THE FUNDING DEBATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000807710005-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 12, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807710005-7
W AShINGTON TIMES
12 ?larch 19h5
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE / --P
ELMO ZUMWALT / WORTH BAGLEY
The funding debate
The passionate debate about
Nicaragua reflects the two
main points of view about
American security policy-
making in the Third World.
Adherents of the White House
view that the Marxist Sandinistas
are fair game argue from the real-
ities of Soviet doctrine and action.
No Communist regime is thought
to be committed to peaceful change
in the world order and they should
not be treated as if they were.
THE WHITE HOUSE VIEW
President Reagan's defense pro-
gram has deterred the Soviets from
the type of direct aggression they
initiated in Afghanistan under
Carter policies. A possible conse-
quence of Mr. Reagan's success,
however, is Moscow's increased
i emphasis on indirect aggression
fashioned to avoid confrontation
with the United States. That Soviet
strategy is evident in Nicaragua and
in El Salvador, both objects of Soviet
and Cuban military assistance
designed to spread armed terror and
subversion in Central America.
If America does not respond with
non-military and military aid, then
the Soviets will be able to accom-
plish their aggression objectives
despite costly U.S. rearming. Should
our response not be timely, resisting
the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran
rebels when they are vulnerable,
then our expensive politico-military
Elmo Zumwalt and Worth Bagley,
retired Navy admirals, are nation-
ally syndicated columnists.
campaigns might not succeed.
The White House recognizes that
the enveloping, indirect Soviet
strategy in the Third World could
force major U.S. arms transfers,
delaying American rearming and
drawing U.S. power from other key
regions, where direct Soviet aggres-
sion might then become attractive.
In that event, our allies would lose
confidence in U.S. defense abilities
and might seize that pretext to
refuse to coordinate in planning
Opponents of the
White House views
downplay the realities
(in Nicaragua).
defenses in regions such as the Per-
sian Gulf, where U.S. arms alone
would be stretched thin under the
best of circumstances.
'Ib defeat those aims of Soviet
Third World strategy, the president
would prefer to use covert measures
where practical to minimize the
demands on our central defense
resources.
Opposing Soviet armed
transgressions in the Third World
both protects the free choice of
exploited peoples and gives them
hope for a peaceful existence. That
American response is not inconsis-
tent with the less-violent U.S. reac-
tion to authoritarian states which do
no: conform with U.S. ideas of
democracy, but which resist Com-
munist subversion.
Whatever our differences with
Chile, South Africa, and the like, the
instrument for showing U.S. dis-
pleasure is diplomacy, not arms. The
White House believes the United
States has enough urgent security
problems without creating more on
its own volition.
THE OPPOSING VIEW
Opponents of these White House
views downplay the realities,
emphasizing what they say are the
moral imperatives of American
behavior.
We should not intervene single-
mindedly in Third World rebellions,
regardless of Soviet involvement,
because oppressed people are seek-
ing their own idea of a better life. If,
in the future, those states fall under
Soviet influence and host Soviet
bases or forces that threaten the
United States, we should act then to
end that threat.
Instead of U.S. intervention in the
Third World, opponents say we
should devote our energies to
changing authoritarian regimes that
pose no threat to the United States
but which affront American values.
There may be a chance that promot-
ing change in these countries could
result in Marxist governments
opposed to the United states, but that
risk is seen as worth taking.
These White House opponents
reiect using covert assistance to
destabilize a Communist govern-
ment or to aid its opponents. They
imply that any covert U.S. operations
are unacce to a ma ?m sure,
tnrou h the Congress, that those
o erations become Public
owledge. They prefer economic
aid, no matter whose hands it will
pass through to reach oppressed
peoples, and they argue that mili-
tary aid should be limited so that
non-military measures are allowed
to have effect.
C. ued
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807710005-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807710005-7
THE ISSUES RAISED
Several issues are raised by these
contrary policies.
President Reagan uses U.S. power
to avoid or head off confrontations
with the Soviet Union so that the
risks of nuclear war are kept low.
His opponents would delay, limit, or
prevent U.S. responses to Soviet
transgressions, accepting conse-
quences that could ensure confron-
tations in the future.
President Reagan would treat
admittedly ambiguous threats and
situations in the Third World for
what they are, managing U.S. mili-
tary and non-military responses to
clarify uncertainties and then
directing actions that best satisfy
U.S. interests.
His opponents prefer quick,
explicit objectives that limit what
the United States might do and
inform the Soviets what they need to
do to succeed. By placing explicit
limits on what the United States
would do to nurture democracy in
the Third World, they allow the Sovi-
ets to raise the price of victory for
Free World influence to a level the
U.S. public generally will not sup-
port.
In response to each signal of
Soviet politico-military aggression,
either direct or indirect, President
Reagan warns the Soviets of the
risks of proceeding.
The Reagan opponents see each
threat of an expanding Soviet influ-
ence as a pretext for not responding,
arguing that the situation is ambigu-
ous and a U.S. reaction more likely
to be provocative than to deter.
The president would resist the
inroads of Soviet subversion in the
Third World to prevent the cumula-
tive erosion of American strategic
positions around the world.
His opponents would accept that
strategic erosion until the Soviets
chose to exploit it by direct threats
to the United States.
It is these issues which should
preoccupy the Congress and the
'American people as the funding for
U.S. policies in Nicaragua and in El
Salvador are debated in this year's
budget.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807710005-7