BRIEFINGS (Ted Sorenson)
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
182
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 17, 2005
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 3, 1976
Content Type:
BRIEF
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4.pdf | 8.03 MB |
Body:
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1976 BRIEFINGS Total
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Senate Armed Services Committee 3
28 January 1976
2 March 1976
3 May 1976
Senate Select Comittee on Intelligence (In.ouye) 10
26 April 1976
7 June 1976
16 June 1976
2 3 June 19 76
30 June 1976
29 July 1976
6 August 1976
23 September 1976
28 September 1976
23 November 1976
Senate Appropriations Committee 4
9 March 1976
10 March 1976
25 May 1976
9 September 1976
Senate Foreign Relations Committee 9
18 February 1976
24 February 1976
10 May 1976
4 June 1976
22 July 1976
15 September 1976
22 September 1976
23 November 1976
23 December 1976
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
19 February 1976
Miscellaneous Committees
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1976 BRIEFINGS (Continued) Total
House Armed Services Committee 10
3 February 1976
6 February 1976
25 March 1976
7 April 1976
6 May 1976 (delegation to China)
11 May 1976
21 May 1976
4 June 1976
22 July 1976
22 November 1976
House Appropriations Committee 5
22 January 1976
16 March 1976
13 April 1976
7 June 1976
1 December 1976
House Interational Relations Committee 5
19 February 1976
12 April 1976
13 April 1976
18 May 1976
24 June 1976
Total of 59 briefings for 19760
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1975 BAW"Sf or Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4
Senate Armed Services Committee
16 January 1975
21 January 1975
11 February 1975
19 February 1975
24 April 1975
23 September 1975
12 December 1975
Senate Select Committee (Church)
15 May 19 7 5
21 May 1975
20 June 1975
14 July 19 75
15 July 1975
24 July 1975
16 September 1975
Senate Appropriations Committee
15 January 1975
25 February 1975
30 April 1975
1 May 1975
30 July 1975
5 September 1975
16 December 1975
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
16 April 1975
25 July 1975
29 July 1975
10 September 1975
6 November 1975
8 December 1975
16 December 1975
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
8 April 1975
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1975 BRIEFINGS (Continued)
House Armed Services Committee
18 April 1975
24 July 1975
25 July 1975
8 September 1975
23 September 1975
8 October 1975
17 November 1975
12 December 1975
House Appropriations Committee
20 February 1975
21 February 1975
17 April 1975
22 April 1975
6 May 1975
15 May 19 7 5
11 June 1975
29 July 1975
6 October 1975
House International Relations Committee
15 January 1975
10 March 1975
16 April 1975
13 May 19 7 5
11 June 1975
10 July 1975
30 July 1975
31 July 1975
4 September 1975
21 October 1975
3 November 1975
12 November 1975
9 December 1975
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FYID1G I3ETOF E CONGfl1 G ;
x. Are you wiiiinI; to nppcar? c,r,,J Lcstify before any duly con.3tituted
.4 > V
committee of 'the Congress on Such c^c:3s
ioas as you may be, reasonably
requested to do so?
Yes .
2. Are you willAnr; to provide su':i, _r:forc,r~ti n , i_:: requested by
corrar,ittees?
OTHER:
1.
Have you ever been convicted
contendere) of orry criminal vi
offense?
No.
of guilty or liO1o
ol.;,'; ion other than a minor traffic
2.
Please advise the Committee of a:y t:cili Tonal inf'c~rirr~ti.or], (dvar?ctrl.c
or unfavorable, which you ? Feel b,. considered in 'connection
with your nomination.
I know of none.
Please provide the Corruriittee w: Lb the rang and current addresses
of five individuals \ hom you believe arc in a position to comment
upon your qualifications for the office to ,Yhich you have been
nominated.
W. Averill Harriman
Lt .Gen . James M. Gavin
Elmo R. hiimwalt, Jr.
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1. Are you willing to appear and testify before any duly constituted
committee of the Congress on such occasions as you may be
reasonably requested to do so?
A. I would expect to follow the policy of previous Directors in this
regard, which is to look to the Congress to determine which
committees should have oversight of intelligence activities and
I would abide by that decision., I would hope, however, that the
Congress would reduce the number of committees having some
degree of oversight over the Agency so that we would no longer
be reporting on our activities to seven different committees.
I understand the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has
that subject under consideration. In addition, I would cooperate
with other committees of Congress on matters within their
jurisdiction and on which the Agency has some expertise.
2. Are you willing to provide such information as is requested by
such committees?
A. As you know, the Congress, by statute, made the Director of
Central Intelligence responsible for protection. of intelligence
sources and methods. Consistent with that responsibility,
I would expect to provide information to committees of
Congress on matters within their jurisdiction.
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Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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*Senate Leadership
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
*Chairman Daniel Inouye
Senator Howard Baker, Ranking Minority Member
Members:
Senators Birch Bayh, Adlai E. Stevenson, William D. Hathaway,
Walter Huddleston, Joseph R. Biden, Gary Hart, Robert Morgan,
Clifford Case (also member of Senate Foreign Relations),
Strom Thurmond also member of Senate Armed Services),
Mark Hatfield, Barry Goldwater (also member of Senate Armed
Services), Robert Stafford, Jake Garn.
Senate Appropriations Intelligence Operations Subcommittee
'Chairman John McClellan
*Senator Milton Young, Ranking Minority Member
Members:
Senators John Stennis, Daniel Inouye, Clifford Case
(the last two are expected to fill current vacancies.
Senate Armed Services CIA Subcommittee
-Chairman John Stennis
'Senator Barry Goldwater,
Members:
Ranking Minority Member (also listed under SSCI)
Senators Howard W. Cannon, Thomas McIntyre,
Senator Strom Thurmond (listed under SSCI)
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Dewey Bartlett
*Chairman John Sparkman
*Senator Clifford Case, Ranking Minority Member (also listed under SSCI)
Members:
Senators Frank Church, Claiborne Pell, Gale McGee, George
McGovern, Hubert Humphrey, Dick Clark, Joseph Biden (also
listed under SSCI)
*Asterisk denotes First Priority, others are Second Priority
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House Leadership
t Representative Thomas P. O'Neill, Speaker
Representative John J. Rhodes, Minority Leader
House Armed Services Special Subcommittee on Intelligence
'Chairman Lucien Nedzi
'Representative Bob Wilson, Ranking Minority Member
Members:
Representatives Melvin Price, Charles E. Bennett,
Samuel S. Stratton, William L. Dickinson
House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee
*Chairman George H. Mahon
*Representative Jack Edwards, Ranking Minority Member
Members:
Representatives Robert L. F. Sikes, Daniel J. Flood, Joseph P.
Addabbo, John J. McFall, John J. Flynt, Robert N. Giaimo,
Bill Chappell, Bill D. Burlison, J. Kenneth Robinson, Jack F.
Kemp, Elford Cederberg
House International Relations Committee
*Chairman Clement Zablocki
'Representative William S. Broomfield., Ranking Minority Member
(these two are not firm but probable)
*Asterisk denotes First Priority, others are Second Priority
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Tha 1lonotable Theodore G. joresasen
Special Counsel to the President
The White House
..`..wy 1961
In connection with the President's rxeetin with the press
tomorrow, ? enclose a brief znemorandum stres:grog the types of
instances where damaging in-forr: ation has been publi3had? Also
encioaed is a memorandum with regard to the action by tha New
York Times and other papers in spreading the Soviet story about
C.,L A. Is ' alleged encouragement of the Generals' plot a3,ain3t
de Gaulle.
This material is to supplement what -WO have already sent
to Ralph Dungan.
A 11D:at
Distribution:
Qri - A-ddressee
1 cc - .DCI i ile ~-yt
I cc - (1) DDGij (Z) Col. G:6 ogan
1cc-~7
Sincerely yours,
Allen Yk7. Dulles
Di: eCtor
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I I.:ay 1901
Hypes of instances where American news media ha-,re published
irforxnation detrimental to the United Stager security and to the
conduct of foreign relations:
(1) UI details obtainable about new weapons;
(') Leaks and indiscretions with regard to Soviet missile
test failures.
(3) Premature publication of persons selected for diplomatic
.
posts abroad so that the foreign country learns of these designations
before formal notification to the government concerned requesting
its acceptance of the designee.
(4) Pick-up and re-play of Soviet propaganda and "plants"
without clearly labeling them as such - e. ;.: the alleged U. S. support
of the Algerian rebels.
(5) .Advertising "Spies in the Skies" which ware generally
(6) Caustic, "Smart Alec" and often overdrawn articles of a
critical nature about the heads or leading personalities in foreign
countri=es (i. e. , the April 21 "Life" article which referred to Sukarno
as "this oriental Lu rumba" is reliably reported to have enrai ed him
and largVly nullified the good euects 01 iris American visit),.
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11 h 3+?.31C? tea Z .2y"a 1t. S4 in i.h r'e ,~ 1's' o., zu
?,.t wl.. ~~ti. +.'i rI~c 3r in the U :lted l.: tatz-: ,
`fix? 1 ^ Lei ~^ :1'.'. O'`.:aLio31:$r 3a" to C : :3': 3'L1o a~ r - - 2 :.1a aad -:a :3
A ?F]'.ri 3 e &a at 3 for zee a-ad iruin~.ibit :3aa%?.~l.~:Ltio: o1teix, on t`ha
basis o.l t:2e 3' OW -11,zh,.LChy infOvr ':a torn.
L :v::- body pplayed ,der :I.J're rule , :11a diaadvantagres we
su 1i r from free :,rxs ura of xy claazi ied informaxiou that is leaked
0r other . i . comesava:xlable .,vo id 'oa somewhat uaut:alized. Aa a
ritain
7ractical -matter, virtually no other c ou .try ~.;t~.lucliz: C r eat a
'r=+x ich h.a one ? the 7 as35f i7r 3 3 in ,x " world, o eratea under the uaMe-
r ~a d r=ulea that awexr to he applicable the Lyn. itad States,
D/FI'ilC:ji
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e May 3, 1`) a1
`s E:GA.ZDINiz I. , j.,L j's#-~i CIA ..\G 1NT5
i -i"A ='.. . Y .i. \ .'.'.'J N f.J Z A {'~l ,^.. ? L-IS.1 i P-1,1"IT SW:..+ V .r..r.
gals c~ rurnor that C 121 h had ne ur c'.a ?t7 : e i~r ~.~er: i3' plot
xi:::i t a .,Feared in TaS:3 soy of April which quoted Pravrda. ThLi
report, w a carried in a '-Reuti -r3 di ahpatch to the An:~rican lpmes,3 and
replayed in France on .April Z4. A categorical d rcial by the 'Director
of Central lnt 11i enc. vas given out on April 26 and widely ;printed
in the une ica.ru press". Ntlotwithstauding the origin of the report and
t"ie denla , many of the r x:?t'I~ an paper. 3 widely published the report
as credible. On April 30, 1961, in a atory under the byline of James
try ;ton, ? e states that the Cl;'~ "was involved in a'_i embarra3:3kig
liaison with the .-rzti-Gaullist o. cera rgwho aged 'Last vee'.c's
insurrection is Al y:er s." Later in the same article he acids the
fo1lo Jin :
"Also, in the last law -Iays, the President has
l oced into angry reports fro' Paris that t.:.a C.i.,. 1. wa3
i>i touch with the in3ur.Aectioni3ts who trie;~1 to overthrow
the de Gaulle .-xov rrixnent of Trance.
a'There reports apparently go back to the fact
that C.I.A. agents have recently been in. touch it_lh the
c.3 i3t.'.w L'i. st,.:st 2; :r.i2c..'^.s3i3 in and V.: L` officials
~~ t
':'L*Je a L::'-C:YC1v'C]?:1 c.$>".. in yr'?`jilli 5+`.+611 uaCklC[e3 ~#9i~itLlJ.e,
a t -ide.i o the not -de Gaulle iiZa"J?:i ~``lL, when. M. ;aoustelle
''Jraa 1.u Yn -;'' a3.1inaton.
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Th.'(a~ cLiar;3 that C' ZlIti-de -Gaulle Generals
is ~U is is u.xqualisiedly 1alae. TI a lunc eon to which rez rence is
mad} was given, 'sot by CIA o fi :gala, but by a rez ch o.iicial and took
place ::.va a year ago.
e fective answer to the # ,i story '.Ya3 l ub1i 3 ed in the
Now York Timm itself on the Loliowi.n; day, ,stay- :, under e: byline
of C. L. S ilzberg :r who stXa33ed the Gommuni3t origin of tha rumor.
hL artlcl , state "To 3#'t t lie record fit ' igat ??- our Covernrxa.errt
be
,haved with diacret iota, wisdom and propriety daring the :narzrrection.
This 13p1i;: to all branches w- the xaabaa y (and consulate general %,?a
+la is s), the C.I..:A. aild .~:ri?S`rit1 r"t:'aneti l/ v:~.S.`i
Mr. Sulzberger I o fated; "i"ate a eagle are tempted
to be i3v#' si~ly L..i:sgs about it" (GL"') and add tilt would e lurkacy
Co in a iila, with our evident d alre to further. d co17 iali'+ation,. that
we would hope to oust the one F roncluman resolved and able to snake
peace in Al ~~?A I a o:a2 ttl, a is o
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CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY.
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SUGGESTED SCHEDULE FOR DCI-DESIGNATE THEODORE C. 'SORENSEN
7 January 1977 from 1800 - 2045 hours
Working Dinner at Headquarters Buildin _
Initial orientation on Central Intelligence matters with
members of DCI Staff
E. H. Knoche, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
-- Anthony Lapham, General Counsel
-- George Cary, Legislative Counsel
-- John Waller, Inspector General
-- Andrew Falkiewicz, Assistant to DCI
Following dinner there will be separate meetings
with individuals as stated below
Overview of Current and Potential Legal Issues Affecting CIA
-- Mr. Lapham, General Counsel
Assistant to DDCI
Overview of Role of CIA Inspector General and Highligh:s of
Current Issues of Major Importance
-- Mr. Waller, Inspector General 1930-2000
Overview of DCI Information Policy and CIA Relations with
the Media, including Briefing on Intelligence Issues of
Current Interest to the Media
-- Mr. Falkiewicz, Assistant to DCI 2000-2015
Overview of CIA Relations with Congress and Preparations
for Mr. Sorensen's Confirmation
-- Mr. Cary, Legislative Counsel 2015-2045
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DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION REQUIRED BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE FOR DCI CONFIRMATION HEARING
1. Complete biography.
2. Financial statement covering all securities and investments
which raise the prospect of a conflict of interest, i.e.,
companies doing business with CIA. (NOTE: A full financial
statement of all holdings should first be submitted to the
General Counsel to determine which, if any interests, have
any connection with CIA.)
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?ft~t~ t[~rStiNEIJLR.~~pK1TG4Dt1liNF~i I H~UO~KE OG -Sl7IZ~1QhIV
15 January 1977 from 1000 - 1430 hours
Briefings Related to Confirmation Hearings Scheduled for 17 January 1977
1. Mr. John F. Blake, Deputy Director for Administration (DDA) .1000-1015
2. Production of National Intelligence Estimates (NIE`s) and
Functions of Nationa Intelligence Officers NIO s
-- Mr. Richard Lehman, Deputy to the DCI for National 1015-1100
Intelligence Officers (D/DCI/NIO)
3. CIA Intelligence Production
-- Dr. Sayre Stevens, Deputy Director for Intel-- 1100-1130
ligence (DDI)
4. Operations Directorate (DDO)
? -- Mr. William W. Wells; Deputy Director for 1130-1230
Operations (DD0)
5. Directorate of Science and Technology (DDS&T)
-- Mr. Leslie C. Dirks, Deputy Director for 1230-1300
Science and Technology (DDS&T)
6. Panel Discussion on Questions and Answers Related to
Confirmation-=Hearings
--.Persons mentioned above plus 1300-1430
-- Mr. John McMahon, Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community (AD/DCI/IC)
Mr. George L. Cary, Legislative Counsel (OLC)
-- Mr. Anthony Lapham, General Counsel (OGC)
-- Mr. John H. Waller, Inspector General (IG)
Assistant Comptroller
Tor esources
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17. What role do you feel Congress should play in covert action?
T thank that Congress should be kept advised of covert actions in a
t
to a Jo nt_Committee on National Security_, anc o y - g
mend t SPCtion bbl hr ame~~ xec aura-repor ing-cif-cev~r-~~a~
an re uirement for
timely fashion through certain designated Members. This is what is done
under Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 1 am not sure if the
precise arrangements under that Section are entirely desirable for this purpose,
however. Its requirement that the President personally certify to the Congress
the necessity for all covert actions may be harmful in associating the head
of state so formally with such activities. Moreover, Section 662 requires
that covert actions be reported to six committees of Congress, a total of 55
Members. This may be more than is necessary and perhaps this procedure
could be consolidated. Finally, the Foreign Assistance Act is, in my view,
an inappropriate place for this provision. It would be better to place covert
action reporting requirements in the National Security Act. Some of these
suggestions have already been made by the, l?y Commission which recom-
the personal certification of the President as to their necessi
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STATEMENT
THEODORE C. SORENSEN
DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
17 JANUARY 1977
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Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
I am grateful for this opportunity to share with you my views
on President-elect Carter's decision to nominate me for the post
of Director of Central Intelligence, and to answer the scurrilous
and unfounded personal attacks which have been anonymously
circulated against me.
I did not seek or lightly accept this assignment, and some of
my friends have suggested that anyone agreeing to take the job lacks
either the sanity or the judgment necessary to fulfill it. I
recognize that the successes of the Intelligence Community are
largely unspoken while its errors are roundly assailed; that it is
often accused of deeds that it never committed or that it undertook
at the request of higher authority; and that the Agency and its employees
are rarely able to defend themselves publicly against these attacks.
In recent days, I have had the same experience.
But I do not intend to be intimidated by those who wish to strike
at me, or through me at Governor Carter, by personal attacks on my
integrity and probity, grossly distorting the facts and maliciously
twisting my words. I prize both my country and p- honor too greatly
to desert this post under that kind of cloud; and I am here to appeal
to the sense of fairness of the Members of this Committee.
I recognize that some of you have legitimate questions concerning
my qualifications. But before dealing with those questions, I must as
a matter of personal privilege respond to the personal attacks upon my
character which my nomination has suddenly stirred..
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1. First, it has been said that I leaked or otherwise conveyed
classified information for political or personal purposes. That
charge is totally false. In the White House, I drew upon classified
materials in backgrounding the press only when I was specifically
directed to do so by the President, who clearly had such authority;
and I took documents home for review only in those rare instances
when I would otherwise have spent 24 hours a day in that office.
I have never compromised the national security of this country,
or approved of anyone else doing so. My affidavits in the lawsuits
brought against the New York Times and Daniel Ellsberg regarding
publication of the Pentagon Papers accurately described the practices
then prevalent in Washington -- not as they should have been but as
they were. Almost identical affidavits were submitted by a former
Assistant Secretary of State, a former State Department Legal Adviser
and a former Ambassador. During my White House service I received
the highest security clearances from the CIA; and I received them
again in the last few weeks. I have something of a reputation for
guarding secrets, whether they be those of my government, my clients,
or my friends. No one has ever charged me with conveying classified
information to others or mislaying classified materials.
2. Second, it has been said that I improperly took classified documents
with me from the White House when I left government service, improperly
used them in writing my book on President Kennedy, and improperly
obtained a tax deduction for donating them to the John F. Kennedy
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Library. Those charges are totally false. Upon the announcement
in early 1964 that I was leaving the White House, I was visited
by the Assistant Archivist of the United States, an official in
the General Services Administration. He informed me that the papers
in my files that I had created and accumulated during the period
of my service in the White House were regarded by both. law and
historical precedent as my personal property; and further, that
I was entitled to make any use of those papers that I deemed appro-
priate, whether selling them as some former White House aides had
done, writing books based on them as other former aides had done,
or donating them to an appropriate educational institution -- with
a tax deduction on the value of the gift -- as still others had done.
Upon my signing on February 14, 1964, a Letter of Intent to
donate my papers to the Kennedy Library, the Archivist's Office
sorted and packed my files, presumably leaving behind anything that
was not mine, transferred them to a GSA depository in the Boston area.
The GSA then sent to my home certain of those papers which I had
selected as necessary background materials for my book. It collected
them from me upon completion of my manuscript, and the entire lot of
my papers was then transmitted to the John F. Kennedy Library, to
which I donated them.
Naturally there were classified papers among them (although no
communications intelligence reports), just as there were classified
documents among the papers taken upon their departure from the White
House by the principal aides of every President at least since Woodrow
Wilson, including Col. House, Samuel Roseman, Harry Hopkins, Sherman Adams,
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McGeorge Bundy and many, many others. Like most of those named,
I reviewed my papers, including classified papers, in preparing
a book on my experiences, just as Gerald Ford at his confirmation
hearing acknowledged drawing upon Top Secret documents in his
possession when writing his book on the Warren Commission. In.
the decade since my book was published, no one has suggested that
security was in any way breached by anything in my book, and it
was in fact submitted for clearance in advance to the National
Security Adviser to the President, to his former deputy, and to
the former Deputy Secretary of Defense. My handling of classified
information was at all times in accordance with the then-existing
laws, regulations and practices.
Upon donating my papers to the Kennedy Library (instead of
selling them individually for a far larger amount), I received the
tax deduction to which I was entitled by law, just as many former
government officials did over the years --'including, in addition
to some or all of those already mentioned, former Ambassador Galbraith,
former White House aide Arthur Schlesinger, and former Governor and
Ambassador Adlai Stevenson.
No doubt arguments can be made against the practice begun by
George Washington of White House occupants taking their papers with
them -- John Eisenhower has recently stated, for example, that his
father inherited from Truman and left to Kennedy no papers other
than the instructions on nuclear attack procedures -- but at the time
I took my papers in 1964, that was clearly the accepted view of the law.
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No doubt arguments can also be made against permitting tax
seductions on the donation of papers by former government officials --
and such arguments were made when the law was changed in 1969 --
but that was nevertheless the law prior to that tipe.
All of the above actions were taken with the full knowledge
and approval of the government, and were publicly described in
the well-publicized affidavits which I filed in the New York Times
case and subsequently in the Ellsberg case, Those two cases involved
important First Amendment issues, including the public's right to
know the tragic history of the Vietnam War. Whatever improvements
might have been made in the wording of dry affidavits, I make no
apology for having responded to the requests of counsel in both
cases to attest to the inconsistencies and anomalies of government
classification practices.
3. Third, it has been said that I avoided military service as a
pacifist during World War II and the Korean War. This charge is
totally false. I have never sought to avoid military service, hazardous
or otherwise, in wartime or any other time. I have never advocated
for the United States a policy of pacifism, non-resistance to attack
or unilateral disarmament. The facts are that I registered for the
draft upon becoming 18 years of age in 1946, a year after World War II
ended, and shortly thereafter expressed the philosophy of non-violence
with which I had been reared by two deeply idealistic parents by
requesting, not an avoidance of military duty or hazardous duty,
but military service in a non-combatant capacity (classification IAO) --
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preferring, by way of illustration, to serve cn the! battlefield
as a medical corpsman saving lives instead of taking lives. This
status was granted. My action was largely symbolic:, inasmuch as
our country was not then at war or expected to go to war. I have
never, in my service on the Executive Committee of the National
Security Council during the Cuban Missile Crisis or at any other
time, permitted my preference for personal non-violence to inhibit
in any way my advice to the President on the military and other
options available as a matter of national policy. I would not have
accepted Governor Carter's designation to be Director of Central
Intelligence were I not prepared to carry out every lawful order
of the President conceivably connected with this post.
4. Fourth, it has been said that my legal representation of
multinational corporations and foreign governments poses a conflict
of interest in undertaking this assignment. This charge is patently
absurd. Over the years, the highest national security officials
in our country have frequently represented such clients before
taking office -- including Messrs. Dulles, Acheson, Rogers, McCloy,
Stevenson and a host of others -- but no one challenged their right
to serve or later claimed that their actions were ;prejudiced by those
earlier ties. My only representations of foreign governments were
the brief occasions on which I represented the Governments of Iran,
Zaire, Sierra Leone and Newfoundland in commercial disputes or
negotiations. In no country did I have any connection with or first-
hand knowledge of any activities of either their intelligence agencies
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or our own; nor do I have now any obligations or prejudices regarding
any foreign country which would interfere with any official duties.
5. The fifth and final charge is the suggestion that I must have
been somehow involved in Kennedy White House plots to assassinate
foreign leaders. That charge is totally false. I have previously
testified under oath, and I do so again today, that I knew nothing
of such plots; and no one who did has ever stated or ever could state,
nor did your predecessor committee find or suggest, that I was
informed or involved in any way. The record is equally clear that
I had. no advance knowledge or involvement of any kind in the Bay of
Pigs or in any CIA covert operations.
Mr. Chairman, far more than any job or title, I value my good
name. I resent this reckless scattering of baseless personal accusations
in order to suppress a different point of view. I respectfully ask
this Committee, whatever the fate of my nomination, to consider
the evidence submitted today and previously submitted to your staff,
and to make it clear that these personal charges are wholly false
and without foundation and not the basis for the Committee's view
of my nomination.
With these personal charges out of the way, we can turn now to
the question of my qualifications -- to legitimate questions raised
by those with whom I respectfully disagree but who are entitled to raise
what they regard as valid questions. There are basically two such
questions:
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First is the question of my experience in intelligence. I was
an observer at National Security Council meetings and a reader of
intelligence reports in the White House, and worked closely with
the CIA and other national security officials during the Cuban
Missile Crisis. I have since leaving the White House written and
lectured widely on international affairs, and engaged in negotiations
with dozens if not hundreds of top foreign officials. I was requested
by the Ford White House a year ago to provide advice and consultation
on its reorganization of the intelligence effort. My qualifications
for this post have been endorsed by John McCone, Clark Clifford,
Averell Harriman, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, General James Gavin, and
others who know of my work. Most importantly, I was chosen by the
President-elect as someone sufficiently in his personal trust and
confidence to bring him the hard unvarnished facts, and to reject
any improper orders whatever their source; as someone who possessed
the integrity necessary to continue the task of restoring public
trust and confidence in the CIA, and earning that trust and confidence
by keeping the Agency accountable and free of abuse; and as someone
with the degree of intellect and independence required. to protect
the integrity of the intelligence process from outside pressures and
politics.
But I recognize that there are those, inside and outside of
the intelligence establishment, who disagree with the Murphy Commission
recommendation that an outsider always be named to this post; who
refuse to recognize the totally non-partisan leadership provided
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by George Bush despite earlier concerns about his partisan
background; or who see no value for this post in a lawyer's
sensitivities to civil liberties and lawful conduct:. These people
believe that only someone from inside the military or intelligence
establishment has the experience necessary for this job. I disagree.
Second is the question of my views. Although as previously
indicated I am not a pacifist, I do favor a foreign policy that
prefers where possible the risks of peace to the risks of war.
Although as previously indicated I fully recognize the need for
legitimate government secrecy, which is in fact weakened by over-
classification, I do believe in the right of the Congress and
public to receive far more information than they presently do
from all government agencies, including the CIA. ][ believe in
the application of moral and legal standards to national security
decisions, including the limitation of covert operations to
extraordinary circumstances involving the vital national interests
of our country, with timely review by the appropriate Congressional
Committees and written authorization by the President and his senior
Cabinet officials.
There are those who disagree with these views and regard them
as incompatible with the duties of a Director of Central Intelligence.
Paying little heed to the fact that the Director's real responsibility
is to provide leadership to the Intelligence Community and objective
intelligence not policy to the President and his policymakers, these
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critics prefer to view this post as part of the national security
decision-making apparatus and prefer in that post someone with
policy commitments more like their own.
Obviously I disagree with that view as well.
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DCI RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS
DCI relations with Congress fall basically into the following Eireas,
General Legislative Oversight, Appropriations, Covert Action,
Substantive Intelligence Support, and Legislation.
1. GENERAL LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT
A. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SS :I) (15 members)
The SSCI was created by S. Res. 400 in the 94th Congress
and has exclusive jurisdiction over CIA and sequential juris-
diction over the remainder of the Intelligence Community (IC)
and has, basically, the following responsibilitie=s; legislations
annual appropriation authorization (for the first time-previously
funds were appropriated without an annual authorization), matters
generally, including oversight to ensure policy makers get
necessary, accurate and timely intelligence, and to ensure; rights
of American citizens are not infringed.
B. Senate Armed Services Committee, CIA Subcommittee (7 members)
While this Subcommittee technically exercises general
oversight jurisdiction, due to the advent of the SSCI, these
responsibilities have de facto shifted to the new Committee.
Even so, we are continuing to keep the Committee informed
of IC matters generally. The Committee is especially kept
informed on matters of foreign military intelligence. It will
have an active role and influence on the authorization of IC
appropriations.
C. House Armed Services Committee, Special Subcommittee
on Intelligence (7 members)
This Subcommittee is responsible for legislation and matters
generally other than appropriations with special emphasis to ensure
the Subcommittee is kept currently informed of foreign intelligence
developments with particular emphasis on foreign weaponry.
D. Ad Hoc Investigations
On occasion committees of Congress undertake special
investigations which may touch on aspects of intelligence operations.
For example, in the 95th Congress a House Select Committee will
be investigating the assassination of President Kennedy, and the
House Ethics Committee will be investigating Korean CIA activities.
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H. APPROPRIATIONS OVERSIGHT
A. Senate Appropriations. Committee, Intelligence Operations
u committee members
Since the Senate follows the House in the appropriations process,
Senate action is generally limited to adjusting House figures. During
the past few years, the Subcommittee has tended to restore some
funds cut by the House. With the added staff interest in the intel-
ligence budget, it should be possible to present IC arguments in
such a way as to off-set decisions made by the House which. adversely
affect IC programs.
B. House Appropriations Committee, Defense Subcommittee (13 mS-Yembers)
This Subcommittee is responsible for the IC budget and its
cost effectiveness. Its report is issued in a short unclassified
statement and a very detailed classified annex. The Chairman,
in fulfillment of his responsibilities to the House, has offered to
all members of the House the right to see the IC budget and the
Subcommittee report thereon.
C. Senate and House Budget Committees
Recent changes in the law provide for increased oversight
of all Executive Branch budgets. It is uncertain at this time to
what extent these Committees will be provided detailed access
to IC budgets, but they no doubt will receive the total figures
hopefully under a condition of non-disclosure.
III. COVERT ACTION
Recently enacted Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act
requires that appropriate committees of Congress (now seven),
including the Subcommittees mentioned in I and I and the Senate
Foreign. Relations Committee (SFRC) and the House International
Relations (HIRC) Committee, receive reports on the scope and
description of all covert action programs found necessary by the
President.
--Proliferation of sensitive information. Under the
above procedures, a minimum 56 Member ss ff' Congress
will be informed of all covert action programs conducted
under the direction of the President. In addition to such
Members, the principal staff member of those subcommittees
also attend such briefings. Also, SFRC and HIRC procedures
allow any member of the full committee to receive information
provided the subcommittees. Technically, all 435 members
of the House have access to any committee records.
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--Public release of covert action information. The
proliferation o? such information as outlinec-al-o-v-e-has led
to numerous instances where considerable information on
covert action programs has been released to the public.
Such release has jeopardized a number of programs and
has led to the cancellation of at least one major program.
A. Non-Oversight Committees
Under the current procedures, the IC briefs any committee
on the substantive intelligence available on almost any subject
requested. In doing so, however, no operational matters or
sensitive intelligence which would reveal intelligence sources
and methods is provided. When questions arise with respect
to the latter, the committees are referred to the appropriate
oversight subcommittees. In the past, certain committees were
not satisfied with the procedures with respect to the refusal to
provide operational or sensitive information; however, in most
cases, they abided thereby.
B. Leadership and Individual Members of Congress
The IC has worked out a system whereby the Majority and
Minority leaders of the House, and to a lesser extent Senate
leadership, are kept currently informed of intelligence with
respect to worldwide events of significance. In addition,
individual members can and do ask for and receive briefings
on a wide range of subjects of interest to them in formulating
positions on proposed legislation and in preparation for trips
abroad.
V. LEGISLATION
A. Draft Proposals Already Submitted
1. Intelligence Sources and Methods
--Purpose: The DCI has statutory responsibility to
protect against the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence
sources and methods. The lack of criminal sanctions for
unauthorized disclosure continues to present a serious
problem for the Government's National Foreign Intelligence
Program. Recent publication of books and articles by
persons having unauthorized access to sensitive intelligence
information has damaged the Government's foreign
intelligence efforts. Legislation establishing criminal
sanctions for such unauthorized disclosure of intelligence
sour es and methods is considered to be a very important
detent. It would not apply to an unauthorized recipient
or the publication of the material by newsmen, etc.
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--Status: The legislation was transmitted by the
President to the 94th Congress and introduced as H. R.
12006, but no further action was taken.
2. Two Deputies
--Purpose: The National Security Act of 1947, as
amended, established the CIA and the positions of
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI). Over the
years, as the requirements, responsibilities and work-
load of the DCI have increased--particularly his duty
to oversee and coordinate the functioning of the Intelligence
Community--it has become increasingly apparent that
a second statutory Deputy Director is needed if the DCI
is to properly carry out his duties and to ensure the most
effective functioning of U. S. foreign intelligence. The
Rockefeller Commission recommended the creation of a
second DDCI position. The President, in 'Executive Order
11905 (issued 18 February 1976), directed that the day-to-
day functioning of the CIA be directed by the DDCI and that
the position of "Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for the Intelligence Community" be established to assist the
DCI in his supervision of the IC.
--Status: The proposed legislation was approved by
OMB for transmittal to the Congress in September 1976.
B. Other Legislation
1. Charter Revision
The SSCI has created a subcommittee to study and
propose charter revisions. The predecessor Church
Committee recommended a number of charter changes.
2. Establishment of a Joint Committee on Oversight or
Rouse Select Committee on IntelligenEe=
While the House exercises oversight over the IC, it
has not set up machinery to take action to pull abreast of
the Senate.. Creation of a House version of the SSCI, if it
had the necessary exclusive jurisdiction, would help diminish
the proliferation of information. An even greater reduction
could be accomplished through the establishment of a joint
committee. This is extremely unlikely, however.
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3. Repeal of Section 662 (Covert Action Reporting)
Since the purpose of a joint committee would be to
concentrate oversight and avoid proliferation, repeal of
Section 662 should be part and parcel of the joint committee
legislation. However, in repealing Section 662, some pro-
vision must be made to protect the legitimate interests of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House
International Relations Committee in being aware of those
matters which affect or support the foreign policy of the U. S.
4. Electronic Surveillance
The Administration supported a bill carefully drawn
on this subject by Attorney General Levi and Senator Kennedy
during the 94th Congress. While the bill did not reach the
floor, it most likely will emerge during the next session
and must be carefully monitored.
C. Pending Budget Supplemental -- IC Staff
The FY 1977 appropriation for the Intelligence Community
'Staff as contained in Title VIII of the Defense Appropriation for
FY 1977 was insufficient to adequately fund the IC Staff for the
entire year. A supplemental request for is now STAT
pending in OMB. It is expected to be reported . avora ly to the
Congress momeAtarily.
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The attached paper was prepared byl
OLC, and given to
A/DDCI, on 29 December for passing to
Director-designate Sorensen.
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MEMORANDUM OF LEGAL ISSUES
From the founding of the Republic, as a matter of principle
and uniform practice, White House papers have been treated as the
personal property of the President and his aides, and have been
removed from the White House upon their departure from office. The
practice began when George Washington removed all of his papers,
and was followed continuously thereafter. [National Study Commission
on Records and Documents of Federal Officials, (Honorable Herbert
Brownell, Chairman), Public Hearings Background Memorandum, page 60,
et. seq.]
Congressional ratification of this practice was evidenced by
repeated appropriations of public funds to buy Presidential papers
from their heirs. For example, Congress appropriated funds to buy
Presidential papers of Presidents Washington, Jefferson, Madison,
Monroe, Jackson, Polk and Tyler. [Library of Congress, Congressional
Research Service, "Ownership of Presidential Papers" (1974), pages 3-4.]
The concept of private ownership of such papers also received judicial
endorsement when Mr. Justice Story of the Supreme Court, sitting as a
circuit judge, held that the papers of George Washington were private,
not public, and subject to copyright protection. [Folsom v. Marsh,
9 Fed. Cas. 342 (No. 4901) (C.C.D. Mass. 184)]
Further Congressional acquiescence in the concept that such papers
are private and not public is reflected in the Presidential Libraries
Act of 1955, which directed the Administrator of General Services to
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negotiate for and accept donations of Presidential historical
materials. As the Library of Congress Research Service found in
reviewing the legislative history of this Act: "In the hearings
which led to the enactment of the Presidential Libraries Act in 1955,
the Administrator of General Services testified that as a matter of
ordinary practice, the President has removed his papers from the
White House at the end of his term. This, he testified, was in keeping
with the tradition and the fact that the papers are the personal
property of the retiring Presidents. Accordingly, he indicated that
the proposed legislation was not mandatory in nature and would not
bind future Presidents. Rather, the decision to make the gift would
continue to rest with the former President and his heirs. Testimony
of Edward F. Measure, Administrator of General Services, in Hearing
at 14-15." [Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service,
op. cit., p
The private ownership concept and the practice of removing such
papers upon termination of White House tenure,conti.nued, without
interruption, and was the universally accepted practice when President
Kennedy entered the White House and Mr. Sorensen began his White House
service. Indeed, as John Eisenhower recently stated, "The only material
left by President Eisenhower for President Kennedy was a satchel con-
taining a series of orders and instructions to be of assistance in the
event of nuclear attack or national crisis."
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This historical practice was summarized as follows in 1971
by Herman Kahn, the former Assistant Archivist of the United States
in charge of Presidential Libraries: "Probably the best proof that
the papers of the Presidents and their aides are not official records,
is that there are not now nor have there ever been in the White House
any files that pre-date those of the incumbency of the current President
and his aides. Nor are they any such papers in the National Archives.
Following their removal from the White House it has been the universal
practice for Presidential aides either to keep in their own office or
house the files created during their White House employment or to give
them to an appropriate library or other depository."
Under governing law at the time of Mr. Sorensen's gift, it was
totally lawful and appropriate that the donor take a tax deduction for
the transfer of such documents. Numerous government officials over
the years have taken such tax deductions, including Governor Adlai
Stevenson, Arthur Schlesinger and J. Kenneth Galbraith. In Mr. Sorensen's
case, his ownership of the documents in question was confirmed by the
government archivist who originally requested the donation. The
Internal Revenue Service, after full audit, approved of the deduction,
and Mr. Sorensen's accountant settled with the Internal Revenue Service
the valuation of the papers.
It was only after the events in question here that Congress
changed the law to preclude such deductions. And it was not until
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1974, ten years after the events in question here, that Congress
made a limited change in past law and practice concerning ownership
and removal of such papers by adopting the Presidential Recordings
and Materials Preservation Act. However, that Act was limited solely
to records and tapes created by the Nixon Administration -- and not any
Administration prior or subsequent thereto.
To cite just a few of the precedents with respect to removal and
donation of papers: Judge Samuel Rosenman, who served as Special
Counsel to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, removed and donated his
papers to the Roosevelt and Truman libraries, as did Roosevelt aides
Harry Hopkins and Louis Howe. Clark Clifford, President Truman's Special
Counsel, took his papers, and donated them to the Truman Library.
Sherman Adams, Eisenhower's Special Counsel, removed his files and
donated them to the Dartmouth College Library. And Mr. Sorensen's
colleagues, McGeorge Bundy, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, Douglas Dillon,
Kenneth Galbraith and Arthur Schlesinger took their files and donated
them to the Kennedy Library.
In almost every case, these papers included classified documents.
For example, a brief review of the tables of contents attached to
gifts of papers deposited in the Kennedy Library reveals that donations
of papers by the following individuals included classified documents:
McGeorge Bundy, National Security Adviser to the President; Robert
McNamara, Secretary of Defense; Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury;
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; and Presidential Aides Arthur Schlesinger,
J. Kenneth Galbraith, and Walter Heller.
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No statute, rule or precedent precluded a government official
from having reference to classified documents or information in
writing books or memoirs. Indeed, since officials carry such
information in their heads, they are always in a position to draw on
it. The current attacks being made on Mr. Sorensen in this regard
could as easily have been levelled against all of the other great
memoir writers of recent history.
A quite recent example is President Ford. On November 21, 1973,
in testimony before the House Judiciary Committee considering his
confirmation as Vice President, President Ford said that in his book,
Portrait of the Assassin, he drew upon highly classified papers of the
Warren Commission and revealed information from at least two "Top Secret"
documents. The Committee did not express concern as to the propriety
of Mr. Ford having had such "Top Secret" papers in his possession while
writing his book. (See transcript of the House Judiciary Committee
hearings of that date.)
The only laws in effect, at the time Mr. Sorensen wrote his book,
governing the use of classified information were the espionage statutes
which prohibited: a) the use of national defense information with the
intent of causing injury to the United States, or to confer an advantage
on a foreign government (18 U.S.C. 8793, 794); b) the release of
classified communications codes (18 U.S.C. 798); or c) the disclosure
of classified security information to foreign governments (50 U.S.C. 8783).
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It is not suggested by'anyone that any of these provisions were
violated. Nor has it ever been suggested, in the decade since
Mr. Sorensen's book was published, that the book disclosed any
classified security information. In fact, the relevant portions
of the book were submitted in advance to McGeorge Bundy, National
Security Adviser to the President, who confirmed that there were
no inappropriate disclosures.
The only regulation governing the use and storage of classified
information received by White House aides was Executive Order 10501,
which provided that the custodian of classified information had
responsibility for providing for its secure storage and handling,
and for following procedures to insure that unauthorized persons not
gain access. Whatever documents Mr. Sorensen required for his book
were released to him by the custodian of his papers, the General
Services Administration, and no suggestion has ever been made that
he gave unauthorized persons access to them.
The General Services Administration acted in accordance with
established practice in permitting Mr. Sorensen to use his papers at
home. Indeed, government officials frequently work at home, and former
officials and generals, drawing on their papers, have often written their
memoirs at home or in their private offices.
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Next 12 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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RADIO TPVrc BR04 Ts 04#1 14.: CIA-RDP90-01089R000100080001-4
4435 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20016 244-354
News Special
WETA TV
PBS Network
DATE January 17, 1977 11:15 AM CITY
Impromptu Press Conference
Washington, D. G.
Q: Mr. Sorensen, could we -- could we ask you at what
point this morning did you decide to withdraw your resignation.
[sic]?
. THEODORE SORENSEN: This is a. decision that has been
evolving over the weekend.
Q: Did you make it while you sat here today, or
had you known you would withdraw prior to your entrance here
this morning?
SORENSEN: I knew prior to my entrance.
[Confusion of voices.]
SORENSEN: At approximately two minutes to ten this
morning.
We have an audio problem here.
Q: [Inaudible.]
SORENSEN: Yes, I spoke to Governor Carter on,--the tele-
phone in the booth downstairs as I entered the building..,; ':He
regretted very much my withdrawal.
Q: Did he try to dissuade you from your decision?
SORENSEN: Well, he and I had been talking over the
weekend, and he was aware of the situation.
Q: What made you wait until his morning?
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OFFICES IN: NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES ? CHICAGO ? DETROIT' ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES
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?- 2
SORENSEN: Because I wanted to answer the personal charges
that had been made against me before I withdrew.
Q: Mr. Sorensen, is there any chance that you might
reconsider the nomination?
SORENSEN: No.
Q:
community is
Why do you say that a portion of the intelligence
not ready to accept you?
SORENSEN: Because it has become apparent to me that
some individuals in the intelligence community prefer someone
of a different philosophy and with different experience.
Q: Are you convinced,,Mr. Sorensen, that this committee
woul.d not pass on your nomination? Were you convinced that you
would not be confirmed by this committee?
SORENSEN: No, I was not convinced. As I said in my
statement, I was convinced that if I were to be confirmed, it
would be with a substantial. division that would handicap my
effectiveness in the job.
Q: What do you mean, Mr. Sorensen, when you say "a.
different philosophy?"
SORENSEN: Well., I tried to spell out in my statement
what I regard as legitimate arguments that can be made against
me; arguments with respect to my experience and arguments with
respect to my views. I happen to think they are fu7l.y compatible
with the job as Director of Central. Intelligence.. But I know that,
there are those who disagree.
--Q: How did you become aware that some people in the
intelligence community did not want to accept someone with your
views?
SORENSEN: Well, one senses that sort of thing.
Q: Did anyone talk to you directly, though? What
happened?
Q: Mr. Sorensen, [words inaudibl.e] that the votes would
not be there...?
SORENSEN: Well., I'll. tell. you once again that I said
in my statement that if I had been confirmed, it woul.d have been
with a divisive and narrow margin that might well have handicapped
my effectiveness in the job.
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Do you share Senator McGovern's....
Q: ...you could not have been?
Q:
Did you believe that you could not have been?
SORENSEN: Well, I obviously until the vote was counted
did not know. So all. I knew was that the opposition was sub-
stantial.
Q: As a result of this experience, do you see the
intelligence community as being very heavily influenced by
people that hold hawkish, right-wing views?
SORENSEN: I would not want to characterize the intel-
ligence community as a whole. The people with whom I have been
working at the Agency have been extremely supportive of both my
views and my qualifications.
Q: Mr. Sorensen, did I understand. you correctly? You
said the President-elect did not try to persuade you to see the
thing through.
SORENSEN: Well, as of this morning, he did not. But
as I say, he and I have had several conversations over the last
few days. And he stoutly insisted that I stay in the race as
the weekend began.
.Q: But as of this morning, he did. not?
SORENSEN:. As of this morning he did.
Q:' How much do you think politics played in this?
Q: In what happened.
SORENSEN: I would assume that politics had something to
do with the charges that have been circulated, against pne.
Q: Do you share Senator McGovern's view that this'means
that the ghost of Joe McCarthy sort of stalked this room....?
SORENSEN: Oh, I think I would prefer to let Senator
McGovern speak for himself on that. -
Q: Mr. Sorensen, could you say why you did it in this
dramatic fashion, why you saved your withdrawal till-the end _ --
rather than announcing. it at.the beginning and then answering the
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questions, the charges against you?
SORENSEN: Possibly because none of you would have been
listening when I answered the charges against me.
[Applause.]
Q: Are you available for any other job in the Carter
administration?
SORENSEN: Not at this time.
Q: Who did circulate the charges againi~t you? Do you
have any idea?. What kind of people or what people,. specifically?
SORENSEN: Well, I thimk some of that ba,,4 already ap-
peared in the press. You can also take a look at.. the organization-,
the American Conservative Union, the Liberty Lobby, spokesmen for
the John Birch Society and others who have asked to testify against
me.
You might also talk to those reporters who have talked
to senators who have been putting out this information,"
Q: Senator McGovern mentioned senators.. What senators?
SORENSEN: Why, I would assume the press knows: that
since they always refused to be quoted by name.
Q: You feel. that the John Birch Society has more in-
fluence on the senators here? Is that what you're su.ggesting,....
SORENSEN: No. No, I.was asked who was circulating
charges. And I listed some of those who are circulating chargc-s-,
Q: You believe there were senators circulating some of
those allegations?
SORENSEN: According to the press. And I believe a little
bit of what I read' in the newspapers.
Q: Did the Governor in any way explain, Mr. Sorensen,
why he so strongly supported you yesterday afternoon and urged
you and insisted that you stay in the race the day befci:r,.e y.-ester-
day and yesterday, and yet this morning put up no particular
opposition to your withdrawing? Did he explain what had changed
his mind, or what?
SORENSEN: The Governor and I had jointly r-eached the
conclusion stated in my final paragraph that there is substantial
opposition in the Senate which would result either in my rejection,
which would handzca his
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start, or result in my being confirmed by a narrow vote, which
would handicap my effectiveness as I got off to a start as Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence.
Q: I understand that, sir. But wasn't that known to
you Sunday afternoon or Saturday morning? What changed? What
was it....?
SORENSEN: There's been a good deal of assessment of
the votes taking place throughout the weekend.
Q: I see.
Q: Mr. Sorensen, this is possibly repetitious, as, a
matter of fact. When did you, in fact, on the spot decide that
you would not accept this job as Director?
SORENSEN: That decision has also been evolving. Like
lots of decisions, it's difficult to pinpoint, a specific moment.
But it was obviously not conclusive until two minutes of ten when.
I telephoned Governor Carter.
Q: But your typed statements had to be done before
SORENSEN:. Yes, although that particular page was not
part of the mimeographed set.
Q: When was that prepared?
SORENSEN: That was prepared late last night:.
Q: So you were prepared to? go -either way last night.
Was that it?
SORENSEN: Well, I knew pretty well. last night which way
I was going.
Q: If you withdrew your nomination because of the
opposition elements in the intelligence community....
SORENSEN: No,
I didn't say that. I didn't say that.
Q: But if you did for that reason, "does that-mea;r that
the next appointee will share their views....?
SORENSEN: No. I think that -- first of all, let me say
that I have -- I have not condemned and will not condemn-the in-
telligence community as a whole. That's a grave mistake. I me-
out there some of the brightest and ablest and most dedicate
people I have ever met anywhere in government. I worked extremely
well with them. I found them very much compatible with my views
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and attitudes on covert operations, on the role of intelligence
in American society, on the kind of role America should play
in world. affairs. As in any large organization, there are
undoubtedly individuals who take a different point of view.
Some of those individuals have friends in Congress, in the
press and elsewhere. And.I.have been led to believe that some
of those individuals -- and I would not even know their names
-- have been a part of the campaign against me.
The next Director of Central. Intelligence hopefully
will not be as vulnerable to the kind of personal malicious
attack which enabled-"those who opposed me for policy reasons
to hide-behind-these perso"nal. attacks in order to achieve
their purpose.
Q: Mr. Sorensen, do y,ou feel that any one of the
senators who you"perceived was opposed to your nomination was
an admirer of Joe McCarthy?
SORENSEN: I think one would simply have to check the
Congressional. Record to find out what some -i.nd.ividuals in_ this
committee said about Joe McCarthy.
Q: Mr. Sorensen, aside from that, do you think anybody
-- now Senator. McGovern raised a very serious question here,
saying that Jon McCarthy ----the ghost of Joe McCarthy stalks
the land; as I recall. Now do you agree with that s becru:se I
noted you didn't want to second that.
SORENSEN: I....
Q: Do you agree or disagree?
SORENSEN: I believe it's more appropriate for me to
talk about my statement and Senator McGovern 'to talk about his
statement.
Q: Mr. Sorensenr, on your discussions initially with
Governor. Carter in Plains when you agreed to take this joby
was there any inkling that this would be such a controversial
nomination and that you would have to fight in order to become
Director. of CIA?
SORENSEN: No.
Q: None at all?
SORENSEN: No.
[Confusion of voices.]
SORENSEN: What?
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Q: Other than-the evolution-that you've been going
through over the weekend, has there anything that happened
specifically, any information provided or any par.tic-ul.ar
statements by anyone that caused your thinking to crystallize
in this manner over -the weekend- and until. this morning when
you made your announcement?
Q: Mr. Sorensen, what is'your attitude on the Ell.sberg
-case? In other words,-did-you favor his theft of those-documents
and his release through the newspapers? I mean, was that a legiti-
mate question....?
SORENSEN: Again, if you would read the statement which
I have delivered, you would find that I submitted an affidavit
at the request of counsel with respect to the inconsistencies
and anomalies with respect to cylassificatioxn practicer in
Washington at the time I served. That was my sole function in
the Ellsberg trial, as it had been in the New York Times' trial
which preceded it.
Q: Didn't you gay somewhere "that _ you felt that it would.
be wrong if these documents had not been released to the Pentagon
or leaked to the Times?
SORENSEN: What I said was in a much more general. statement
that I thought the public was entitled to know the tragic history
of the Vietnam war.
[Confusion of voices.
Q; Do you condemn El.l.sberg in any way?
:SORENSEN: I'm sorry, I didn't hear you.
Q:. Mr. Sorensen, do you condemn Ellsberg in any way
for the way he released those papers?
SORENSEN: I really regard either approval or condemnation
of Daniel Ellsberg in 3.977 as an'irrel.evant question. He is not
on trial here today.
Q: No, no, it's just a matter of your....
Q:
-SORENSEN: I'm sorry, I can't hear you.
Q: Would you be conferring with the President-elect
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successor? Will he ask your opinion? Has he asked your
opinion?
SORENSEN: Well, he didn't have time to ask it