DCI BUSH CONFIRMATION HEARINGS REFERENCES TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01089R000100030002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 314
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 28, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR:
28 December 1976
OLC: 76-3794
D/DCI/IC
Assistant Legislative Counsel
SUBJECT: DCI Bush Confirmation Hearings References to
Intelligence Community
1. Although the confirmation hearings dealt primarily with
Mr. Bush's qualifications in view of his perceived partisan political
background, the hearings did touch on the DCI Community role.
2. The most extensive discussion by Director Bush is found on
page 29 in response to a question by Senator Gary Hart regarding DCI
budgetary control. Director Bush stated that he supported recommenda-
tions for increased budgetary authority. In addition, Director Bush
volunteered his opposition to separation of the DCI from his DCIA role.
3. In his prepared statement Director Bush emphasized his
Community role (pg. 8).
4. In response to written questions from Senator Thurmond,
Director Bush noted the coordination role of the DCI (pg. 13).
5. In response to a question from Senator Symington, Director
Bush noted the role of the DCI in eliminating duplication in the intelli-
gence collection effort (pg. 15).
6. The prepared remarks of Chairman Stennis noted the role of
the DCI as "the nation's Chief Intelligence Officer and principal advisor
to the President and the NSC on all intelligence matters" (pg 4).
7. Page References to DCI Community Role (pp. 4, 8, 13, 15, 28-29,
Attachment
Confirmation Hearings
Dist: Original - Addressee, W/Atts; 1 - OLC Subject, W/Atts; 1 - OLC Chrono, WO
LM; d.la(Typed 27 December 1976)
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NOMINATION OF GEORGE RUSH TO BE DIRECTOR
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
HEARING
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
NOMINATION OF GEORGE BUSH TO BE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
63-620 WASHINGTON : 1976
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PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOIIN C. STENNIS
The Committee meets this morning to consider the nomination of Mr. George
Bush to be Director of Central Intelligence. He is to replace Mr. William Cathy.
Mr. Bush's nomination was forwarded to the, Senate on November 4. 1975 and
referred to the Armed Services Committee on the same date. It has been only
within the last week, however, that Mr. Bush has been available to appear hofore
This Committee,
STATUTORY BASIS AND DESCRIPTION OF POSITION
The position of Director, Central Intelligence was established in section 102, a 1
of the National Security Act of 1947. The National Security Act of P147 was the
culmination of years of studies, months of hearings, and weeks of dclii eratini::
by the Armed Services Committee. It is this Act that set up the National 14ewn-
rity Council, restructured the defense establishment and created the Central In-
telligence Agency (CIA). The Act was designed to provide a "national security
organization" in which intelligence could play a vital and effective role. By lnvc.
the Director of Central Intelligence was made the executive head of a new agency
for national intelligence-the Central Intelligence A
enc
At th
g
y.
e Same time h11
3.~..s?\ under the National Security Council, the Director of "central intel-
ligence".
onal Security Act of 1947 prescribes various restrictions, powers, and
responsibilities for the Director of Central Intelligence. Because of the integral
relationship and overlap of the Intelligence Community and the Defense Depart-
ment, the law explicitly requires that both the Director and Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence shall not be military personnel and shall not he subject.
to military control. The Director of Central Intelligence is given special discretion-
ary power to terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agenc v
"whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the iaiteri',ts
of the United States". Furthermore, the Act grants special power to the Director
of Central Intelligence to have access to all intelligence of the United States
Government for correlation, evaluation and dissemination including information
of the F.B.I. as may be essential to national security.
Finally, it should be noted that under law, "The Director of Central Intel-
ligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclc, urn:."
In addition to those provisions set forth in the law itself, executive ordeis and
practice have further underscored the overall leadership role of the 1)irooror
of Central Intelligence in the United States intelligence community, Under recent
Presidents, the Director of Central Intelligence has served as the Nation's
chief intelligence officer and principal advisor to the President and the National
Security Council on all Intelligence matters.
By and large, the 1947 National Security act has served this Nation well.
In recent years, however, I have concluded that the Charter of the Intelligence
Community should be revised. Indeed, in 1973 1 proposed legislation which
would have made several changes to the National Security Act of 1947. Recent
investigative disclosures about past intelligence activities have highlighted the
need for some changes.
QUALIFICATIONS FOR THE DIRECTOR
Any person confirmed to the position of Director of Central Intelligence mint
be able to give momentum and direction to the necessary and inevitable chances
that will be made in U.S. intelligence activities. The nominee must have the
ability to gain quickly an understanding of the Intelligence Coniunih and
exercise effective control over it. He must possess an uncompromising objectivity
regarding intelligence matters and the courage and integrity to rise r.bove
parochial interests.
ACCOUNTABILITY
As a matter of policy, the Democratic Caucus has adopted a requirement tha';
every nominee appearing before the Senate be asked to provide a personal cotr-
mitment to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly eOiatit ircfl
committee of the Senate. Such a commitment will of course he expected of any
nominee to be Director of Central Intelligence. But the Director has a special
responsibility in his dealings with the Congress that goes far beyond a nacre
commitment to appear upon request. Because intelligence must necessarily
Involve secrecy, the Congress is particularly dependent upon the personal into,; ity
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-~~CULU i.J1e11, Nil', 1 W111 De nappy LO respond 'AS t1'ankly, as honestly
-as I can to any of your questions.
T'irst, my views on intelligence. I believe in a strong intelligence
capability for the United States. My more than 3 years in two vital
foreign affairs posts, plus my attending Cabinet meetings for 4 years.
plus my 4 years in Congress, make me totally convinced that we,musf
see our intelligence capability certainly maintained and I would say
strengthened. We mast, not see the CLk dismantled.
Reporting and investigative reporting in the papers and investiga-
tive work proper by the Senate and the House have brought to light
some abuses that have taken place over a long period of time. Clearly
things were clone that, were outrageous. Some of them were morally
offensive. And these must not be repeated and I will take every step
to see that they are not repeated.
I understand that. Director Colby has already issued directives that
implement some of the decisions of the Rockefeller Commission, de-
cisions designed to safeguard against abuses. If confirmed, I will do
all in my power to keep informed personally, to demand to the highest
'ethical standards from those with whom-I work, and particalarly
to see that this Agency stays in foreign, I repeat, foreign, intelligen.ee
business.
I am told that morale at the CIA and indeed in other parts of the
intellic?ence community is low. This most change and T am
o
. t
fr
n'
o
,..may best to Delp change it. Some people today are driven to wantonly
,se. sensitive information-not talkinaa here about the Congress-
c> the pro
er o
i
ht
l
p
vers
g
aut
uorit:ies of th C bt t fid
eongressuoren and foe alike around the world. In many instances this type of dis
closure can wipe out effective operations, can enr,langer the lives of
-patriotic Aluerii-ans and ('an carlse efOrinonS (hill! e to Our secuirrty
t s iew the job of Director of Central intellig-once not. as a maker of
foreipolicy but as one who should forcefully and objectively pre-
sent to the President and to the National Security Council the finding,
and views of the intelligence community.
It. is essential that these recommendations be without political tilt.
It is essential that strongly held differences within this very large
community be presented. It is essential that without regard to' exist-
ing policy or future policy, the intelligence estimates be presented-
cold ' bard, truthful.
I aim convinced that T have the proper access to the President that
-was strongly emphasized in the recent Murphy Commission report.
T hope von find. r entleinen. that I have the proper integrity and clhar-
ncter to (10 this job.
1a urther, I see running of the CL's as very important. but T see the
responihility for coordinating all of our -Foreig) intelligence activi-
ties as even more important. The CIA has a flundamenta.l input into
intellis-epee etiiiuates. but so :rust the other agencies.
T will he fair to all, but I will do my level best to eliminate unneces-
sary duplication of effort and minimize interagency bureaucratic dis
piutes. it will not be easy. T am told. but. I will try hard on this.
Now. NIr. Ch.iirun;,n. a word about my personal cualifications. T en-
familiar with the charms, very familiar with them, that I am too
political for this job. Here is my side of the story.
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of other
takes 12
. Teak, to
~;r wl orld-
;,ecessary
:ope that
;,eve done
~tllleIlG-
whll lot
not had
;trobably
k5' or an-
lucre in
,ittee will
' agillll.
he would promise not to be a
candidate for Vice President. He respect-
fully declined to make any binding as-
sertion of that kind.
Mr. President, may I have an addi-
tional 2 minutes?
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I
yield 2 additional minutes to the Sena-
tor.
Mr. STENNIS. I admired his attitude
and openly approved it and I approve it
now.
He said "no," that he would not make
any such promise. He would not bargain
away any part, or one iota of his citizen-
ship in such a way, just to be approved
for this appointment or any other
appointment.
As I say, I am glad he answered that
way. I would have thought less of him had
he not. But as it worked out, the develop-
ment came from the other direction. The
President of the United States wrote to
-me as chairman of the committee and
for the committee. I have a letter here
dated the 18th of December 1975, which
we put into the record of the hearings.
I ask unanimous consent that a copy
of the same letter, Mr. President, be
printed in the RECORD at the conclusion
of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it Is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. STENNIS. So, Mr. President, we
have a man here that I do not come to
praise, but I come to state that from the
record, the man-his attainments, his
intelligence, his undoubted dedication
and solid patriotic motives-fills the bill.
He is accepting this position, If it is
finally reached by him, as a solemn ob-
ligation and because of his responsibil-
ities as a citizen of the United States. He
is coming in response to the call of the
President of the United States.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator's 2 minutes have expired.
Mr. STENNIS. Will the Senator yield
me half a minute?
Mr. THURMOND. Yes.
Mr. STENNIS. I have said the Senate
would be amply justified in approving
this nomination. Moreover, I think the
office is such that there ought to be as
large a vote of confirmation here as the
Senate could possibly give. I hope the
Senate does that.
I thank the Senator for yielding to me.
EXHIBIT 1
TwE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, December 18, 1975.
Hon. JOHN C. STENNIS,
Chairman, Armed Set vices Committee, U.S.
Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN. As we both know, the
Nation must have a strong and effective for-
eign intelligence capability. Just over two
weeks ago, on December 7th while in Pearl
Harbor, I said that we must never drop our
guard nor unilaterally dismantle our de-
fenses. The Central Intelligence Agency is
essential to maintaining our national se-
curity.
I nominated Ambassador George Bush to
be CIA Director so we can now.get on with
appropriate decisions concerning the intel-
ligence community. I need-and the Nation
needs-his leadership at CIA as we rebuild
and strengthen the foreign intelligence com-
munity in a manner which earns the con-
fidence of the American people.
Ambassador Bush and I agree that the Na-
tion's immediate foreign intelligence needs
S 605
must take precedence over other considera-
tions and there should be continuity in the
CIA leadership. Therefore, if Ambassador
Bush is confirmed by the Senate as Director
of Central Intelligence, I will not consider
him as my Vice Presidential running mate
in 1976.
He and I have discussed this In detail. In
fact, he urged that I make this decision. This
says something about the man and about
his desire to do this job for the Nation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your efforts
on behalf of Ambassador Bush's nomination.
I will deeply appreciate your efforts to ex-
pedite approval of this nominee by your
Committee and the full Senate.
GERALD R. FORD.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield
10 minutes to the distinguished Senator
from Vermont.
Mr. LEAHY. I thank the distinguished
Senator from New Hampshire.
Mr. President, before I begin my re-
marks- I I ask unanimous consent that,
during the vote on the Bush nomination,
Douglas Racine of my staff be granted
privilege of the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, for more
than 1 year the Nation has been sub-
jected to a seemingly endless litany of
abuses of power by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. Assassination attempts,
Interference in the internal politics of
friendly governments, and other covert
activities in addition to illegal domestic
activities which strike at the heart of
our personal liberties have been reported
ad nauseum. The fact is that the CIA is
crippled, unable to perform the crucial
tasks for which it was created.
I am firm in my conviction that the
congressional investigations of the CIA
that have exposed those abuses have
been necessary. They were not meant to
destroy the CIA. I do not believe that
any Senator desires that. We all recog-
nize that the CIA must be capable of
continuing its intelligence-gathering ac-
tivities. It would be naive to think that
a country with the military power and
global responsibilities of the United
States could survive without an intelli-
gence community. These investigations
were meant to uncover the wrongdoings
of the past and the weaknesses of the
present so that such incidents can be
prevented in the future; and more im-
portant, so that public confidence in the
Agency can be restored.
Because of the past year's revelations,
public confidence in the CIA has been
virtually destroyed. The public has seen
the legitimate functions of the CIA sub-
verted by the political manipulations of
Presidents, Republicans and Democrats.
Improper activities against foreign gov-
ernments and political groups have been
undertaken at the whim of CIA officials
or under Presidential directive. Accurate
intelligence information has gone un-
heeded because it conflicted with the pol-
icy goals of various administrations, Re-
publican and Democrat. The CIA has too
often been a political tool of Presidents,
rather than the intelligence-gathering
tool it was intended to be when created
by the Congress in 1'947.
In fact, public confidence in most of
our governmental Institutions has suf-
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S 606
CONGRESSIONAL RECORIi) - SENATI la,f a ._i 1 !? 16
fered greatly in the last 10 years. Having
been deceived by the official lies sur-
rouding American involvement in Viet-
nam and the deceit and corruption of
Watergate, the American people are jus-
tifiably cynical about their Government.
One of our first priorities must be the
restoration of trust in our traditional in-
stitutions-c trust that is deserved. The
CIA must be rebuilt, both as an effective
agency of Government, and as an insti-
tution worthy of public support One can-
not be done without the other. The CIA
must again be perceived as an efficient
intelligence-gathering agency rather
than an elite arm of the administration.
Public support of American foreign pol-
icy objectives requires public support of
the CIA, which is so intricately involved
in the formulation of that policy. The
success of arms limitations " agreements
requires accurate verification of infor-
mation. The size of our defense budget is
largely dependent on the magnitude of
the Soviet military effort-an assess-
ment that nu t be accurate and un-
biased. The American people must feel
confident that these decisions, and a host
of others, ai-e being based on efficient and
honest intelligence-gathering, if we ex-
pect them to support our foreign and
defense policies and goals.
The Director of the CIA, the most visi-
ble symbol of that agency, must be a
person capable of successfully complet-
ing this rebuilding effort in an atmos-
phere that is perceived as free from any
and all political considerations, Like
Caesar's wife, he must be above suspicion.
And that its the problem confronting us
by this nomination. For the fact is that
in the nomination of Ambassador Bush
we are facing a problem of perception as
much as of fact.
Mr. President, I have been greatly
troubled by this nomination. In the
course of the hearings in the Armed
Services Committee or elsewhere, I have
heard nothing that indicates that George
Bush is anything but a highly profes-
sional and honest man. He has earned an
excellent reputation in all of his previous
agency of Government, and as an insti-
public positions. He served with distinc-
tion in the House of Representatives. For
almost any other position that the Senate
must give its consent to, I would not op-
pose his confirmation. In ordinary times
I might not oppose his confirmation as
CIA Director. But these are not ordinary
times.
The job of Director of the Central In-
telligence Agency, along with that of
FBI Director, demands more than an
honest, capable, and professional person,
even though it demands all of these attri-
butes. It demands someone who will be
perceived by the public as free from
political pressures in rebuilding the
Agency. In normal times this alone would
not, in my opinion, disqualify someone
with a political background from the job.
But in thaie times, I must conclude that
a highly partisan political background
is an insuinmountable obstacle for this
post.
The distinguished chairman of the
Armed Services Committee told Ambas-
sador Bush at the hearing that if he
was using the directorship of the CIA as
a stepping stone to the vice presidency,
he would question his judgment, Mr.
President, if he or if anyone were using
it as a stepping stone to the vice presi-
dency, I would question his sanity. But
that is really not the issue.
Obviously, the CIA needs a director
who will be independent of the Waite
House, a person who can resist pressures
from all outside sources. The nature of
the job, that of providing the President
and his foreign policy advisors with ob-
jective analyses of events in are" of
the world of interest to the United States,
demands that high degree of independ-
ence.
Not only must the director of the CIA
he independent in fact; he must also
have the appearance of independence.
The public must perceive him as a pro-
fessional, not a political ally of the Pres-
ident. In my opinion this is a sine qua
iron for confirmation. George Bush ob-
viously does not satisfy that essential
requirement.
Mr. President, this should not neces-
sarily rule out everybody who has been
involved in politics. However, Ambassa-
dor Bush does not have an ordinary
Political background. We are not talking
about a man who has simply served as
an elected official; we are talking about
a man who has served as national chair-
man of one of our two great political
parties. We are considering the couf`ir-
ination of a man who has been nomi-
nated by the President out of a desire,
as the President himself put It, to have
one of his boys," a member of his team,
as Director of the CIA.
The fact that the President has re-
moved Ambassador Bush from consider-
ation as his running mate this year does
not diminish the fact that he has been
and remains a leader of his party-and
I might add a capable one.
Mr. President, I believe that this nomi-
iiation, if confirmed, would reaffirm the
cynicism already rampant among the
American people. It will be perceived as
yet another example of politics as usual,
And politics as usual has resulted in
Vietnam, Watergate, FBI abuses, and
CIA abuses. It is time to begin putting
an end to that prevailing attitude in this
country.
As we consider this nomination, we
must keep in mind that public opinion
of the CIA has reached its nadir. This
nomination does not begin to change
that negative impression; in fact, from
`that I hear from my constituents, it
only reinforces it. The rejection of this
nomination should not and would not be
viewed as an affront to Ambassador flush,
a fine public servant. It would be per-
ceived as a concrete manifestation of the
intent of Congress to rebuild the CIA and
to restore to it the confidence and trust
of the American people.
I thank my distinguished colleague
from New Hampshire. I yield back what-
m-ver remaining time I have.
Mr. McINTYRE. May I ask the Sena-
tor to expand a little bit on the reaction
he has had from some of his constitu-
ents to this nomination?
Mr. LEAHY. I have made it a point to
let the people in Vermont know how I
feel about this particular nomination In
visits back home, in mailings, and on
radio talk shows. As the Senator from
New Hampshire knows, I do not come
from a State which is noted for being
heavily anti-Republican. In fact, I: am
the first member of my party ever to be
elected to the Senate from that State.
Mr. McINTYRE. May I interrupt tai
add my congratulations. 1 hope that
many more Senators who share the con-
cern of the Senator from Vermont come
to the Chamber.
Mr. LEAHY. I thank the Senator.
I will tell the Senator that the People
in Vermont are very concerned about this
nomination. I think the people in Ver-
mont are strongly behind the idea that
the CIA and FBI are necessary institu-
tions of our Government, but they have
been very, very concerned about the reve-
lations they have heard. They feel that
both of these agencies have been badly
damaged by misconduct, by improper
activities, and they want to see them re-
stored to a position of trust.
I used the expression here of politics as
usual. I heard that time and time again
from Vermonters, including many people
I would consider basically conservative
Republican Vermonters. They are all
very concerned. They feel that this nomi-
nation just masks some kind of a political
reward. That is the way it is perceived.
Mr. McIN'I`YRE. Mr. President, I want
to thank the distinguished Senator from
Vermont for his fine statement. :i re-
serve the remainder of niy time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. THURMOND. Will the Senator
yield 7 minutes?
Mr. T=OWER. I yield 7 minutes to the
Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I
rise in support of the pending nomina-
tion cf Mr. Bush as Director of Central
Intelligence. It is my belief that he would
fulfill well the difficult job of managing
the CIA in the present environment
promulgated by numerous events.
Mr. Bush has the individual traits
necessary for such a high position. He is
a man of integrity, extraordinary abil-
ity and intellect. He has already brought
these substantial capabilities to bear in
several positions of great responsibility:
First, as the recent U.S. liaison chief with
the Peoples Republic of China, and prior
to that as U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations.
LROAD EXPERIENCE
These high appointments came fol-
lowing his service in the U.S. House of
Representatives and as National Chair-
man of the Republican Party. Earlier he
was a successful manager of a petroleum
company. Further, contrary to some ex-
pressed viewpoints, I weigh his tenure as
Chairman of the Republican National
Committee as an asset in assuming the
CIA directorship. Some of the difflcul-
ties which the CIA has encountered
might have been avoided had more po-
litical judgment been brought to bear.
Mr. Bush himself made it clear in his
confirmation hearings that political
partisanship has no place in the CIA
post, but he felt that his political experi-
ence would be an asset once he assumes
Directorship of the CIA.
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Jan. ry 27, 1916 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
S 607
'Frankly, for example, are now coming into play nvsu hg
lwhen he appeared before our th
-1-114 ----- -_p__w -- differences in Opinion may occur sneth
e
carry the day, so to speak, and was the the underlying reason for-thevannouncement He stated that he would take seriously
impres$lon of integrity and competence by Sen. John G. Tower (R-Tex.) Wednesday the Director's responsibility to protect
which he portrayed to the members. His that he opposes formation of a new oversight intelligence sources and unauthorized
frank handling of sensitive areas of ques- committee to monitor the intelligence disclosure. Further,, he pledged to work
tioning, and his sound views On gather- community. out a relationship with the Congress
ing, management and use of intelligence -Tower urged instead that the oversight which would meet the legitimate and
based,iipon his political background. -- --- _? -
spirit of clubby toleration. As the second-
The high regard in which he was held ranking Republican on the Senate Armed
by the committee obviously had some- Services Committee, Tower enjoys a position
thing to do with the request from some of influence on that panel.
of the lnembers that the President state The White House and intelligence coin-
in writing that Ambassador Bush would munity would gladly settle for that arrange-
ment in place of the present congery of six
not be offered the post of Vice President congressional committees that have a con-
later it the year. While continuity was sultative role on CIA matters.
given a the reason for tenure, I doubt In the Senate there is a growing con-
this'wopld have been required of a man sensus for separate House and Senate over-
lesser ability than the nominee now sight committees rather than a single joint
under consideration by this body, panel. The fear among Senate advocates of
I POLITICAL RESERVATIONS tighter congressional control is that a joint
committee bill might perish in the House
Franl ly, I do not agree with stated or in conference.
viewpoints of some of my colleagues that The administration favors a. joint com-
the fact of past political activity on the mittee approach to minimize the number of
part of the nominee has discredited him congressional staff personnel involved, since
in the g es of the public. I have not seen, staffers are regarded by the intelligence pro-
certalrii r in my own mail, nor heard of Seals as potential leakers of national
securitcurity secrets. It would also reduce the
any other Senators receiving significant number of trips required between the CIA's
public opposition to his appointment. Langley headquarters and Capitol Hill, where
The mail I have received on the CIA has Colby has spent a larger portion of his ten-
deplored the public disclosure of highly ure than any of his predecessors in the di-
al sources.
Further, earlier this week even the
Washington Post published an article
stating the public was shocked and dis-
mayed by the placing on the public rec-
ord in $he Congress of highly sensitive
matters, These revelations, often from
unnamed sources, involved covert and
other secret activities approved by -Presi-
dents elected from both major political
parties. That is where the public con-
cern lie,, on disclosures which are tear-
ing do the CIA, not upon the selection
of thisiighly competent man to repair
the da age of this overexposure.
At this point in my remarks, Mr. Presi-
dent, I bask unanimous consent to have
printed in the RECORD an article in the
January 23, 1976, issue of the Washing-
ton Post entitled "Climate Is Changing
for `Reform' of CIA."
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in_ the RECORD,
as folla)ws:
CLIMATE IS CHANGING FOR "REFORM". OF CIA
(By Laurence Stern)
A drastically altered political climate will
greet outgoing Central Intelligence Agency
Director William E. Colby when he appears
on Capitol Hill today to offer his prescrip-
tion for reorganizing the intelligence com-
oa,.,aa., pica vi uiic l.Oingie`sn,
CAN WORK WITH CONGRESS
Mr. President, the position is one of
great importance, and I do not wish to
raise any personal point with any of my
colleagues. Each is entitled to his own
views and has an obligation to his consti-
tuents to represent them in that way.
However, it is my feeling that a man with
experience in the Congress, where most
of the complaints are. being heard, may
well be able to deal more effectively with
the serious problems now facing the CIA.
Further, his roles as Ambassador to
the United Nations and Liaison Chief to
the Peoples Republic of China certainly
should have given him a realistic idea of
the issues of other countries in which
the United States has a national security
concern.
Therefore, based upon the recognized
integrity and competence of the nominee,
I urge the Senate to view this nomination
in the most objective light possible, as
the new Director of this Agenov needs
mity has developed between administration ~- meet the e problems s ahead.
le eheadad.
officials and members of Congress is the de-
mand for stronger punitive action against The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
those in government and even in journal- yields time?
Ism who make public classified material. - Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield
It was in this spirit, perhaps, that Sen. 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator
Charles H. Percy (R-111.) asked one of yes- from Colorado.
terday's witnesses, former CIA official David Mr. GARY HART., I thank the Senator
Phillips, for a 6111 explanation, of Britain's from New Hampshire.
official Secrets Act, which imposes far-rang- Mr. President, on. November 3, 1975,
lag official censorship over a wide range of President Ford announced his intention
governmental action-not only of a national to nominate George Bush to be Director
security nature-and makes disclosure pun-
ishable by criminal prosecution. of Central Intelligence. Despite my re-
Colby is supporting a legislative proposal spect and admiration for the man, I must
that would impose criminal punishment on oppose his nomination. He is, simply, the
government employees for divulging classified wrong man for this job.
information during or after their active The CIA must stay out of politics. The
service.
There are also strong punitive provisions appointment of a partisan politician to
for disclosure of government secrets proposed be Director of the CIA will create a bad
in the bill known as 5.1, which would re- precedent. Although I have no reason to
codify the U.S. Criminal Code and is await- believe that Mr. Bush would politicize
ing action in the Senate. the CIA or bend intelligence judgments
one congressional participant in the in- to meet political needs, we might not be
telligence "reform" process now under way as fortunate with-future political Direc-
prophesied that the net effect of the legisla- tors of the CIA.
tive labor on the intelligence issue will be The CIA has had eight Directors since
to produce "an American official secrets act it was created in 1947. Three-Roscoe
and no reform." Hillenkoetter, Walter Bedell Smith, and
SOUND INTELLIGENCE VIEWS William Raborn--have come from the
Mr. THURMOND. Now turning away military. Two-Richard Helms and Wil-
from the politics of this nomination. I liam Cnlhv-ha.ve come from within the
1Y11.\.one,
Just a few months ago there were predic- substantive issues which came out of and James Schlesinger-have come from
tions of major legislative surgery for the the hearings. Mr. Bush made it clear he distinguished private and government
CIA-tall of ending covert operations, split- saw the need for a strong intelligence careers. None has Come from political
ting off the analytical and operational community, but one which would in no life. This tradition should be maintained.
branches of the agency, relocating the direc- way abuse its power. - The appointment of Mr. Bush is a dis-
tor to put him in the White House. He maintained the CIA should stay service to the CIA. The Agency is at a
Now t e forces for maintenance of the strictly in the area of foreign intelli- critical period in its history, It has con-
status q o are emerging as the Senate Gov-
ernment y.
operations Committee moves into gene and coordinate the activities of ducted illegal domestic activities in this
the law-rafting stage of . the intelligence the other agencies so involved. Mr. Bush country. It has been misused, and abused,
controversy, which has been liveliest subject also noted the culmination of these ef- by American Presidents. It has been the
of political interest in Washington since the forts would be to provide the President subject of investigations, by a Presiden-
Watergate scandals. and the National Security Council objec- tial commission and, two congressional,
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5608
CONGRESSIONAL RECUIRD -SENATE Janu.ai i,;.g on Led,
(erred to Mr. Bush's views on covert ac- is echoing the same line as the President the man and hid politfn ;
tion as the reason for rejecting his s "e is going to be suspect if he is it, I told hint in the beg.~ni , i's. "You arc
nomination. ~30.aics, net going to ride z_arol 1 ? Scnaie
Mr. President, the question of covert ringola. This is an issue on which there the foie reputation of your lather who
action and Mr. Bush's views on covert a,rer two very strong and conflictiog views. served here, and many of i ,new hiih)."
action is really only marginally relevant. We ought to have advice on Angola from He quickly said that he n as not e -
because covert action is indeed an in- the. best nonpolitical nian we can get. pectin:, that, aria I 1^.a r-elizced ll;
;strument of foreign policy and has been Just the other day on the Israeli ques- was not..
authorized by succeeding presidents of ti +fi, we had testimony from the Director But talking :tbctit appointing a roan
both parties as a matter of continuing of i.ihe Central Intelligence Agency, on tie because formerly he ha been in political
American foreign police conduct for the of scion o: whether, in fact, Israel is life, I have jotted down e eral of the
last 25 to 30 year:. ti ''-atoned: whether they should, in fact. recent Chief Justices of the United
Now, should Congress decide that have a billion and a half dollars; what States--certainly an inilwriaut office, the
there be no mare covert action or should their relative standing and relative higheit in the judicial branch of the
the President of the United States de- strength is with respect to the Arab Gavernhnent.
tion is not a proper world, I short w th Mr. Taf t, a Former Pre i-
tide that covi-,rt ac
taol of diplomacy, then it would not i is the strongest kind of political dent of the UfniLed State appoints'l
make any difference what the DCI's issue we can get with great overtor.en Chief ,vnsti,e of the United States,-the
views on covert action were because he and great implications, all through the highest office in the other pinnacle.
would be bound not to engage in any political spectrum. Chi=,f Justice H ghe' I believe he fol-
covert action. So this is a policy matter lyre. Bush has been in politics, I dice lowed Mr. (aft-a for ice, Cabinet mem-
that could be v-idely debated on they s he may be again. But we should ber, former Governor of New York, a
floor, m -her got a man who is today in poli- former cool nissioneT somewhere. I do
I do not know whether the majority tiE s, or one who is likely to be in politics not remember just what outstanding io
of this Senate believes in covert action in the future, or one who is concerned every office he held, outstanding as Chief
or a majority opposes it, but that is a about proving that he is nonpolitical. Justice.
policy matter which could be resolved _ think sometimes it is just as bad to Chief Ju. trice Stone_ former Attorney
by debate in the Senate, and I think h.,,.e to lean over backwards, one way or Cei.eral of the United Stute,s-I do not
ought not to be considered in the con- tits other, to prove or disprove something remember now what other offices he held.
text of the consideration of the qualifica? a A is to be guilty of it. I `. hick he had been attorney general of
tions of Mr. Bush to be DCI. well recall a very good friend of mine his home State.
The PRESIDING OF`F`ICE;it (Mi wi, is a judge, at all levels of the court, Chief Justice Free former
CASE). Who yields time? aril I have never had a judge rule against Member of the House of Representatives.
Mr. McINTYRE, Mr. President, I yield die as many times as this particular I do not know if he was c airman of the
5 minutes to the, distinguished Senator luuclge. in my judgment, he was leaning party or not, but he was cr-tainly active
from Louisiana. over backwards to try to prove he and vigorous in the party. A fine, out-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sell- was being objective to his good friend. standing Chief Justi.- f the United
ator from Louisiana i reeogni?,,ed for 5 Mr. President, we do not want that, St te>. P
minutes. ki d of a man as Director of the Central a din ref rritl" re tit rn n from both
Mr. JOHN 3TON. Mr. President, I rise Intelligence Agency, someone who is try- parties.
in opposition to the nomination and, in ing to prove he is nonpolitical. We do Chief Ju-:tics W acre; ruler Governor
so doing, I would like to point out that nor; want a man who is political. of California, former attorney general of
this is the first nomination I have ever i just hope that the Senate will tuarii California. served many years. He served
opposed, if there has been any other, and down this nomination and find any other many years and help d rewrite the law
it has not been more than one nomina- position in Government for Mi. Bush for to I-crge extent.
tion, and I do not recall which one that v;hich he is admirably suited other than And we have the present Chief Justice
was. I"irector of the Central Intelligence Oh the judicial branch.
i0"? L. Ph esident., I say 3% :: ith emphasis
I do so not. out of any feeling of lack Agency. this charge, so-called is not founded.
of ability or integrity or any of those net us get, our advice front someone ask friend from New Hampshire,
qualities that. are usually associated with wi?ose political future in no way hinges I a- ver y valuable Member of athis m holy
a nominee. I have the utmost confidence aeon the decisions he makes as the Direc- and of our Armed Services Committee,
from everything I have heard about Mr. ,,o; of the CIA. where is there in the record the slight-
Bush, but one thing I do know, Mr. Presi- i thank my good friend from New est scintilla of evidence that this man,
dent, that is very clear about M Bush: 1?-mpshire. Mr. Bush, was not (rank, and candid,
He has been a politician and he he either Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I thank truthful, and spontaneous with our colu-
will be a politician or at least at this par e Senator from Louisiana for his fine nhitttoe in his answers?
ocular time be looks like one. ,.t utement, in support of what I think is
Now, Mr. President, as a full-time poll There will not be anything in the Tec-
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sri - ss vs V
N- ._. u O w y 'C7 C -- C C
I- CY 4n
1. CJ ri
7. rye .., C. ` of the committee.
First. let me, say quite sincerely that it is not easy for me to come
here today to speak - m?ainst. the nomination of George Bush for the
directorship of the. CIA. He is a man of demonstrated ability. He is a
man I personally like, I voted for his confirmation when he was
assigned as our Pe,rnaanent Representative to the United Nations.
And from what I am told, his record as our representative in Peking
has been a worthy one.
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I can think of many positions in the Government for which I would
not hesitate in the s] ighitest to support the appointment of Ambassador
Bush, but lie is not in my judgment the right, man for this particular
job.
Ali-. Chairman, let us not forget the original purpose of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the reason for its creation in the first place.
It was to be an independent civilian, nonpolitical, nonpartisan intel-
]irrence agency. Its duty was in the words of Allen Dulles, the CI A's
Director from 15.5:, to 1961, to weigh all the facts and to draw con-
clusions from those facts, without having either the facts or the con-
clusions warped by the inevitable and even proper prejudices of thw
men whose duty it is to determine policy and who, having once deter-
mined the policy. are too likely to be blinded to any facts which Wright
tend to prove the pol icy to be faulty.
The Central Intelligence Agency, concluded Dulles, should have
nothing to (10 with policy.
This is how the CIA was meant to operate. It was to be totally ob-
jective. It was to be completely disinterested. In fact, its character
was one to be shorn of any vested interest. The CIA was to be insu-
lated from the ebb and flow of political considerations. It was an
agency that was intended to stand up to pressures from any source,
whether from the State Department or the Pentagon, and to resist
all the partisan pressures which may be brought, to bear by various
groups, both inside and outside the Government, including partisan
pressures from the White House itself.
Otherwise. Air. Chairman, there really is no need to have a CIA.
For many years we did without one. ''ire collected our intelligence
from other agencies of the Government, from the State Department.
from the Military Forces that have, as you know, Air. Chairman, a
very considerable intelligence capability. But when the CIA was
established, the principal argument for its creation was that we should
have a disinterested agency so that. neither the President nor the Con-
gress would have to rely solely on the self-interested intelligence as-
sessments afforded by institutions that were policy oriented, that had
vested interests to protect and to preserve.
So. if we are to maintain the CIA and achieve its intended purpose,
we must guarantee the independence and the nonpolitical character
of that agency.
Mr. Chairman, be assured that the CIA will be no more independ-
ent and no more nonpolitical than its Director. This does not mean
that we must always select a Director from within the Agency or from
outside the Government. Just because someone has been in politics, by
no means is he. automatically disqualified from heading the CIA. The
critical factor is the selection of a person of demonstrated independ-
ence whose role in politics has been one of muted partisanship and who
has shown the capacity to stand ill) and say, no, Mr. President. I be-
lieve you are wrong. According to our best information, the policy
you propose will fail. It is based upon incorrect assumptions which
are contradicted by the underlying facts as we find them. And I must
insist even at the risk of courting your displeasure. Mr. President.
that, yon review once more the facts as we have determined then in this
Agency.
Vow, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that unless we have a Director who is
in a position to assert this kind of independence, whatever the Ares
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49
surer may be, political or otherwise, on the President to follow s'om.e
policy thought by the Director to be unwise, then the important role
of the CIA cannot be sustained.
This is why the appointment of Ambassador Bush is so ill advised.
It is one thing to choose an individual who may have had political
experience, say someone like Elliot Richardson, or John Sherman
Cooper, two inen whose whole public life tended to demonstrate a
proven independence and a muted partisan background, and quite an-
other to choose someone whose principal political role has been chair-
man of the Republican National Committee.
While there is no need to eliminate ,in- individual from considera-
tion simply because he or she has held public office, the line must be
drawn somewhere. A man of Mr. Bush's prolonged involvement in
partisan activities at the highest party level surely passes over that
line.
We should also not lose sight of the impression this appointment
will make, not only within our Government, but throughout the. coun-
try. At the very time we are discussing the reform of our intelli-
gence services, we create a most unfortunate impression if we treat ap-
pointments to the CIA in the same way we used to treat appointments
to the. Post Office Department.
Mr. Chairman, there is some irony in the fact that we used to as a
matter of custom set aside the postmaster generalship for a man who
had served as party chairman. Postmaster generalship was known to
be the most political and the least sensitive Cabinet post. Surely the
directorship of the CIA is the least political and most sensitive of all
appointments.
Journalist Tom Braden, a. former CIA officer, captures the essence
of this aspect of the, problem with. the Bush nomination in a column
in the Fort Lauderdale News entitled, "George Bush, Bad Choice for
CLA Job." -Braden noted that the appointment looks bad and looks
bad at a time when public confidence in the CIA is such that every-
thing about, it should look good.
Mr. Chairman, the Senate and House committees, not to mention
the President's own Commission on Intelligence, have labored for
3nonths, reviewing the problems of the, intelligence agencies. These
problems, they have been plentiful, and the. areas for new legislation
are many. Still the prospects for starting afresh are food., and I have
viewed the chances to restore public trust and confidence in the CIA
with considerable optimism, but this is no way to begin the restora-
tion. No new set, of laws, no new g tiding principles, regardless of how
ski.llfnlly drawn, will restore this trust if the credentials of the new
Director raise serious questions of propriety.
As a Washington Post colunui entitled, "Overlook Political Real-
ities" by the conservative Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, certainly
no partisans of mine, notes :
The Bush nomination is regarded by some intelligence experts as another
grave morale deflator. They reason that any identified politician, no matter
glow resolved to be politically pure. would aggravate the CIA's credibility gap.
Instead of.an identified politician like Bush .. , what is needed, they feel, is a
respected non-politician, perhaps from business or the academic world.
The columnists then go on to say :
Not all experts agree. One former CIA official wants the CIA placed under
political leadership capable of working closely with Congress, But even that
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distinetly minority position rebels against any Presidential scenario that looks
to the CIA as possible stepping-stone to the Vice Presidential nomination.
It is precisely that potential, the use of the CIA as a springboard
for higher office, that. I find particular?Iv tr'oublesonie.
4 second editorial in the Post entitled, `'The lln;;h Appointment,''
tales a stand against his nomination, arr, ' gu rig that this position
should not be regarded ns a political parking spot," and particularly
in view of the need to strengthen and restore public confidence in the
('IA after the revelations of wrongdoing that have marked the news
for these many months. I could not agree more.
It appears as though the White ]Tons(,. rnav be using this important:
post merely as a grooming room before llr. Nish is brought on stage
)rest year as a Vice Presidential running mate. Personally, Mr. ('laair?-
nian, I think he would grace the, ticket if that were the question. 'I'irat
is not the question. When asked at a press conference if the noun ca-
tion of -Mr. hush would eliminate him as a. Vice-Presidential eanrli-
date, President Ford said, "I don't think he's eliminated from con-
sideration by anybody, the delegates to the convention or myself."
When asked the wane question on "Meet hire Press." the President
bristled and replied coolly, "I don't think people with talent ought to
be excluded from aary field of public service."
Mr. Bush also loaves the door wide open. In his appearance before
this committee yesterday Isis answer to the guc4tion of whether or not
he would accept the Vice-Presidential norninat ion was, "T cannot in all
honesty tell you drat i would not accept."
5o liere we stand. Need we find or look to hie-her places than the
Presidency and the nominee himself to confirut the factl that this door
is left open and that lie remains under active conside-?ation for a place
u,I the ticket in 1976?
Ire stand in this position in the close wake of Watergate, and this
connnittee has before it a. candidate for Director of the (`IA, a man
of strong' partisan political background anti a beckoning political
future.
Tinder these eircumstnnees I find the apnointnient astonishing.
Now, as never before. the Director Of the CU must. be compleftly
above political Suspicion. At the very least this cornnriti T believe,
should insist that the nominee disavow any place on the 1976 Presi-
dential ticket. Is he to be there only 6 months? Are we to approve..
riven the present state of the CIS and public attitudes toward it. a
Director who will be there hardly long enough to warm his chair?
Are we not to ask some assurance at least that he stay long enou,ali
to do the job that needs so badly the doing?
I believe that this committee should insist that the nominee dis-
avow any place on the 1976 Presidential ticket. Otherwise his posi-
tion as CIA Director would be hopelessly compromised. Consider
the thought-provoking words, Mr. Chairman, of George F. Will. I
believe him to he the most articulate and profound of all the conserv-
ative columnists in this country today. Now, listen to his words. Ile
is a thinking man. Ile says with respect to this nomination:
It is possible to imagine situations in which the CTA world he pressured
tt, suppress inconvenient information, or to report things convenient to the
political purposes of an administration.
Imagine an administration looking to the next election and determine] to
celebrate detente as its finest achievement. Imagine that the administration.
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51
is excessively anxious to achieve another strategic arms agreement with the
Soviet Union.
Suppose the administration triumphantly signed an agreement limiting the-
number of strategic vehicles-missiles and bombers-on each side. Critics might
say the limit is a false ceiling. Critics might charge that the limit is as high
as the Soviet Union can or wants to go during the term of the agreement.
Therefore, the agreement is an empty exercise, a limit that does not limit.
Then the administration would appreciate a CIA report arguing that the
Soviet Union has the ability to surpass the limit in the near future and would
do so if there were no agreement.
Or suppose the administration wanted an intelligence report minimizing
this or that verification problem-say, the difficulty of verifying Soviet compli-
ance with range limits on cruise missiles.
Or suppose the administration could get a CIA report uspportilig the hither-
to unsupported Soviet contention that the Soviet Backfire bomber-which can
deliver nuclear weapons over intercontinental distances-nevertheless lacks
the strategic significance, and should not count against the Soviet total of
2,400 strategic vehicles permitted by the Vladivostok Agreement. Such a CIA
report would concede a Soviet point without seeming to be a concession, and
could grease the skids for a pre-election agreement.
Those are George Will's words.
What would be the response in these circumstances of a Director
who hoped to be tapped by the President for higher political Office?
We expect too much of human nature if we do not recognize the
compromising position into which the Director is placed if he has
constantly dangled before him the promise of high political office
while he is charged with such sensitive and serious duties to perform,
all of which must be of a highly independent nad nonpolitical char-
acter.
I remember reading a passage from the testimony of fen. Vernon
Walters during the impeachment inquiry last year. General Walters
was and continues to be the No. 2 man at the CIA. In his testi-
mony he told of a meeting he had with John Dean in 1972. In this
meeting General Walters informed Dean that, and I quote :
Any attempt to involve the Agency in the stifling of this (the Watergate)
affair would be a disaster. It would destroy the credibility of the Agency with
the Congress, with the nation. It would be a grave disservice to the President.
I will not be a party to it, and I am quite prepared to resign before I do
anything that will implicate the Agency in this matter.
Thus, the CIA resisted White house pressures to stifle the FBI
investigation. Could the Agency stand up against such pre silres if
its Director were a close political 'ally of the President and indeed
one of the candidates actively being considered for the Vice-Presi-
dential office?
Columnist George Will concluded that Ambassador Bush at the
CIA would be "the wrong kind of guy at the wrong place at the
worst possible time." For the reasons I have outlined, I am forced
to agree.
Mr. Chairman, let us not make It traversty out of our efforts to re-
form the CIA. The Senate and the people we represent have the right
to insist upon a, Central Intelligence Agency which is politically neutral
and totally professional. It is strange that I should have to come before
this of alf committees to make that argumnent. I urge this committee to
oppose the nomination of George Bush to this sensitive position unless,
lie is at least willing to withdraw himself completely as a Vice-Presi-
dential candidate in 1976. It is not a matter of Ambassador Bush being
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asked to renounce his political birthright as Ire said yesterday. I aril
sure lie will have opportunities in the future to cont,irlue his political
career, if he so wishes. But what he wishes now is to be appointed at
the threshold of the national elections Director of the CIA and it is the
propriety of such an ap ointment that we must consider.
What is at stake right now is the professional reputation of the
intelligence services and the confidence of the American people in
their institutions of government. Those questions are of much greater
significance than any one person's political future in 1976. If Ambas-
sador Bush wants to be. Director of the CIA, he should seek that
position. If lle wants to be Vice President, their that ought to be his
goal. It is wrong for him to want both positions, even in a, Bicenten-
nial year.
And so I speak out against this appointment, Mr. Chairman. I do so
reluctantly. It has been a very hard thing for me to do because of jnv
personal liking and respect for George Bush. But no other course is
open to Inc. For if the CIA is to play its intended role in our Govern-
rnent it must be impartial, non partisan, and nonpolitical, all([ its ability
1o do so depends in the final analysis on the Director who possesses
those same qualities.
That concludes in v statement, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator, as always, you have given its a thought-
provoking, very valuable, and well ln?epared statement.
I do not know the pleasure of committee members regarding dnes-
tions, but frankly, I made some notes myself pondering your points
and more. I am sure yon do not object.
Senator CrruRc.rr. No. I Will respond to any questions, Mr. Chairman.
'pile CrrAIiuIAN. Well, I will pass. Senator Thurmond, I Will turn
it over to you.
Senator Ti rL RMOy n. 'T'hank von, lllr. Chairman.
The CrrAIRM.IN. Without, objection, we will follow our usual 10-
nt3nnte till-to, rule.
Senator T1rrR~ro~n. Senator Clinch, To you know Mr. Bush very
well
Senator Crrrriirrr. Yes. I have known hint fora number of yea rs.
Senator Trrrr.3roNn. Do you consider him an honorable man ?
Senator Cu urcrr. Yes ; I do.
Senator Tuuxriroxnr. Do you consider him a man of character and
inrte`rity?
Senator Crrrla rr. Yes, I do.
Senator T1rURM0Nn. Did you bear his statement before this com-
mittee or have you read his statement ?
Senator CHURCH. I read his statement.
Senator THITRMIOND. And lie stated under no conditions would lie
play any politics. He would be completely nonpartisan, and politics
would not enter into the performance of his duties at all. Did on,
know he said that?
Senator Cuiicnr. Yes. I read that statement.
Senator TmTmr_oNn. Do you believe him?
Senator CrruRCri. Senator, as I said in mny prepared statement, we
have two things to consider and I say this having spent a year investi-
gatinlgthe CIA and it is ill-- firm belief that we must do everything we
an to restore public confidence in the professional character of that
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53
agency. So one thing we must consider is appearances, if public con-
fidence is to be restored.
Senator SYMINGTON. Consider what? I did not hear.
Senator CHURCH. Our appearances, if public confidence is to be
restored. I think the appointment of a man whose political role in the
past has been so highly partisan-lie has been the chairman of the
Republican Party-is in itself a mistake so far as appearances go.
Beyond that, I would say that if the Director of the CIA is, to,
be actively considered on the national ticket, then lie is placed in a
hopelessly compromised position. I think he would try conscientiously
to do his job, but with that particular position dangling in front of
him it would be asking more of human nature than we should to put
him in a position where he may have to court the displeasure of the
President in order to do his job.
That has nothing to do with his integrity or his good intentions.
It has to do with human nature with which all. of us are well
acquainted, and I think it is wrong to place the Director of the CIA
in that kind of a compromised position.
Senator TsiururoND. Do you think he has the character and courage
to become Vice President?
Senator Cinnicir. I would support him as I have in the past for
many offices of a political character. I supported him for our Ambas-
sador to the United Nations and I think he did a. fine job as our
Ambassador to China, but there is a difference between the Vice
Presidency or the Presidency which are partisan political offices and
the Directorship of the CIA which is not.
Senator TIIun rOND. That is not .tire question I asked you. Do you
think he has the character and the courage to become Vice President?
Senator Criuiwii. I said before I thought he would grace tide
ticket.
Senator TIiuRMOND. How is that?
Senator CHURCH. I said before in my prepared statement----
Senator TrLURMOND. Is your answer yes or no?,
Senator CHURCH [continuing]. That I thought he would grace the
ticket. My answer is yes.
Senator TIIURMOND. Well, if a nian has the character and courage'
to become Vice President do you not think he has the character and
courage to do what he told this committee he would do, and then
Senator CHURCH. As I said
Senator TrruRZZ'oND [continuing]. And that is not play politics
with the position.
Senator Ciruucri.As I said, I think I made my position clear. I
think this is not a question of character or courage. I think it places
the Director in a compromised position and no man can fully dis-
charge his duties in such a compromised position.
Senator TnuRMOND. Do you not think the President is considering
other important people for the Vice President if he i s considering
Mr. Bush? Or do you think he is centered on Mr. Bush?
Senator Cirurcir. I do not know what the President's final choice
would be. I only know what he has said and he has said that Mr.
Bush is one of those that he is considering.
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Senator TirTnMoyr>. In Tact, Mr. Bush is not going to be in the spot-
light more, at least he will be watched in a position where he will not
lie able to make political speeches. He will not be able to express his
political philosophy, lie will not be able to advocate Presidents nor
express his principles. He will be taken out of the picture, so to speak,
if he is confirmed in this position.
Senator Cirumiji. If be is being taken out of the position then I
would only hope he would say so.
Senator Trrvxazoxn. He has said this. If he takes this he is out of
politics. He said this. Now, do you believe him ?
Senator Cnucii. I read his words and you have read his words.
I have commented on what lie said in my statement and I stand by
rnv statement.
Senator Ttu,n om). -Now, what about Mr. Simon? He is one of the
ablest Secretaries of the Treasury since Alexander Ilarni]ton. Suppose
the President considered him. Do you think he should resign as
Secretary of the Treasury?
Senator CHURCTI. Of course not, Senator. I see a very great distiuc-
tiorr between the Director of CIA and the Secretary of the Treasury.
I mentioned earlier in my statement, that when we set up the CIA
we, did so for the purpose of establishing a wholly disinterested
agency that would be wholly professionaland nonpolitical in character.
'I'Iris is a unique position. And it is for that reason and that reason
only that I am here this morning. If AIr. Bush had been nominated
to be Secreta,rv of the Ti-easnry I would not be here protestinig. I
would vote for his confirmation.
Senator 'I'llITRATOND. Suppose the President considers Mr. Morton,
Secretary of Commerce. Should lie be denied being considered because
be is Secretary of Conrnrerce?
Senator CITURCTT. The answer that I gave you to your previous gnes-
_tion applies fully to this question.
Senator TrrUr;`roxur. Suppose the President is cori idering Air.
Pnmsfeld. That is a rroupolitical position-of all positions, von might
spry. He is here in this country. He does not make political speeches.
Ile does not male partisan speeches. He and the Secretary of State.
are two Cabinet officials that remain aloof from politics. Should Mr.
i.umsfeld be denied being considered because he is Secretary of
Defense ?
Senator CHURrrr. I think the question of Seeret.ary of Defense is a
little different but not nineh from the other positions in the Cabinet. I
have mown Secretaries of Defense that have played quite an active
political role. But the Department of Defense is an interested agency.
It, has ongoing prog-ranis of great magnitude. It has vested interests
to protect. And the point, the, central point of my argument is that
we set, up the CIA so that we might have, a totally independent, and
disinterested agency to which the President might look for basic facts
a rainst which to weigh whatever he is being told by the Pentagon or
the State Department or other agencies that have vested interests in
ongoing programs.
For example, I would not want my intelligence on the effectiveness
of the foreign aid program to come exclusively from the foreign aid
agency and that is why we set up the CIA and that is why it is a, unique
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position in the Government. Therefore, I think it would be a mistake
to compare the Director of the CIA with other members of the Cabinet.
Senator THURMOND. And do you not feel with Mr. Bush's back-
ground as a Congressman, his having to understand Government and
its ramifications, its various agencies the functions it performs, repre-
sentative to the United Nations and having dealt with the representa-
tives there from all over the world, and as a representative to Red
China-a country tive have to- deal with and are dealing with-do you
not feel. that all of this better qualifies him to be a good CIA Director
rather than to get some one who is not qualified in that way?
The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, excuse me. Your time is up, but you may
answer the question.
Senator Ci rrnicu. Very well, Mr. Chairman.
My answer to the question is that Mr. Bush's qualifications in polit-
ical service and in diplomatic service eminently qualify him for polit-
ical office and for diplomatic office, but I have tried to point out the
reasons why the Directorship of the CIA is uniquely different. If I
were looking for a political man to serve in that office, 1then I would
want to find one whose past record demonstrates that he has from time
to time stood up to the Executive and opposed the Executive publicly
on matters of important; policy because I think without that demon-
stration of independence he cannot possibly play the role intended for
the Director of CIA. That is my answer to the question.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you., Senator. -
Senator Symington, that brings us to you, sir,
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Church, you need no commendation from me now. I have
agreed with all apsects of what you have done, but, a-side from this
particular issue, your recent activities have made me proud of being
in the Senate.
Senator Cnumrcn. Thank you very much.
Senator SYMTNCTON. You say you would not approve a vote for this
appointment unless Ambassador Bush in turn said lie would not be a
candidate for the Vice Presidency. If he said that, we both know he is
an honorable man and would mean it.
Would you approve him if he did say he would not be a candidate?
Senator C1rnncrt. I think that I would make no determined fight
against his nomination because f think that such a renunciation would.
clear the way to his confirmation. I would still personally cast my vote
against the appointment, because I think that in his public assign-.
nients and in his public record in the past, he may be very well qualified
for any number of political posts but I do not believe that lie has den-
oustrated the kind of independence, standing up to the Executive
authority, that I would like to find in a Director of the CIA who may
very well be called to do just that in an issue of critical importance to
the country.
Senator SYMtxoroN. Thank you. I have no further questions.
The C IATRMAN. All right, Senator.
Senator Tower, that brings us to you.
Senator TowER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Church, you and I have been engaged together in a common
effort for some time; namely, the investigation of the intelligence-
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gathering community. It was the idea, of the Senates that this invest,1
gation should be conducted with an air of sensitivity and as free of
partisan politics as possible. Therefore, the Senate set up our com-
mittee with it Republican representation that is quite frankly appor-
tioned to its number, six Democrats and five Republicans. And rather
than follow the usual procedure of having the next ranking Democrat
serve in the absence of the chairman, the ranking Republican was
designated as the vice chairman. This is the extent to which the Senate
has gone in Irving to establish the bipartisan character of this
committee.
I think von would agree. I know von would agree, that the investiga-
tion slronhl be coiritircted in a non-partisan Way and I think that von
and I both endeavored to do that. But. a great deal has been said al>,nt
perceptions and appearances here today and i f we are to believe what.
the columnists and the pundits say. many of them, our efforts have not
been non-partisan. As amatter of fact, we have been accused of cover-
big, lip possible involvement of the Kennedys in certain abuses of pow?r
by both the CIA and the I+13I.
Do you believe that these perceptions of what we have (lone al-0,
correct?
Senator Cirrus ir. No. Of course I believe they are incorrect and I
think the fact that we have been able to act on all important wat-
ters with unanimity, both the Republicans and Democratic rnemhe"s
agreeing. is the most effective rebuttal to those, who are trying to rsast
the committee ill an unfavorable light. and I thin]:, therefore, their
Worts have failed.
Senator Towr:r Well. you have quoted various newspaper column: sts
and reinforcing your argument that appearances and perceptions are
important, that these are the perceptions that we must pay at tentioir to.
IV]iy are those perceptions of George Bush any, more valid than that
cohnnnists' perceptions of the over-politicization of our committee
process activities?
Senator CrrUIa T . Because. Senator. T think the report of our coar?-
mittee, the unanimity with Nvhiclr we have acted. is in itself a rebuttal
to those charges. T am afraid that the nature of the political service of
George Bush and its highly partisan character would create a urost
unfortunate public irupression, quite apart from the man himself.
When I speak of appearances T do not speak of the man himself.
I have told you of my personal feelings about George Bush. But We
are attempting in this period to restore public confidence in the CIA
and pubic confidence depends on a public perception that the agency
is as nonpartisan and as independent and as nonpolitical and as
professional as it was intended to be when it. was created by Congress.
As you know, appearances do matter. I think in this case the appear-
ance would be an unfortunate one and make it more difficult to restore
that public confidence in the CIA.
Senator Tows. It is my view that George Bush's character. the
service that he has already rendered to his country. his ability to rasa
above partisanship has been demonstrated and therefore T would
suggest that his performance gives the lie to these perceptions as well
as the. performance of the select committee gives the lie to the per
ceptions of what we have done.
Now, you probably know that some people in the press corps have
referred to our committee as the Church for President. Now, I do
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not regard this as being true but as long as we are talking about per-
ceptions we might as well talk about these things and the committee
has been formed for you to enter your name into the lists for the
Democratic nomination for the Presidency. Do you believe that that
fact makes our investigation of the CIA an act of politics or that it
is colored any way by politics?
Senator CHURCH. Senator, I have made no decision with respect to
the Presidency one way or another but you hold and I hold political
partisan offices. The Presidens a politically partisan office. I am
not running at, this time for thecyPiresidency and I am not running nor
am I the nominee for the Directorship of the CIA but the ('IA is not
a political office or a partisan office. And it is very important that we
carefully choose the man who is to occupy it during the very period
when it must be rest ructured and reformed and public confidence re-
stored in it.
You see, I am not against the CIA as you very well know. I think
that its intelligence-gathering functions are critical to the country,
and furthermore I think it is critical to the country that we have
one agency that does not have a vested interest in what, it says. I do
not want the President getting all his information simply from the
State Department or the Pentagon or from political sources, partisan
sources. I want him to have some agency to which he can turn and
have some confidence that he is gettine. the objective facts from an
entirely disinterested source even if those facts are unpleasant to
him.
The office we are talking about is the Directorship of the, CIA. We
are not talking about the senior Senator from Texas' office or the.
senior Senator from Idaho's office or the Presidency, all of which are
political partisan offices as we well know.
The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I am sorry. Your time has expired.
Senator TowFR. May I ask one more question, Mr. Chairman?
The CHArr,NIAN. All. right.
Senator Towim. We have already agreed that it is enormously
important that the select committee have credibility and that is a
matter of appearances and perceptions. Would not our investigation
have, more credibility if you were to foreswear any ambitions toward
the. Presidency of the United States?
Senator Cmrs.cin. Senator Tower, if I were to become a candidate
for President of the United States, I would step down as chairman
of the committee. I must make that clear.
Senator Towr:R. Mr. Bush has made it clear that he would perforce
leave the CIA were he nominated for other office.
Senator Crlirrrcir. Right.
If the situations are equitable in your mind, Senator, then I cannot
dissuade you.
The CIIAIrtarAN. All. right, gentlemen. Thank you.
Senator McIntyre.
Senator McINTYRF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have one Question, Senator. Yesterday I was bo'[incing around
the idea that a Director of Central Intelligence, finding himself being
pressed by an incumbent President, should have some. place to report
improper requests. Who could he talk to? I am concerned that there
seems to be no procedure in the law currently to cover the situation in
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which a Director of Central Intelligence is approached by the White
House and by the White House I mean the President and people who
speak very closely for the President, and asked to involve this Agency
in unauthorized and illegal activities.
Can such an approach be reported to Congress, and if so, to whom?
Has the select committee considered this problem in the light of past
abuses and are there. any legislative proposals which would offer a
solution?
Senator Cr3Zuia ii. Senator ,McIntyre, we have given long and
thoughtful consideration to a solution to this problem. As a matter of
fact, the active investigation of the committee is over and we have
now turned to remedies, one of which would be the creation of a per-
manent committee to oversee intelligence operations, intelligence ac-
tivities of the Government. That committee could either take the form
of a Senate committee; if the House were interested in establishing a
House commnittee. or it could take the form of a joint committee if that
%%.ere the judgment of both I louses.
In any case, we believe that the committee should have access to all
of the necessary information and indeed that the law should lay uhou
the CIA and other intelligence agencies an affirmative duty to keep
the committee currently informed.
A similar provision exists in the law that created the Joint Corn-
mittee on Atomic Energy anrd that has worked very well.
Furthermore, it is my belief that such a, committee should be fold in
advance of any significa.trt new covert operation that is in active con-
sideration by the Executive. I understand that AI r. Bush disagrees, if
I read correctly his testinron,v yesterday. But if there is to be an answ n
to your question, then I think it, is necessary that the committee that
is selected to supervise intelligence operations must have advanwe
notice of any significant new covert. activity in order that it can advise
the President directly of its disagreement, if the committee is in dis-
ag;reement with the President's proposed course of action, in which
case, the I'resicicnt. mig.;ht wish to reconsider or to modify that course.
of action, or if lie chooses to go forward with it as it is his constitn-
tional right to do, then at least he goes, 4`01ward at his peril becaarse
that committee, in my view, should also have control of the purse
strings and it pattern of defiance would lend to the counteraction
that normally takes place between the two~branches.
I think this is all very necessary if the Congress is to play its con-
stitutional role and if we are to assume our part of the responsibility
for covert, operations throughout the world, many of which have been
catastrophes for this crnmtry.
Senator? Thank vou, Senator. Thank you, Chairman.
The C rr.~ rxm_.~ ~r. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Goldwater?
Senat?a? tlrar.r,w:~rr-n, I have no questions. I am glad to yield to either
Senator Tower or to Senator Scott,.
The CITATRI-f_vN. All right.
Senator Scott.
Senator Scovrr. Than). >on,11Ir. (hairrnan.
T would commend the Senator for the te-timonv that. h(,has hroutrlrt
before its. T thin), he has raised enestions that should he considered by
this committee. I do not, necessarily agree with his conclusion.
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59
Let me ask you, Senator, you made your views on Mr. Bush serving
as chairman, Republican National Committee, only in part and I
would say should we not consider the total rain'? Should we, not con-
sider the overall man and the question of integrity has come up and
I do not believe there has been really any thought that the nominee is
lacking in that respect.
Now, I served with Mr. Bush in the House of Representatives, as
you know. He was a Member of the House for two terms. I tad l:ieve
his second term, even in Texas, lie ran without Democratic opposition,
either Democratic or Republican opposition. Ile sought to run for
the Senate and there is where he ran into trouble.
Senator Ciiuvcu. That is a question of judgment, Senator Scott.
Senator SCOTT._ Well, he did not get; enough votes. That ti- as his
difficulty. He must be familiar with international affairs and I would
believe the CIA is involved in international affairs. It has been criti-
cized, you know-you are more familiar perhaps ur that field than any-
body in this room-criticized for domestic intelligence. Ilere lie has
been our Ambassador to the United Nations and lie has been our
representative to Red China.
Now, ,you would consider all of these factors in making a decision?
Senator Citurcri. Oh, certainly, Senator. The man and his whole
record should be considered. My point which, if I may, I will reiterate,
is that his record has been an excellent record of political service which
I think qualified him for any number of political positions.
Senator Scorr. Well, now-go ahead, sir.
Senator Cit rcir. I would just add that I do not. take the. position-
I do not make the argarnient that no one who serves in political life
could be considered or should be considered for the Directorship or the
CIA, but if you are going to turn to a man of politics, then I think
that it ought to be, a man who has denioristrated in his political career
that lie can. and is willing to stand ill) and take the heat even where it
courts the displeasure, of his own President.
There have been such men who have demonstrated that kind of
independence and. such men should not be disqualified from serving
in this particular position. But I do think that Mr. Bush's political
record has been not, of that char?acte.r. It has been one of good service
but it has been certainly not one of muted partisanship and T do not
know of an. occasion when he has ever in the course of his political
career stood or chose to take a strong stand against a major policy
of the President.
Senator ScorT. You would say that the Director of the CTA, dur-
ing? the time that he serves as the Director of the CIA, should not in
any way be involved in partisan politics? Would that be a fair state-
rnent?
Senator Cniurcn. Yes, of course.
Senator SCOTT. Now, I serve on the Committee on the Judiciary.
We have been considering the ('resident's nominee for the Snprenue
Court- of the United States. Would you see any parallel betty c e-n par-
tisanship on the Supreme Court of the United States and pa:rtisrri-
slrip on the. CIA.?
WTO111cl You say that a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States should be entirely free of politics while he is serving as a
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States?
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Senator
(::rurcrr. Ye
Senator SCOW. Well, now, having said that. you will recall, and I
nor not sure of the date, it. may he 1920, we had a sitting Justice of
the Suprerue (1ourt of the Inited tates, Charles Evans 17 n;;hes, who
was nominated by the Democratic Party to be their candidate for
President of the United States.
Senator C1n;rcJr. I believe it was the Republican Party.
Senator SCOTT. Well, you are quite right, and Mr. Wilson was the
Democratic candidate, so T misstated myself. But we did lime an
.A e ociate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, later
Chief Justice, that. was the nominee of his party to be President of the
Tinited States.
Now, I would think that Chief Justice IIuglres ivas one of our great
('liief Justices and yet, he interrupted his career by being a candidate
for the highest office in our country.
Senator Crrrrcir. il)a,t may have been one of the reasons. Senator,
lie was defeated.
Senator Scorr. Now, if we had a man of integrity, a man competent
to be Director of the CIA, could not- the same thing happen in his
case ? Is this a real disqualification and I do see a parallel here between
these two situations.
Senator Crn-rcir. The idea. with the parallel, as T see it, Senator
Scott, is that the. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court operates as the
presiding officer over a third and independent branch of the Govern-
ment. The Supreme Court has very real powers of its own and he sits
in judgment and helps participate in the writing of decisions over
which the President has no say.
But the Director of the CIA is an agent of the President and he is in
unite a different position in relationship to the. President than any
.Justice of the Supreme Court and the quality you must find in a
Director is one that can assure members of this committee and the
Senate and the country as a whole that lie can, if necessary stand up
to the President when the interest, of the country require it.
Senator Scoria. Mr. Chairman, I agree with the witness completely
on that.
Now, I think that is the question before this committee.
Senator. Griner r. Yes.
Senator Scorr, Can Mr. Rush, with his background, stand up, if
need be, to the President, of the United States, But is it not, a fact
that we should look at the overall man and see if lre meet-s that qualifi-
cation not merely the fact, that lie served as the chairman of the
Republican National Committee?
Senator Cnmwir. Yes. With that I totally agree and I would only
say you should look not only to his past record but to his immediate
future prospects.
Senator Sco,rT. Thank you.
The Cr i.vnv rnN. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Culver?
Senator C[?rXFF. No questions.
The Cir.xirin_~N. Senator Hart?
Senator l-[ i r. Senator Church, I would like to read the list of
former CLA Directors.
Adm. Poscoe Hillencotter, came in. I think. shortly after the 1047
act was passed. Gen. Walter Smith; Allen Dulles, John McCone,
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Adm. William Raborn, retired; Richard Helms; James Schlesinger;
Gen. Vernon Walters, Acting Director; and William Colby.
Those are all the Directors of the Agency since the 1947 act was
passed.
To your knowledge, had any of those individuals held political
office ?
Senator CnuRCIr. To my knowledge, none. They were either pro-
fessional military men-they cane from within the Agency and were
professionals. Or they had held other appointive offices.
Senator HART. Is your objection to Ambassador Bush based on
his qualifications, his integrity, or his performance in public life?
Senator Criurcarr. No; I.think I have made it clear that I have high
regard for him personally, and I think he served in political offices with
distinction. I have, however, observed that in the course of his career
I have known no time when he has ever chosen to take serious issue on
a major matter with the President of his party in any of his
positions.
Senator HART. To what degree is your concern based upon Mr.
Bush's own political background in the context of this present. admin-
istration or upon the, precedent which is established of appointing for
the first time in the history of the Agency someone with a background
in elective office.
Senator Crrrrncrr. Senator, it is both. If one were to choose a time for
departingfroth the custom, the pattern that has been so (,,]early estab-
iished with other directors, to choose a man who comes not only from
a political background, but one of a, highly partisan. character, cer-
tainly no one can gainsay that fact that the national chairman of the
Republican Party is about as partisan a, political position as anyone
can hold in the country.
For that reason. I think Mr. O'Brien, if it Democrat were President,
Mr. Larry O'Brien ought not to be nominated to be Director of the
CIA. Of all times to do it, this is the worst, right at a time when it is
obvious that public confidence needs to be restored in the professional,
impartial and nonpolitical character of the agency.
So, we have the worst of all possible worlds. That is what this com-
mittee is faced with. It has nothing to do with the personal traits of
the nominee.
Senator HART. Would your view of Mr. Bush's appointment if he
were to agree, and I have no reason to believe that he would, to serve
a fixed term?
Senator CHURCH. Yes, if that fixed term was long enough to do his
job in the CIA and extend it past the next election. There is another
consideration here that this committee has to take into view. Do you
really want a caretaker for this Agency that will serve only a few
months?
I think he needs to make this clear, and lie has not, I must say.
IIe. has left the door open in his statement and has based it upon his
political birthright. Well, his political birthright does not include
being Director of the CIA. It includes his rigglit to run for public
office, to be sure, but that is quite a different matter tliae confirming
lrimn now for this particular position.
Senator HAwr. Do you believe that thin committee or the Senate of
the United States has any real standard, based on past practice or tradi-
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tion, by which to judge what a good CIA Director should be, and if
so, what are those standards?
Senator 'CITUURCIT. Well.. if the Senate by now has not adopted those
standards, it should. I think that, in the past the fact that Presidents
have chosen men that either have come from within the Agency or pro-
fessional men or men from the business-world of proven abilities, has
not ever put this kind of.question to the Senate so directly as it is now
placed before the Senate in connection with this particular nomination.
So, we will set the standards and :the question is whether we set a
high one or whether we set a low one, because in the future, the
Agency must, live with that standard.
Senator HART. But I take it, it is your judgment that those stand-
ards should include complete nonpartisanship.
Senator Crrurrcri. Yes.
Senator HART. And would you adopt the same position were the
parties reversed?
Senator Cxuizcir. Yes.
Senator HART. Do you think this committee has either the right or
the responsibility to inquire into a future Director's views on certain
matters of intelligence policy?
Senator GimmcH. Yes.
Senator HART. His attitude toward covert operations?
Senator Cirrn;crt. Of course.
Senator HART. 'Toward informing the Congress---either its present
committee structure or any future oversight committee-of activities
going on in the intelligence community?
Senator Ch uRch . Certainly so.
Senator HART. Those are all the questions I have.
The CrrAII:mIAN. Thank you, Senator, very much.
Senator Church, I want to thank you on behalf of the committee
for coming today. I think your presentation has been worthwhile and
intelligently presented.
I said in my opening statement yesterday, written on the back of
an. envelope the night before, that I~hoped these hearings would point
out to the President-any President-and make him more conscious
of the awesome power and responsibility that the statute gives him,
and, to some degree, if we are going to have an agency of this type,
would point out and would underscore the responsibility, not only to
personally supervise the exercise of this power in the hands of the
head of the CIA, and some of his subordinates, to make them obvious
of their responsibilities.
So your statement on the independence, being independent of the
President, certainly emphasized his relation and his responsibility.
But, just to get that on its four sides now, as far as being totally
independent of the President, the President selects the head of the
CIA and our law-as a matter of fact, the money is appropriated to
the President as you know, and the President, by and large, sets the
mission that the head of the CIA is going to perform, the mission
or the policy or whatever you might call it.
The President sets the original steps and is held responsible in a
large way, for the outcome. So, I think when we talk about being
independent of the President, it is not altogether independent. What
you were getting down to was independence at the ultimate level there
when something wrong was proposed. Is that right?
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SenatorC7itiralr. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Of course, the Director of the
Agency is subordinate to the President and must take the President's
orders and must implement those orders; but the reason for having
the Director-and the Agency is only as self-assertive as the Director.
That is, I think, a maximum-we can all agree upon. The reason for
having an agency like the CIA is so that the President can turn to a
disinterested source.
Now, you may have many pressures on the President to do something
that looks politically favorable. And yet, the Agency may have facts
that are displeasing to the President, but facts which persuade the
Director that to take this course would be disastrous.
Now, you have got to have a Director, under those circumstances,
who is not thinking about the next election or a position on the ticket,
but who is going to stand up and say, even at the risk of courting
your displeasure, Mr. President, it is my responsibility to tell you
that this course you want to take, no matter what anybody else says,
is wrong. It is going to fail. And these are the reasons. I must empha-
size them as forcefully as I can.
The CITATRMAN. That is the point I was trying to emphasize too,
Senator. When you get down to that level, it depends, does it not, on
the man's character and integrity, after all. I mean the Director of
the CIA. That is what is going to determine his going one way or the
other, is it not, the basic character, integrity, and dedication?
Senator CirnEo I. Mr. Chairman, you have lived longer than I have
and you know there are certain tests that are hard for any man to
meet. I would plead with you not to. place the Director of the CIA
in a position where he is politically compromised. Don't do that and
expect that of any man because even subconsciously his judgment
could easily be affected. It is'not a question just of integrity. I do
not think Mr. Bush would ever intentionally do anything that in his
judgment would be a serious disservice to his country. But these are
circumstances that are wrong and unless they are clarified, I think
no man could perform in that office in a proper way.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, there might be a degree of integrity or quality
of integrity like that old saying we used to have about 14 carat gold
or whatever it is. Anyway, it comes down to those basic qualities that
are in a man that cause him to put up It flag when he thinks there is
wrongdoing. I think that is what we have to guard against.
Talking about laying down, standards, if I could write it out, it
would be "beware." Beware of the President or anyone, who comes
to you with ideas and courses that you think are basically wrong.
Do you have anything further you want to say?
Senator CHURCH. Nothing further.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Senator GOIDWATER. Might I make just one comment before you
leave?
The CHAIRMAN. A]l right, Senator.
Senator GoLDwATER. The comment about a man having the strength
to speak up to a President. I can tell you from personal knowledge
that Mr. Bush did not want the job as chairman of the Republican
National Committee and it took a lot of persuading to get him to
take it.
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I can say further that he `vent through probably the toughest
time that any man in any office close to the President will ever go
through, almost hourly contact about whether or not the President
should go. I think he was the first man to my knowledge to let the
President know he should go. I do not know of a tougher decision.
Senator CHURCH. Thank you.
The CHAURMAx. All right, Senator. Thank you very much.
Senator THURMOND. I have one more question.
The Cr LAIRMAN. Senator Thurmond.
Senator THURMOND. Isn't it true that the difficulties of the CIA over
the years have occurred while CIA was under the leadership of so-
called professional intelligence persons and not those with so-called
political background?
Senator CnuRcu. Senator, I have not made any argument for limit-
ing the selection of the Director to professional men. It is true that the
CIA did get into great difficulty when professional men were Direct ors
and I have not argued that no one from political life should be
considered.
I have tried to lay out as clearly and as lucidly as I can the standard
that I think should try to obtain.
The Cl I AIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.
_Mr. Bush, if you will come around here please. In keeping with my
announcement, of yesterday, members of the committee, we will pro-
ceed with those who did not have a chance to ask questions yesterday.
But first, as you know, the Senate Democratic caucus has adopted a
policy with respect to every nomination which requires that every
nominee be asked : "Do we have your commitment to respond to re-
quests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of
the Senate ? Will you respond for the record.
Mr. Busrr. Yes, Mr. Chairman. You have my commitment to comply
with any such requests.
STATEMENT OF MR. GEORGE BUSH-Resumed
The C.i1AIRtirAx. Senator Culver, I believe you are the first one ac-
cording to the list.
Senator CULVER. Ambassador Bush, I do not intend to submit you
to extended interrogation. I have. been acquainted with you over a
period of several years, have enjoyed your friendship, and know of
your keen devotion to public and political service. As a fellow politi-
cian. I admire your stamina and versatility. I am also in agreement
with you on many of the points of policy which were raised in the
committee meeting yesterday.
I think, therefore, it is only fair that I announce to you now in this
open forum of my intention to vote against your confirmation for this
office. There are few public positions, including the Vice-Presidency,
for which I would not consider you an altogether suitable choice. But.
I do not feel that you are the proper nominee for the directorship of
the Central Intelligence Agency at this juncture in its history and at
this moment in our national life.
I hold no dogmas about what sort of person should hold this office.
Indeed there may be real advantages in having a Director who has not
been an intelligence professional. But 1 do know that the intelligence
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community now requires leadership of transcendent qualities of dis-
interestedness and the power to evoke public confidence.
It is not just a matter of finding a person who enjoys this President's
confidence and the amiable assent of the Contress. The next Director
must be a. builder, not a curator. He cannot project even the appear-
ance. of partisan bias. He must command the allegiance of those who
work in intelligence and the complete confidence of a nation that de-
pends on this clear devotion to high standards of performance and
tide.lity to constitutional principles.
I believe, that we have no right to deprive you of your constitutional
birthright to be a candidate for Vice President or any other office. For
me that is an issue that obscures rather than clarifies our obligations.
But I do think it, is fair to suggest that the nominee for the CIA now
or in the future ought to be a man or woman whom the next adniinis-
tration would consider as its Director.
The Chairman said yesterday that it, would probably take a year
for any new CIA Director to learn his job well. That just strengthens
my view that any nominee for this post should be someone who would
l,e considered, qualified, independent, and nonpartisan enough to be
continued in that position by a new administration of either party.
We have learned in the case of both the FBI and the CIA that Direc-
tors should not become so entrenched that they become, stronger than
passing administrations. But we have learned too that constant turn-
over or easy susceptibility to political changes is also destruictive of the
ofl e
We are less than .a. year away from an election. Your nomination,
through no fault of yours, inevitably takes on political overtones.
'I'lhere i s a very strong chance that a year hence we will have yet another
nomination. to this office, and your incumbency will have been purely
transitional.
Yet. we are in need now of a Director who can restore intelligence to
its rightful and proper place in Our national security system. Unfor-
tunately, the way this nomination was made and the, public and parti-
san offices you have held will not make that task easier.
Therefore. Mr. Bush, it is with much regret and without the, slightest
shadow on either your character or your qualifications for any other
positions, I shall vote against your confirmation.
'Pliank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Cm\unrAN. All right, Senator.
Senator Scott, that brings us to you.
Senator Sro'rr. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bush, I am sorry, I was not able to be here yesterday to welcome
ti ou before our committee. I do so now. I think that Senator Church
has raised some serious questions and I believe we ought to talk about
those and get your responses.
Now, can you provide factual nonpartisan information to the Presi-
dent, in view of your total, overall background. Is there anything in
the past or are there any aspirations in the future that would cause
you not to provide entirely factual, entirely nonpartisan information
to the President in the event that you are confirmed to be Director of
CTA ?
Mr. Bush. No. sir. I can provide that information and I am confi-
dent that I will have the access to see that the product of the intelli-
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gence community is directly provided to the President of the United
States.
Senator SCOTT. Well, now, we know that we have had a committee-
Senator Tower on this committee sits on the committee that has been
investigating the CIA. Senator. Church chairs that committee. And
it has been holding investigations and the prestige of the Agency has
suffered in recent years and its activities have been gone into rather
thoroughly.
Now, I would believe that we need someone to head the CIA that
can help reestablish its credibility, and its prestige. How would you fit
into that picture?, Could you do this type of thin-, or would you bring
discredit because of your former association as the chairman of the
Republican National Committee?
I believe Senator Church has pretty well put that question before
the committee and I would just like for you to respond to it and tell
us in your own words what, your feeling is with regard to the prestige,
the integrity, the impartiality of the CIA and the reliability of it.
Mr. Brsri. Well, I do share Senator Church's view that the Agency
must be devoid of partisan politics and I tried to make clear to the
committee yesterday-obviously not to his satisfaction-that I was ca-
pable of doing that. Senator Church has elected to use the analogy
of the political figure from his own party, Larry O'Brien. I think
there is some difference in terms of qualifications. Larry O'Brien did
not serve in the Congress of the United States for 4 years. Larry
O'Brien did not serve, with no partisanship, at the United Nations for
2 years. Larry O'Brien did not serve as the Chief of the U.S. Liaison
Office in the People's Republic of China. Senator Church mentioned
that maybe you need somebody from business. I ran a successful busi-
ness, started it, ran it, managed it. and I think did reasonably well in
it, but at some point I would wonder when does one, because he served
his party in difficult times have enough of a record so that people can
judge the overall record. And I would not, if I were making deter-
minations, disqualify Senator Jackson because he was the chairman of
the Democratic National Committee, because he served his party as
the chairman of the Democratic National Committee.
And I would only urge you, Senator Scott, to consider the overall
record and then hopefully figure that maybe my character and integ-
rity, which I hope I have demonstrated, will add up.
I understand the concern with "perception." I understand it. But, as
I said yesterday and I repeat, I hope that the committee will judge me
not on the perception of others and not on the editorials that were
selectively read here today, but on an overall record that I am proud
of, and that I don't care what action this committee takes, I will never
apologize, and that is not what Senator Culver is asking me to do for
serving in a partisan position.
Senator Church said that there was-my record was devoid of dem-
onstrable independence. I wrote a letter to the President of the United
States asking that lie resign, the chairman of his own party.
Now, I submit for the record that that is demonstrable independence.
I did not do it by calling the newspapers and saying, "Look, I am
having a press conference. Here is a sensational statement to make me,
to separate me from a President in great agony."
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But I did it and I think there are examples th..t people who served
with me on the Republican National Committee could provide that
would show where I resisted pressure from the White House.
I will readily concede that it was not done a la klee , lights and
press conference, but I think that even in that highly partisan job, I
demonstrated, I hope I did anyway, a certain integrity that I felt my
part in those difficult tines was entitled to.
So, I understand the concern, Senator Scott, and I can only tell you
I will do my level best.
Senator Scorr. You will do your level best to serve in a completely
impartial manner?
Mr. Busty. Yes.
Senator SCOTT. And help to reestablish the credibility of the CIA.
Mr. Bush, there has been some question as to the secrecy within the
CIA and the fact that even Members of Congress are not knowledge-
able about its activities. Could you comment with regard not to pub-
licizing all of its activities before the entire world but do you have any
concept as to how you might let the Congress be informed as to the
activities of the CIA without unduly handicapping it in its work, work
that it is charged with perforrnu-g i
Mr. Busts. No firm recommendations other than general support for
the recommendation of the Rockefeller Commission of a bunt c.om-
mittee, but recognizing that this is the sole prerogative, of the Con-
gress itself. But I would say that, I believe my relationship, my train-
ing and my background would be helpful in keeping the Congress
informed, which certainly would be my intention.
Senator Scorr. You would intend to keep the Congress and particu-
larly this oversight committee informed.
Mr. Br,Tsir.. Yes, sir.
The Hughes amendment specifies as I understand it this, relating to
certain kinds of activities, and I would faithfully follow the law in
that regard.
Senator SCOTT. Well, now, could you tell us what you see are the.
advantages and disadvantages of having a, career intelligence individ-
ual as Director of the CIA as contrasted with one who has not worked
in this specific field, and I am assuming, and you correct me, if I aut
wrong, that you do not have an intelligence background. You have
many other attributes.
Mr. Buser. That is right. My connection with intelligence has beejt
in two foreign affairs posts in which I dealt with the product of in-
telligence. I know something about it. I know many of the individuals
that involve the agency and -I should say here I have great respect for
people that devote their entire lives to service of the CIA and I might
take this opportunity to say I have great respect for Bill. Colby. He has
treated me in an extraordinarily difficult situation with innate civility
and decency and I want to get that on the record.
But I have no feeling that it should be spelled out, that you need a
career man or that you need an outside person at any given time. I
have great respect for them and I would say that both can serve and
both can serve admirably.
Senator SCOTT. Well, now, we had before us some time ago Mr.
Kelley to be Director of the FBI, Mr. Kelley who is a former F131
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agent, former chief of police, a man who spent his lifetime in this field,
and I am not in any way asking you to comment on his capabilities. I
think that, would be improper. But you have an entirely different, batek-
grcnurd. Do you feel that you can perform the duties of that office as
effectively as someone who does have a lifetime of service in the in-
telli:,,ence field?
All'. BU-sr-H. Clearly, sir., I have a great deal more to learn in terms
of the methodology and the day-to-day workings of intelligence, but
I believe I could. You see, I have a perception that without discredit-
ing any of the individuals who ran the CIA. that there has been dem-
om.trated from time to time or in at least some of the things that went
wrong a lack of political sensitivity.
Now, I am .not saying that. the only person that can cure those defi-
cienties if they existed is somebody who has been in politics. I feel couti-
dent because of what I feel are sensitiveness to the public derived from
partisan politics that I could do that job.
Senator Score. Let me ask you one final question, if I may.
There has been mention of the. possibility of your Vice Presidential
aspirations. Frankly I am not sure Governor Reagan would choose you
as ;( running mate ( laughter but let me ask you, in the event of your
confirmation, even if you have further political aspirations, can you
operate in the position as Director of the CIA as if you were not inter-
ested in this further office?
In the work you do from day to day would you have part of your
tini~' spent on running for Vice President and part of it being in
char~_e of the office, or could you devote your full time and attention
to being Director of the CIA?
:1f r. Pt' -,sit. I would scrupulously avoid partisan politics in that case.
Senator. ScoTT. Is it your answer that you could devote full time and
attention to being director of the CIA?
Ir. Bc~sri. Yes, sir. I have done it in two nonpartisan jobs and I will
do it again if confirmed by the Senate.
Senator ScoTT. Thank you. sir.
The CFIAIRMAN. Gentlemen of the committee. for your information
may I outline the program that will come before us this afternoon.
We all know we are in what we hope is the last week of this session.
At 3 p.m., I have set the hearing on the nomination of -\Ir. Robert
Ellsworth, nominated to be the Deputy Secretary of Defense. There is
a law that permits a second Deputy. Mr. Clements, the present. Deputy
Secretary of Defense will be designated as principal Deputy Secretary
of I )efeiise. We have the nomination before its, too, of the Secretary of
the. Air Force, Mr. Thomas C. Reed, which has been here the required
len:zth. of time.
The same is true as to 11Tr. William I. Greener to be Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Public. Affairs, and Mr. Matthew J. Perry,
to be a judge of the court of military appeals. Of course, we have this
matter of Mr. Rush's nomination to conclude, and we. may have some
other NX itnesses.
Now. returning to_ the examination of _Ir. Bush, that brings its back
to Senator Leahy. Did you finish yesterday with the points you had?
T think f called on you the second time. You indicated you had addi-
tional quest ions.
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Senator LEAiY. We were on the question of the Inspector General
and most of those questions Mr. Bush answered.
As I understand it, you are, very much in favor of upgrading the
position of inspector general. Would you basically be in favor of fol-
lowing the recommendations of the Rockefeller report on that?,
Mr. Busii. I believe I would have to review what they were but I.
believe I would, which gave him the right to go to the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).
Senator LEaaiY.And the other thing-I must admit I was out part
of this morning and you may have covered this-but you spoke of
writing a letter to President Nixon asking him to resign. When did
you write that letter?
Mr. Busl_r. Just at the very end. Just after the final revelations of the
Iast tape.
Senator LEATIY. And that was at a time when that was pretty
much the general feeling within the Republican Party; was it not?
Mr. Bt,srr. It might have been the general feeling of the Republican
Party. I am not sure it was the general feeling of the President at
that time. I have no way of knowing.
Senator LEijrr. I ain sure the President did not. give an indication
lie was very eager to give up his service, I grant you that.,
So it was right at the very end.
Mr. Busir. Yes. I do not have the exact date, but it was right-jest
before lie resigned.
The (H 1r Fr 1N. All right, gentlemen of the committee, does anyone
want to ask any more questions?
Senator GOLDWATER. I have a question.
The GrrAar.z:~x. All right, Senator Goldwater. Senator Symington
will be next.
Senator GOLDWATER. The condition that the CIA finds itself in
today is not the fault of its Directors. It has been the use, the misuse,
and the abuse of Presidents and all the committee meetings I have
attended as a. member of the intelligence- committee, I cannot come
up with anything that could condemn the CIA unless you. might say it
was following the orders of the Commander-in-Chief and that is a
tough one to crack.
The CrrAIRMAN. All right. Thank you, Senator Goldwater.
Senator Symington.
Senator SY vsi~r,TO ~T. Mr. Ambassador, I have a question as a result
of the. statement of Senator Church, for whom I have, respect as I
have for you.
In my private business career I was known as a sick businessman.
One would sort of tear a place up, then watch it operate clean for a
time ; and after that there is a second period of time watching it oper-
ate, raw; then a third in which one hopes the business would really roll.
This I did I think some six times.
If you were a Vice-Presidential candidate in the next election, in a
few months, you would have to leave an. organization of many thou-
sends of people, an organization which we all know currently has low
morale. You would really have but a few months to get into it before
you became a Vice-Presidential candidate if chosen by the President.
I am not accusing anybody of setting you up, but it seems to me
anybody who has had experience with large organizations, whether
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private business or Government, would know that reorganization takes
extensive time. You would have to study the people, heads of the
departments, and so forth, and it would take months before you could
come to firm judgment.
That has been my experience. If you took this job, then shortly were
tapped for Vice President, by that time there is no possible way, as I
see it, that you could really get to the core of the problem of restoring
morale and proper position to the Central Intelligence Agency.
Would you comment on that?,
\1 r. BIsir. I think I could agree, Senator Symington, that one
could not do the entire job in 6 months. 9 months, whatever the period
is, but as I indicated yesterday, I think-or awhile bark-Ithink one
would have to be hallucinating if he thought this was a steppingstone
to becoming the Vice President. I was not motivated that way in
accepting this job-certainly, sir, if I can put it in these terms, can a
person complete the job in terms of the restoration of morale, in terms
of reestablishing whatever needs to be done in terms of confidence with
the services around the world, and such? I do not believe it could be
finished in that period of time but I would have to also concede that
n]y chances of being Vice President, if there are any left at all, if I am
confirmed for this job would be insi-Dificant and that I certainly
Senator SYMIINGTON. That being true
1Tr. Brsn [continumgl. Certainty they would be diminished further
when I keep my word and stay out of politics and do not campaign
and do not give political speeches and disappear from the political
scene.
Senator SYMrrINOTroN. I have known well or fairly well every Director
of the CIA since its beginning, before that General Donovan, head of
the OSS. Surely you could not complete your work by the time the
Vice Presidency came up. It is going to be 'a difficult job on any basis.
I do not see. why, therefore, and this has nothing to do with your
character, your future, your integrity-why you do not say if you got
this job you would stay on at least 2 years. I have been around this
a renew in one way or another fora long time; and believe it would
take at least 2 years to get its proper position reestablished in the
Government.
_llr. Bu sir. That is certainly rny intention to do that and the only
thin!: I cannot give you an honest answer to is if this is the way
that would evolve-trot Senator Church's opinion, because I gather
he would vote against, me anyway. and I do not think that is what
troubled Senator Oliver.
In the final analysis, without having- done anythitir I was offered
the nomination kind of, on a silver platter. I cannot tell you that I
Would not accept it and I frankly do not. think in an office where you
serve at the pleasure of the President that that should be a criterion
for any office, and I just-that is just my concept of service and I hope
I am motivated in my public life by service.
SEnatrn SYNr7NOTON. T respect your thinking and hope you will
give son e thought to mine.
The CTI ATIuE v-,.A I l right, gentlemen.
Senator )=Tart.
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Senator HART. I would like to note for the record that you Were
not asked by Senator Scott whether you would want some place on his
Reagan ticket. That is a separate issue.
You stated yesterday among other things that you oppose making
public any part of the CIA budget. Is that correct?
Mr. Bush. Yes, sir.
Senator HART. How do you square that with the first article, section
9 of the Constitution which says that no money shall be drawn from
the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law,
that a regular statement of account of the receipts and expenditures
of all public money shall be published from time to time?
Mr. Busii. I have not reviewed the legal provisions of it but I liave
noted very carefully the positions of previous Directors who have ap-
peared before this committee as having done a responsible job. I know
they take very seriously their obligations under the National. Security
Act to protect their sources and protect the security of the Agency,
and without having gotten a legal brief on it I would simply defer to
the collective wisdom of those who I believe most people feel. have
done a remarkably good job over the years-they feel that if you
begin snaking public parts of the budget of this Central Intelligence
Agency that that will lead-except to the appropriate authorities now
existing, where disclosure is done-that will lead to great complica-
tions for our intelligence gathering and or intelligence capability and
in keeping secret properly the things that should be kept secret.
Senator HART. But your conviction would wane if Congress ordered
otherwise,?,
Mr. Busu. As I hope I indicated yesterday, Senator Hart, I would
abide by the law.
Senator HART. On the select committee we came across something
called floating authority. If a Director felt that he had received
authority from the President to carry out certain operations, and the
Director left office--the next Director came in and was briefed on
ongoing operations and assumed. that the authority that the previous
Director had received from the President or even a previous Presi-
dent floated to him.
Do you have any reaction to this as far as walking into ongoing
operations? Would you, for example, insist that President Ford grant
you authority to carry out certain operations that are going on?
Mr. Busx. Given the nature of the controversy and my very limited
knowledge of it, I would want to immediately know-'I assume you
are talking about covert operations and maybe other operations as
Well, and see that they were properly reviewed and properly author-
ized. If I had enormous problems with them, I certainly would feel
no hesitancy in taking that up in National Security Council. or to the
President depending upon what the magnitude of the problem was. I
think the point you raise is a very important one and I would want to
be sure that day I walked in that I not only knew what was happen-
ing in these rather sensitive areas but that if the program raised real
doubts in my mind or reasonable doubts in my mind that I would then
do what was necessary to resolve these doubts which is the kind of
consultation you are talking about.
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Senator HART. You came out foursquare again4 the assassination
of foreign leaders, but on the other hand yon left open the possibility
of conducting covert operations to. overthrow foreign governments.
Even though you agreed we should tread lightly on constitutionally
and democratically elected governments, you did leave open a sub-
stantial loophole for overthrowing governments.
Now, what we found out with regard to foreign assassinations
was that of the five or six that we were involved in, only two involved
direct attempts to assassinate a foreign leader. The other three or four
involved attempts on foreign leaders that flowed from or resulted from
our participation or encouragement of coup operations in those coun-
tries or dissident operations.
Now, how (lo you reconcile that?
Mr. Bunn. Well. I would have to study those cases very carefully
but I can see a system where democracy has been democratically ill-
stalled-suppose you had, another Hitler come in who had been demo-
cratically installed and a group within his country tried to do some-
thing. And all your European allies were extremely concerned, and
all of them urged the United Staten to give covert support rather than
some kind of declaration of war. I would not want to rule out that
kind of operation and I do not think we should tic the hands of this
country in the face of that kind of a threat.
Senator HART. That is the easy one.
Mr. Busrr. It is all impressive one, though, Senator, and from it can
stern many, many others in my opinion.
Senator HART. General Schneider in Chile?
Mr. Busu. I ha-,,c not studied the Schneider cash enough to know.
but as I understand the Schneider case in finality the United States
did not do that: is th' t correct ? I think so.
Senator HART. Well, the problem I am posing there is that we are
involved in some covert operations in governments-and they are
not Hitler kinds of situations at all. We have encouraged or supported
coup d'etat. attempts that have, resulted in assassinations of foreign
leaders and in this case the equivalent to Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs.
The point I making, is you cannot conic out against assassinations
and leave open the possibility of covert operations that may lead to
assassinations. That is too easy.
Mr. Bu-sir. It happens to be the way the world appears. The world
appears tome to be that. way.
Senator HART. And that is the kind of world you want to perpetuate?
Mr. Busir. No. but I have great concern from having lived in a
rather disciplined totalitarian society for a while. I have a concern
about the world as we really see it and I do not believe that some
antagonists-and I am not talking about the people of the Republic
of China-play by the Marquis of Queensbury rules when. you get
into this business. I think we have a certain commitment to morality
but I do, not. think we should close the door forever on covert activity
which is where this discussion appears to me to logically lead.
Senator HART. There are all kinds of covert activity. I am specifying
attempts to overthrow governments of other countries.
Mr. Busu. And I said I would not suggest that we rule that out
forever. I suggest we tread very, very carefully. And I have given
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73
you an example that I do not know your committee would agree with
but I have thrown the example of a Hitler and you say that is very
simple, but unfortunately I think it makes the point that we should
not rule out that kind of thing.
Senator HART. In the 6 or 7 days you have been back, have you been
briefed by Director Colby?
Mr. Busri. I have had one 20-minute talk with Director Colby, but
have not been briefed by him.
Senator HART. Have you read the Rockefeller Commission report?
Mr. Busi3. Yes, I have.
Senator HART. Have you read our assassination report?
Mr. Busii. Not entirely but almost entirely.
Senator HART. I think what is disturbing, and it is not your fault
at all, but something is wrong with the system, that you won Id come
back and you opened yesterday by saying you were fatigued and suf-
fering from time distances and answered a large number of questions
by saying you did not know, you did not know what the practice had
been, you did not know what the policy had been.
I think before the Congress of the United States, the Senate of the
United States, confirms people for jobs like this we ought to provide
for an interim period where you. learn what the job is, what the
agency is doing, and then you can respond to fairly profound policy
-questions that we have to answer in our minds before we. Vote for you.
I have not been here long enough to know how long this has been
going on, but I think it is terribly unfair not only to us but, to the
people of this country to be asked to confirm somebody for a situation,
probably one of the imi.ost sensitive positions in our Government, who
has had 6 days back in this country, has missed most of the, debate, and
cannot answer most of these policy questions on the ground that you
just are not familiar enough with the policy position.
I do not take that out on you again, but I think it is a, terrible
position.
Mr. Busrn. Well, I would only say that, the very nature of this CIA
perhaps makes this particular agency more prone to have that problem
than in others because of the secret nature of a lot of the information
to which your committee has had access but to which I have not.
Senator HArr. I am. not talking about secret information. I am
talking about policy questions--the role of the NSC, the role of the
40 Committee, your attitude toward budgets, and a lot of other things
that are not secret and that we ought to talk about there and should
talk about before we talk of confirmation. I think that is what greatly
disturbs me.
The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I am sorry, but your time is up.
Senator Jackson has not had a chance to ask any questions yet.
Senator JACKSON. I have been delayed. I want to say at the outset
that I have the highest personal regard for Ambassador Bush. Those
of us who had the privilege of serving with his father on this com-
mittee certainly admire and respect the integrity of the Bush family;
and I respect yours, Mr. Ambassador.
I have a couple of comments that I want to make, Mr. Chairman,
and
The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator.
Senator JAczisoN [continuing]. And get a response here.
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It seems to me, Mr. Ambassador, that President Ford has put you
in an awkward and very unfair position. I think the President should
make clear that he will not ask you to be on the 1976 ticket if he gets
the nomination. I believe, very candidly, that this committee would
be defaulting on its duty if at this stage, given all the problems with
the CIA, we put in. a Director who may serve for less than a year.
Can you assure the committee that you will serve as CIA Director
at least until January 19, 1977-that is, at least. 1 year? Now, I ask
this question because the chairman and I and others have repeatedly
asked of nominees will they serve out their term or serve a, reasonable
length of time in terms of the needs of the job. I think the chairman
has taken a very strong position on this. And I would like to have your
comments.
Mr. Buse. I serve at. the pleasure of the President and there is no
terns, as I understand it, Senator, for this job and I have every inten-
tion of serving more than a year in this job.
Senator JecKsox. That is your intention but, you see, there is a
cloud over this. Do you think it would be good for the CIA that we
confirm a Director who might be out, say, this summer-who would be
in for just 6 months?
Mr. Busx. You mean if you knew for sure-is the question based on
the predicate that you knew for a fact certain that the Director would
only be in there 6 months?
Senator JACKSON. We do not know what you will be doing under
the circumstances, as I understand your statement yesterday, that if
called upon to be on the ticket you would accept and
Mr. Busx. That is not exactly the way I phrased it. I said I could
not say I would not accept but it is a semantical difference and I fur-
ther said, Senator Jackson, that I did not think any American should
be asked to, for that high service, to say in advance that he would not
do that, would not accept an office of that dimension that he had not
campaigned for, where he laid politics aside at the very outset. I just
feel that is a very strong principle but I can understand your question
and I
Senator JAcicswN. Well, my concern here is totally impersonal. I am
looking at the long tradition of the CIA in the area of national secu-
rity. I asked this of Mr. Pumsfeld, but the CIA is even more sensitive
in this particular area. I partly sympathize with you and your predica-
inent here. But, you know, what if we were going through this same
line of questions, same set of facts, for the Director of the FBI? And
the CIA is really in many ways more sensitive than the FBI.
Mr. BUSH. But my point, sir, yesterday was that no person for con-
firmation to any office that I know of-maybe we can research one
out-has ever been asked to foreswear that kind of political service in
the history of this country.
Senator JACKSON. Do you think it would look good for faith and
confidence in the CIA if, come this summer, you should leave the CIA
and be a candidate? Would that be constructive for the career service,
and for the host of sensitive issues that we have seen aired in connec-
tion with the CIA?
Mr. Busx. I think, sir, it would depend on the type of job in that
very short period of time I have been able to do. If I indeed had kept
my word, if I had indeed had some part in restoring morale, if I indeed
had cooperated fully with the U.S. Congress, if I indeed had objee-
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tively, in what might be a different situation or two, presented the
product of the intelligence community to the President of the United
States without knuckling under on whatever the issue might be to
State Department or Defense Department. I think then I should be
judged on the product of my work. I think that is the way I would be.
judged.
When I went to the U.N., which is not exactly the same analogy.
there was understandable concern expressed editorially and when I.
left I think they felt that I coped with that job. I know they felt I did'
it in an impartial fashion and I cannot say I finished it in sotuething
around 2 years; but I think I did it reasonably well and I would think
this would be the criteria that I would ask to be judged. by, perform-
ance, admittedly in a very short time frame.
Senator JACKSON. But this is the first time we have nominated some
one with a long political background to head CIA.
Mr. Busii. But, Senator Jackson, my argument on that one, and
we had some of it yesterday, I had 3 years in foreign affairs, I had 4
years in Congress, and I had 2 years as chairman of the party and I.
think that is a fairly good-and so many years in business, running;
business establishments-so I think that is a fairly good balance in
terms of qualifications.
Senator JACKSON. My basic concern here is the awkward and unfair
position you are being put in by the President.
Let me ask you, have you had any understanding with President;
Ford that you will not be asked to be on the 1976 ticket if he gets the
nomination?
Mr. Busx. No, sir. All I know about that is that he said-he did not
say I was being considered as was represented here this morning. I
think he said Mr. Ilumsfeld and I should not be eliminated from con-
sideration, is the way I recall it.
Senator JACKSON. To be very candid about it, it seems to me the Pres-
ident has put you in a very awkward position. The need here is really,
to save the CIA. I do not need to recite what the Agency has gone
through. It has been a very rough period. And it seems to me. that the
judgment of the President in this matter is at best imposing a terrible
burden on the CIA and on you. It raises a real problem here of nomi-
nating someone, who is a potential candidate, for service of less than
a year.
This is what really troubles me because I have the highest. regard
and personal respect for your ability and above all, your integrity,
Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the President should assure this
committee that lie will not ask Ambassador Bush to be on the ticket.
Let inc now ask you some specific questions. Suppose a SALT-type
agreement signed by President Ford is failing through noncompliance
by the Soviets on the eve of the election. Would you call the facts as you
see them?
Mr. Busii. Yes, sir. I tried to establish yesterday that I view it aC
fundamental that the product of our intelligence be presented without
bias, without policy considerations, to the President. And I base been
assured that I will have the kind of access to have a personal-such
presentation if indeed it is warranted.
Senator JACKSON. Can you assure us that there would be no delay. no
purposef it ambiguity, no fuzzing of the facts that you would get the
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truth to the best of the ability of the CIA, and that you would make
known the truth to the President and to those in Government, including
Congress, who need that kind of information to do their job and pro-
tect the national security-no matter how embarrassing it might be to
the administration at that tune?
Mr. Br-sir. I would certainly do what is--would be necessary to get
these views to the President and I would comply fully with the law in
informing the Congress.
Senator JACKSON. Without delay.
Mr. BUrsri. Without delay.
Senator JACKSON. And no ambiguities.
Mr. 131:;sir. No ambiguities, but I should make this point clear, that
every time, there is it difference as between intelligence estimates or
every time there is some difference within the, say, estimates that we
present and the estimates that are presented through another depart-
ment, say Defense, the minute that hits I think the President or the
administration is entitled to--
Senator JACKSON. I did not say go pill)] ic.
Mr. Busit [continuing]. To iron out differences before these things
are aired, and I would carefully comply with the law in informing the
Con.-r ess.
Senator JACKSON. Yes. We know there are variations on intelligence
esti n i ates , and all those thi ngs are to be reported and
Mr. Brsrr. And they would be reported, sir.
If they are required
Senator JACKSON. That is what T am saving, sir. I am not talking
about what your final judgment is, but about facts that have come to
your attention or information that has come to your attentions. Obvi-
ousy the CIA may have one view, the DIA may have another, and
State another. But what I am talking about is whether, right on the eve
of an election, facts came to your attention, would you nevertheless
disclose all of that information to the proper officials of the Govern-
mnent, executive and legislative?
Mr. Brsrr. I would disclose. -yesterday I made clear that there are
some things that are-I thin]: are yes. 1 would disclose to the proper
authorities in the Congress what was reouired.
Senator JACKSON. Even though you had not come to a final decision
on the significance or what to do about them ?
Mr. Busi-c. But let rue make one thing very clear. Senator. It won't{
have nothing to do with whether there was :in election coming up or
not as to whether I faithfully fu]filled thiese obligations.
Put as I appealed yesterday. I hope the judgment. will be ruade not
on a selective column but whether I have the character and integrity
to fulfill that commitment.
Senator JACKSON. You see, my concern here obviously is the awk-
wanl position yon have been placed in. It is hard enough to be the
head of the CIA and we are departing here from the tradition of the
Agency in the selection of people in connection with this nomination
at this time when-let, its be candid about it--there is a lack of public
confidence-we have got to admit it-in both the CIA and the FBI.
And T think it puts you in avery difficult position.
Mr. Bnrsnr. I agree, sir, but I think it makes it even more incumbent
on me to do my level best to keep my word and if you feel as you
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generously said that I have the c:lraracter and the integrity, I would
hope that you would give some weight to that vis-a-vis the question of
appearance.
Senator JACKSON. Yes.
But, you know, what is really troublesome is that the public needs
confidence in our intelligence efforts now as never before. It is a crisis.
When Ave were in a crisis previously the Democratic Presielent, Mr.
Roosevelt, brought in Mr. Knox, and Mr. Stirnson, and Mr. Lovett,
who was with your father's old firm, and in the area of security, the
OSS, General Donovan, a distinguished Republican was brought. 'ill;
and likewise in the immediate postwar period General Vandenberg
was heading up the interim intelligence agency until the admiral took
over.
And the lone; list of CIA. directors that. has been put in the record,
Mr. Chairman, is one in which the whole appearance of any possible
partisanship has been removed.
Ambassador Bush, these are. just thoughts that go through my mind
in a very candid and objective way and T am trying to be is fair as
I can. It really bothers me out of the, great respect I have for the need
for a bipartisan policy in the Brea of national security. At this point
I can only conclude by saying, I think you are in a very awkward
position.
Mr. Busu. I concede that. I do not have total blinders on but the
thing I do not feel and would like to reiterate is that because a person
has served his party, and you should be perhaps sensitive to this as I,
that that. assignment should be homed in on and that this should
be a disqualifying factor.
Senator JACKSOI . That is why I turned down the Secretary of
Defense job.
Mr. Buser. WVell, I think the country was ill-served because I do not
think we who have been in partisan politics and then shift gears and
,hopefully-commendably-should then be branded aid given the
connotation of something less than decent.
Senator JACicsrm . Yes. I agree.
Mr. BLSsir. And I lam versensitive, to that.
Senator JACKSON. That is right.
Mr. Br-sIT. And so I am proud of the service to the p;zrty and I tliinlc
it ought not. be per se a disqualification particularly if I have a tra'k
record in other fielals. I am not upset in the least about your raising- it
because I know. I have gigot a heck of a problem,
Senator J ACKSO . I think it is good for both parties to ha.vc' sorlcone,
of your stature as the chairman and not be catemorized thereafter as
being, shall -, e say. a pol or a professional politician per se. I think
roil. are absolutel c right on that
34y point. is that we ar'e introducing a new criterion into this CIA
area that we have never donwk before.
As far as Defe-nee goes, Mel Laird was legally involved as chairman
of various Tian hilean committees and he did a marvelous job as Sec.-
r etriry of Defense.
AMA, central point again is that. I believe President To-1,d has a irc-
sponsibility here to assure the committee, Mr. Chairman, that this
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term is going to be-assuming he faithfully performs his duty-is go
ing to be more than to next July. That is my point.
We, insist in connection with every other candidate coming up, that
it not be ,just an interim appointment. I want to make that observation.
Mr. Busx. Mr. Chairman
Senator JACTisoN. Ambassador Bush is in an awkward position.
Mr. Busri. Might I make a very brief reply?
The C1rAIRi rAN. All right.
lr. Busir. I will snake it brief and strong.
I am not suggesting a precedent of a short term, but Secretary
;Schlesinger served very briefly in CIA before moving to the Defense
Department. Ile serves at the pleasure of the President. You know,
you are saying --
Senator JACKSON. But what was his background?
Ali-. Bu sir. He had a fine background.
Senator J,wjisox. Yes; but I mean it was one of great professional-
isin. He had a Ph. D. in economics. I-fe had been involved in strategic
matters that ran for years, heavily involved in intelligence. He prob-
al~ly carne to that oilice for a short period of time with greater ex-
pet-ti ,-e than most of his predecessors.
If r. Brsrr. I was simply, sir, addressing myself to length of time,
for curtain period oil tune. That is my only point.
Senator JACKSON. Ile went on to another nonpolitical position as
Secretary of Defense.
The OHAIR rA ,. Gentlemen, I think we are about to end the ques-
tinin(, now and I preface that because there were some other persons
who wanted to appear here, I am ready to stay and hear them and
1 hope others can.
Senator Hart has indicated he has additional questions.
All right, Senator Hart.
Senator HART. Mr. Ambassador, yesterday you indicated that you
thought Congress should be made aware of executive decisions on cov-
ert. operations going on in the world. I would like to get back to the
question of when you think Congress should be made aware. Do you
think it. should be after a decision is made by the Executive to launch
.-an operation but before implementation, or after the decision and after
implementi.on. I make specific reference to the present problem of
_Angola.
Ali-. Busrr. Well ; I am not sure how Angola was handled in terms
cuf-the law says timely and I do not know how that has been inter-
preted. Perhaps this information is
Senator ILART. Do you have any thoughts on it?
Mr. Duerr. My own view would be very quickly but I do not think
it ou(rht to be, as I indicated yesterday, ought to he simultaneous with
the decision being made which is the prerogative of the Executive.
Senator IIAw,T. But. it, seems to me fairly crucial as to whether that
information comes to Congress before we have begun an operation or
afterward. After we have begun operations, after we have put $25
million into Angola., what, are the alternatives open to Congress? What
can Congress now do? What would you do if you were in Congress?
Mr. Buses. Out of the recommendations of your committee you can
pass legislation to clarify the Hughes amendment if that is what is
required.
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Senator HART. That is not going to help us too much with the pres-
ent problem. It may help you in future ones.
Mr. Buses. Well ; I mean the present one-I hate to keep saying this-
I have not been briefed on exactly what is happening in Angola and
I do not believe many people have, but I think there are a lot of things
that concern us.
Senator HART. It is fairly representative of a pattern of conduct. I
do not refer to it to catch you off guard but get your views on pro-
cedures the leadership of this country has ordinarily used in the past.
Mr. Busiu. I would say timely notification but I would. not want to
tell you that I thought that should be done simultaneous with the
President making a decision.
? Senator HAIrr. Then we launch the operation, and after we begin
aid to a group of people in some country, only then would Congress
have the alternatives of shutting it down or getting involved with
the White House and the administration on the question of whether
we should be there. A better method would be to be involved in the
decisiontnaking process at the outset.
Mr. Busii. I think that
Senator HART. That is a test case.
Mr. BusIi. I think that there, are some areas where the President
has those inherent powers and he should be allowed to proceed. I think
consultation with Congress as provided under the Hughes amend-
ment will eliminate much of what happened under several Presidents
before. As I understand it, that amendment just passed in 1974.
Senator IIART. The select committee has discovered that of the total
amount of money spent by CIA on covert operations, only about a
quarter of that moneY-roughly about a quarter of the projects ap-
proved-are approved by the 40 Committee. Three-quarters of the
money and the projects are launched by the CIA itself. Would you feel
better about conducting your job as Director of CIA if all covert
operations were approved by the 40 Committee?
Mr. Busii. Clearly.
Senator IIART. Even if Congress decides?
Mr. Busii. Clearly. I have no hesitancy in saying I would like the
NSC approval on that type of operation.
Senator HART. The Rockefeller Commission in recommendation No.
26 suggested that there be a single and exclusive high level channnel
for transmission of all White House staff requests to the CIA, one
J person linking the CIA Director and Deputy Director with the Presi-
dent and that any communications outside that channel should be
immediately reported to the DCI. What is your feeling about that?
Mr. Busx. I am very much in favor of that and I think the DCI
slioulcl be kept informed. I am sure there are a lot of, you know, day-
to-day kinds of minimal requests, "Please look up a paper within such,
and such a time and send it to us." We do not want to get this job
bogged down in too much redtape but in principle I agree that the
Director should be informed of White House requests and I think it
is a good safeguard against abuses.
Senator HART. That is all.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, gentlemen, anything else?
Senator JACKSON. Just one question.
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The CHAIRMAN. Senator Jackson has asked for one question.
Senator LEAHY. Then I will want 2 minutes.
Senator JACKSON. Ambassador Bush, can you tell its who, will be
your deputy? Will it be the present deputy?
Mr. Bi-su. No, sir.
I cannot, tell you that.
Senator JACKSON. Are there any plans you know of for a changet
Mr. Busx. None that I know of.
Senator JACxsov. I think it, is relevant, Mr. Clrairma i.
The CrHAIRMAN. Yes. I think it is relevant, too.
Senator JACKSON. I think we should ask the President whether he
contemplates any change on the part of the overall administration of
the CIA.
Mr. BUSH. I can say it is relevant to this question that I did ask
for the right to, in consultation with the President, suggest a deputy
should I feel that was necessary. But there is no commitment to con-
tinuation of the existing deputy or--
Senator JACKSON. That would be something you would discuss after
you have been in office for a little while.
Mr. BUSH. No plans; no. sir.
Senator JACKSON. You want to feel your way and see what the.
situation is.
Mr. BUSH. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. If I may coin.ment here, that question Caine to my-
mind. I made inquiry and as I understood it there were no plans to
change deputies. The Deputy Director must also be confirmed by the
Senate.
Mr. Busn. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. The question was relevant and Senator Jackson
conferred with me on it. .I think if there is going to be a change you
should be in on it, of course.
Mr. BusH. Yes, sir.
The CIrLIRvrAN. Arid you expect to be, I suppose.
Mr. Brrs r. I not only expect. to be, sir, but Ihave - the assurance of
the President that. you know, I would have an input on the decision.
The CHAIRMAN. That is what I meant by being in on it. There ace
no references to the present incumbent or anything like. that, but if
there is going_ to be a change I think you should have It pr?ominerit
part in that selection. Next to the President, the responsibility is
yours.
All right. Senator Leahy, you had a question.
Senator L3:AHY. Just. a brief statement Mr. Chairman. I will 1,e
brief.
The CH.' IRMAN. Cei tainl
Senator LEAHY. We have gone over a, great deal and Ambassador
Bush has crone through a great deal in the last 2 days.
Senator Goldwater said earlier that nmnv of the problems of thn
CT.. have, resulted from the abuse of various Presidents and I ao'r?rce with 1iire. T a,?i '. hr iii f'~-)iul)t hurt him hack in Arizon>i.
1330- ` is t-rue an I the ills lwve been caused by both Dc nocrati(, acid
I'epiiblica) Presidents who '}five ab,,sed the CIA, according to the
report, but there. is al,;o anofher problem. That has been, as I stated
yesterday, the lack of appropriate oversight by us here in the Congress.
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I think that if nothing else comes out of all of this, hopefaITy, we will
have some adequate oversight in the future.
But, you know, no matter what kind of oversight meciaaaaisms we
set up, they can only be effective to the extent that the Director of
the CIA is effective in carrying out his responsibilities, not only to
tell the truth to the various committees that might be involved with
that, but making sure the Agency does not withhold things. I am
concerned because there is a perception in this country that, that is
going on because we need a CIA and we need an intelligence eom-
i mnity in this country, but I cannot believe that it can work effe tin-ely
a long as this country perceives that it is continuously involved in
either political chores for the President or things that go way beyond
the charter and way beyond the law.
I wish, Mr. Ambassador, that you were here to be confirmed for
any other position that this committee has jurisdiction over. I really
do, because that question of perception still concerns me. It has con-
corned me for years not only with the CIA, but with the FBI and I
stated publicly years before I came here that those are two positions
that should be held by people who are seen as being totally divorced
from politics. I find that I am troubled more by this nomination than
by any other appointment we have had before this committee.
I am troubled by it more, than any appointment that I have had to
vote on as a Senator in the less than a Year that I have. been. here,
partly because of your own performance here, which I think has been a
difficult one. I think it has been particularly difficult because you have
been called upon to testify in such a really short time and you have
not had a chance to do the preparation that I am sure you would have
liked to do.
And I really cannot find it in me to vote for your confirmation on
those grounds, but not because I perceive you as a dishonest man. I
do not. Not because I perceive you as an incompetent person. Quite
the opposite. You have proven time and time again that you are
extremely competent, that, you are extremely professional.
But I ant concerned that the CIA is at a watershed in its percep-
tions, in its own being, and that, the President is really doing a dis-
service in taking somebody without a background in the intelligence
area and somebody who I think is going to be perceived as being a
political appointment.
As I said, I wish you could have been here to be. confirmed in any
4 one of the other positions that. this committee sits on.
The CFTATRITAN. All right.
Proceed, Alr. Bush.
12-h'. BTTRTT. I do have a background of 3 years in highly sensitive
foreign affairs experience, two of the highest diplomatic posts T believe,
this country has, in which I dealt, with the product of intelligence. I
know something about }now intelligence arks and I submit that is a
rood b icka,round. But. Senator, I know you have arrived at, your
conclusion honestly and I wotnld only sey I think it is unfortunate
that you can: say I have the character and I have the i?nteprity. the
perception, but that the way it is looked at by somebody else override's
'T'hank you, sir.
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Senator LEwis. I think it is perhaps more difficult than that, be-
cause of what has gone before us in the CIA. I think it is probably a.
problem of history that has put you in this difficult position. I have
no question in my own mind as I made some informal notes around
the Senate but that you will be confirmed. And I have no question
but that your confirmation will be recommended by this committee,
but I thought that it is a matter of honesty to you that you certainly
deserve to know exactly what my feelings are.
Mr. Busii. I respect your frankness, sir.
The CrrAIlmMZAN. Mr. Bush, let me be sure we understand each other.
You have seen the concern here. You said you would not, bargain
away your birthright of citizenship or any part thereof, just to be
1onfirmed or to receive an office. That was in reference to a. question
about the Vice Presidency. I like that position, frankly. But, you
have also said now, as I understand, you were going to have, no part,
if you are confirmed, in this Presidential race of any kind, that your
present sole purpose is to get in there and do the very best job you can
and serve at the pleasure of the President, being no fixed term ; is that
correct?
Mr. Bvuii. Yes, Sir.
The Cr-AIR,IrAK. You have nothing- in mind that could be in the
nature of a reservation on any of those points.
Mr. Busrr. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. You are not going to show up quitting to go into
business or seek offiee for yourself or for anyone else if I understand
von correctly.
_i\I. B1-str. That is correct, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. All right.
Is there, anything else you want to say on that matter?
Mr. Birsii. No, sir.
The CrmAImNIAN. Members of the committee, are there aary other
questions?
This has been a very thorough examination.
I think that is all the questioning. We are not trying to close, the
door on any members of the committee who might want to ask ques-
tions, but I think this will conclude the questioning period.
Members of the committee, other testimony that I propose to take
now brings forth another explanation. We have set a member of nom-
inations for 2 p.m. to which no objections have been tiled. Mr. Robert
Ellsworth, to be aDeputy Secretary of Defense; Thomas C. Reed, to
be Secretary of the Air Force; William I. Greener, to be. Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs; and Matthew J. Perry, to be
a judge on the Court. of Military Appeals.
Now. I propose that we recess until 2 p.m. and at that time take up
these other matters that I have enumerated unless something about the
Bush nomination might intervene. We have with us Mr. Cohen, presi-
dent of Common Cause, who had asked to testify.
Mr. Cohen, please come to the witness table.
Mr. Bush, I think it will be well if you remain here and hear the
testimony. You do not have to stay but that might save time.
Mr. Bi sir. I will be pleased to stay, Mr. Chairman.
The Ch[AInAMAN. Those who wish to leave may do so, of course, but
please do so quietly.
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83
STATEMENT OF DAVID COHEN, PRESIDENT, COMMON CAUSE
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cohen, what is your full name, sir?
Mr. COIIEN. My name is David Cohen.
The CHAIRMAN. WThom do you represent?
Mr. COHEN. I serve as president of Common Cause, a nonpartisan
citizens lobby.
The CIIAIr.IIAN. And you appear for them?
Mr. ColirN.. I do indeed.
The CHAirnrAN. All right.
Proceed if you will. We are glad to have you here, sir.
Mr. CoH1:N. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and we appreciate the op-
portunity today to testify on the nomination of Ambassador Bush to
be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
My testimony will deal with two broad areas: One, the procedure
the Senate Armed Services Committee should follow in all major
confirmation matters including this one; and two, the special attention
intelligence policy matters should receive at these hearings.
Common Cause, believes the hearings on the nomination of Mr.
George Bush to serve as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
present a special opportunity for the Armed Services Committee to
set appropriate and proper standards for confirmation hearings on
key Presidential appointees.
Senate committees frequently have neglected their constitutional
responsibility in this area. Confirmation hearings are often empty
rituals, involving hasty and superficial review of Presidential nom-
inees. I think we have begun to see some progress made by the Senate
Commerce and Interior Committees and we urge the Senate Armed
Services Committee to make the confirmation process the kind of
deliberate and probing undertaking it can and should be. Toward this
end we suggest that the committee take the following steps in han-
dling Ambassador Bush's nomination :
First, the committee should develop standards to govern its deci-
sion on Mr. Bush's confirmation. These standards should cover admin-
istrative competency and relevant expertise, as well as commitment to
various principles of accountability and ground rules regarding CIA
operations.
Second, the committee should carefully evaluate Mr. Bush's back-
ground and views on the basis of these standards. This evaluation
should entail broad and extensive questioning. Frankly we believe
that one or two days of hearings is insufficient to do the j,ob.
Third, the committee should require Mr. Bush to submit a public
financial disclosure statement and should examine it for any potential
conflicts of interest. It should require resolution of any conflicts,, if
there are any, as a condition of confirmation.
Fourth, the committee should postpone voting on Mr. Bush for at
least 2 weeks after the hearings are completed. This would enable the
committee to study the hearing record and complete its investigation
of his background. Mr. Bush could then be called back during that
time for further questioning if the committee thought that that were
necessary.
Fifth, the committee should issue a report to the Senate on the Bush
nomination at least 3 full days prior to a Senate vote. This would give
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other Senators ample time to scrutinize the record and the commit-
tee's findings. As seem:; to be the case in this instance, there is a dis-
agreement within the commit f ee. Time should be pernaittecl to develota
majority and minority views. The full Senate should vote on the Buse
appointment. We believe that major appointments such as llirectom-
of CIA should receive a filll confirmation hearing tntt the full Sen-
ate should be. allowed to vote on all such appointments.
We believe, these measures would guarantee a thorough and resmaon-
sible evaluation ct' Mr. Bus i's cfnalific.ations. We consider it par-
ticularly important that these steps be taken in connection with tip'
nomination of the individual who would head a G-omernment ag)-ncv
which hits been the sttlmmect of such intense criticism and scrutiny in
recent months. By adhering to these guidelines, than committee would
also set an irn >ortant standard for other Senate connmitte s to fol]owz?
and this would go a lone; way toward revitalizing the Senate's role in
confirming Presidential appointees.
At a time. when public confidence in governmental institutions is
alarmingly low, it is especially important that the, American pubh'
be convinced that the Senate is committed to carrying out its advice
and consent function in all orderly, thorough, and judicious manner.
To vote on confirmation before this session adjourns or recesses would
be a travesty of the confirmation process. We believe it is also impor-
tant to find out something about Mr. Bush's views on. intellima'nce
policy in a more formal way than has been done at this hearing.
Mr. Bush has indicated a belief that the United States must develop
an intelligence capability second to none. Yet Bush has not vet ex-
pressed himself on substantivc actions he would take as Director. nor
has he addressed the concerns which the Congress and much of the
public share on the conduct of intelligence operations in a derrtocracv.
I understand the reasons as to why this is so. It is certainly no fault
of Ambassador Bash. Batt we do believe that the procesq, here should
be slowed down so thn.t the Ambassador can in fact be fully briefed
by Mr. Colby and others and that, in turn, he can provide fuller
answers than he has been able to on questions that have been raised
dunning this hea:ring .
We believe it is appropriate for the Senate to consider the nomi-
nation of Ambassador Bush only after he answers basic questions
concerning the accountability oi` the Agency.
In order to have Borne time, Mr. Chairman. I would like. t'me ques-
t ions that we have snbmitteal as possible examples to be included in the
statement as if read. I only want to summarize three such gatestions.
One question we, have raised is what steps would the Ambassador
take to allow public review of iutelligm'nce bna4rets. 'Ellis was as partial
reconnneaadation of time Rockefeller ('ornmis-ion. Ambassador Bur;h
has indicated, at least general agreemerrt with the Rockefeller Coral-
rnission. lie wanted to have a chance to stndv it, further, I think this
is one area where further study must be made because there seems to
he some conilict between what the .nahass:aclor said to Senator Ilam?t
and with the recornrnendaations of the Rockefeller Corrrmission.
Would Ambassador Bush recommend to o he Yresidenf i };,at t'be
administration notify all individuals who have byeen subject, of in-
telli!rcnem' proe-rams and nefivities whiilr were illegal, unconstitu-
tional or beyond tlre charter of t lie offending agency?
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As another example of a question I think has to be put, what spe-
cific steps would Ambassador Bush take to minimize political inilu-
ence on the CIA?
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to deal with the question of
taking politics out of the CIA because the issue of confirmation before
this c.onnmittee has been made all the more serious because, Ambassa-
dor Bush has refused to remove his name from consideration for Vice
President. This refusal to forgo political ambition may be candid, but
it shows astonishing lack of sensitivity to the events of the last few
years.
I want to be very clear. The point I am making has nothing to do
with Ambassador Bush's past background. I.R. has to do with what he
says about the future.
To learn from the mistakes and deficiencies of the past, a successful
CIA head will have to run the agency difl:erently. We have had the
painful experience of seeing secrecy breed excesses. It leads to policy
failures, It ine~ it,ably results in matters being kept from the Congress.
A CIA head whoLis ready to consider high elective office less than
1 year after his appointment will be perceived to service the short-
terml political needs of a sitting President rather than the duties
of the agency and the best interests of the Nation. The need for solid
intelligence analysis is too important to be mixed up with the pur-
surt of elective office. A willingness to seek or accept high elective
office presents a clear and present danger to the CIA agency's mission
and morale.
If the Senate Armed Services Committee and the full. ,Senate- ap-
prove Mr. Bush they will ratify and legitimize Ainbasador Bush's
availability for high elective office. The Senate cannot escape responsi-
bility on this matter.
Just as Common Cause i elieves the Attorney General should now
be drawn from a President's campaign so we, believe that the head
of the CIA should foreswear going from that office to any elec-
tive Office.
Unless Ambassador Bush changes his position, Senate approval will
sanction the concept of political ambition in the Director of the CIA.
None of us would accept that concept for a Supreme Court justice or
the Director of the FBI. Those who head ac'enci.es that deal with
secret matters, and whose activities affect individual li.bc ,ties, must
be judged against the, highest of standards. Fair adinin_istration of
the vast powers of the CIA requires elimination of any appearance of
present and future political involvement.
Unless Ambassador Bush changes his position we urge the Senate
Armed Services Committee to report his nomination to the floor with
it recommendation that, it. be rejected. It is the only responsible act
in our judgment, for the, Senate Armed Services Committee to do.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we believe this committee will be tak-
ing its confirmation responsibilities seriously if it calls Mr. Bush back
and pursues with him again his refusal to withdraw from considera-
tion for the Vice Presidency, pursues the kinds of policy questions we
suggested, and then makes a full report to the Senate well in advance
of these ratters being debated.
The intelligence community has a history of being ungovernable.
But to this point no real attempt has been made to gain that measure
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of control which will insure that intelligence agencies perform only
acceptable functions while allowing them the freedom to conduct oper-
ations with the requisite secrecy needed to insure success. The issue is
to make the intelligence community governable and the Bush con-
firmation hearing is the first major test.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CIIAIRArAN. You have given thought to that statement. You
presented it well. I want to read it and I will read it. Of course, it will
be in the record, too. We thank you for taking time to go into the sub-
ject, to prepare your statement, and. for coming here, too.
Mr. Coai,,v. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID COHEN, PRESTOENT, COATIlfON CAUSF
Mr. Chairman, Common Cause appreciates the opportunity to testify today on
the nomination of George Bush to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
I am David Cohen. President of Common Cause.
My testimony will deal with two broad areas :
1) the procedure the Senate Armed Services Committee should follow in all
major confirmation matters ;
2) the special attention intelligence policy matters should receive at these
hearings.
Common Cause believes the hearings on the nomination of Mr. George Bush
to serve as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency present a special oppor-
tunity for the Armed Services Committee to set appropriate and proper standards
for confirmation hearings on key Presidential appointees. Senate committees
frequently have neglected their constitutional responsibility in this area. con-
firmation hearings are often empty rituals, involving hasty and superficial re-
view of Presidential nominees. We urge the Armed Services Committee to make
the confirmation process the kind of deliberate and probing undertaking it can
and should be. Toward this end, we suggest that the Committee take the follow-
ing steps in handling the Bush nomination :
First, the Committee should develop standards to govern its decision on Mr.
Bush's confirmation. These standards should cover administrative competency
and relevant expertise, as well as commitment to various principles of account-
ability and ground rules regarding CIA operations.
Second, the Committee should carefully evaluate Mr. Bush's background and
views on the basis of these standards. This evaluation shontd entail broad and
extensive questioning. One or two days of hearings is insufficient to do the job.
Third, the Committee should require Mr. Bush to submit a public financial
disclosure statement and should examine it for any potential conflicts of interest.
It should require resolution of any conflicts as a condition of confirmation.
Fourth, the Committee should postpone voting on Mr. Bush for at least two
weeks after the hearings. This would enable the committee to study the hearing
record and complete its investigation of his background. Mr. Bush could be
called back during that time for further questioning if necessary.
Fifth, the Committee Should issue a report to the Senate on the Bush nomina-
tion at least three full days prior to a Senate vote. This would give other Sena-
tors ample time to scrutinize the record and the Committee's findings. The full
Senate should vote on the Bush appointment. Major appointments should receive
a full confirmation hearing but the full Senate should be allowed to vote on all
such appointments.
We believe these measures would guarantee a thorough and responsible evalu-
ation of Mr. Bush's qualifications, We consider It particularly important that
these steps be taken in connection with the nomination of the individual who
would head a government agency which has been the subject of such intense
criticism and scrutiny in recent months. By adhering to these guidelines, the
Committee would also set an important standard for Other Senate committees
to follow and this would go a long way toward revitalizing the Senate's role in
confirming Presidential appointees.
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At a time when public confidence in governmental institutions is alarmingly
low, it is especially important that 'ti'le American public be convinced that the
Senate is committed to carrying out its advise and consent function in an orderly,
thorough and judicious manner. To vote on confirmation before this session ad-
journs or recesses would be a travesty of the confirmation process.
MR. BUSIH'S VIEWS ON INTELLIGENCE POLICY
Mr. Bush has indicated a belief that the United States must develop an intelli-
gence capability second to none. Mr. Bush has not yet expressed himself on sub-
stantive actions he would 'take as Director, nor has he addressed the concerns
which the Congress and much of the public share on the conduct of intelligence
operations in a democracy. We believe it is appropriate for the Senate to con-
sider the nomination of Mr. Bush only after he answers basic questions concern-
ing the accountability of the agency. Examples of such questions follow :
What steps would he take to allow public review of intelligence budgets?
Would he recommend to the President that the Administration notify all in-
dividuals who have been subjects of intelligence programs and 'activities which
were illegal, unconstitutional or'beyond the charter of the offending intelligence
agency?
What would he do to reduce duplication and waste in the intelligence field?
As Director of Central Intelligence ((his NSC post), what would he do to
coordinate intelligence agencies?
What methods would he develop to facilitate Congressional 'assessment of the
performance of the CIA and other intelligence agencies?
What form of new charter 'would he recommend to the Congress for the CIA?
for NSC?
What limits would ho set on covert activities abroad? at home?
What method would he advocate for "clearing" such operations, if any?
Would he agree to make all Presidential orders available for inspection to an
appropriate oversight body?
Would he arrange the CIA hierarchy so that a definite chain of command
existed and definite responsibility could be assigned for all actions?
Would he approve the upgrading of the position of the CIA inspector general
as recommended by the Rockefeller Commission?
Would he agree t'o'testify before' Congressional committees?
How would he separate foreign and domestic intelligence activities?
What steps would he take to minimize political influence on the CIA?
TAKING POLITICS OUT OF THE CIA
The issue of confirmation is made all the more serious because Mr. Bush
has refused to remove his name from consideration for Vice ]'resident. This
refusal to forego political ambition may be candid but it shows astonishing lack
of sensitivity to the events of the last few years.
To learn from the mistakes and deficiencies of the past, a successful CIA head
will have to run the agency differently. We have had the painful experience of
seeing secrecy breed excesses. It leads to policy failures. It inevitably results
in matters being kept from the Congress.
A CIA head who is ready to consider high elective office less than one yen r
after his appointment will lie perceived to service the short term political needs
of a sitting President rather than the duties of the agency and the best interests
of the nation. The need for solid intelligence analysis is too important to be
mixed up with the pursuit of elective office. A willingness to seek or accept high
elective office presents a clear and present danger to the agency's mission and
morale.
If the Senate Armed Services. Committe and the full Senate approve Mr.
Bush they will ratify and legitimize Mr. Bush's availability for high elective.
office. The Senate cannot escape responsibility on this matter.
Just as Common Cause believes the Attorney General should not be drawn
from a President's campaign so we believe that the head of the CIA should
foreswear going from that office to any elective office.
Unless Mr. Bush changes his position, Senate approval will sanction the-
concept of political ambition in the Director of the CIA. None of us Would accept
that concept for a Supreme Court justice or the Director of the ]CBI. Those who,
head agencies that deal with secret matters, and whose activities affect in(-
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vidual liberties, must be judged against the highest of standards. Fairadminis-
tration of the vast powers of the CIA requires elimination of any appearance
of present and future political involvement.
Unless Mr. Bush changes his position we urge the Senate Armed Services
C'omxnittee to report his nomination to the floor with a recommendation that it
he rejectced. It is the only responsible act for the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee to do.
CONCLUSION
In our judgment this Committee will be taking its confirmation responsi-
bilities seriously if it calls Mr. Bush back and pursues with him again his
refusal to withdraw from consideration for the Vice-Presidency, pursues the kinds
of policy questions we suggested and then makes a full report to the Senate
well in advance of these matters being debated.
The intelligence community has a history of being ungovernable. :Put to this
point no real attempt has been made to gain that measure of general controi
which will insure that intelligence agencies perform only aceptable functions
while allowing them the freedom to conduct operations with the requisite
secrecy needed to insure success. The issue is to make the intelligence com-
munity governable and the Bush confirmation hearing is the first major test.
'I''he C11:1TP.brAX. Now, gentlemen, the nest. wittnss, tAfr. Ileister.
Come around, please, sir and give your full name to the committee.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD HEISLER, SOCIALIST WORKERS
1976 NATIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE
_lIr. Ilr:rsr.r:r. lly norw is Ed Heisler.
7'he ('rr:~rrnr.ax. l)o von represent the Socialist Workers 1976 ' a-
tiortal Camp rign Committee?
.1Ir. Ilr.rsr'r ii. Yes. I mil national chairperson for our Presidential
campaign committee, and I am a member of the national committee
of the Socialist Workers Party.
'I'l;e t'rrsrr;nr~~. l''elcome, and may I ask you how much time you
want?
y1fr. flr:rsr,ra. I will be very brief, perhaps 6, 7, or 8 minutes.
The Crr.~n:ni.vN. That is all right. We are glad to have you here. We
were not going to limit Your time unless it happened to be an extreme
armrntnt. You may plnceed in your own way.
AIr., ?lr r5r.r:r,. My party is running Peter Ca.mejo for President, and
Willie Ifae Reid for Vice President. of the ZFnitecl States. I ;im here
today to speak in opposition !to the nomination of George Bush to the
post of Director of the (''entral It) tell itrenee. I want to thank the corn-
ruittee for the opportunity to present my views.
I am speaking today as one of the victims of the practices of the
(`L1. As von are probably aware, members of ]fly party have been the
objects of a 25-year CIA campaign of illegal surveillance. 'Inaddi-
tionto that, the FBI has also conducted criminal illegal activ-tics tie-
signed to disrupt thr, political campaigns and other activities of the
Socialist Workers Party. This is despite the fact that the. Socialist
Workers Party does not advocate or engage in violent or illegal activ-
ity. And the CIA and the FBI have never produced a shred of evi-
dence contrary to this.
It is not only the members -and supporters of the Socialist Workers
Party that have been victimizedtfhy the CIA. The rights of tliousar,ds
of inericar,ns, be they trade unionists, civil rights activists, or op-
ponents of war such as the one in Southeast Asia. have, been and con-
tinue. to be up until today violated by the Central Intelligence Agency.
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In order to halt these illegal activities against us. my party has
filed a. lawsuit against the CIA and the FBI. We, are seeking $2.1
million in damages for the attacks we have suffered on our right to
express our views, our right to run candidates for public office, and
our right to win people to our point of view.
This case will be going to trial early next year in Washi LIg-ton. D.C.,.
and if Mr. Bush is confirmed as the Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, he will be a defendant in that trial.
I have with me today just a few of the files that the CrA has been
forced to divulge as 'a result of oar lawsuit. These files prove that the
CIA began spying on. the 'Socialist Workers Party, especially its
eandidates for public office, in 1950. 1 also have. here files that the
CIA has gathered on our Presidential candidate, Mr. Peter ( unejo.
These are just a few of the files. The CIA has indicated to us that
they have hundreds of more pagers of information on Peter Camejo
which so far they have refused to release. Prominent individuals from
all walks of American life, including former Attorney General Ramsey
Clark, NAACP, Labor Director Herbert Hill, Members of the Con-
gress, and the editors of the New York Times newspaper have pub-
licly condemned this outrageous violation of our constitutional rights.
Has Mr. Bush expressed his opposition? Ile has not. I would urge
this commnittee to reject the nomination of Mr. Bush or any other indi-
vidual who has not taken a clear stand against CIA surveillance of the
Socialist Workers Party and other America political organizations.
CIA's activities have been the most lethal. outside the borders of this
country. It has played the role of an international agency of repres-
sion. Under Democratic and Republican administrations alike, the
CIA has acted to crush popular movements abroad, overthrow demo-
cratically elected governments, and assassinate political figures judged
to be, threats to the investments of American corpoi^ations.
In 1960, for example, the CIA trained and equipped mercenaries
who carried out ,in invasion. of Cuba. Numerous lurid assassination
plots against Fidel Castro have been revealed.
More recently the CIA attempted to determine the outcome of an
election in Chile. When that failed it organized a military coup that
brought a military dictatorship into power that murdered thousands
of innocent men, women, children, trade unionists, students, working
people. And today the CIA is, right now t.oday, supporting and back-
ing that military dictatorship in Chile, and Mr. Bush supports that
dictatorship, too, and would continue as Director of the CIA.
You know, in yesterday's session a committee member asked Mr.
Bush point blank if he would direct the CIA under instructions from
the President to organize the forceful, violent overthrow of a demo-
cratically elected government in the future. Mr. Bush responded in
a very careful way. Iie said we would tread very carefully in organiz-
ing that kind of illegal action overthrowing a democratically elected
government. And today again, at this hearing, he refused to say cate-
gorically that he would not attempt to use. the CIA to overthrowdemo-
cratically elected governments in the world.
That can only mean one thing. He would; if instructed to, by the
President of the United States.
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Now, he said that he would not rule it out forever, but I think he
would not rule it out tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, whenever
he is confirmed, if he is confirmed as Director of the CIA.
He talked about Hitler. Everyone knows that the Hitler regime in
Germany did not come to power through democratic elections. Fascism
has never come to power anywhere in the world through democratic
elections, but Mr. Bush, as a Government figure and leader has sup-
ported right wing military and even Fascist type, .I1itlerite type mili-
tary dictatorships.
For example, the Franco regime in Spain. He supported that.
Today the. CIA, the Ford administration, are supporting the racist
apartheid regime in South Africa. A dictatorship like that is con-
sidered a great friend of this government, a great friend of the CIA,
and whatever administration is in power.
Today the State Departmrmt and the CIA are working hand in
,love with the racist South African regime to carry out a military in-
tervention in Angola. There are thousands of South African troops
in Angola today, fighting against that liberation movement. At this
very moment, the CIA is distributing millions of dollars in military
weapons and supplies in Angola, in an attempt to determine the politi-
cal destiny of the people of that country. That is just part of the rec-
ord of the CIA internationally.
Where is the record of lair. Bush's opposition to these Undemocratic
and criminal practices? It is not available. I. do not think this com-
mittee should approve the, nomination of any Director who has not
committed himself to putting an end to the CIA's interference of the
internal affairs of people in other countries. The Socialist Workers
Party is demanding that all secret FBI and CIA files be opened to the
public. For example, we would like all of the files, all of the CIA files
on our Presidential candidate, Mr. Camejo, released to the pnblic be-
cause, we do not have anything to hide. We have nothing to hide but
we think the CIA has much to hide and conceal from the American
people.
We can be sure that all of these revelations that have already come
to the, surface and been published are just the tip of the iceberg and
that even more horrible atrocities and crimes committed in the name
of the American people behind our backs still remain enshrouded in
secrecv. We think that it is the fundamental right of the American
people to know the full truth about policies that are being carried out
behind our backs and in our name. And we think bringing all of the
acts about the illegal CIA activities into the open can be an impor-
tant first step in putting an end to them.
I urge this committee to refuse to confirm Mr. Bush or any other
candidates, potential candidates, who will not issue a clear statement
to that, effect. Because my party has been a target of CIA harassment
for over 15 years and because of our deep concern about the demo-
cratie rights and the well-being of working people here and around the
world, we are vitally interested in decisions made by Congress in re-
lation to CIA..
Because of the facts I have pointed out, the Socialist Workers Party
has no confidence at all in Mr. Bush and we do not think any Ameri-
can can feel any confidence about his intentions to stop the criminal
:activities that have been the CIA's trademark since its inception or
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to expose those that have already been carried out, and for these rea-
sons I urge you to reject this nomination.
The CHAIRMAN. All right. I thank you very much for your time and
your attention here, and for presenting your statement.
Just one question about the files. What do you think about opening
up all the FBI files, for instance? What is your position on that?
Mr. HrisnrR. We would like the FBI-in fact, we are demanding
that the FBI release to the public all of the files they .have on the
Socialist Workers Party or any other political dissident groups in this
country-the black movement, the antiwar movement in the past-
'because we do not have anything to hide, but we know now from doc-
uments that we have uncovered as a result of our lawsuit, just a few
documents, that the FBI is hiding illegal criminal activities conducted
against us and many others.
The CHAIRMAN. My question really was, would you favor the open-
ing up to the public--
Mr. HrrsriR. To the public.
The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Of all FBI files? What about that?
Mr. Hrzs,rrR. Yes; we do not-we think all of their files on political
dissidents in this country, political organizations, the union movement,
the civil rights movement, the women's liberation movement, the So-
cialist movement, should be released. That is what we are recommend-
ing.
The CHAR MAN. My question is : do you favor opening up all FBI
files?
Mr. HE;,,rsLrR. Which files do you have in mind specifically?
The CILAIRMTAN. FBI files, all of them, every one. Whatever they
have. They have a file on me, I suppose. I sent them a letter when I was
an officer in my State, district attorney, but my question is open up
all files? Do you favor that?
Mr. IIrisLri. All right. Lot us start with the files on the Socialist
Workers Party. Let us start there. They are refusing to even open
up those files.
The CILynusrAN. I do not want to prolong this if you do not mind.
.If you cannot answer that "yes" or "no," that is all right.
Mr. I-IErsi sii. Which files do you have in mind? Are , ou thinking,
for example, of a file--say they have a file on someone who committed
forgery. That type of criminal activity. Of course, we are not asking
them to release those kinds of files. We are asking them to release files
that prove and demonstrate illegal. activities in violation of the Bill
of Rights. That is the only files.
The CIFAIRMTAN. This is just an approach to this question. Listen to
my question, please. Do you advocate opening up all of the FBI files
and all the, cases that they work on and develop? Is that your position?
Mr. IIrrsLER. We think that all of the files that pertain to criminal
and illegal activities conducted throughout, the world like political
assassinations, like overthrowing governments through force and vio-
lence, criminal activities of that type, activities that are in violation.
of international law and in many cases domestic law, those files should
be released; yes.
The CHAIRMAN. And you are talking about our files in our CIA?
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i17r. IIEISLER. We Nvoidd like our files-we do not think the CIA
should have any files on any person in this country because of their
political activity.
The CHAIRMAN. All right.
Mr. HEISLER. Even under the congressional mandate they are not
supposed to do that, but regardless--
The CHAIRMAN. You have made that clear. Let me ask you one
more question. Do you think that we should have a CIA of ally kind?
Mr. IIEISLER. Well, if you can think of a good function for them.
it is very clear now that CIA has been used primarily as an instru-
mont to force governments and dictatorships on people throughout the
world. It has not served any kind of progressive cause at all.
You }rave the example of Chile.
The Cr7AIR_M AN. I am looking for one person who advocates the
abolition of the CIA. Are you that one?
112r. HEISLER. We favor the abolition of the CIA ; yes, we do.
The Cr rAIRMAN. All right.
Mr. III:ISLER. Because they are not an organization set up to pro-
tect freedom or democracy or anything like that, throughout the
world. Where have they done that? They have not. (rive me an ex-
ample of where they helped to extend democratic rights for any
people anywhere in the world. Give me one example.
The CHAIRMAN. A11 right. You ha ve answered my question.
Mr. IIEISLER. They cannot.
The CHAIRMAN. is there any other explanation you want to add to
that answer, you may do so. but answer it yes or no, and I commend
you for saying it one way or the other.
Mr. IIEISLER. No. We do not like to beat arounrl the bush.
The CHAIRMAN. All right. Well, thank you very much for coming.
Now I had an inquiry from Mr. E. C. Ackerman. All right. sir.
come around, please.
STATEMENT OF E. C. ACKERMAN
The. CHAIRMAN. You are from Florida, I understand.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Yes, sir.
The CrrvRnrAN. And yon eaine np here just for this purpose.
A fr. ACKERMAN. Yes. sir.
The CHATPMAN. Well, we want to thank yon for that. You were
formerly with the CIA.
Mr. ACRERMAN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. All right. You do have a prepared statement, don't
yon?
:1fr. ciK FxMAN. Yes. sir.
The CSHAIRMAN. Please read your statement.
blr. ArnERVr,~~. Mr. Chairman. I wish to express my appreciation
for this opportunity to appear before the. Armed Services Committee.
I regret that I must sneak against the nomination of Ambassador
Bush as Director of the CIA.
I want to make it elear from the outset that I have no reason to
question Ambassador Bush's ability or his integrity. It is my undor-
standinm that he rates high marks in both. But the fact is that he is
a partisan political figure, and I believe that his installation as CIA
Director would have the effect of dragging tho CIA into an election
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year political controversy which would be disastrous for the Agency
and the country.
I speak only for myself, but I believe that many of my views are
shared by nny former colleagues, working case officers in CLV clan
destine services. I spent 11 years as it case officer. I worked in 20
countries. I was principally involved in acquiring intelligence in-
formation from human sources in the Soviet bloc countries. I re-
signed from the CIA on May 30 this year because I felt I could no
longer do ury job. Wholesale exposure of intelligence methods and
information had destroyed my ability to recruit and sustain contact
with sources. I hoped to call attention to this situation but my call
has largely been ignored.
Mr. Chairman, I feel that we have for the past year been involved in
a situation which does credit to none of us. Ave, have all been wrong.
The CIA undertook improper operations and the improprieties de-
rnanded inquiry by appropriate political. institutions, but a clandestine
intelligence service is a fragile nrechanislit which simply cannot be
investigated in public. The inquiry has been all too public. Much of it
has been carried out in the n? nedia and it has not, been American journal-
ism's finest hour. With a few noteworthy exceptions, it has heen the
hour of the sensationalist and the advocates; and much of the inquiry
has been carried out in Congress-and I fear this investigation, too-
has been tinged with sensationalism and with partisanship.
The result is that today our case officers abroad who, in many cases,
live under constant threat of imprisonment or kidnapping and execu-
tion by terrorist groups simply cannot perform effectively. When a
case officer recruits a new source he is inevitably obliged to convince
that source of his -ability to. protect the source's security. This con-
sideration is of paramount importance for many sources and all of the
most valuable ones maintain contact at the peril of their lives.
Today the case officer's task is next to impossible. Sources wonder
with some justification if they will be the object of the next leak or
the next investigation or the next CIA- employee who takes it upon
himself to tell all he knows. Case officers can argue w:lth merit that
the agency can protect source identities, but sources are not, prone to
draw fine lines of distinction between that which can be protected and
all til at. which has been exposed.
We have paralyzed the clandestine services at a time when they are
sorely needed, ft time of questionable detente, of escalating inter-
national terrorisuz and most dangerous of all, impending nuclear pro..
liferat-ion. We have had our orgy of exposer. It is time to stop. It in
time to put sensationalism aside, to put partisanship aside, to consider
soberly and in a nonpartisans manner the future role of the CIA. It is
time to reach a national consensus that we will have an effective in-
telligence service that is for the simple reason that we must, have an
effective intelligence service. The installation of Ambassador Push
as CIA Director would not permit a nonpartisan consideration of the
future role of tine CI:. nor would it allow the establishment of a broad
national consensus on this subject. It would instead politicize the ques-
tion of CIA reform. It would pit a Republican CIA Director against a
Democratic Congress. aerainst. Democratic Presidentia_i aspirants. It
would inevitably eml)roil the agency in the 1976 Presidential campaign.
It would prolong indefinitely the paralysis of the, clandestine services.
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We have never had a partisan CIA Director and this is exactly the
wrong time to set such a precedent.
Therefore, I call upon the President to withdraw the nomination
of Ambassador Rush and if this withdrawal is not forthcoming, for
the Armed Services Committee to reject that nomination.
Thank you.
The CuAnnr&x. Well, I thank you very much. You have made some
good observations there. I do not resent them one bit. You said this
hearing had sensationalism about it. What have you seen here this
morning sensational, or yesterday?
Mr. ACKERMAV No. I am sorry. I was referring to the hearings of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thought ,you were. talking to us. What did
you see sensational about them, their hearing, I mean?
Mr. AC!KER3rAN. \\'ell----
The CHAnurAN. I have not heard anything like that from any other
source, but you certainly are entitled to your opinion.
Mr. AcriiERMAN. I thought there was questionable necessity to hold
open hearings, to drag senior intelligence officers before television
cameras at open hearings. I would say that every open hearing and
every such appearance makes it more difficult for the working case
officer in the field to cleat with his sources.
The CFIAIRMAN. You have made that clear. I am impressed with
what you say about it being more difficult for the employees of the
CIA to operate when things are stirred up and that is a concern that
is on the minds of many of us here on this committee, I can assure you.
You were with the CIA for 13 years?
Mr. ACKERMAN. Eleven years, sir.
The CIIAIRMrAN. Excuse me, 11 years. And you resigned, voluntarily?
Mr. ACKF:RDMAN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. All right. I do not agree with all your conclusions
but I think you have some good points in your statement, certainly
worthy of our record, and I thank you again very much for coming.
Mr. ACriERM:AN. Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. For the information of those who may be interested,
we resume. hearings here or convene here again at 2 p.m. today. Ave will
have with us Mr. Robert Ellsworth, Mr. Thomas C. Reed, Mr. William
1. Greener and Mr. Matthew J. Perry. We will proceed with an ex-
amination of those gentlemen with reference to the positions for which
they have been nominated. For those who are not here, if anyone is
representing them, ask them please to arrive a, little. ahead of time.
Mr. Bush. as I said, so far as I know this concludes the testimony
in the matter of your nomination. I will have to confer with the com-
mittee further. If any have additional questions it will be their privi-
lege to ask them. But with the thanks of the committee for your atten-
tion and your attendance, so far as we know and are concerned, you
need not come back until further notice.
Mr. Buser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, the committee will take a recess until
2 p.m. today.
[Whereupon, at 1:1h p.m.. the nomination hearing of _Mr. Bush was
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STATEMENT OF GEORGE BUSH
CONFIRMATION HEARINGS ON HIS NOMINATION TO BE
DIRECTOR OF THE CIA
December 15, 1975 -- Senate Armed Services Committee
I am pleased to be back in the United States. I am still .on
Peking standard time; so if I seem a little tired I hope you will
forgive me.
My nomination was sent to this committee sometime
ago, but I was unable to leave China prior to the President's
visit.
The President left Peking December 5th and we left
I recognize that I am being nominated as director of
the CIA at a very complicated time in the history of this agency
and indeed in the history of our country. In fact, having been
in China for a year, I didn't fully realize the depth of the emotions
surrounding the CIA controversy.
Be that as it may I have a few fundamental views that I
would like to set out in the brief statement.
First, my views on intelligence. I believe in a strong
intelligenccapability for.. the USA. My more than three years
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in two vital foreign affairs posts, plus my attending Cabinet
meetings for four years, plus my four years in Congress, make
me totally convinced that we must see our intelligence capability
strengthened. We must not see the CIA dismantled.
Reporting and investigative work by the Senate and the
House have brought to light some abuses that have taken place over
a long period of time. Clearly things were done that were outrageous
and morally offensive. These must not be repeated and I will take
every step possible to see that they are not.
I understand that Director Colby has already issued directives
that implement some of the decisions of the Rockefeller Commission -
decisions designed to safeguard against abuses. If confirmed, I
will do all in my power to keep informed, to demand the highest
ethical standards from those with whom I work and particularly
to see that this agency stays in foreign, I repeat foreign,, intelligence
business.
I am told that morale at the CIA and indeed in other parts
of the intelligence community is low. This must change and I'll
do my best tqch nge it. Some people today are driven to wantonly
disclose sensitive information -- not to the proper oversight
authorities of the Congress but to friend and foe alike around the
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world. In many instances this type of disclosure can wipe out
effective operations, can endanger the lives of patriotic Americans
and can cause enormous damage to our own security.
I view the job of Director of Central Intelligence not as a
maker of foreign policy; but as one who should forcefully and
objectively present to the President and to the National Security
Council the findings and views of the intelligence community.
It is essential that the recommendations be without political
It is essential that strongly held differences within the"
intelligence community be presented..
It is essential that without regard to existing policy or
future policy, the intelligence estimates. be presented -- cold,
hard, truthful. .
I am convinced that I have the proper access to the
Pre-sident that was strongly emphasized in the recent Robert- D.
Murphy Commission Report.
I hope you find I have the proper integrity and character
to see the -jobwill faithfully be done.
Further I see the running of the CIA as very important,
but I see the responsibility for coordinating all of our foreign .
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intelligence activities as even more important. The CIA has a
fundamental input into intelligence estimates, but so must the
other agencies.
I will be fair to all, but I will do my level best to eliminate
unnecessary duplication of effort and minimize interagency
bureaucratic disputes. It won't be easy, I am told, but I will
try hard on this.
Second, my personal qualifications:
I am familiar with the charges that I am too political
for this job. Here is my side:
Yes, I have been in politics. I served four years in Congress.
I served 2 years as Chairman of my party. I have no apology for
either service, indeed I am proud to have served.
Some of the difficulties the CIA has encountered might
have been avoided if more political, judgment had been brought to bear.
I am not talking about narrow political partisanship, I am talking
about the respect for the people and their sensitivities that most
politicans understand.
I ,do not view political experience as a detriment. I view
it as an asset; but I also recognize the need to leave politics behind
the minute I take on the.new job if confirmed.
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I would like to'add:
If confirmed I will take no part, directly or indirectly,
in any partisan political activity of any kind.
I will not attend any political meetings.
I will give no political speeches nor make any political
contributions.
My ability to shut politics off when serving in non partisan
jobs has been demonstrated in two high and sensitive foreign affairs
posts -- as the committee can verify.
For two years I was Ambassador at the United Nations, and
for a little over a year I served in China as Chief of the U. S.
Liaison Office. Both jobs taught me a lot about the product of our
intelligence community -- both taught me the fundamental importance
of retaining an intelligence community second to. none.
Frankly, many of our friends around the world and some
who are not so friendly are wondering what we are doing to our-
selves as a nation as they see the attacks on the CIA. Some must
wonder if they can depend on us to protect them if they cooperate with
us on important intelligence projects.
I think many admire our ability to cleanse ourselves and admit
mistakes; but in something as sensitive as intelligence they frankly
hope we don't go so far that we will kill off an important asset that
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They themselves and the free world vitally need for their own
security.
In addition to my foreign affairs assignments I attended
Cabinet meetings from 1971-1974. Those four years gave me a
good insight into some of the foreign policy considerations facing
our country.
I think this foreign affairs background will be extremely
useful in my new job.
I also feel the administrative experience I had in starting
and running a business enterprise, which prospered, will be
helpful.
Lastly, I will address myself to a question that is on
the minds of some members of this committee. Namely, the
question of my having been considered in the past for the
Vice Presidency.
When Secretary Rumsfeld was before this committee not
so long ago, his name having been speculated on for Vice President,
he said "it is presumptuous of me to stand up and take myself out
of consideration for something I am not in consideration for".
The committee accepted this answer then and I offer
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Let me add just one thing more:
If some individual or group comes forward promoting me for
Vice President when I am Director of CIA I will instruct them to
cease such activity.
But there is one other question, namely; "even if you have
not lifted a finger to seek the nomination and even if you have actively
discouraged others-from advocating you for office, and the nomination
is then offered to you - will you then accept?
I cannot in all honesty tell you that I would not accept.
I don't think any American should be asked to say he
would not accept.
To my knowledge noone in the history of this Republic has
ever been asked to renounce his political birthright as the price
of confirmation for any office.
I can tell you that I will not seek any office while I hold the
job as CIA Director. I will put politics totally out of my sphere of
activities.
In this new job I serve at the pleasure of the President. I
plan to stay as long as he wants me there.
Some of my friends-have asked me "Why do you accept this
job with all its controversy and with its obvious barriers to political
future?" My answer is simple.
First, the work is desperately important to the survival of this
country and to the survival of freedom around the world.
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Second, old fashioned as it may sound, it is my
duty to serve my country. I did not seek this job, but I want
to do it and I will do my very best.
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JOURNAL
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
Monday - 15 December 1975
4. LIAISON Called Pete Roussel,
White House, in connection wit `d s nomination hearing
earlier in the day. I suggested some areas which Ambassador Bush may
wish to clarify on the answers he provided to questions concerning the
Official Secrets Act, Section' 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act, the
role of the ambassador, and providing NIE's to the Congress. Roussel
said our points were well taken, he would pass them on to Ambassador
Bush, and suggested that one of us stand by tomorrow during the ;econd
day of hearings for possible help.
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ADDENDUM TO JOURNAL,
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
Monday - 15 December 1975
2. LIAISON Ed Braswell, Chief Counsel, Senate
Armed Services Committee,
Braswell also asked that we provide him with a paper saying that
we have reviewed Ambassador Bush's portfolio and state the instances where
certain stocks that he owns wool cause any conflicts of interest. He needs
this document by tomorrow morning.
3. ADMINISTRATIVE Called Bob Wolthius,
White House, aiscuss the Acinistration's plans, for the proposed special
session of the Senate tomorrow on the Defense Appropriations Budget.
4. ADMINISTRATIVE Talked to John Maury,
DOD, to di regard to the Defense Appropriations bill
to be debated in the Senate tomorrow.
5. ~ ~ LIAISON Talked with Chuck Snodgrass,
staff of House Appropriations Committee, concerning our trip to
I then received a call from George Seymour, DOD, who said
Representative Joseph Addabbo (D., N. Y.) arid a group of Defense Subcommittee
members are thinking of making a trip to the same area. Ther : were further
conversations between Snodgrass and Ralph Preston, also of the. Committee
staff, who said he wasn't sure what the Subcommittee was going to do, and in
any event, the staffers are having Chairman George Mahon send letters to the
Secretarie,; of State and Defense as well as the Director regarding the staff25X1
trip.
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Addendum to Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel
Monday - 15 December 1975
Page 2
6. TRAVEL The Director called to advise
me of a conversation wi epre entative John Flynt (D., Ga.) concerning
his foreign travel. Per the Director's instructions, I have been in touch
wit about it.
7. LIAISON Attended a breakfast session with
Representative Ronald Dellums (D., Calif.) and his Administrative Assistant,
Robert Brauer.
8.
of the confirmation hearings for;
Legislative Counsel
cc:
O/DDCI
IC Staff
EA/DDO
Compt
ADMINISTRATIVE Attended the open session
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OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR STENNIS -- HEARINGS
ON BUSH NOMINATION -- December 15, 1975
My desire and wishes would be that we not have a secret Intelligence
Agency -- a CIA. But my judgment tells me that we must have such an Agency.
Even though it is a new and different concept of government from
anything we have had until after the end of World War II, we realized then
that we must have an intelligence gathering agency and much of its work
would have to be carried on in secret. Thus; we enacted as a part of the
National Security Act of 1947, provisions for the creation of this Agency.
Later, with the joining of NATO and other commitments, we were further
convinced that such an Agency, properly managed, was not only necessary but
was very apt and useful in carrying out those commitments which were considered
a part of our own national security. Our government, and this includes the
Chief Executive and at least a major segment of the Legislative Branch, must
have the benefit of knowing what is going on in other countries, be they
friendly or unfriendly. It is actually frightening to think of any President
trying to proceed without intelligence of the nature I have mentioned.
And of necessity, the power that is given to this Agency under law
is placed largely in the hands of the Chief Executive, whomever he may be.
First, through these hearings we can emphasize the absolute necessity
of a clear consciousness on the part of the Chief Executive of the nation of
this special power, and of the care and personal attention the President must
give to this special and exceptional power and also to the individuals that
he selects to act for him. I hope these hearings will. emphasize that point.
It is a fact that the funds the Congress appropriates for this special
Agency are placed directly in the hands of the President of the United States.
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In the final analysis, he is the one that directs the Agency and the use
of these funds. Further, there must be a surveillance by the Congress of the
exercise of the power given and the funds provided to a President, any
President.
That system of surveillance must be marked out and carried out more
intensively in the future than in the past.
I mention these points now just to make clear that even though changes
in the law and the system are needed, as I see it, proposed changes are not
now the main focal point of these hearings. Changes in the law or the system
would require hearings quite extensive indeed. The chief focal point of
our hearings beginning today relate to the nominee, the Honorable George Bush
of Texas. Mr. Bush is a gentleman that so far as I know has an honorable
public career, a man of capacity and integrity.. These matters and others
are all placed in issue by his nomination. I believe this Committee wants
to make a full examination of his character, his integrity, his capabilities
and other qualifications that pertain to the duties of the Director.
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OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN C. S TENNIS (D-Miss) ON
THE NOMINATION OF i%/IR. GEORGE BUSH TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
The Committee meets this morning to consider the nomination of
Mr. George Bush to be Director of Central Intelligence. He is to replace
Mr. William Colby.
Mr. Bush's nomination was forwarded to the Senate on November 4,
1975 and referred to the Armed Services Committee on the same date.
It.has been only within the last week, however, that MMCr. Bush has been
available to appear before this Committee.
STATUTORY BASIS AND DESCRIPTION OF POSITION
The position of Director, Central Intelligence was established in
section 10Z(a) of the National Security Act of 1947. The National Security
Act of 1947 was the culmination of years of studies, months of hearings,
and weeks of deliberations by the Armed Services Committee. It is this
Act that set up the National Security Council, restructured the defense
establishment and created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Act
was designed to provide a "national security organization" in which
intelligence could play a vital and effective role. By law, the Director of
Central intelligence was made the executive head of a new agency for nation-
al intelligence -- the Central Intelligence Agency. At the same time he was
to be under the National ^ecurity Council, the Director of "central
intelligence".
The National Security Act of 1947 prescribes various restrictions,
powers, and responsibilities for the Director of Central Intelligence.
Because of the integral relationship and overlap of the Intelligence
Community and the Defense Department, the law explicitly requires that
both the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence shall not
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2
b- ir::.i!it^i r ? :xson_aJ a d oh'-Jl not h ::uhj.ct to r=ilita,i'y contiol.. ':"h?
Di.a ^:ctoi of C jatral r: _t _1.1i^ hr,.c ire iv yn ^~ vial eli scx'ctiota i 'y -owox to
toimi-rin.ta the I f~lc;rix ?t of o#.#ic i or ^;Mi logc of th=: F.3 _~cy
tt4'Tl1 is ?v .:r h^, sh:111 --'-r. .uch tax :~i.n^.tio;::~ r: cc^ ,^ry or ._.dvisahl in tho
int-1 sts of th? Uilit~-c! +t4.:t" ". U1'th^-,Y'Iy:':.ox'~-, tho Act ,rants 3t7~c1?.~1
rosv x' to th^ Dix~ctox' of C titial Intellin^sacw~ to haw- Zcc-ass to all
intvl.lin nco of th- Uni.t c? ~t^t Cc;vsri.iment for corr latio i, -,valuation
.nd inclu'in; infornai tion of tho F. I. as may be -ssontial
to national c ^c zx it
Finz,lly, it should b-: not :c? that unclor law, "Th D:ir?ctor of C?ntral
.ntollir'_ncO shall ',?^- 3.2 ?.Uoon3ibl:, fox' protecting int^lli; ':1C 0ouI,C ^?n^.
I?r.-othodr, f_cos uiiautho iz ~d di: cIocuI ,."
to tho`!-~ , nr ovi iofx c -:t forth Li th.- law its elf, -;x_>cutiv
o L~.^13 f. nia.ct1c-' h-.-:',v xl.:th - a ':Yl! ^ xcCOrcc th? ovs:t all 1?^"~3ichi io1
of tho Dig ctoi of C-nti a;l i.rs.t :11.iY ,ac-. in th- Un-it!~d wtat^s int-fflir ".c,3
c(-: r.-unity, ' Tnd-:i i -;c nt 7.1 3if -ntc, th- Dii octo- of C ,_ .ta :al
T;.at :Ilia^iac^ h--.n a th^ Natior..t:c chi:-f intollin~ ac : Offic r sand
41
rt~xi ^"i 'til?.^ l;`ti ox .. the Senate to
ieeisonra I con i:a..itr.,ent to x ess,cnd to r.:^ruocte to appear nd tectif7 before
any cluUT con ,tituted COI er..:itt 'C of the ~;enc te. Such conarritrr-ent will of In. c0US. e b.c expect .~.1 of an P _,.. one.itiee to lee Director of C 3tial Intelligence.
_._rut t