REAGAN'S USE OF FORCE MARKS TURNING POINT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000807570018-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: April 16, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/23: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807570018-9
ti:,! tr?EAR[9 I WASHINGTON POST
16 April 1986
3.~c r+-r
Reagan's Use of Force
Marks Turning Point
More Terror and Retaliation Seen
By Lou Cannon and Bob Woodward J
W.ishmgtoe Post Staff Writers
Monday's military strike against Libya marked a
turning point in administration policy after five years of
internal debate about how to respond to international
terrorism. Officials said yesterday that the attack is
likely to prompt further terrorist attacks against U.S.
targets that could require additional military opera-
tions.
"For the first time we weren't debating whether to
use military force against state-supported terrorism but
the best way to use it," said an official who participated
in the deliberations preceding President Reagan's de-
cision to launch the attack.
Reagan said yesterday that the strike against Libya
was "but a single engagement in a long battle against
terrorism" and vowed to keep up the pressure on Lib-
yan leader Muammar Qaddafi to end his support for ter-
rorism.
Other officials emphasized that the military strike
could mark the beginning of a long and difficult period
of conflict. One official said the administration would
seek further economic actions against Libya by Euro-
pean allies and would use other military options if nec-
essary.
"We're not just turning our head and going off to oth-
er business," the official said. "We realize this could be a
tough problem to deal with for a while and we're deter-
mined to use the energy and resources necessary to
deal with it."
Officials said yesterday that the Reagan turn to a mil-
itary option had resolved the long conflict between Sec-
retary of State George P. Shultz, who for nearly
two years has publicly advocated a military re-
sponse to terrorism, and Defense Secretary Cas-
par W. Weinberger who, with the support of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, often had objected to using
U.S. military forces in antiterrorist operations.
Yesterday, Pentagon spokesman Robert B.
Sims took pains to point out Weinberger's sup-
port of the operation and said the secretary was
involved in target and route selections even
though he was out of the country in the week be-
fore the attack. There was "uniform consensus
and support" for the operations from Weinberger
and the joint chiefs, Sims said.
A longtime friend of Reagan said yesterday
that "Cap always knows where Reagan's head is
and understood that the president had finally de-
termined to strike back."
Reagan, in a speech to the American Business
Conference, said U.S. forces "spoke to the out-
law Libyan regime in the only language that Col-
onel Qaddafi seems to understand."
Reagan arrived at this position as part of a
long process in which he was increasingly frus-
trated at the failure to influence or deter Qaddafi
by diplomatic or economic means, officials said.
One official said that as Reagan's frustration
grew, he more frequently expressed his "revul-
sion" at Qaddafi's willingness to kill innocent ci-
vilians in his efforts to strike against the United
States.
But it was the rare success of a military an-
titerrorist operation-not frustration-that ap-
parently convinced Reagan to follow this course,
the official said. He said the president's commit-
ment to a military response against terrorism
dated to last October when U.S. planes inter-
cepted the hijackers of the Italian luxury liner
Achille Lauro, on which a U.S. citizen was mur-
dered.
Reagan's turn to a military response reflects
in part his growing reliance on Shultz, officials
said. But they said Shultz's position was en-
hanced by a growing appetite in the White House
national security office for military retaliation.
"When Shultz first made his case, the national
security adviser [William P. Clark] sided with
Weinberger," an official said. "When Clark was
replaced by [Robert C.1 McFarlane, Shultz
gained an important ally, but one who believed in
a step-by-step approach with military action as
the last resort. Now, there is a national security
adviser [John M. Poindexter] who turns readily
to military force."
Libya has been a thorn in the administration's
side since the early days of the Reagan presf c y. On Jan. 30, 1981, days after Reagan took
office, the Central Intelligence enc circulated
what it considered to be an important intelli-
gence paper titled "Libya, Aims and Vulnerabil-
ities," which forecast that a a s "aggressive
policies will pose a growing challenge en e to
interests in the Middle East and Africa." It con-
cluded that a a i would engage in more ad-
venturism."
On May 6, 1981, in the administration's first
confrontation with Qaddafi, the United States
closed the Libyan diplomatic mission in Wash-
ington and alleged "Libyan provocations and mis-
conduct, including support for international ter-
rorism."
This was followed by the Aug. 19. 1981, -
ercise in the Gulf of Sidra that led to the downing
of two Libyan jets after a brief dogfight with 177.
lanes. Soon afterward, the White House re-
ceived intelligence reports tat a a i was
sen ing out "hit squads" to assassinate Reagan
and other top administration otticials,
Cate in 1981 a memo was sent to the presi-
dent-signed by then-secretary of state Alex-
ander M. Haig Jr., director of central intelligence
William 1. Casey and Weinberger-saying that,
at a National Security Planning Group meeting
on Nov. 30, "you directed that plans be devel-
oped for a military response against Libya in the
event of a further Libyan attempt to assassinate
American officials or attack U.S. facilities."
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/23: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807570018-9
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These three advisers-in language remark-
ably similar to the rationale th4 administration is
now using for its Libyan operation-recom-
mended that Reagan order contingency military
planning "to carry out military action against Lib-
ya in self-defense following a further Libyan
provocation."
The Pentagon did top-secret planning and pro-
posed a series of graduated responses as contin-
gencies. But they were never carried out, and
administration officials subsequently acknowl-
edged that concern about "hit squads" on Amer-
ican soil may have been overblown.
Libya was a back-burner concern during 1982
and much of the following year. But terrorism
abruptly became a major administration concern
after a suicide truck bomber hurtled into a Ma-
rine headquarters barracks in Beirut on Oct. 23,
1983, and killed 241 U.S. servicemen.
"Reagan took that catastrophe very hard," said
a longtime associate of the president, "even
though the Grenada invasion the following week
softened some of the impact. It began to change
his thinking."
The Beirut incident also had an impact on two
former Marines, Shultz and McFarlane. A week
before the attack, McFarlane had replaced Clark
as national security affairs adviser. The Marines
were withdrawn from Lebanon early in 1984,
but terrorism remained of major concern to Rea-
gan, Shultz and McFarlane and was heightened
by a Sept. 20, 1984, terrorist attack on the U.S.
Embassy annex in Beirut.
On Oct. 25, 1984, in a speech titled "Terror-
ism and the Modern World," Shultz called for a
new and violent response to terrorist activity.
"We must reach a consensus in this country
that our responses should go beyond passive de-
fense to consider means of active prevention,
preemption and retaliation," Shultz said. "Our
goal must be to prevent and deter future terror-
ist acts, and experience has taught us over the
years that one of the best deterrents to terror-
ism is the certainty that swift and sure measures
will be taken against those who engage in it."
But Shultz's counsel, resisted in specific in-
stances by Weinberger and the joint chiefs. i
not immediately prevail. Instead, the president
agreed to a covert operation in which the CIA
would train and support counterterrorist units in
the Middle East.
''
iF -ended disastrously on March 8, 1985,
when a unit of the Lebanese intelligence service,
acting without CIA authorization undertook the
car-bombing of a suspected terrorist that failed
to kill him but left 80 civilians ea an anot er
200 inure s a result, Reagan and the CIA
quickly canceled the covert operation.
ree months later, when TWA- Flight 847
was hijacked, administration conflicts about how
to deal with terrorism remained unresolved. But
terrorism quickly became a highly visible issue
for Americans during the 17 days of this crisis.
Although a Navy diver aboard Flight 847 was
killed by the hijackers, the rest of the passengers
were released unharmed. But McFarlane and
other high officials concluded in the aftermath
that the administration had been fortunate to
have the incident resolved peacefully. They pri-
vately launched nine months of top-secret plan-
ning that culminated Monday in the military op-
eration against Libya known as "El Dorado Can-
yon."
Sources said it was the TWA 847 hijacking
that brought anti-Libyan and antiterrorist
icies toget er. a top-secret planning led to a
number of military options in which Libya in-
creasingly was singled out as a main arge
even though several other nations, notably Syria
and ran were a so considered to be centers o
state-supported terrorism. The pla
inc u e a
CIA covert operation to undermine Qaddafi and
secret military contingency pFan-ning with Egypt
for a possible joint U.S-Egyptian attack on ya.
A senior official said yesterday that Libya as
been a significant concern for the United States
ever since the antiterrorist contingency planning
began last summer. But this planning was sharp-
ly accelerated by the Achille Lauro hijacking and
espcially by the Dec. 27 terrorist attacks at the
Rome and Vienna airports.
The airport attacks provoked a furious person-
al denunciation of Qaddafi by Reagan, who at a
January news conference called the Libyan lead-
er "a barbarian." Reagan's concern and Shultz's
conviction that force must be used against ter-
rorism finally prevailed in the bombing operation
carried out Monday-an exercise that adminis-
tration officials see not as the end of an effort to
appease terrorism but as the beginning of a long
and probably violent conflict with Libya.
Staff writers Fred Hiatt and David Hoffman
contributed to this report.
A
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/23: CIA-RDP9O-00965ROO0807570018-9