STATE DEPT. PLAN URGED LIBYA COUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000807560025-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: October 5, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807560025-2
(tle P WASHINGTON POST
5 October 1986
State Dept.
Plan Urged
Libya Coup
Reagan Policy Vetoed
Efforts to Encourage
Gadhafi Assassination
By Bob Woodward
wadwwn? Pm,t Staff Writer
A State Department working pa-
per used last August in drawing up
the Reagan administration's plan of
deception and disinformation
against Libyan leader Moammar
Gadhafi advocated a strategy that
could lead to "a coup or assassina-
tion attempt" against Gadhafi by his
own military or other opponents.
The memo, circulated by the
State Department on Aug. 6 in ad-
vance of a White House meeting of
officials at the assistant secretary
level, stated, "The goal of our near-
term strategy should be to continue
Gadhafi's paranoia so that he re-
mains preoccupied, off-balance ...
[and] believes that the army and
other elements in Libya are plotting
against him-possibly with Soviet
help. Believing that, he may in-
crease the pressure on the [Libyan]
army, which in turn may prompt a
coup or assassination attempt.-
The final directive approved by
President Reagan in mid-August did
not mention assassination. Instead,
it ordered covert, diplomatic and
economic steps designed to deter
Libyan-sponsored terrorism and
bring about a change of leadership
in Libya.
Administration officials have said
explicitly that the overall adminis-
tration policy does not directly seek
assassination of Gadhafi, although
some officials acknowledge that
that could be one outcome. A 1981
executive order signed by Reagan
directs that "no person employed by
or acting on behalf of the United
States government shall engage in,
or conspire to engage in, assassi.
nation."
An administration official yester-
day issued the following White
House response: "The document in
question is a working paper with no
standing as administration policy.
Moreover, any inference in the doc-
ument that a policy option was ever
considered to promote the assas-
sination of Gadhafi is wrong. Sup-
port for assassination in any form
has never been and is not now a
part of administration policy."
The statement added, "Advocat-
ing change in a governmental re-
gime is not the same as advocating
assassination. To associate the two
Several senior administration
officials privately criticized the am-
biguity of overall policy toward
Gadhafi, which they see as aimed at
removing him without directly em-
ploying necessary or likely means
for doing so. "They want him out
but not the dirty hands," said one
ranking administration official.
Similarly, some sources said ad-
ministration officials failed to real-
ize that spreading disinformation to
deceive Gadhafi would also mislead
the American news media and pub-
lic. They also said that the policy of
deception and disinformation grew
out of an overreaction by adminis-
tration officials to a new intelli-
gence report on Gadhafi's state of
mind.
.The in IIiQ n report- deliv-
ered in Jul to Secretar of State
eor e u tz an entra me -
li ence Agency Director William J.
Case sai a a i had ac so
bizarrel in a meeting wi emeni
a e see aln
out of control and might be on the
verge of a nervous br akdown
Some administration officals saw in
this an opportunity to increase psy-
chological pressure on Gadhafi,
whom they were determined to
oust if they could.
Subsequent, more reliable intel-
ligence indicated that the initial re-
port was exaggerated. Gadhafi ac-
tually sat through the meeting with
the Yemenis in silence, apparently
sulking in a corner, according to
sources. Such behavior is not un-
usual for the mercurial Libyan lead-
er, according to government spe-
cialists, but by the time the Gadhafi
behavior was understood, a crucial
interagency review was under way.
Keenly attentive to Gadhafi's ev-
ery step, fearing a resurgence of his
terrorist plots and wishing to cap-
italize on the deterrent value of the
April 14 U.S. bombing raid on Lib-
ya, the administration seized on the
original report of the Libyan's in-
stability and went into high gear.
The State and Defense depart-
e -
-
_nts. t e an t Fe ate
Hous an to consider wh . .
might be taken to keen uo the "as-
sure on Gadhafi and jar him psycho-
l g calls as part of another phase of
d i
Although there was other evi-
dence that adha i wa in a e r -s-
lion ater the U S r id sourr s sit
the administration's tendency to
imp- to conclusions from tentative
or single intellig n r its as in-
dicative of the handlin of Libyan
intelligence in orma ion
"It's no longer rational," said one
intelligence official. "The use and
sifting of [intelligence reports] does
not have the clear-headed, dispas-
sionate eye that is required."
But Casey for one wanted more
action and more results, according
Richard Kerr the CIA's new de
.- -
-or opera ions -0 icia or t e
ast an sia, went to work, acr
cor mg o sources. sca ation o
the psychological war against Gad-
hafi-was propose .
he 17th anniversary of Gad-
hafi's revolution was coming up on
Sept. I. He was supposed to make a
speech to mark the occasion, an im-
portant symbolic event. U.S. offi-
cials speculated on the possibility of
frightening him into not appearing.
There was reliable intelligence that
he had moved Libyan military head-
quarters from the coast inland near.
ly 500 miles to Kufrah. He was ob-
viously fearful, officials concluded,
and wanted the headquarters to be
less accessible to U.S. carrier-based
bombers.
Inside the inteliQg,~,~_..~u-
nityand within the State -so
bate began. Could Gadhafi be
cause oosecon i ence in him-
se . e sou be ke tin i mg or
hheranm'ver~ nary f at impact would
Or on the Libyan military that is
supposed to be restive and unhappy
wit eir ea er.
bald
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The officials involved in these
discussions newt at a
and other top o ficials were
frustra-
.tlc~ tat the CIA effort to under-
mine and overthrow adhafi had .
not succeeded "We had a -lit
that was working welly riper j
terrorism, but [senior adminictra-
ti n o icials wanted to o further
and change the regime " said one
source.
A seven- a e memo dated Aug 6
from t e State Departm n 's 0ffj
of intelli and research was
distribute to senior middle- e i
officials in preparation for an un.
coming interagency meetin . It was
t mo a propose t e rea
and illusory events" and speculated
that enough pressure on Gadhafi
might prompt him to so press his
own military and other Libyan el-
ements that they could attempt to
assassinate him.
One recipient of the memo was
Lt. Gen. John H. Moellering, assist-
ant to the chairman of the Joints
Chiefs of Staff, according to
sources. They said that Moellering
expressed dismay within the Pen-
tagon and to Adm. William J. Crowe
Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
that the administration might be
embarking on a dangerous course.
He argued that such a plan could be
the equivalent of waving a red flag
in front of the unstable Libyan lead-
er.
He and others also expressed
concern that U.S. officials were dis-
cussing actions designed to prompt
an "assassination" despite what they
took to be a ban on U.S. govern-
ment participation in such plots.
On Au . _7 at 4:30 p .T., the Crisis,
Pre-Planning rou
the White Housettion nroom.
There senior representatives from
the CIA, the State Deparanme t nd
Wh
ite House endorsed the overall
menc memo and other planning dot
uments.
Vincent M. Cannistraro. a vet-
eran CIA operations officer and di-_
rector of intelligence on the Nation-
al Security Council staff, and How-
ard Teicher, the director-of"
rector of the
office of political military affairs in
the NSC, supported the disinforma-
tion and deception p n, tfie sources
Informed sources said that they
understood that White House na-
tional security affairs adviser John
M. Poindexter approved the gen-
eral principles and approaches of
the State Department memo, but
the reference to prompting an "as-
sassination attempt" was removed.
A meeting with the president to
consider the next steps on Libya
was scheduled for Aug. 14. This
was the National Security Planning
Group . (NSPG), the Cabinet-level
discussion involving Reagan and his
top advisers.
Before the meeting, Poindexter
sent the president a three-page
memo outlining the next steps and
saying that a key element of the
strategy was to combine "real and
,illusionary events-through a dis-
information program-with the ba-
sic goal of making Gadhafi think
that there is a high degree of inter-
nal opposition to him within Libya,
that his key trusted aides are dis-
loyal, that the U.S. is about to move
against him militarily."
This section of Poindexter's
memo reflected the Aug. 6 State
Department proposal for "a se-
quenced chain of real and illusory
events .... "
Sources said Reagan approved
the overall plan and that it was
made formal in a National Security
Decision Document he signed, That
document does not mention assas-
sination, and the only deception was
to be directed abroad and at Gad-
hafi.
Poindexter's aide Teicher was,
according to sources, the only non-
Cabinet-level official at the Aug. 14
NSPG meeting. He was the note-
taker for the one-hour session.
White House officials said that
Teicher was one of the officials who
spoke with The Wall Street journal
before its Aug. 25 story that said
"the U.S. and Libya are on a colli-
sion course again," and painted a
picture of impending U.S. military
action in response to Gadhafi's al-
leged renewal of terrorist plots.
Teicher has said he spoke with
one author of the Journal story be-
fore its publication but that he did
not leak anything and the author
already had all the details.
The White House has taken the
position that the Journal article was
"generally correct" but that the in-
formation was not authorized for
release. One White House official
said recently that information pro-
vided the Journal was part of a
"Lone Ranger operation" by one or
more officials but not Teicher.
After The Washington Post dis-
closed details of the administra.
tion's deception campaign against
Gadhafi last week, administration
officials disputed the suggestion-
contained in Poindexter's August
memo to Reagan-that Gadhafi
was "quiescent" on the terrorist front at the
time the campaign against him was being
planned.
The most recent administration position
on whether Gadhafi was stepping up terror-
ist plans last summer was provided Thurs-
day by a senior administration official who
said that in July the intelligence was tenta-
tive-"it didn't say that he [Gadhafil was
going to go off and bomb something or go
off and take somebody hostage or hijack an
airplane. It wasn't that kind of hard intel-
ligence, but there were little pieces that
indicated he was beginning to move."
Intelligence experts said the U.S. intel-
ligence agencies and the White House were
on the lookout for anything on Gadhafi. Said
one well-placed expert, "The intelligence
machinery was cocked, a hair-trigger ....
Five Libyans arriving in Paris with five suit-
cases became an intelligence report.
"It just wasn't hard," said this expert,
who has firsthand knowledge of the reports.
"Poindexter would not have said 'quiescent'
to the president if that was not the case
? ... At the same time there was indication
that the Libyan infrastructure was being
reassembled" after so many Libyan diplo-
mats allegedly involved in terrorism were
expelled from European capitals.
He added, "The administration and the
intelligence agencies are paranoid about
Gadhafi and for good reason."
He said some members of the adminis-
tration are not skilled at interpreting raw
intelligence, saying it is an art form and that
many officials are inclined to overstate the
Libyan problem.
At the same time, sources said the ad-
ministration had dozens of reports showing
meetings and travel by Libyans that were
deemed suspicious.
A senior administration official said the
increase number of-intelligence
reports
hinting at terrorist ac ivi in Par re ct-s a
vastly improved intelligence collection sys-
tte and the hi h priority assigned to re-
ports of possible terrorist incidents, espe-
ving
sponsor of terrorist pots.
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He said, there are "lots of 'heads up' re-
ports and that does not necessarily mean
there is renewed activity .... We are just
better and more attentive .... Also, our
ability to disseminate it is better."
One former head of a U.S. intelligence
agenc sai it is U un erstan mg t 5t t Fe
i
ntelligence on Libya an yan ac
not of a very high quality and attributes the
aisa regiments to the weakness of the in-
formation. He adde hen the inte i-
gence is 111,10110131 an mcontroverti e, t ere is
agreement. ou get disagreements w en no
one has enou h ood information."
Reagan and other a mmistration officials
on Thursday denied any intent to have the
disinformation appear in the U.S. news me-
dia. At the same time, they acknowledged
that there was a plan to deceive Gadhafi.
Whether the White House deliberately
attempted to spread disinformation, or
whether one aide without authorization
passed on the disinformation to U.S. news
media, officials said that a simple fact was
overlooked: It is impossible to have a high-
level, high-visibility effort of deception
aimed abroad without some or all of the in-
formation appearing in the U.S. media.
A former CIA officer said that the agency
normally undertakes small, low-level disin-
formation campaigns in a few countries or a
single country . But in the current anti-Gad-
ha iplan, the ormer o ficer said, "the ire of
disinformation was supposed to sweep
across the Middle East an urope ... and
no one was supposed to notice? They were
kidding themselves."
The recirculation back into the U .S, news
media of disinformation planted abroad by
the-CM is often referred to-as " ow ck."
But one source familiar with tea ius-
tration strategy said that what happened in
the latest a aipoywas ow-r
cause the launch of the idea, mtenpona or
not, was in the U.S. media.
Staff researcher Barbara Fein man
contributed to this report
HOW PROGRAM ON LIBYA DEVELOPED
? April 14: U.S. bombing raid on Libya.
^ July: New intelligence report questioning the mental stability of
Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi triggers interagency review of
U.S.-Libyan policy.
^ Aug. 6: State Department group circulates to interagency group
a memo proposing a disinformation and deception campaign and
suggesting such a campaign could trigger an assassination attempt
on Gadhafi by his military or other opponents.
^ Aug. 7: Crisis Pre-Planning Group of officials from State, Central
Intelligence Agency, Defense Department and White House meet
at White House to endorse overall plan outlined in original State
Department memo.
^ Aug. 12: Reagan gets three?page memo from Adm. John M.
Poindexter, his national security affairs adviser, summarizing a pro-
posed program of disinformation against Libya.
^ Aug 14: Reagan meets with Cabinet-level National Security
Planning Group and approves the--program as outlined by Poindex-
ter.
^ Aug 25: The Wall Street Journal reports that the United States
and Libya are on a "collision course" and that U.S. military action
against Libya is impending.
? Aug. 26: White House spokesman Larry Speakes describes the
Journal report as "authoritative" and major television networks and
newspapers report stories similar to the Journal account.
3.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807560025-2