U.S. DECIDED TO GIVE LIBYA FIRM MESSAGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000807570024-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: March 26, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/23: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807570024-2
;.cN'rLAN& LC\SHTNGTnN POST Al - R. , "
\ ~~-- 26 March 19&E ~t
I1. S. Decided
To Give Libya
Firm Message
By Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writer
In the middle of July last
year, then-national security
affairs adviser Robert C.
McFarlane opened a meeting
on Libya with President Rea-
gan and top administration
foreign policy advisers by say-
ing that Muammar Qaddafi
threatened U.S. interests,
that diplomatic pressure and
economic sanctions had failed
to curtail his terrorism, and
that much stronger measures
should be undertaken to
thwart the Libyan leader.
After McFarlane's presen-
tation, something happened
that has been rare in the Rea-
gan administration on foreign
policy issues. Everyone
agree The Central Intelli-
gence Agency and Depart-
ments of State and Defense
each concurred. An unmistak-
able-warning was to be sent to
Qaddafi, although it was not
yet clear bow, w ere or w en.
This unusual consensus
launched a series of discus-.
sions, studies, interagency
meetings, and even military
targeting plans on Libya. The
door was considered open for
new ideas on how to deal with
Qaddafi. There even was se-
rious consideration of a pre-
emptive military strike
against Libya in concert with
U.S. allies in the Middle East,
according to well-placed
sources, but Reagan never
agreed to such actions.
A to -secret CIA study dat-
ed several days after the " Na-
tional Securit Planning Grou
(NSPG) meeting in u y ana-
lyzed the pros and cons of pre-
emptive mi nta ac ion an
concluded that the administra+:
lion had an opportunity to redraw
the ma of North Africa.
Reagan's senior a visers agreed
that, following the hijacking of TWA
flight 847 in June, when one Amer-
ican was killed and 39 others held
hostage for 17 days, a line had to be
drawn against terrorism. Even Rea-
gan, who had shown restraint after
previous terrorist incidents, said
that the televised humiliation
aboard the TWA jet was too much
to endure and that the United
States would act in the future, the
sources said.
U.S. intelligence showed that
Iran and Syria probably were more
involved in the recent acts of ter-
rorism, but those countries were
not the visible symbols of evil that
Qaddafi Presented. A demonstration
of U.S. resolve was necessary and
Libya was singled out.
The key planner on the Libya
issue was Vice Adm. John M. Po-
indexter, then the deputy national
security affairs adviser who even-
tually succeeded McFarlane as the
senior adviser. Poindexter chaired
regular, even weekly, White House
meetings. Poindexter made a secret
visit to Egypt around Labor Day
last year to coordinate possible joint
military operations against Libya.
Sources described this as only
contingency planning, but it was
given extraordinary importance and
secrecy. He was accompanied by
Donald R. Fortier, now Poindex-
ter's deputy at the NSC.
Poindexter carried with him a
ledge from Reagan that the United
es would provide direct combat
rt to Egypt in any confronta-
tion with Libya along the 600-mile
Egyptian-Libyan border, according
to two informed sources, One of-
ficial recently played down the sig-
nificance of this pledge, saying that
it was routine in any contingency
Planning with an ally.
In a parallel development, Rea-
gan apptnv 1:! 1 a cove opera-
tion aesigned to undermine Qaddafi;
a an, the rest ent ec at
this effort be coordinat wit
allies in the Middle East disposed to
An intelligence analysis done before
the November summit meeting in
Geneva between Reagan and Soviet
leader Mikhail Gorbachev con-
cluded that strong overt or covert
action against i -w-o-60--not
trigger a Soviet response and would
nQt ready er~ely affect the summit.
Administration attention was re-
focused on Lib a again late 1ast
year. when U.S. intelligence eter-
mmed that Soviet-made SA5 long-
range antiaircraft missiles were
being installed at two and possibly,
three sites in Libya.
The White House then attempted
to send another emissary to Egypt
to continue contingency planning in
December, but the Egyptians re-
portedly put it off, according to
knowledgeable sources. At that
time, U.S.-Egyptian relations were
strained following the interception
by U.S. jet fighters of an Egyptian
airliner carrying the four hijackers
of the cruise ship Achille Lauro.
The Pentagon further discour-
aged any direct U.S. military action
and determined that an all-out mil-
itary engagement with Libya could
require up to six U.S. divisions, or
more than 90,000 men.
Following the Dec. 27 terrorist
attacks on the Rome and Vienna
airports, the CIA otound a s rong
Libyan connection to the terrorists
and anti-Qadda planning was ac-
celerated. At meetings of the NSPG
on Jan. 6 and 7, the president or-
dered that more money and atten-
tion be given to the covert CIA plan
designed to undermine Qaddafi:
Reagan also irecte that
mi Mary
contingency planning with E ypt
continue. Publicly, the president
ordered increas economic sanc-
Aircraft carrier operations north
of Libya were ordered in late Jan-
uary, but the Defense Department
wanted to wait until three carriers
were available near the Gulf of
Sidra before testing Qaddafi's claim
that the entire gulf is Libyan ter-
ritory.
Qaddafi's claim, rejected by vir-
tually all other nations, presented
the administration with what one
source called "a golden opportunity"
to test Libya but not undertake any
preemptive or retaliatory action
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/23: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807570024-2
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/23: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807570024-2
against targets that had not at-
tacked U.S. forces first.
"Any response would be defen-
sive," said one official, "and there
was at least the presumption that
international law and public opinion
would be on our side.-
A senior Pentagon planner was
sent to Egypt in February to con-
tinue the contingency planning,
which has received much attention
in the White House because of Po-
indexter's previous role, the
sources said.
One source said this week's ac-
tion may have satisfied the presi-
dent's determination to demon-
strate U.S. resolve, but the source
also indicated that a wide range of
more dramatic options are available
if Qaddafi provokes them.
Several sources said that given
the more radical options, the admin-
istration has taken a moderate
course.
"American public opinion was
ready for this, prepared, knowing
that Qaddafi is a bad actor," one
official said. "They're ready for just
about anything; they knew some-
thing was going to happen; they
would probably tolerate anything
the president chose to do."
Since the first year of the Reagan
administration, w en a i a eg-
edly was planning to send hit squads
to assassinate top U.S. officials, toe
Libyan a er has been a m o
nemesis for the administration, par-
ticularly CIA Director William
Casey, actor mg to sources.
"There are lots of [intelligence]
collection assets given to Qaddafi,
trying to keep up with him, at-
tempts to follow him, to [intercept]
his phone calls, take photographs of
him," one senior source said.
At the Defense Department,
Qaddafi has been taken less serious-
ly, according to sources, becau
e
poses no direct strategic threat to
the United States. min the last
nine mont s, eagan, asey and
Poindexter have made Qaddafi a
primary focus. The vast national se-
curity apparatus of the United
States has been focused on the Lib-
yan leader, including diplomacy,
economic sanctions, a CIA covert
plan, an now ree avy -carrier
groups.
01
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/23: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807570024-2