IRANIAN POWER PLAYS REFLECTED IN TERRORIST MOVES?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000807620003-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 5, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807620003-9
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C;J PACE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
5 November 1986
Iranian power
plays reflected in
terrorist moves?
J By pobin Mh10 1
Sp" to The cnnnin Sconce Monitor
WnNnglon to move
Terrorism emanating from the Middle East is beginning
beyond the control of even those states that have traditionally
supported the myriad extremist factions operating both in and
outside the region.
Groups such as Hizbullah ("Party of God"), the umbrella Shiite
Muslim movement in Lebanon of
which Islamic Jihad is believed to be a
part, are increasingly acting on their
own initiative. This trend, which has
been emerging in the past year, often
runs contrary to the wishes of states
such as Iran and Syria that have
helped create and support the groups.
But Iran and, perhaps to a lesser
degree, Syria retain influence over the
extremist groups and are now trying to
reassert their control. This jockeying
for power may well be a contributing
factor in this week's release of Amer-
ican hostage David Jacobsen.
Iran's apparent involvement in con-
vincing Islamic Jihad ("Holy War") to
free Mr. Jacobsen may have flowed in
part from Tehran's self-interest. At
least one faction of Iranians have
something to gain domestically - and
in the region - by reining in the extremists at a crucial juncture.
There also appears to have been a more specific quid pro quo in
what White House chief of staff Donald Regan conceded over the
weekend was "a deal" with unspecified parties.
Iran's sponsorship of terrorism and misadventures by Muslim
extremists now appear to be a key element in the rivalry between
moderates and radicals over the future leadership of that country.
At stake ultimately is Iran's reputation abroad, particularly at a
time of economic trouble, and its entire
approach toward foreign policy and the
six-year-old war with Iraq. The current
dispute in Tehran is not likely to settle the
issue of Iran's future direction. But it may
establish a different framework.
The power struggle is reflected in a
recent controversy centered on the
Islamic Liberation Movement (ILM)
headed by Mehdi Hashemi. He is son-in-
law and aide to Ayatollah Hossein Ali
Montazeri, who, a year ago, was chosen to
be Ayatollah Khomeini's successor.
The ILM oversees foreign extremist
groups from Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Sau-
di Arabia, and elsewhere, based in Tehran
and involved in "exporting the revolu-
tion" or undermining Western influence
and moderate regimes in the Middle East.
Mr. Hashemi and several of his ILM
colleagues were arrested last month on
charges of murder, both before and after
Iran's 1979 revolution; illegal possession
of weapons and secret government docu-
ments; forging official papers; and secret
illegal activities. Hashemi was also re-
portedly linked with last month's kidnap-
ping in Tehran of a diplomat from Syria,
Iran's closest Arab ally, and with smug-
gling guns on a Saudi airliner during the
annual Muslim pilgrimage in August.
The charges are among the most damn-
ing indictments ever against a high-level
government insider, particularly one so
close to Ayatollah Khomeini's successor.
The case offers an indication of how
key figures in the extremist campaign are
now considered to have gone beyond
what is acceptable to Iran's leadership. It
also demonstrates how far the govern-
ment is prepared to go to stop that. The
Iranian theocracy rarely launders its
dirty works with such publicity. This de-
velopment is all the more interesting in
light of Jacobsen's release and sugges-
tions that other Americans may be freed.
Iran seems to be reining in the extrem-
ists, at home and in the region, and trying
to tone down its image as a terror master.
The initiative for Hashemi's arrest ap-
parently came from the emerging moder-
ate block in the Iranian hierarchy, which
seeks to change both Iran's policy and the
leadership succession. For more than two
years, the moderates have struggled to
improve relations with Arab moderates
and Western nations for political, eco-
nomic, and military reasons.
Politically, the moderates have long
been concerned about breaking out of the
isolation enforced by the outside world,
which has often held Tehran culpable for
various terrorist acts. Radical elements
that have supported ILM practices feel
that extremist acts are the most effective
way to undermine rivals and promote
militant Islam. But many moderates ar-
gue that the Islamic revival is best served
by proving Iran a model state that others
will voluntarily want to imitate.
One early indication of the moderates'
new approach came during the interven-
tion of parliamentary Speaker Hashemi
Rafsanjani during the hijacking of a
Trans World Airlines plane in June 1985.
Mr. Rafsanjani played a pivotal role,
which the US acknowledged, by exerting
influence on Hizbullah, to gain the release
?~~;~, ~rf
of 39 US passengers. Iran's moderates
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807620003-9