BRIEFINGS (Ted Sorenson)

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
182
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 17, 2005
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 3, 1976
Content Type: 
BRIEF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4.pdf8.03 MB
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25X1 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 1976 BRIEFINGS Total Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Senate Armed Services Committee 3 28 January 1976 2 March 1976 3 May 1976 Senate Select Comittee on Intelligence (In.ouye) 10 26 April 1976 7 June 1976 16 June 1976 2 3 June 19 76 30 June 1976 29 July 1976 6 August 1976 23 September 1976 28 September 1976 23 November 1976 Senate Appropriations Committee 4 9 March 1976 10 March 1976 25 May 1976 9 September 1976 Senate Foreign Relations Committee 9 18 February 1976 24 February 1976 10 May 1976 4 June 1976 22 July 1976 15 September 1976 22 September 1976 23 November 1976 23 December 1976 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 19 February 1976 Miscellaneous Committees Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 1976 BRIEFINGS (Continued) Total House Armed Services Committee 10 3 February 1976 6 February 1976 25 March 1976 7 April 1976 6 May 1976 (delegation to China) 11 May 1976 21 May 1976 4 June 1976 22 July 1976 22 November 1976 House Appropriations Committee 5 22 January 1976 16 March 1976 13 April 1976 7 June 1976 1 December 1976 House Interational Relations Committee 5 19 February 1976 12 April 1976 13 April 1976 18 May 1976 24 June 1976 Total of 59 briefings for 19760 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 1975 BAW"Sf or Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Senate Armed Services Committee 16 January 1975 21 January 1975 11 February 1975 19 February 1975 24 April 1975 23 September 1975 12 December 1975 Senate Select Committee (Church) 15 May 19 7 5 21 May 1975 20 June 1975 14 July 19 75 15 July 1975 24 July 1975 16 September 1975 Senate Appropriations Committee 15 January 1975 25 February 1975 30 April 1975 1 May 1975 30 July 1975 5 September 1975 16 December 1975 Senate Foreign Relations Committee 16 April 1975 25 July 1975 29 July 1975 10 September 1975 6 November 1975 8 December 1975 16 December 1975 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 8 April 1975 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 1975 BRIEFINGS (Continued) House Armed Services Committee 18 April 1975 24 July 1975 25 July 1975 8 September 1975 23 September 1975 8 October 1975 17 November 1975 12 December 1975 House Appropriations Committee 20 February 1975 21 February 1975 17 April 1975 22 April 1975 6 May 1975 15 May 19 7 5 11 June 1975 29 July 1975 6 October 1975 House International Relations Committee 15 January 1975 10 March 1975 16 April 1975 13 May 19 7 5 11 June 1975 10 July 1975 30 July 1975 31 July 1975 4 September 1975 21 October 1975 3 November 1975 12 November 1975 9 December 1975 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 . Approved For Release 2005/1.2/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 FYID1G I3ETOF E CONGfl1 G ; x. Are you wiiiinI; to nppcar? c,r,,J Lcstify before any duly con.3tituted .4 > V committee of 'the Congress on Such c^c:3s ioas as you may be, reasonably requested to do so? Yes . 2. Are you willAnr; to provide su':i, _r:forc,r~ti n , i_:: requested by corrar,ittees? OTHER: 1. Have you ever been convicted contendere) of orry criminal vi offense? No. of guilty or liO1o ol.;,'; ion other than a minor traffic 2. Please advise the Committee of a:y t:cili Tonal inf'c~rirr~ti.or], (dvar?ctrl.c or unfavorable, which you ? Feel b,. considered in 'connection with your nomination. I know of none. Please provide the Corruriittee w: Lb the rang and current addresses of five individuals \ hom you believe arc in a position to comment upon your qualifications for the office to ,Yhich you have been nominated. W. Averill Harriman Lt .Gen . James M. Gavin Elmo R. hiimwalt, Jr. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 1. Are you willing to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Congress on such occasions as you may be reasonably requested to do so? A. I would expect to follow the policy of previous Directors in this regard, which is to look to the Congress to determine which committees should have oversight of intelligence activities and I would abide by that decision., I would hope, however, that the Congress would reduce the number of committees having some degree of oversight over the Agency so that we would no longer be reporting on our activities to seven different committees. I understand the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has that subject under consideration. In addition, I would cooperate with other committees of Congress on matters within their jurisdiction and on which the Agency has some expertise. 2. Are you willing to provide such information as is requested by such committees? A. As you know, the Congress, by statute, made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for protection. of intelligence sources and methods. Consistent with that responsibility, I would expect to provide information to committees of Congress on matters within their jurisdiction. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 STAT Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For ReIeM?RTEl/14CACLA-~DP90-01089RO00100080001-4 *Senate Leadership Senate Select Committee on Intelligence *Chairman Daniel Inouye Senator Howard Baker, Ranking Minority Member Members: Senators Birch Bayh, Adlai E. Stevenson, William D. Hathaway, Walter Huddleston, Joseph R. Biden, Gary Hart, Robert Morgan, Clifford Case (also member of Senate Foreign Relations), Strom Thurmond also member of Senate Armed Services), Mark Hatfield, Barry Goldwater (also member of Senate Armed Services), Robert Stafford, Jake Garn. Senate Appropriations Intelligence Operations Subcommittee 'Chairman John McClellan *Senator Milton Young, Ranking Minority Member Members: Senators John Stennis, Daniel Inouye, Clifford Case (the last two are expected to fill current vacancies. Senate Armed Services CIA Subcommittee -Chairman John Stennis 'Senator Barry Goldwater, Members: Ranking Minority Member (also listed under SSCI) Senators Howard W. Cannon, Thomas McIntyre, Senator Strom Thurmond (listed under SSCI) Senate Foreign Relations Committee Dewey Bartlett *Chairman John Sparkman *Senator Clifford Case, Ranking Minority Member (also listed under SSCI) Members: Senators Frank Church, Claiborne Pell, Gale McGee, George McGovern, Hubert Humphrey, Dick Clark, Joseph Biden (also listed under SSCI) *Asterisk denotes First Priority, others are Second Priority Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 House Leadership t Representative Thomas P. O'Neill, Speaker Representative John J. Rhodes, Minority Leader House Armed Services Special Subcommittee on Intelligence 'Chairman Lucien Nedzi 'Representative Bob Wilson, Ranking Minority Member Members: Representatives Melvin Price, Charles E. Bennett, Samuel S. Stratton, William L. Dickinson House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee *Chairman George H. Mahon *Representative Jack Edwards, Ranking Minority Member Members: Representatives Robert L. F. Sikes, Daniel J. Flood, Joseph P. Addabbo, John J. McFall, John J. Flynt, Robert N. Giaimo, Bill Chappell, Bill D. Burlison, J. Kenneth Robinson, Jack F. Kemp, Elford Cederberg House International Relations Committee *Chairman Clement Zablocki 'Representative William S. Broomfield., Ranking Minority Member (these two are not firm but probable) *Asterisk denotes First Priority, others are Second Priority Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R00010008090.1-4 Tha 1lonotable Theodore G. joresasen Special Counsel to the President The White House ..`..wy 1961 In connection with the President's rxeetin with the press tomorrow, ? enclose a brief znemorandum stres:grog the types of instances where damaging in-forr: ation has been publi3had? Also encioaed is a memorandum with regard to the action by tha New York Times and other papers in spreading the Soviet story about C.,L A. Is ' alleged encouragement of the Generals' plot a3,ain3t de Gaulle. This material is to supplement what -WO have already sent to Ralph Dungan. A 11D:at Distribution: Qri - A-ddressee 1 cc - .DCI i ile ~-yt I cc - (1) DDGij (Z) Col. G:6 ogan 1cc-~7 Sincerely yours, Allen Yk7. Dulles Di: eCtor Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12rf4 C.CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 I I.:ay 1901 Hypes of instances where American news media ha-,re published irforxnation detrimental to the United Stager security and to the conduct of foreign relations: (1) UI details obtainable about new weapons; (') Leaks and indiscretions with regard to Soviet missile test failures. (3) Premature publication of persons selected for diplomatic . posts abroad so that the foreign country learns of these designations before formal notification to the government concerned requesting its acceptance of the designee. (4) Pick-up and re-play of Soviet propaganda and "plants" without clearly labeling them as such - e. ;.: the alleged U. S. support of the Algerian rebels. (5) .Advertising "Spies in the Skies" which ware generally (6) Caustic, "Smart Alec" and often overdrawn articles of a critical nature about the heads or leading personalities in foreign countri=es (i. e. , the April 21 "Life" article which referred to Sukarno as "this oriental Lu rumba" is reliably reported to have enrai ed him and largVly nullified the good euects 01 iris American visit),. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved F6r Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 11 h 3+?.31C? tea Z .2y"a 1t. S4 in i.h r'e ,~ 1's' o., zu ?,.t wl.. ~~ti. +.'i rI~c 3r in the U :lted l.: tatz-: , `fix? 1 ^ Lei ~^ :1'.'. O'`.:aLio31:$r 3a" to C : :3': 3'L1o a~ r - - 2 :.1a aad -:a :3 A ?F]'.ri 3 e &a at 3 for zee a-ad iruin~.ibit :3aa%?.~l.~:Ltio: o1teix, on t`ha basis o.l t:2e 3' OW -11,zh,.LChy infOvr ':a torn. L :v::- body pplayed ,der :I.J're rule , :11a diaadvantagres we su 1i r from free :,rxs ura of xy claazi ied informaxiou that is leaked 0r other . i . comesava:xlable .,vo id 'oa somewhat uaut:alized. Aa a ritain 7ractical -matter, virtually no other c ou .try ~.;t~.lucliz: C r eat a 'r=+x ich h.a one ? the 7 as35f i7r 3 3 in ,x " world, o eratea under the uaMe- r ~a d r=ulea that awexr to he applicable the Lyn. itad States, D/FI'ilC:ji Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved ForSelease 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089F4000100080001-4 e May 3, 1`) a1 `s E:GA.ZDINiz I. , j.,L j's#-~i CIA ..\G 1NT5 i -i"A ='.. . Y .i. \ .'.'.'J N f.J Z A {'~l ,^.. ? L-IS.1 i P-1,1"IT SW:..+ V .r..r. gals c~ rurnor that C 121 h had ne ur c'.a ?t7 : e i~r ~.~er: i3' plot xi:::i t a .,Feared in TaS:3 soy of April which quoted Pravrda. ThLi report, w a carried in a '-Reuti -r3 di ahpatch to the An:~rican lpmes,3 and replayed in France on .April Z4. A categorical d rcial by the 'Director of Central lnt 11i enc. vas given out on April 26 and widely ;printed in the une ica.ru press". Ntlotwithstauding the origin of the report and t"ie denla , many of the r x:?t'I~ an paper. 3 widely published the report as credible. On April 30, 1961, in a atory under the byline of James try ;ton, ? e states that the Cl;'~ "was involved in a'_i embarra3:3kig liaison with the .-rzti-Gaullist o. cera rgwho aged 'Last vee'.c's insurrection is Al y:er s." Later in the same article he acids the fo1lo Jin : "Also, in the last law -Iays, the President has l oced into angry reports fro' Paris that t.:.a C.i.,. 1. wa3 i>i touch with the in3ur.Aectioni3ts who trie;~1 to overthrow the de Gaulle .-xov rrixnent of Trance. a'There reports apparently go back to the fact that C.I.A. agents have recently been in. touch it_lh the c.3 i3t.'.w L'i. st,.:st 2; :r.i2c..'^.s3i3 in and V.: L` officials ~~ t ':'L*Je a L::'-C:YC1v'C]?:1 c.$>".. in yr'?`jilli 5+`.+611 uaCklC[e3 ~#9i~itLlJ.e, a t -ide.i o the not -de Gaulle iiZa"J?:i ~``lL, when. M. ;aoustelle ''Jraa 1.u Yn -;'' a3.1inaton. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Th.'(a~ cLiar;3 that C' ZlIti-de -Gaulle Generals is ~U is is u.xqualisiedly 1alae. TI a lunc eon to which rez rence is mad} was given, 'sot by CIA o fi :gala, but by a rez ch o.iicial and took place ::.va a year ago. e fective answer to the # ,i story '.Ya3 l ub1i 3 ed in the Now York Timm itself on the Loliowi.n; day, ,stay- :, under e: byline of C. L. S ilzberg :r who stXa33ed the Gommuni3t origin of tha rumor. hL artlcl , state "To 3#'t t lie record fit ' igat ??- our Covernrxa.errt be ,haved with diacret iota, wisdom and propriety daring the :narzrrection. This 13p1i;: to all branches w- the xaabaa y (and consulate general %,?a +la is s), the C.I..:A. aild .~:ri?S`rit1 r"t:'aneti l/ v:~.S.`i Mr. Sulzberger I o fated; "i"ate a eagle are tempted to be i3v#' si~ly L..i:sgs about it" (GL"') and add tilt would e lurkacy Co in a iila, with our evident d alre to further. d co17 iali'+ation,. that we would hope to oust the one F roncluman resolved and able to snake peace in Al ~~?A I a o:a2 ttl, a is o Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 SUGGESTED SCHEDULE FOR DCI-DESIGNATE THEODORE C. 'SORENSEN 7 January 1977 from 1800 - 2045 hours Working Dinner at Headquarters Buildin _ Initial orientation on Central Intelligence matters with members of DCI Staff E. H. Knoche, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence -- Anthony Lapham, General Counsel -- George Cary, Legislative Counsel -- John Waller, Inspector General -- Andrew Falkiewicz, Assistant to DCI Following dinner there will be separate meetings with individuals as stated below Overview of Current and Potential Legal Issues Affecting CIA -- Mr. Lapham, General Counsel Assistant to DDCI Overview of Role of CIA Inspector General and Highligh:s of Current Issues of Major Importance -- Mr. Waller, Inspector General 1930-2000 Overview of DCI Information Policy and CIA Relations with the Media, including Briefing on Intelligence Issues of Current Interest to the Media -- Mr. Falkiewicz, Assistant to DCI 2000-2015 Overview of CIA Relations with Congress and Preparations for Mr. Sorensen's Confirmation -- Mr. Cary, Legislative Counsel 2015-2045 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION REQUIRED BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE FOR DCI CONFIRMATION HEARING 1. Complete biography. 2. Financial statement covering all securities and investments which raise the prospect of a conflict of interest, i.e., companies doing business with CIA. (NOTE: A full financial statement of all holdings should first be submitted to the General Counsel to determine which, if any interests, have any connection with CIA.) Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 ?ft~t~ t[~rStiNEIJLR.~~pK1TG4Dt1liNF~i I H~UO~KE OG -Sl7IZ~1QhIV 15 January 1977 from 1000 - 1430 hours Briefings Related to Confirmation Hearings Scheduled for 17 January 1977 1. Mr. John F. Blake, Deputy Director for Administration (DDA) .1000-1015 2. Production of National Intelligence Estimates (NIE`s) and Functions of Nationa Intelligence Officers NIO s -- Mr. Richard Lehman, Deputy to the DCI for National 1015-1100 Intelligence Officers (D/DCI/NIO) 3. CIA Intelligence Production -- Dr. Sayre Stevens, Deputy Director for Intel-- 1100-1130 ligence (DDI) 4. Operations Directorate (DDO) ? -- Mr. William W. Wells; Deputy Director for 1130-1230 Operations (DD0) 5. Directorate of Science and Technology (DDS&T) -- Mr. Leslie C. Dirks, Deputy Director for 1230-1300 Science and Technology (DDS&T) 6. Panel Discussion on Questions and Answers Related to Confirmation-=Hearings --.Persons mentioned above plus 1300-1430 -- Mr. John McMahon, Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community (AD/DCI/IC) Mr. George L. Cary, Legislative Counsel (OLC) -- Mr. Anthony Lapham, General Counsel (OGC) -- Mr. John H. Waller, Inspector General (IG) Assistant Comptroller Tor esources Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001'-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 17. What role do you feel Congress should play in covert action? T thank that Congress should be kept advised of covert actions in a t to a Jo nt_Committee on National Security_, anc o y - g mend t SPCtion bbl hr ame~~ xec aura-repor ing-cif-cev~r-~~a~ an re uirement for timely fashion through certain designated Members. This is what is done under Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 1 am not sure if the precise arrangements under that Section are entirely desirable for this purpose, however. Its requirement that the President personally certify to the Congress the necessity for all covert actions may be harmful in associating the head of state so formally with such activities. Moreover, Section 662 requires that covert actions be reported to six committees of Congress, a total of 55 Members. This may be more than is necessary and perhaps this procedure could be consolidated. Finally, the Foreign Assistance Act is, in my view, an inappropriate place for this provision. It would be better to place covert action reporting requirements in the National Security Act. Some of these suggestions have already been made by the, l?y Commission which recom- the personal certification of the President as to their necessi Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01 { Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 STATEMENT THEODORE C. SORENSEN DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BEFORE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE UNITED STATES SENATE 17 JANUARY 1977 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: I am grateful for this opportunity to share with you my views on President-elect Carter's decision to nominate me for the post of Director of Central Intelligence, and to answer the scurrilous and unfounded personal attacks which have been anonymously circulated against me. I did not seek or lightly accept this assignment, and some of my friends have suggested that anyone agreeing to take the job lacks either the sanity or the judgment necessary to fulfill it. I recognize that the successes of the Intelligence Community are largely unspoken while its errors are roundly assailed; that it is often accused of deeds that it never committed or that it undertook at the request of higher authority; and that the Agency and its employees are rarely able to defend themselves publicly against these attacks. In recent days, I have had the same experience. But I do not intend to be intimidated by those who wish to strike at me, or through me at Governor Carter, by personal attacks on my integrity and probity, grossly distorting the facts and maliciously twisting my words. I prize both my country and p- honor too greatly to desert this post under that kind of cloud; and I am here to appeal to the sense of fairness of the Members of this Committee. I recognize that some of you have legitimate questions concerning my qualifications. But before dealing with those questions, I must as a matter of personal privilege respond to the personal attacks upon my character which my nomination has suddenly stirred.. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 1. First, it has been said that I leaked or otherwise conveyed classified information for political or personal purposes. That charge is totally false. In the White House, I drew upon classified materials in backgrounding the press only when I was specifically directed to do so by the President, who clearly had such authority; and I took documents home for review only in those rare instances when I would otherwise have spent 24 hours a day in that office. I have never compromised the national security of this country, or approved of anyone else doing so. My affidavits in the lawsuits brought against the New York Times and Daniel Ellsberg regarding publication of the Pentagon Papers accurately described the practices then prevalent in Washington -- not as they should have been but as they were. Almost identical affidavits were submitted by a former Assistant Secretary of State, a former State Department Legal Adviser and a former Ambassador. During my White House service I received the highest security clearances from the CIA; and I received them again in the last few weeks. I have something of a reputation for guarding secrets, whether they be those of my government, my clients, or my friends. No one has ever charged me with conveying classified information to others or mislaying classified materials. 2. Second, it has been said that I improperly took classified documents with me from the White House when I left government service, improperly used them in writing my book on President Kennedy, and improperly obtained a tax deduction for donating them to the John F. Kennedy Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Library. Those charges are totally false. Upon the announcement in early 1964 that I was leaving the White House, I was visited by the Assistant Archivist of the United States, an official in the General Services Administration. He informed me that the papers in my files that I had created and accumulated during the period of my service in the White House were regarded by both. law and historical precedent as my personal property; and further, that I was entitled to make any use of those papers that I deemed appro- priate, whether selling them as some former White House aides had done, writing books based on them as other former aides had done, or donating them to an appropriate educational institution -- with a tax deduction on the value of the gift -- as still others had done. Upon my signing on February 14, 1964, a Letter of Intent to donate my papers to the Kennedy Library, the Archivist's Office sorted and packed my files, presumably leaving behind anything that was not mine, transferred them to a GSA depository in the Boston area. The GSA then sent to my home certain of those papers which I had selected as necessary background materials for my book. It collected them from me upon completion of my manuscript, and the entire lot of my papers was then transmitted to the John F. Kennedy Library, to which I donated them. Naturally there were classified papers among them (although no communications intelligence reports), just as there were classified documents among the papers taken upon their departure from the White House by the principal aides of every President at least since Woodrow Wilson, including Col. House, Samuel Roseman, Harry Hopkins, Sherman Adams, Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 McGeorge Bundy and many, many others. Like most of those named, I reviewed my papers, including classified papers, in preparing a book on my experiences, just as Gerald Ford at his confirmation hearing acknowledged drawing upon Top Secret documents in his possession when writing his book on the Warren Commission. In. the decade since my book was published, no one has suggested that security was in any way breached by anything in my book, and it was in fact submitted for clearance in advance to the National Security Adviser to the President, to his former deputy, and to the former Deputy Secretary of Defense. My handling of classified information was at all times in accordance with the then-existing laws, regulations and practices. Upon donating my papers to the Kennedy Library (instead of selling them individually for a far larger amount), I received the tax deduction to which I was entitled by law, just as many former government officials did over the years --'including, in addition to some or all of those already mentioned, former Ambassador Galbraith, former White House aide Arthur Schlesinger, and former Governor and Ambassador Adlai Stevenson. No doubt arguments can be made against the practice begun by George Washington of White House occupants taking their papers with them -- John Eisenhower has recently stated, for example, that his father inherited from Truman and left to Kennedy no papers other than the instructions on nuclear attack procedures -- but at the time I took my papers in 1964, that was clearly the accepted view of the law. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 No doubt arguments can also be made against permitting tax seductions on the donation of papers by former government officials -- and such arguments were made when the law was changed in 1969 -- but that was nevertheless the law prior to that tipe. All of the above actions were taken with the full knowledge and approval of the government, and were publicly described in the well-publicized affidavits which I filed in the New York Times case and subsequently in the Ellsberg case, Those two cases involved important First Amendment issues, including the public's right to know the tragic history of the Vietnam War. Whatever improvements might have been made in the wording of dry affidavits, I make no apology for having responded to the requests of counsel in both cases to attest to the inconsistencies and anomalies of government classification practices. 3. Third, it has been said that I avoided military service as a pacifist during World War II and the Korean War. This charge is totally false. I have never sought to avoid military service, hazardous or otherwise, in wartime or any other time. I have never advocated for the United States a policy of pacifism, non-resistance to attack or unilateral disarmament. The facts are that I registered for the draft upon becoming 18 years of age in 1946, a year after World War II ended, and shortly thereafter expressed the philosophy of non-violence with which I had been reared by two deeply idealistic parents by requesting, not an avoidance of military duty or hazardous duty, but military service in a non-combatant capacity (classification IAO) -- -5- Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 preferring, by way of illustration, to serve cn the! battlefield as a medical corpsman saving lives instead of taking lives. This status was granted. My action was largely symbolic:, inasmuch as our country was not then at war or expected to go to war. I have never, in my service on the Executive Committee of the National Security Council during the Cuban Missile Crisis or at any other time, permitted my preference for personal non-violence to inhibit in any way my advice to the President on the military and other options available as a matter of national policy. I would not have accepted Governor Carter's designation to be Director of Central Intelligence were I not prepared to carry out every lawful order of the President conceivably connected with this post. 4. Fourth, it has been said that my legal representation of multinational corporations and foreign governments poses a conflict of interest in undertaking this assignment. This charge is patently absurd. Over the years, the highest national security officials in our country have frequently represented such clients before taking office -- including Messrs. Dulles, Acheson, Rogers, McCloy, Stevenson and a host of others -- but no one challenged their right to serve or later claimed that their actions were ;prejudiced by those earlier ties. My only representations of foreign governments were the brief occasions on which I represented the Governments of Iran, Zaire, Sierra Leone and Newfoundland in commercial disputes or negotiations. In no country did I have any connection with or first- hand knowledge of any activities of either their intelligence agencies Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 or our own; nor do I have now any obligations or prejudices regarding any foreign country which would interfere with any official duties. 5. The fifth and final charge is the suggestion that I must have been somehow involved in Kennedy White House plots to assassinate foreign leaders. That charge is totally false. I have previously testified under oath, and I do so again today, that I knew nothing of such plots; and no one who did has ever stated or ever could state, nor did your predecessor committee find or suggest, that I was informed or involved in any way. The record is equally clear that I had. no advance knowledge or involvement of any kind in the Bay of Pigs or in any CIA covert operations. Mr. Chairman, far more than any job or title, I value my good name. I resent this reckless scattering of baseless personal accusations in order to suppress a different point of view. I respectfully ask this Committee, whatever the fate of my nomination, to consider the evidence submitted today and previously submitted to your staff, and to make it clear that these personal charges are wholly false and without foundation and not the basis for the Committee's view of my nomination. With these personal charges out of the way, we can turn now to the question of my qualifications -- to legitimate questions raised by those with whom I respectfully disagree but who are entitled to raise what they regard as valid questions. There are basically two such questions: Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 First is the question of my experience in intelligence. I was an observer at National Security Council meetings and a reader of intelligence reports in the White House, and worked closely with the CIA and other national security officials during the Cuban Missile Crisis. I have since leaving the White House written and lectured widely on international affairs, and engaged in negotiations with dozens if not hundreds of top foreign officials. I was requested by the Ford White House a year ago to provide advice and consultation on its reorganization of the intelligence effort. My qualifications for this post have been endorsed by John McCone, Clark Clifford, Averell Harriman, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, General James Gavin, and others who know of my work. Most importantly, I was chosen by the President-elect as someone sufficiently in his personal trust and confidence to bring him the hard unvarnished facts, and to reject any improper orders whatever their source; as someone who possessed the integrity necessary to continue the task of restoring public trust and confidence in the CIA, and earning that trust and confidence by keeping the Agency accountable and free of abuse; and as someone with the degree of intellect and independence required. to protect the integrity of the intelligence process from outside pressures and politics. But I recognize that there are those, inside and outside of the intelligence establishment, who disagree with the Murphy Commission recommendation that an outsider always be named to this post; who refuse to recognize the totally non-partisan leadership provided Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 by George Bush despite earlier concerns about his partisan background; or who see no value for this post in a lawyer's sensitivities to civil liberties and lawful conduct:. These people believe that only someone from inside the military or intelligence establishment has the experience necessary for this job. I disagree. Second is the question of my views. Although as previously indicated I am not a pacifist, I do favor a foreign policy that prefers where possible the risks of peace to the risks of war. Although as previously indicated I fully recognize the need for legitimate government secrecy, which is in fact weakened by over- classification, I do believe in the right of the Congress and public to receive far more information than they presently do from all government agencies, including the CIA. ][ believe in the application of moral and legal standards to national security decisions, including the limitation of covert operations to extraordinary circumstances involving the vital national interests of our country, with timely review by the appropriate Congressional Committees and written authorization by the President and his senior Cabinet officials. There are those who disagree with these views and regard them as incompatible with the duties of a Director of Central Intelligence. Paying little heed to the fact that the Director's real responsibility is to provide leadership to the Intelligence Community and objective intelligence not policy to the President and his policymakers, these Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 critics prefer to view this post as part of the national security decision-making apparatus and prefer in that post someone with policy commitments more like their own. Obviously I disagree with that view as well. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 DCI RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS DCI relations with Congress fall basically into the following Eireas, General Legislative Oversight, Appropriations, Covert Action, Substantive Intelligence Support, and Legislation. 1. GENERAL LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT A. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SS :I) (15 members) The SSCI was created by S. Res. 400 in the 94th Congress and has exclusive jurisdiction over CIA and sequential juris- diction over the remainder of the Intelligence Community (IC) and has, basically, the following responsibilitie=s; legislations annual appropriation authorization (for the first time-previously funds were appropriated without an annual authorization), matters generally, including oversight to ensure policy makers get necessary, accurate and timely intelligence, and to ensure; rights of American citizens are not infringed. B. Senate Armed Services Committee, CIA Subcommittee (7 members) While this Subcommittee technically exercises general oversight jurisdiction, due to the advent of the SSCI, these responsibilities have de facto shifted to the new Committee. Even so, we are continuing to keep the Committee informed of IC matters generally. The Committee is especially kept informed on matters of foreign military intelligence. It will have an active role and influence on the authorization of IC appropriations. C. House Armed Services Committee, Special Subcommittee on Intelligence (7 members) This Subcommittee is responsible for legislation and matters generally other than appropriations with special emphasis to ensure the Subcommittee is kept currently informed of foreign intelligence developments with particular emphasis on foreign weaponry. D. Ad Hoc Investigations On occasion committees of Congress undertake special investigations which may touch on aspects of intelligence operations. For example, in the 95th Congress a House Select Committee will be investigating the assassination of President Kennedy, and the House Ethics Committee will be investigating Korean CIA activities. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 H. APPROPRIATIONS OVERSIGHT A. Senate Appropriations. Committee, Intelligence Operations u committee members Since the Senate follows the House in the appropriations process, Senate action is generally limited to adjusting House figures. During the past few years, the Subcommittee has tended to restore some funds cut by the House. With the added staff interest in the intel- ligence budget, it should be possible to present IC arguments in such a way as to off-set decisions made by the House which. adversely affect IC programs. B. House Appropriations Committee, Defense Subcommittee (13 mS-Yembers) This Subcommittee is responsible for the IC budget and its cost effectiveness. Its report is issued in a short unclassified statement and a very detailed classified annex. The Chairman, in fulfillment of his responsibilities to the House, has offered to all members of the House the right to see the IC budget and the Subcommittee report thereon. C. Senate and House Budget Committees Recent changes in the law provide for increased oversight of all Executive Branch budgets. It is uncertain at this time to what extent these Committees will be provided detailed access to IC budgets, but they no doubt will receive the total figures hopefully under a condition of non-disclosure. III. COVERT ACTION Recently enacted Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act requires that appropriate committees of Congress (now seven), including the Subcommittees mentioned in I and I and the Senate Foreign. Relations Committee (SFRC) and the House International Relations (HIRC) Committee, receive reports on the scope and description of all covert action programs found necessary by the President. --Proliferation of sensitive information. Under the above procedures, a minimum 56 Member ss ff' Congress will be informed of all covert action programs conducted under the direction of the President. In addition to such Members, the principal staff member of those subcommittees also attend such briefings. Also, SFRC and HIRC procedures allow any member of the full committee to receive information provided the subcommittees. Technically, all 435 members of the House have access to any committee records. Approved For Release 2005/12/14 :2CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 --Public release of covert action information. The proliferation o? such information as outlinec-al-o-v-e-has led to numerous instances where considerable information on covert action programs has been released to the public. Such release has jeopardized a number of programs and has led to the cancellation of at least one major program. A. Non-Oversight Committees Under the current procedures, the IC briefs any committee on the substantive intelligence available on almost any subject requested. In doing so, however, no operational matters or sensitive intelligence which would reveal intelligence sources and methods is provided. When questions arise with respect to the latter, the committees are referred to the appropriate oversight subcommittees. In the past, certain committees were not satisfied with the procedures with respect to the refusal to provide operational or sensitive information; however, in most cases, they abided thereby. B. Leadership and Individual Members of Congress The IC has worked out a system whereby the Majority and Minority leaders of the House, and to a lesser extent Senate leadership, are kept currently informed of intelligence with respect to worldwide events of significance. In addition, individual members can and do ask for and receive briefings on a wide range of subjects of interest to them in formulating positions on proposed legislation and in preparation for trips abroad. V. LEGISLATION A. Draft Proposals Already Submitted 1. Intelligence Sources and Methods --Purpose: The DCI has statutory responsibility to protect against the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods. The lack of criminal sanctions for unauthorized disclosure continues to present a serious problem for the Government's National Foreign Intelligence Program. Recent publication of books and articles by persons having unauthorized access to sensitive intelligence information has damaged the Government's foreign intelligence efforts. Legislation establishing criminal sanctions for such unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sour es and methods is considered to be a very important detent. It would not apply to an unauthorized recipient or the publication of the material by newsmen, etc. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: 3 CIA-RDP90-01089ROO01 00080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 --Status: The legislation was transmitted by the President to the 94th Congress and introduced as H. R. 12006, but no further action was taken. 2. Two Deputies --Purpose: The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, established the CIA and the positions of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI). Over the years, as the requirements, responsibilities and work- load of the DCI have increased--particularly his duty to oversee and coordinate the functioning of the Intelligence Community--it has become increasingly apparent that a second statutory Deputy Director is needed if the DCI is to properly carry out his duties and to ensure the most effective functioning of U. S. foreign intelligence. The Rockefeller Commission recommended the creation of a second DDCI position. The President, in 'Executive Order 11905 (issued 18 February 1976), directed that the day-to- day functioning of the CIA be directed by the DDCI and that the position of "Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community" be established to assist the DCI in his supervision of the IC. --Status: The proposed legislation was approved by OMB for transmittal to the Congress in September 1976. B. Other Legislation 1. Charter Revision The SSCI has created a subcommittee to study and propose charter revisions. The predecessor Church Committee recommended a number of charter changes. 2. Establishment of a Joint Committee on Oversight or Rouse Select Committee on IntelligenEe= While the House exercises oversight over the IC, it has not set up machinery to take action to pull abreast of the Senate.. Creation of a House version of the SSCI, if it had the necessary exclusive jurisdiction, would help diminish the proliferation of information. An even greater reduction could be accomplished through the establishment of a joint committee. This is extremely unlikely, however. Approved For Release 2005/12/14 :4CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 3. Repeal of Section 662 (Covert Action Reporting) Since the purpose of a joint committee would be to concentrate oversight and avoid proliferation, repeal of Section 662 should be part and parcel of the joint committee legislation. However, in repealing Section 662, some pro- vision must be made to protect the legitimate interests of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee in being aware of those matters which affect or support the foreign policy of the U. S. 4. Electronic Surveillance The Administration supported a bill carefully drawn on this subject by Attorney General Levi and Senator Kennedy during the 94th Congress. While the bill did not reach the floor, it most likely will emerge during the next session and must be carefully monitored. C. Pending Budget Supplemental -- IC Staff The FY 1977 appropriation for the Intelligence Community 'Staff as contained in Title VIII of the Defense Appropriation for FY 1977 was insufficient to adequately fund the IC Staff for the entire year. A supplemental request for is now STAT pending in OMB. It is expected to be reported . avora ly to the Congress momeAtarily. Approved For Release 2005/12/14 :4CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 The attached paper was prepared byl OLC, and given to A/DDCI, on 29 December for passing to Director-designate Sorensen. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 MEMORANDUM OF LEGAL ISSUES From the founding of the Republic, as a matter of principle and uniform practice, White House papers have been treated as the personal property of the President and his aides, and have been removed from the White House upon their departure from office. The practice began when George Washington removed all of his papers, and was followed continuously thereafter. [National Study Commission on Records and Documents of Federal Officials, (Honorable Herbert Brownell, Chairman), Public Hearings Background Memorandum, page 60, et. seq.] Congressional ratification of this practice was evidenced by repeated appropriations of public funds to buy Presidential papers from their heirs. For example, Congress appropriated funds to buy Presidential papers of Presidents Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Jackson, Polk and Tyler. [Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, "Ownership of Presidential Papers" (1974), pages 3-4.] The concept of private ownership of such papers also received judicial endorsement when Mr. Justice Story of the Supreme Court, sitting as a circuit judge, held that the papers of George Washington were private, not public, and subject to copyright protection. [Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342 (No. 4901) (C.C.D. Mass. 184)] Further Congressional acquiescence in the concept that such papers are private and not public is reflected in the Presidential Libraries Act of 1955, which directed the Administrator of General Services to Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 negotiate for and accept donations of Presidential historical materials. As the Library of Congress Research Service found in reviewing the legislative history of this Act: "In the hearings which led to the enactment of the Presidential Libraries Act in 1955, the Administrator of General Services testified that as a matter of ordinary practice, the President has removed his papers from the White House at the end of his term. This, he testified, was in keeping with the tradition and the fact that the papers are the personal property of the retiring Presidents. Accordingly, he indicated that the proposed legislation was not mandatory in nature and would not bind future Presidents. Rather, the decision to make the gift would continue to rest with the former President and his heirs. Testimony of Edward F. Measure, Administrator of General Services, in Hearing at 14-15." [Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, op. cit., p The private ownership concept and the practice of removing such papers upon termination of White House tenure,conti.nued, without interruption, and was the universally accepted practice when President Kennedy entered the White House and Mr. Sorensen began his White House service. Indeed, as John Eisenhower recently stated, "The only material left by President Eisenhower for President Kennedy was a satchel con- taining a series of orders and instructions to be of assistance in the event of nuclear attack or national crisis." Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 This historical practice was summarized as follows in 1971 by Herman Kahn, the former Assistant Archivist of the United States in charge of Presidential Libraries: "Probably the best proof that the papers of the Presidents and their aides are not official records, is that there are not now nor have there ever been in the White House any files that pre-date those of the incumbency of the current President and his aides. Nor are they any such papers in the National Archives. Following their removal from the White House it has been the universal practice for Presidential aides either to keep in their own office or house the files created during their White House employment or to give them to an appropriate library or other depository." Under governing law at the time of Mr. Sorensen's gift, it was totally lawful and appropriate that the donor take a tax deduction for the transfer of such documents. Numerous government officials over the years have taken such tax deductions, including Governor Adlai Stevenson, Arthur Schlesinger and J. Kenneth Galbraith. In Mr. Sorensen's case, his ownership of the documents in question was confirmed by the government archivist who originally requested the donation. The Internal Revenue Service, after full audit, approved of the deduction, and Mr. Sorensen's accountant settled with the Internal Revenue Service the valuation of the papers. It was only after the events in question here that Congress changed the law to preclude such deductions. And it was not until Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 1974, ten years after the events in question here, that Congress made a limited change in past law and practice concerning ownership and removal of such papers by adopting the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act. However, that Act was limited solely to records and tapes created by the Nixon Administration -- and not any Administration prior or subsequent thereto. To cite just a few of the precedents with respect to removal and donation of papers: Judge Samuel Rosenman, who served as Special Counsel to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, removed and donated his papers to the Roosevelt and Truman libraries, as did Roosevelt aides Harry Hopkins and Louis Howe. Clark Clifford, President Truman's Special Counsel, took his papers, and donated them to the Truman Library. Sherman Adams, Eisenhower's Special Counsel, removed his files and donated them to the Dartmouth College Library. And Mr. Sorensen's colleagues, McGeorge Bundy, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, Douglas Dillon, Kenneth Galbraith and Arthur Schlesinger took their files and donated them to the Kennedy Library. In almost every case, these papers included classified documents. For example, a brief review of the tables of contents attached to gifts of papers deposited in the Kennedy Library reveals that donations of papers by the following individuals included classified documents: McGeorge Bundy, National Security Adviser to the President; Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense; Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury; Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; and Presidential Aides Arthur Schlesinger, J. Kenneth Galbraith, and Walter Heller. -4- Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 No statute, rule or precedent precluded a government official from having reference to classified documents or information in writing books or memoirs. Indeed, since officials carry such information in their heads, they are always in a position to draw on it. The current attacks being made on Mr. Sorensen in this regard could as easily have been levelled against all of the other great memoir writers of recent history. A quite recent example is President Ford. On November 21, 1973, in testimony before the House Judiciary Committee considering his confirmation as Vice President, President Ford said that in his book, Portrait of the Assassin, he drew upon highly classified papers of the Warren Commission and revealed information from at least two "Top Secret" documents. The Committee did not express concern as to the propriety of Mr. Ford having had such "Top Secret" papers in his possession while writing his book. (See transcript of the House Judiciary Committee hearings of that date.) The only laws in effect, at the time Mr. Sorensen wrote his book, governing the use of classified information were the espionage statutes which prohibited: a) the use of national defense information with the intent of causing injury to the United States, or to confer an advantage on a foreign government (18 U.S.C. 8793, 794); b) the release of classified communications codes (18 U.S.C. 798); or c) the disclosure of classified security information to foreign governments (50 U.S.C. 8783). Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 It is not suggested by'anyone that any of these provisions were violated. Nor has it ever been suggested, in the decade since Mr. Sorensen's book was published, that the book disclosed any classified security information. In fact, the relevant portions of the book were submitted in advance to McGeorge Bundy, National Security Adviser to the President, who confirmed that there were no inappropriate disclosures. The only regulation governing the use and storage of classified information received by White House aides was Executive Order 10501, which provided that the custodian of classified information had responsibility for providing for its secure storage and handling, and for following procedures to insure that unauthorized persons not gain access. Whatever documents Mr. Sorensen required for his book were released to him by the custodian of his papers, the General Services Administration, and no suggestion has ever been made that he gave unauthorized persons access to them. The General Services Administration acted in accordance with established practice in permitting Mr. Sorensen to use his papers at home. Indeed, government officials frequently work at home, and former officials and generals, drawing on their papers, have often written their memoirs at home or in their private offices. -6- Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 STAT Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Next 12 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 RADIO TPVrc BR04 Ts 04#1 14.: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 4435 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20016 244-354 News Special WETA TV PBS Network DATE January 17, 1977 11:15 AM CITY Impromptu Press Conference Washington, D. G. Q: Mr. Sorensen, could we -- could we ask you at what point this morning did you decide to withdraw your resignation. [sic]? . THEODORE SORENSEN: This is a. decision that has been evolving over the weekend. Q: Did you make it while you sat here today, or had you known you would withdraw prior to your entrance here this morning? SORENSEN: I knew prior to my entrance. [Confusion of voices.] SORENSEN: At approximately two minutes to ten this morning. We have an audio problem here. Q: [Inaudible.] SORENSEN: Yes, I spoke to Governor Carter on,--the tele- phone in the booth downstairs as I entered the building..,; ':He regretted very much my withdrawal. Q: Did he try to dissuade you from your decision? SORENSEN: Well, he and I had been talking over the weekend, and he was aware of the situation. Q: What made you wait until his morning? Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 OFFICES IN: NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES ? CHICAGO ? DETROIT' ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01.089R000100080001-4 ?- 2 SORENSEN: Because I wanted to answer the personal charges that had been made against me before I withdrew. Q: Mr. Sorensen, is there any chance that you might reconsider the nomination? SORENSEN: No. Q: community is Why do you say that a portion of the intelligence not ready to accept you? SORENSEN: Because it has become apparent to me that some individuals in the intelligence community prefer someone of a different philosophy and with different experience. Q: Are you convinced,,Mr. Sorensen, that this committee woul.d not pass on your nomination? Were you convinced that you would not be confirmed by this committee? SORENSEN: No, I was not convinced. As I said in my statement, I was convinced that if I were to be confirmed, it would be with a substantial. division that would handicap my effectiveness in the job. Q: What do you mean, Mr. Sorensen, when you say "a. different philosophy?" SORENSEN: Well., I tried to spell out in my statement what I regard as legitimate arguments that can be made against me; arguments with respect to my experience and arguments with respect to my views. I happen to think they are fu7l.y compatible with the job as Director of Central. Intelligence.. But I know that, there are those who disagree. --Q: How did you become aware that some people in the intelligence community did not want to accept someone with your views? SORENSEN: Well, one senses that sort of thing. Q: Did anyone talk to you directly, though? What happened? Q: Mr. Sorensen, [words inaudibl.e] that the votes would not be there...? SORENSEN: Well., I'll. tell. you once again that I said in my statement that if I had been confirmed, it woul.d have been with a divisive and narrow margin that might well have handicapped my effectiveness in the job. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 -3- Do you share Senator McGovern's.... Q: ...you could not have been? Q: Did you believe that you could not have been? SORENSEN: Well, I obviously until the vote was counted did not know. So all. I knew was that the opposition was sub- stantial. Q: As a result of this experience, do you see the intelligence community as being very heavily influenced by people that hold hawkish, right-wing views? SORENSEN: I would not want to characterize the intel- ligence community as a whole. The people with whom I have been working at the Agency have been extremely supportive of both my views and my qualifications. Q: Mr. Sorensen, did I understand. you correctly? You said the President-elect did not try to persuade you to see the thing through. SORENSEN: Well, as of this morning, he did not. But as I say, he and I have had several conversations over the last few days. And he stoutly insisted that I stay in the race as the weekend began. .Q: But as of this morning, he did. not? SORENSEN:. As of this morning he did. Q:' How much do you think politics played in this? Q: In what happened. SORENSEN: I would assume that politics had something to do with the charges that have been circulated, against pne. Q: Do you share Senator McGovern's view that this'means that the ghost of Joe McCarthy sort of stalked this room....? SORENSEN: Oh, I think I would prefer to let Senator McGovern speak for himself on that. - Q: Mr. Sorensen, could you say why you did it in this dramatic fashion, why you saved your withdrawal till-the end _ -- rather than announcing. it at.the beginning and then answering the Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 -4- questions, the charges against you? SORENSEN: Possibly because none of you would have been listening when I answered the charges against me. [Applause.] Q: Are you available for any other job in the Carter administration? SORENSEN: Not at this time. Q: Who did circulate the charges againi~t you? Do you have any idea?. What kind of people or what people,. specifically? SORENSEN: Well, I thimk some of that ba,,4 already ap- peared in the press. You can also take a look at.. the organization-, the American Conservative Union, the Liberty Lobby, spokesmen for the John Birch Society and others who have asked to testify against me. You might also talk to those reporters who have talked to senators who have been putting out this information," Q: Senator McGovern mentioned senators.. What senators? SORENSEN: Why, I would assume the press knows: that since they always refused to be quoted by name. Q: You feel. that the John Birch Society has more in- fluence on the senators here? Is that what you're su.ggesting,.... SORENSEN: No. No, I.was asked who was circulating charges. And I listed some of those who are circulating chargc-s-, Q: You believe there were senators circulating some of those allegations? SORENSEN: According to the press. And I believe a little bit of what I read' in the newspapers. Q: Did the Governor in any way explain, Mr. Sorensen, why he so strongly supported you yesterday afternoon and urged you and insisted that you stay in the race the day befci:r,.e y.-ester- day and yesterday, and yet this morning put up no particular opposition to your withdrawing? Did he explain what had changed his mind, or what? SORENSEN: The Governor and I had jointly r-eached the conclusion stated in my final paragraph that there is substantial opposition in the Senate which would result either in my rejection, which would handzca his Approved For Welease 2109/ 2 n/sr~AlABP?d-01( 89fb616b60-4a new Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 -5- start, or result in my being confirmed by a narrow vote, which would handicap my effectiveness as I got off to a start as Direc- tor of Central Intelligence. Q: I understand that, sir. But wasn't that known to you Sunday afternoon or Saturday morning? What changed? What was it....? SORENSEN: There's been a good deal of assessment of the votes taking place throughout the weekend. Q: I see. Q: Mr. Sorensen, this is possibly repetitious, as, a matter of fact. When did you, in fact, on the spot decide that you would not accept this job as Director? SORENSEN: That decision has also been evolving. Like lots of decisions, it's difficult to pinpoint, a specific moment. But it was obviously not conclusive until two minutes of ten when. I telephoned Governor Carter. Q: But your typed statements had to be done before SORENSEN:. Yes, although that particular page was not part of the mimeographed set. Q: When was that prepared? SORENSEN: That was prepared late last night:. Q: So you were prepared to? go -either way last night. Was that it? SORENSEN: Well, I knew pretty well. last night which way I was going. Q: If you withdrew your nomination because of the opposition elements in the intelligence community.... SORENSEN: No, I didn't say that. I didn't say that. Q: But if you did for that reason, "does that-mea;r that the next appointee will share their views....? SORENSEN: No. I think that -- first of all, let me say that I have -- I have not condemned and will not condemn-the in- telligence community as a whole. That's a grave mistake. I me- out there some of the brightest and ablest and most dedicate people I have ever met anywhere in government. I worked extremely well with them. I found them very much compatible with my views Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 -6- and attitudes on covert operations, on the role of intelligence in American society, on the kind of role America should play in world. affairs. As in any large organization, there are undoubtedly individuals who take a different point of view. Some of those individuals have friends in Congress, in the press and elsewhere. And.I.have been led to believe that some of those individuals -- and I would not even know their names -- have been a part of the campaign against me. The next Director of Central. Intelligence hopefully will not be as vulnerable to the kind of personal malicious attack which enabled-"those who opposed me for policy reasons to hide-behind-these perso"nal. attacks in order to achieve their purpose. Q: Mr. Sorensen, do y,ou feel that any one of the senators who you"perceived was opposed to your nomination was an admirer of Joe McCarthy? SORENSEN: I think one would simply have to check the Congressional. Record to find out what some -i.nd.ividuals in_ this committee said about Joe McCarthy. Q: Mr. Sorensen, aside from that, do you think anybody -- now Senator. McGovern raised a very serious question here, saying that Jon McCarthy ----the ghost of Joe McCarthy stalks the land; as I recall. Now do you agree with that s becru:se I noted you didn't want to second that. SORENSEN: I.... Q: Do you agree or disagree? SORENSEN: I believe it's more appropriate for me to talk about my statement and Senator McGovern 'to talk about his statement. Q: Mr. Sorensenr, on your discussions initially with Governor. Carter in Plains when you agreed to take this joby was there any inkling that this would be such a controversial nomination and that you would have to fight in order to become Director. of CIA? SORENSEN: No. Q: None at all? SORENSEN: No. [Confusion of voices.] SORENSEN: What? Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14..zpA-RDP90=01089R000100080001-4 Q: Other than-the evolution-that you've been going through over the weekend, has there anything that happened specifically, any information provided or any par.tic-ul.ar statements by anyone that caused your thinking to crystallize in this manner over -the weekend- and until. this morning when you made your announcement? Q: Mr. Sorensen, what is'your attitude on the Ell.sberg -case? In other words,-did-you favor his theft of those-documents and his release through the newspapers? I mean, was that a legiti- mate question....? SORENSEN: Again, if you would read the statement which I have delivered, you would find that I submitted an affidavit at the request of counsel with respect to the inconsistencies and anomalies with respect to cylassificatioxn practicer in Washington at the time I served. That was my sole function in the Ellsberg trial, as it had been in the New York Times' trial which preceded it. Q: Didn't you gay somewhere "that _ you felt that it would. be wrong if these documents had not been released to the Pentagon or leaked to the Times? SORENSEN: What I said was in a much more general. statement that I thought the public was entitled to know the tragic history of the Vietnam war. [Confusion of voices. Q; Do you condemn El.l.sberg in any way? :SORENSEN: I'm sorry, I didn't hear you. Q:. Mr. Sorensen, do you condemn Ellsberg in any way for the way he released those papers? SORENSEN: I really regard either approval or condemnation of Daniel Ellsberg in 3.977 as an'irrel.evant question. He is not on trial here today. Q: No, no, it's just a matter of your.... Q: -SORENSEN: I'm sorry, I can't hear you. Q: Would you be conferring with the President-elect Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4 successor? Will he ask your opinion? Has he asked your opinion? SORENSEN: Well, he didn't have time to ask it