind looking at pages 1 and 2, or,
rather, specifically, the second page after the cover, and
read the title to the jury?
A "Evolution Of The War, Phased Withdrawal
of U. S. Forces, 1962 to l964."
Could you describe briefly the contents of
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Exhibit 8 to the jury?
Soensen - Direct
11.),134
AYes. x This book focuses almost exclusively
upon a proposal nade in 1962 to prepare for the phased
withdrawal of Ampri,-;An forces from the war in Vietnam and
for our ultimate disengagement.
This began in the optimism of 1962, when
there had been a settlement in'Laos,.when American advisers
- were in Vietnam and when the reports, rightly or wongly,
were that all, was going well.
There was hope that the strategic hamlet
situation -- project was a success, that American heli-
copters were doing their job --
MR. NISSEN: - Excuse me here, your Honor.
If this is in Volume 8, it would surprise
me, and it is --
THE COURT: He is testifying to what he
,
believes is in Volume S. If it is not, you may cross-
examine him on it.
MR. NISSEN: 15 he responding to the
question of what is in Volume 8? I don't think so.
THE .COURT: Do you understand the ques-
tion?
THE WITNESS: ?Yes, T. certainly do.
THE COURT:
111 right. You may continue.
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Sorensen - Direct
DY THE WITNESS:
A And 4.n thrlt period of optimism, it was
Secretary McNamara V,c, proposed at a Honolulu conference
that a plan be prepared for the phased withdrawal of
American farces beginning in 1964 and drawn down over a
period of four years and for a reduction of American aid.
During the months that followed, covered
by this particular report, a variety of plans and proposals,
drafts, models, alternatives, were put forward'. All of
them were rejected.
At first they were rejected as being too
slow and too costly, but inthe end they were rejected be-
cause they were totally unrealistic and had no relation-
ship to what was actually going on in Vietnam at that time.
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prug.17ess was 1)einc mac.:. MLS ion were sent out from
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Washington, and one famous mision came back with such a
divided repot between the military official on th.:4 mission
and the civilian official on the mission that President
Kennedy said to them at the National Security Council
meeting, "Are you sure you two fellows went to the same
place?"
16,4'6
Srensen - Direct
Dtarin sP.rrt'," peri.od th-Ftre was something
? of a debate grying
.7,icj.,D the Goverratent as to w-1-:at was
the political ;:ind military situation in Vietnam, 1-,. much
Finally the situation deteriorated so that it
was clear that no plan for phased withdrawal would succeed.
Before that time, at the October 2, 1963, National
Security Council meeting mentioned earlier, an attempt had
been made to-surface this idea, and an announcement was
released that 1,000 men would be withdrawn from Vietnam
by theend
that year. In fact, 1,000 men were with-
drawn' but approximately- the same number were sent during
?
20p that period of time, so that it was not much of a with-
drawal, and the plan was formally abandoned in the summer
of 1964, when it was clear that it had no realistic meaning.
23i BY MR. BOUDTN:
_ 0 ?Do you have an opinion - Mr.: Sorensen, whether
the information in Exhibit 6, if released in 1969,- could
Scrensen Direct
have caused in.jury to the United States?
A
Yes Iccrtainly have such an OO
0 ? Do you have an 4)2.nkm as to whether the
information in that exhibit,?if relesed in 196, could
have been of advantage to a for. ign power in relation
.to the national .defense of the United States??
Yes, I do have such aY
opinion.
first question, incidentally, Which 1. would-
\
.-10f! like to repeat is, when I. asked you about injury to the
17 United Stats,. 1 was '-.eferring to injury with respect to
12 the. national defense:--you?v4nderstand that?
A Certainly.?
? 14;, ? 0 Now, what is you opinion as to whther or. not
- ?i
the release of this information set forth in 3"::?:hi_b!t a,
if released in 1969, would or would not cause injury to
18 ;? ?
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the United States?
THE COURT: The form is bad. Rephrase
- MR. DOUDIN: I withdraw that,
? Q COuld the information in Exhibit 8, if released
in 1969, have aused injury to the United State S with ?
respect to its national defense?
Certainly not.
MR. NISSEN: Objection, :your Honor, There ?
- has been no showing- that the witness is qualified to answer
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Sor:en- Direct
such a question,
THE COURT: Overrulcl.
NTEEN-:
Secondly, there is no showing
in t.e question of what is neant by ",--e]ate=d to the
national defense.'
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MEL BOUDIN:
z
Could the information in Exhibit 8, if released
in 1969, have been used to the advantage of a foreign
nation with respect to the national defense of the United
States?
A No.
Could the information in Exhibit 8, if released
n 1969, have been used in a manner nrejudicial to the
defense interests of the United States?
No, not in my opinion.
Now, is the basis for the three opinions which
you have just given substantially the same.?
A Substantially, yes.
_Would you state the basis for your opinion?
A d be very happy to do so. Tn the first
place, you must remember that what this volume deals with
essentially is a plan that the United States itself
abandoned and never formally adopted, because it WPS
3 !.
77-
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1
Sorensen - Direct 1
meaningless, becanse it was unrealistic, because it was
out of touch with the events that were taking place in
South Vietnam. It talks about a?set-ics of drafts,
series of proposals, arguments over tho atenatives,
non*, of them were adopted, and I don't think that they
were very meaningful. The United States Government
decided they Were not very meaningful in 1964, much J.ess
later on.
B-t.that's really a _secondary reason. --Dy 1969,
even if it had been meaningful in 1964, It certainly had
no-??real-meaning- or importance in 1969.- It could not -have
been of advantage to a foreign government, it could not have-
. hurt. the defense interests of the. United States .in 1969
to talk- about an abandoned -plan for troop withdrawals back
- in 1964, when in 1969 we had over500,000 ren in South
Vietnam, compared with 13,000 back in 1964. The leaders
in both countries were different, policies were different,
even the procedures by
which decisions were reached had
? completely changed by 1969. . So in that sense it was meaning-i
. 25
less then.
? And finally, most of this, the essence of this
information, by 1969 had alreaely been public. Some of it
was public right away. There are White Nouse .7res3 releases
in here, congressional testimony, and bulletins issued by
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Sorensen - Direct
the Department oa' state. In Pdcitlon to that, some
3 of it came out indirectly at the time, through spekiches
that were made hy cublic offir-ial, some of it leaked to
i
the press, as is inevitable, and a good deal of it has been 11.
I
discussed in hooks that I have road, that others have i
16,190
written, during these last few years.
0
WP asked you before with respect to the subject
of IEs, these National Intelligence Estimates. Can you
describe a little more particularly what they are?
A Well, a National Intelligence Es imate is
basically an attempt by the intelligence community in
the Executive Branch of the Federal Government to predict,
to guess, to give some kind of judgment, as to what is going
to happen in the near or far future. Some of those guesses
turn out to he right and some of them turn out to be wrong.
THE COURT: Excuse me.
ny MR. BOUDIN:
what are the sources for the information that
20 appears in an NI : Where does it come from?
It varies widely. Some information in an NIE
comes from public sources; some of it is the opinion, the
judgment, the guesswork, of members of the intelligence
community; occasionally it's based upon hard collections of
hard facts. But those are
NIEs are trying to predict
generally not in NIEs, because the
the future, not talk about the past.
.4
?
;
I
3
41
?
.? 6
s jI
I
10
13-1;
14
'
,
c
16,191
Sorensen - Direct
0 If v01.-: were to look at an NIE reference,
that is, simply an NIP,' the number, and the date, without
any indication as to what the sources were, could you tell
what the sources were from the NIE itself?
A No, no, of course not. The fact that is
says "NIE" means almost nothing. It might be extremely
valid and
all.
44;*
valuable and it might not be worth very much at..
\
Now, you have testified before with respect
to meetings of the National Security Council. You have
seen the work, the writings, documents, issued by the
National Security Council or in its name; have you not? -
A Oh, yes; many times.
Q And dr) those documents. necessarily contain
material that 4is marked top
17 1
18 yes.
!
19
20
21 11
24
25

would say
secret or secret or confidential?.
it's
invariably marked that way,
Do they contain information which relates
to the national. defense? -
MR. NISSEN: Objection.
yOur Honor.- We're not t
MR. BUUD1N:
Immmaterial,
lking about the documents here.
Talking
?erally that are marked with "NSC."
THE COURT:
about documents gen- i
Ova.rruled.

?
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2 BY THE WITNESS:
Sorensen - Direct
16,192
3 A Would you repeat the question, please?
111
4
7
BY MR. BOUDIN:
Surely. 1^1en you see a marking on a docu-
ment which indicates that it comes from the NSC --
THE COURT: You better reread the question.
You're talking about a completely different question.
read it.
(The question was read.)
11 MR. Nrss N: - We object to that question,
your Honor.
13q THE CGURT: D..0 you understand the question?
TEE WITNESS: . Yes. And the answer is
. And sometimes do they contain information
which does not relate to. national. defense?-'
We object.to that as immate-
BY THE WITNESS:
Almost everything relates to the national
The question is withdrawn?
? ^%
t-Aliprovea or
ft
41,
Sorensen - Direct
16,193
MR. QUID : Withdra,n, your Honer.
THE C CURT : All right. The answer, then,
is f-.-tricic.en, ladies and gentlemen, and is to be disregarded
;IT you.
'Ask your next question.
BY Fa. BOUDIN:
Q Would L...he release of an .NIE be of adva.nta e
to a ?foreign nation regardless of its con ents?
A Not every N1E regardless of its contents.
MR. NISSEN: Objc...ction as imrnaterial, your
Honors You cant have an NIE if it does n' t have contents,
a
so It's _immaterial
14 Jf?MR. BOUDIN: No, I said regardless of
the nature of its contents:
-
THE COURT:
_
The answer is stricke.n.
Rephrase your
"
-"AfrMR BOUDIN:
-E::-20:1-..,' BY MR? BOUDIN:
-,, --r-,
21 ''. 4 -
%
,?:,::,:?7.,---.-.?,L1?.:, if.
, Would the release of an LIE, because it
...... '' ' '
22 '.'
.i :...
, labeled "NI', be. of advantage to a foreign nation no matter = -
- 23 l?? what was the nature of its contents? --..:,'',
I,
--,-
24 1 A
,..--
Of course not.
??''!?:
- - f
14 _ -
-....
25 :!
I .
,! Q And would the release of an NSC document
?
i.
i
7. ... ,
,
':-.:.,.: ,:- ---...._ - .1 .7?.,...?,:,?17.: -. I_ l';
ii. .,.: . ?;:a
. ..- .
The objection is sustained.
question.
All right.
pprove
-
or e ea e b
4
16,1941
7-i:!
101!
13
Sorensen -Direct
.
cause injury to the United States, reg_rdless of the
nature of its contents, merely because it wa-s an NSC docu-
ment?
A No.
ANR.. EGUDIN: your Honor, I'm prepared to L.
turn to the next exhibit. I await your pleasure on this.
THE CCURT: All -right. We will take
the afternoon recess.
Ladies and gentlemen, ye are going to take
the afternoon recess now until 8:45 a.m. tomorrow morning.
know lts going to lae a little earlier. I'd appreciate
if you can all be here on tire, as yod-have in the pas
Keep in mind,
now, the statements that I have
made to you before, not to discuss this case among your-
18.0 -t4e.I.ves or with anyone else or not to rdiscuss anything at
17 all about the case or what occurs in the courtroom. Every-
10 thing that you need and everything that vcu should have to
V
20
itt
21
determine the issues in this case you should read,
-hear in this courtroom and not anywhere
All right. So until 8:45 tomorrow morning
. you are-exoused, and I hope you have a very pleasant-even-
You may step down.-
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,
4 1:
5 :1
Y:1(' fo'lowing further procee6inz:3
were -1-.ad ;n cpen court, c',1ts_:d-2t pres-
ence al-ILI honsj of thcl jk:;:y:)
THE CCURT: We will 1:o in rene
MR. W177!'-GLASS: Your Honor, just aircr
matt
There is a document marked -A-t5. That's
Witness Adaalls' personal file_ I'd ask Mr. Nissen his
position on this.
We would like to withdraw it over
\
c it to Mr. Adams, and return it to
the clerk in the morning.;
,
14 is returned to the
THE COURT A1 ighto See you tomorrow
4 -
t 8 5 tet ,me say to you what I said to the jury: :Let'
all try to be here on time if we're going to run the flay
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VOLUME 92
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
-
HONORABLE WM. MATTHEW BYRNE, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING
^
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff, )
VS. ) No. 9373-CD-WMB
i
II )
k ANTHONY JOSEPH RUSSO, JR., )
il
d)
: DANIEL ELLSBERG,
1: )
Defendants. )
1
3 PLACE: Los Angeles, California
DATE: Friday, March 16, 1973
REPORTERS' TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
1
PAGES: .16,196 - 16,357
: ROBERT E. KILLION, CSR -
:BEN NEWLANDER, CSR
'Official Court Reporters
110 U. S. Court House
.312 North-. Spring Street
Los Angeles, California 9-0012
[phone]
_
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1 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA; FRIDAY, MARCH 16, 1973; 8:55 A.M.
16,198
the stand?
^
(The following proceedings were
had in open court, out of the presence
and hearing of the jury:)
THE COURT: Bring the jury in.
MR. HOUDIN: Your Honor, may the witness take
THE COURT: Yes.- Mr.. Sorensen?
THEODORE C. SORENSEN,
called as a witness by the defendants jointly, having been
previously duly sworn, resumed the stand and testified
further as follows:
MR. WEINGLASS: Your Honor, may the record
show that Exhibit A-65 has been returned to the clerk this
morning?
25 gentlemen.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Good morning, Mr. Sorensen.
THE WITNESS: Good morning, your Honor.
(The following further proceedings
were had in open court, in the presence
and hearing of the jury:)
THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and
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Sorensen - Direct
Mr. Boudin?
MR.?BOUDIN: Would the clerk give Mr. Sorensen
Exhibit 9?
10'1
BY MR. BOUDIN:
16,199
THE COURT: Yes.
(Whereupon Government's Exhibit
9 was placed before the witness.)
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Resumed)
11 Q Mr. SorenSen, would you be good enough to turn;
;
-
to the second page, which gives the number of the volume in
13: the Pentagon Papers series .and the name of it, and state it
to the j
rY?
Yes. This is Volume IV.B.5; entitled
"Evolution Of The War The Overthrow Of Ngo Dinh Diem,
May to November 1963."
Thank you. Have you read that volume,
Exhibit 9?
its contents?
A Yes. This exhibit is concerned entirely with
Yes, I have, Mr. Boudin.
Would you describe .to thejury very briefly
the overthrow of Premier Diem of South Vietnam in 1963
and the events which took place between May and November of
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that year.
Sorensen - Direct
16,200
The increasing remoteness and repression
of the Diem regime at that time posed a problem for the
United States. It was highlighted on May 8, which was
Buddha's birthday, when a Buddhist political demonstration
was violently suppressed by the Diem regime, aided and
inspired by the Premier's brother, Mr. Nhu, and, for that
matter, his sister-in-law, Madame Nhu.
As a result, political oppOsition to
the-regime began to rise in the country. Student
demonstrations occurred; a series of Buddhist monks or
priests burned themselves to death, and it was clear to the
United States that the political and military situation
15, was rapidly deteriorating.
This volume concerns itself with the
debate in the United States as to what could be done about
it. The fact is that Mr. Diem the premier, felt that the
United States had no alternative but to go along with him,
and so he rejected the advice of Ambassador Nolting, of
Ambassador Nolting's subordinate, Mr. Trueheart, when
Nolting left, of the new ambassador, Ambassador Lodge, when
he came to the scene later that year.
The situation continued to deteriorate,
as a result, the military leaders in South Vietnam felt
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16,201
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Sorensen - Direct
2 ? they ought to take the matters into their own hands and try
to bring about a change in government.
There were all kinds of plots, all kinds
of rumors reaching the ears of the United States officials;
6' there were, indeed, some specific contacts made with
U. S. officials which are described in this volume.
There was a famous and controversial
telegram sent from the administration in Washington --
controversial, in part because the President and others
were out of town at the time -- which indicated that the
United States would not block an overthrow of the Diem
regime. There was no oVerthrow at that particular time,
1
1 ",
.1- 4...
The debate continued, and this overlapped
somewhat with Exhibit 8, which I mentioned yesterday,
because the debate concerned not only how good or how bad
was the situation in Vietnam but also what should the
United States do about it, and the military and the CIA,
General Harkins, General Krulak, and the CIA mission chief
in Saigon, were on one side.
They said, "We had better go along with
Premier Diem. He's all we got. No one has any political
power base or program."
The State Department; Ambassador Lodge,
unlike his predecessor Nolting, and others said, "No; it is
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Sorensen - Direct
impossible with Diem; it is a hopeless cause. If the military'
3 wants to try their hand at it, the United States should not
4 stand in their way."
After the McNamara-Taylor mission to
South Vietnam, a compromise approach was tried in which
pressure was put on Premier Diem to get rid of his brother
and sister-in-law and try to reform his government and its
attitude toward the Buddhists and the students.
There was also another alternative that
at least crept into the discussion at this point, and that
12, was one introduced by Attorney General Kennedy and by a
13 State Department aide, namely, that if all the alternatives
14 were as hopeless as they sounded, perhaps the United States
15 should consider getting out of Vietnam altogether.
Finally, on November 1st the generals
acted. They used their forces to surround the capitol; they
overthrew the government of Diem; Diem and his brother
escaped into hiding but, as was well reported in the press
at that time, they were eventually captured and killed.
The aftermath which is described at the
close of this volume tells about the succeeding government.
It was weak. The economy of South Vietnam began to
deteriorate, and the United States began to find out that
the reports it had been receiving from that country were not
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..L5 ?
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16,203
Sorensen 7 Direct
altogether accurate, and that the situationwas much less
optimistic than they had thought
,
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16,204
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. Sorensen - Direct
0 Thank you. Do you have an opinion, Mr.
Sorensen, as to whether the information in this Exh,ibit
No. 9, Covering this period May to November, 1963, if It
had been released in have caused injury to
the United States or advantage to a foreign nation in
relation to the national defense of the United States?
Yes, I do have such an opinion.
Do you have an opinion as to whether the
information in that volume, if released in 1969, could
have been used in a manner prejudicial to the interests
he United States?
Ida have such an opinion. Yes.
-Could the information in that exhibit have
been used to cause. injury to the United States in relation_
to the-national defense, if released in 1969?
No.
.Could the information in that exhibit, if
released in 1969, have been used to the advantage of a
foreign nation with respect to the defense of the United
Certainly not.
Could the information have been used, if
released in 1969, to the prejudice of the defense interests
a,tes?
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?
A No.
? 0
Now, with respect to the three opinions which
you have just expressed, is thE.; general basis for those
three opinions the same? .
.1res, it is, Mr,. Boudin. ?
7 0 Would you state to the'jury and to. the Court
8 the basis for your opinion?
9 A I would be very glad to do that.
To an unusual extent., everything, the essence
.:1S
of what is in this volume was already in public print
by 1969. Much of it is concerned with news events, the
overthrow of the government, the assassination of a premier,
1
_
the press statements- made by the United States officials
at. the time, the raids on-the Buddhist -pagodas,. the:
suppression of the :Buddhist demonstrations everybody-- -
was- reading about that 'in the newspapers at. the time.
It is pulled together here again (indicating).
Moreover, this was one of those issUes which
r
[
-1
This kind of information, the facts upon whic1C,
bitterly divided American officials themselves. I recall
how bitter it was and how each side would take their
case to the newspapers, either through leaks or through
direct statements.
their judgments were based, was given to the newspapermen
_
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or women who were on their side or who were' friendly
16,206 !
to them. Anything that wasn't given to the newspapers
at the time has long since been given to a variety of
books that have been written on this subject, and it is
a subject well written about.
In fact, the authors Of this Pentagon Paper
state in the Paper that the best sources about he
:plotting that went on in South Vietnam and the meetings
that took place in the United States Government are the
published books.
A man named Shaplen, who was on the scene in
has written all about the revolt; Arthur
Roger Hilsman, Tom Meklin wrote books that
-,are regarded by' he authors of this as authoritative,
which contain the essence of this material, and other
books by Halberstam, by Marguerite Higgins, and by others ----
,even my book had some of this same material in it, so it
was all very well known long before 1969.
Secondly, you want to bear in mind that there -
is an argument going on here (indicating). That is what
is described in this book, an argument about what to do
about a premieri who in 1969 was no longer there, what
to do about the rumors ofa plot, which in 1969 was no.
longer taking place.
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Sorensen - Direct
There was conflicting advice; there were
predictions, judgments made, but those had no applicability
to 1969 whatsoever.
5 The governments had changed on both sides;
Diem was gone; the government who had succeeded him was
gone, and, sad to say, President Kennedy was also gone.
The leadership had changed; the policies had changed.
The United States relationship with South
Vietnam had completely changed, and we had nos relationship
with any other country in the world anything like the
relationship we had with South Vietnam in 1963, so this
was not a precedent, had no applicability to anything else,
and would, therefore, not be of any real use at all in
1969 to another country with respect to the defense of
the United States.
And I think that is all. I think those are
Were the leaks to which you referred unusual,
or were they part of a general practice inside the govern-
THE COURT: Excuse me -?
-
MR. NISSEN: Objection, your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. NISSEN: Immaterial.
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MR. EOUDIN: I take it the line to which
had intended to
THE COURT: The line is as I mentioned yester-
day at side bar.
MR. BOUDIN: Precisely. I have no further
16,208
questions.
THE COURT: All right. Again, Mr. Weinglass,
this is a joint witness?
MR. WEINGLASS: Yes.
THE COURT:
Cross examination, Mr. Nissen?
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Sorensen - Cross
CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. NISSEN:
0 What has been the extent of your military
16,209
? service, sir?
A I have not served in the military forces
themselves.
0 How much time have you spent in Vietnam, sir?
A In Vietnam?
0 Yes.
A I have not spent any time.
MR. NISSEN: We have no further questions
of this witness.
THE COURT:
All right. Redirect?
MR. EOUDIN: No, your Honor, no redirect.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Sorensen, thank
? THE WITNESS: Thank you.
THE COURT: Call your next witness -- Well,
before you call this next witness, you have filed this
document this morning, and I want to take a look at it.
Give a copy_ o the Government, and -- This
will be the next witness?
MR. WEINGLASS: Yes.
THE COURT: Give a copy to the Government.
,
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Ladies and gentlemen, I ant going to have
to take a few minutes to read this, so you will get an
Z.
extra cup of coffee this morning.
16,210
The schedule is different
from what I anticipated, so it will be about five or
ten minutes, and then we will have you back in again_
Thank you..
(The following further proceedings
were had in open court, outside the presence
and hearing of the jury:)
THE COURT: Who is going to examine?
MR. WEINGLASS: Mr. Young.
THE COURT: Mr. Young, what is your estimate
11.11. YOUNG: I would say about an hour and a
THE COURT: All right. We will be in recess ?
until I get a chance to look at this.
(Recesstaken.)
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vailable
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1
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^ad classifiqd documents daily, and drafted. Inany such
monlls to or for thct Pr'esidcnt, I m very familiar with the
S-ThLos
opc:!):iuns, praLices, .N.;,11 as t-.:Lw,?.
^gardiyv-i
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f'
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3. cue flat .. "top secret' stamps
froatly and routinelv
bLictet 6flri
n '0; atty, .t,cct comc,ce
inj y Lo 1.,0 11-) t. c . ? r. ?,-).t1
the gertraj public ,...itot:e he 93:anted. accc.3 to the. :1,1-1f:.orril;-:.t.jo;
Dud, cyt. such (3:Lifications rarely
over rclac '.: a olt of whether tnc,
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?
3i
.:11 LC ..-,Y!d cvt2nt' 'IaL, 01cer,,6 t, ,_ii1(-011. L undS.
J
f i
, T7),:! t,,,!:.lic '; ,:-H1 to 17c iokorma, ,,AIU t.,,,c Congye--.'fs ritiht._ L,-.. .
t i
4 1,e informed, h,'.ve not to LI: 'tIoled(1.: >f_-0/ ..(tgardd as i),Iportani_
0, *.
t !I 1
N criteria by tl-v.,sc,, CAertili Cirri clar,-;sifiets, Nor is cons- I
1 ,
,
,
4 deraLon r?Ive-'n lo t_hr- daug,.. of irrei-!-1- '.i tr 1.)1---,r 'tr_., th(.1
,.
tt t
1..
, natiorul ccuoii int.ere.,,' of the Onit-2d Stutek:.- if the public:
1 t
i
t and Coef-,4,: : denied 1:-.1,':. necessary ior an informed
I
i ment, ?enliTrit,-.ened debate; C.:1? correction of::: misl:akes, tivit, etit-- .
1.
t
i _continuation ol invalid 1)(t1 -.i_eS and ,..7,trategies, and the pret- ,
.1
1
1 verition uf atie ..)f: .,,:)asL erf:OT5r
t
e. 4, ..:: have Lrequently read cL,...3,-7.-ied documnLs'coy,- 1
,
1 ,
i tling in.CormJ.tion whit.Yq .1..7,. nr.A.-. secret,.or the seerocy of t
,
t
1 which was pot noccssar for.auy conceivable purpose related
..
to nationc-J sc.Irlrit,.- asdistingished- f.:,:ox, political t
. i
1 , t
t: I
embarrassmon1-.; pr Villa the 00lic and '-:..e Congress had eve-ry ;
t
i right and roasp;1 to ?;no..4 In :t doutocrucy. Luny suCti dour,lentst
con La. .:if.t11 known to th:L.s country'
',Illexeln; and thus
the only ly..-opl-:! de:!'?,..r.1 iTh':., ::?::-'v.:7'...a.C.:!.':.1-.1 d!-7, a re:41J1L of the
. r. i
(ict54:31114.0-v,1-?,. Jr' 4(..1.( cArb......v.t.t, t.,,J tv ..?.? :-. :At/ 1::',24,,,, ,f,-,e,i? .,t, . ---i? ,,,,,o._
c(!ng., (,::!- .?,,,-! 1 ? -1,2; -. ; .?) ;,?'.). : ,.... .
- ?
I.
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1
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'.
,
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1
' 1
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S. Dn9 :;.n the it .0i.1:;int
1.1w Lc>11,11 r c:fc, o have p1..)
or
ch. (L:.I S o;i fur.
?
tro;.,A th, .,..v1.,..th,,,, ,,-,r (herwi. utili,ze tl)om :j_n -
.
-record," ".1),1(2):.(jund (:).,. ,A._11".:,;_: i:j.H15
,
with one or more -,,?oren.Li.l.L.i,ve:; of thc,,, ;Js m-.,..:dia and
1
1 ,
, occasio/Illy in speeche .,!(.7) ?,ormal authoKitv vw.,, souyht.
,
!!-
-.
j or .7.--t: ainod ',..,:-)z- ,;,,-i.(7!.1 us,, ThErt no inveLigati,on or prof.;cuta --
1
I ensued. On t1-7,,:: ..,,nt-,,:ar'.,i the Presideh, -.:,;ecreu of Si:_aLe,
:
11'1-
I
rs,
I
Socretary of Do fns L ;rnl nc3. ai. i is Lao"e)f-
1 Nior.-..?11 tiirc,?,ir of C 1,7. asd. other moil-
-
1:,er:3 of de 1-1Lional Yst)-10,iJejly (1n6
I erately dissaminated nooh iLlEomation from 1-iwo to time
i order to aa.v.ance the 'LtAtcic, :If a piJrt1cular prson
4
-policy poU. p. r w.rtnt, or the AdministraLioH
. .
no.tional interest,
: icials u-ten thc_ the:-5(t. (via clthcr;
4
including the. Triaintenanr:o of bje.naship.with pewsmenc a
desire to demonstrate bow much they kne:ii 6r how important
they were, a desire- to undercut a rival official or ageryc.y,
4
q? . ?
or a desire tO oppose a poficy or proposal with which they
disagred.- vOhlle iaL frcgrintly
' ovcr Llioso 1.(2a!-;" of claific.d_
? and docur).nts, an invstiatioll v.;-a5 rarely. ordero,d, and
)11- r,,Tirrin:11.01- 01 ihr, un:111i-17r,0
? wil; 5) 5(r1; pfoiLl() rc:vLi
?
Astroved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP90-01089R00010.0090002-2
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Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP90-01089R000100090002-2
: of
-H!edJ 1h:
. t)! shc,!, 111
1. f. o w
i and from, that u, , 5:.,upuoli- or uppdUion,
t
. .ye co'.Aple1.o con.Liciene. the
respon au0. dedicaLion our Cltizenf, vYer they
fully .iftfcirmd !Cloy all 1, ...J.:Ion .:, iLs
Lo provide vo-1 ihe press J with. the ful.lest
possil--;te intanaaLion narroweLY.. lij of ni.tionai
ti
security
New.3.paper Publihers
, AssociatiLn, April, 27, ) ;) 'ech, 21.), i he
PraljdOnL t41, ths-' hc,i(th: .1 'old u,1 rey :ed
3
a the publication of nece.s.miily -,ecret information a,ad
appc-led to t-he nation':% rLess o and vi:ivat-,
own re:;fl-Insi . 1$. L u in LI-II:, reqr d he of: o3.
A
4-
pror:cyse, much les !i form (Jovcrnmental
restndnt, and spoke F.;ha- against cencr-sllip? cence.almt.,
Ii
-the stifling of dissent c.nd the covering up
and urged only self-discipline and self-restraint as the
basis for p-zavcnting harmful unauthoriz21 d1scloaux7es- On
the basis o5 many convertiohs with the Presiderc(:. on this
topic, Y that t1A5 con-:.;iF,;Lent with 16.s.te,lief an6
-practice. Pr.:-La ied o- and (:)1:.her::.: hi fi; bAleL. U:1,1:.. the;
press c.rcUia advance inio:.:-:?atiow it;
po:-;sc!-vied on the of
Lhc
; (1,2 cc,;.
Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP90-01089R000100090002-2
?
?
Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP90-01089R000100090002-2
-
Lhe Prc3i
ricl
with Lho. n: I
i thlz.; Lup1(..:, the
-:orkiny o,r LAI
L speech
1.t..c,.0 to v,7!
in Lhr....-op ni.on of .cr.ly!,.-ipro-.7.i-c our
naLionai
in Lhe spePrTh os -oalows:
tDiehri!.s orf this FLII:i011:3 cov-r-r.-L pre-
'Tor71.r,7)Lion 1.0 cw.nitcr thn r.:ovrrr2.rt:
to ovry
32rr!dr?-IrJr..-,fx cnrErnd.
that. ti st:-..r .,-..rrrgn, C-Kr
and tii2 hu r ,
cx.ir PD'.1 .thc!ir use,.
hav!1! -all l.. on pjopoiated .in thcr.r a1,11
othr to a Ce91-ee so1r,7ioient:r
stif.r.rfy ond ia at
unc2 th,rrr
. . .
a .r.';er::.r.,.,2t 11.H.7rchunirt
faJlo0Q(1, req115,rod its'. - ? 1
4.0.1.-rercation -at thc exporirt of cdnsiderabler.rt
ahC
1 .Further eap1provier-L7do laru..a.Z.tpx.this r..;pecrrrdl,kncludei.1
'-ri.-ewspapbr and mayain?sl-,orirrs :r cali.nq
*:r
1 t'le.apons; on. 1.
met?-rois of dc.to.c..:1.-jng iet mrssile z-:rnd
?
on new .
:r
f
; other Lest-f-r;; oia- 5.ANOS and oLhor reconnaince sa.telliteS,t
..
:! on the U-S- -:6A:gai;.:'dng poitioh in advance of the Test_ Ban
talksr,in Genu; oA an in!.:rnal memo.candum.rogarding
. '
.military strgy :ift.m :the Sccrr.!tRry of State to the
r - .
Secret-arv of :').1'1J:Inr5 cln co--fiak:rive U.S. and Sovicb (1E.1.vn
_ , _ .
lopNiclnt in 1.11%-! us..? ,.f nnc e;t1.- tv!:.opulgion for subiNirinOs,
ooer piirtilLs; and on a
Oairt'e-1-1 61- .1-I.7-11'-, VR-(19)-oll di,, '71 op.A4',4 P.2j3L' kfl'-'j'il 1 c 1, 1 (c..ti
i. ,
revealr2d tf,.) thr- P,..1Y:.:-:;ir.h ?Ili. ':;..i Ly La moniLo-,:.tho:.;c:
r
- ?
5,r?
?"- ????-?,??./"..".
,
_
y
4
4
4
I G. Classified docui.tenc-..; or the in.Lormation COh-
1_
tained titcein also public view th,roucrh the books 1
4 . ?- - -
e-627 articles of:: former governm-2nt ofiiciaLs. 7 have many
4
A times observed this practice and participated in it. Tn
1
rt keeping with the long -s'cancIng practice that the parael:- ,n4
_ .
. . ?
'a files of the Prei.d.-7:11A and . top appointees hi, long to 1.Iy3m
Approved For Release 2005/11128 : CIA-RDP90-01089R000100090002-2
t ;ok),:!.!.:(1 that tocitnical
of a nuGic,:r w,-!apon Lr 1.iiiq device ha.-1 4;een le:aked a
decar
Lo I)v '151I
Bein
with th ".PentaTDn ..hich appeared in the press
last year, :T. ;.ilow of nothIn in'those doeGmen.tsich
compares in '.uv way with LIi. eriousness ef some of the
above mentioned diseiro-,ulis. Revolatiow; of past s'Zrategy,
discussions, (.-,rnsiderations, predictions, informrAtion,
priorities, pins and assessments, unlike the then-current:-
information and technology.revaled in so;i(e of these
cases,
cannot comprwse c.rrent. ntional se.cnr1.,_A But no 1.).X.-
cution occurred in any of those_ canes.
.-r
4
and-may' b' m
reoved ro(i l 6fficii-aL the conclusion of
?
their service, C remov-A 17 cartow; of paprs, document::: Fold
files of all kinds (7 cartons of which v,:ere "classified")
1.;
123;0*.al., My off :tee in the vAhiLe House upon my departure in t-
February of 1964 I drew upon this material, keeping some.
of it in my elm home, in .:riLing the bcie1 E1flEY, publislac In
1965. The classifiedI material included copies of the Eennedv? '
EhruslIchev. corro.F.:pon,lence, Ihe transcript of -their summit ?
ing at Vienna, secret, meisloranda and dirccties relating Co the t
CiA641.1m:tae. ?D/psi",& 1 r&v(Al s co cr ovAd" f(4
? /
Bay of: Pig!:, 01.11,..!1.: l'i.Gi?Jr_ntial letters and.
./OL;Iyh-S.(1-i,,..7aity did noL
r
I
M?4
Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CJA-RDP90-01.089R000100090002-2
use quotation. T.iar:zs Wilcn an-1.
subraittryd p:Jrtions ofith, :3.127. for illf:orma.1
individuals thon or
;iy:-;ervc:.!:.in high nation,'r
security po..;iti.on, eii.L nt s':; aj o; ::n any 20=1.
clearance or approval frr.thu. governmcnt and was at no timo.
questioned or reprimanded in this regard. The government,
speak i_n through -t-1-w National Archives, asked me as the
lawful 64nor .,7;ap to donate Ler the Uniteel
i
States 0f Amer!_ca for e'enLual deposit in Lhz John Fitzgerald i
i ., ,
Konnedv.Library; and th-_,1 (..;overnm,in,.., acting th,-ough Lne - . .
i .
r
;
.! lute...nal Reocaue S,..rvi,:, :ecc.K.fni-d t..--o: nese were My Oro- . t
4 i 11
ti ? k
per in g
in rariting,a t Or2
az duction for this gift Ij
. The legis- ;
. t
lative hisCory of Ln e, Presidential '.,ibraries Act of 1955
, .
and the Federal Property _tnd Administrative Serv't.ces ci of
4
1949 made clear that the ,,;.c wore Ply pap-_,_.rs to dispose of I
if
saw fit, much as Shoeman ACams, Samuel Rosenman, Clark
?
.1
Clifford and a-great-.ma.ny others haj-dc,-.ne before me.
9. ?.1 also serve:fi unofficial cditor of th.,7.-
_
posthuoosly publishe!d rnu.:::,c;:_ipt on tue Cuban misrAla
? - - -
ss-
by Robert ro J",:enn?dy entitled TH1,P.T7.7.,EN DAYS. That manusc.c5ptl
quoted froll previously classified lettezs of President Xenne-6,)%
and Soviet Chairman ic.h:ushchev, sumylarized a highly
classified memorandum to the Ftt'cornev G2nera1 from J. Edgar
Iloover, and quoted a variety of exti7cluely confidential
conversations.
publication.
.flo qnestion LU.J1 vith rsp,..ct? to this
?
?
?
.n?-? '
l'oVecl'Peir-Rel' ease 2005/11428.-rGIA-RDP20-' 011)8b-RbOUTOO6r0d62-2-2-----:'-.
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Approved For Release 2005111/28 : CIA-RDP90-01089R000100090002-2
10. ,.,:hat aU. . th,.-! above boils to is this:
The govrnme;it ,
-..T-:ini;:nd and vc,,:o.r.A:cd Lh facL
CEtLi.C.Y.0 ond
of elaznificd
con3e':;t2:;.:ntly larcje
frp:7:1 ,:jovern:--.1nt to th
public -- to Lhi oViiknent's emoarrassment,
OCC.10 ly OV.?:11 to it.:; injury a3p.rL of the system al.
-governing and livimj
labels have come to :,tcan little in practicc, and becausse
the guidclinos for clssifjcaion, dr.'Iclasiacation an0
1 utilization .of classUie,j :a::Lerl are so vague and ob3ctre.:.1
.1 that no one Can b cer in clhcn they are violated, hundrc-xl
1 ' of violationE; of thi:! let of the ,law if it is bzoadly
. . .
interpreted occur every month. The governmont has accepted
this as an inherent p.irt our syem and has -relied on
the support ok suborci_ivZItes, ou their loyalty, consciences
and solf-discipline, an',1 cccasi.,nolly on al:_rtinistrative
a
procf2durc3 to doter and corro.ct the disseination ot thosa 6
?
sta.to ...-iecrots that re tctut:L1y iojurious to the national
sa.z:cre;ity
? ? .
12L I indel.sti.:41d that this affidavit trill be s-
ni4".%_e3: by con7--ll for the defense,
:7.wOrn In i-?.i7nrn
0
I .
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,
? V. ,
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a
Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP90-01089R000100090002-2
'11Th D r17,T.R 1.CT
FOR THE (TJ111- HlisTricT OF CALIFORNIA
UNITED STAT S OF Ail;;RSCA, )
)
vs.
PlainLiff,
)
)
)
NO. 9:373- (,../F.13) -CD
)
AFFIDAVIT OF
ANTHONY ,IOSEP11 RUSSO, JR.,
DANIEL ELLSBERG,
)
)
)
THEODORE C. SORENSEN
DcfendanLs.
)
STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
says:
SS.
THEODORE C. SORENSEN, being duly sworn, cleposs and
1. I am a member of the law firm of 'Paul, Weiss,
? . Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, 345 Park Avenue, New York,
New York.
2. Having served as a lawyer in both the Executive
and Legislative branches of the Federal Government from 1951
to 1964, including more than three years as Special Counsel
to the President, at which time I held a top security
clearance, participated in National Security Council meetings,
read classified documents daily, and drafted many such docu-
ments to or for the _Presiclen!7?, I am very familiar with the
United States Government's military, diplomatic and intelli-
gence oporat-ions, policies 71(1 practices, as well as those
regarding the classi A.cation of various papers. in the name of
Mk( (x.I I
6. 4 rfll,(44,1 10- (, I
lk
who is prowl of his yrs of public service and who recognizes
iLw need !,)1: a Timid1jIl1TlI usiei:'v in (joYernment.
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'4? ? -.8.174'0111.?::.
-
Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP90-01089R000100090002
-
3. T can flatly ti. uuo that "top secret" stamps are
frequently and routinely nt,:.)
.,](j with only the briefest and
loosest consideratinn iC any, direct and concrete
injury to the nation.'s
interests would result if
the general public were to be granted access to the ,information;
and, once applied, the tenure of such classifications rarely if.
ever reflects a thoucjhtful reconsideration of whether thq
passage of time and events has altered the original grounds.
The public's -right. to be informed, and the Congress's right to ;
be informed, have not to my knowledge been regarded as importane
criteria by those determining classifications. Nor is consi-
deration given to the danger of irreparable injury to the
national security interest of the United States if the public
and Congress are denied facts necessary for an informed judg-
?
merit, enlightened debate, the correction of mistakes, the dis-
continuation of invalid policies and strategies, and the pre-
vention of a repetition of past errors.
4. 1 have frequently read classified documents con-
taining information which was not secret, or the secrecy of
which was DOI:- recessary for any conceivable purpose related
to national sc111_27:it:, as &.stinguished from political
embarrassment, cr which the pu5lic and the Congress had every
right and reason to. ;now :t democracy. Many such documents
containd eh oh well anown to this country's
enemies invol7ed therein; and thus
the on) y as a result of the
4.1a6.6 (ii