QADDAFI PURSUES DUAL STRATEGY IN EFFORT TO EXPAND LIBYA'S INFLUENCE IN CHAD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000807450001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 26, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807450001-0
1
CHRISTIAN SCIFNCE ;MONITOR
26 June 1985
a k, I 14 ,U,
Qaddafi Pursues dual strategy in effort to expand
Libya's influence in Chad
By David K. Willis
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
N'Djatnena, Chad
Here in a highly strategic country twice the area of France,
Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi pursues a double strategy in
his apparent effort to expand his government's influence.
Moving to try to contain him are France, the United States,
the Chadian government of President Hissein Habre, and such
African states as Niger and Zaire.
Chad may be the world's poorest nation (according to the
World Bank), thinly populated (less than 5 million people), more
than half desert, and devastated by drought. But it is also
Libya's southern neighbor and borders on traditionally pro-
Western Sudan and Cameroon. Fierce civil war and French-Lib-
yan confrontation have racked the country for two decades.
The first element of Colonel Qaddafi's dual strategy is
unfolding in northern Chad, where, according to knowledgeable
sources here, Libya is now hard-surfacing a long 10,000-foot run-
way at a new airfield.
This causes the Chadians anguish, says an inside source, "be-
cause it confirms that Libya has engineered the de facto parti-
cion of Chad. Libya has been able to reach the south of Chad
with long-range Soviet aircraft but the new airstrip gives shorter
range planes the ability to fly farther south than ever before."
The second element of the strategy is apparent in reports from
these same sources stating that Libya is dropping arms in south-
ern Chad to commando units to encourage them in their rebel-
lion against President Habre. French intelligence has confirmed
two such arms drops recently, sources rert.
There is some surprise here that Qaddafi has not launched a
military offensive south of the two main northern cities he still
holds (Faya-Largeau and Fada) since making and then breaking
a troop withdrawal agreement with French President Francois
Mitterrand in Cyprus last September. The French withdrew.
The Libyans did not.
Western sources agree, however, that Qaddafi retains the abil-
ity to launch an offensive when he chooses. "He has the initia-
tive and he is impossible to predict," one source says.
It may be partly wishful thinking, but there is some lingering
hope here that Qaddafi may face opposition from his own armed
forces to another campaign of the kind that brought French
troops into Chad. in 1983 in an operation codenamed
"Manta." In August 1983 Libyan troops entered north-
ern Chad in support of insurgents, prompting the
Chadian government to ask for French support.
Drench policy, as summed up by one source close to
Drench thinking here, is "Manta without manta" -
keeping troops and aircraft nearby but not in Chad itself.
A bout 1, 200 French troops are believed to be stationed at
Bangui in the Central African Republic, south of here,
and more in Libreville, Gabon.
President Mitterrand, facing French legislative elec-
Lions next May which many analysts expect him to lose,
is thought to want to avoid the embarrassment in Chad
suffered last year when the Libyans failed to leave.
"Yet if the Libyans do come south in a big way, the
French will have to come in again for their own credibil-
ity in Africa as a whole," says an iformed source.
"But they won't come in without clear reason, first be-
cause they don't want to be seen to be acting in a colonial
way, and second because France views itself as a Medi-
u'rranean power as well as an African one and does a lot
of business with Libya, including arms sales."
The word here is that the French prefer to act not as
gendarmes (who step in to prevent trouble) but as
pompiers (firemen who respond to a blaze).
Meanwhile the French have just announced that
8500.000 has been given to Habra to pay allowances to
commandos who support the government. "The only
way the government cwr- xeep these very poor coclos
[commandos] is to pay them," one source says.
The French are also raising their budget support to
Habra this year.
Habra himself has been touring those parts of Chad -
the south and the center -- he controls. He is said to be
planning a diplomatic offensive against Libya at the Or-
ganization of African Unity meeting in Addis Ababa.
Ethiopia. He is seeking the support of Zaire and Niger,
both of which have criticized Libya for alleged subver-
sive activities in their own countries recently.
The Reagan administration supports the Habre gov-
ernment against Libya as a way of containing Libyan in-
fluence in general.
As of Oct. 1, 1984, Washington had provided $52 mil-
lion in economic aid. US military aid runs at about $5
million a year. In 1983, as the Libyans sent troops into
northern Chad, President Reagan authorized up to $25
million to purchase military supplies.
The US makes it clear that France has the primary
role in this part of Africa. If Libya does move south, US
pressure on France to react as strongly as needed will be
intense. The US itself is not about to send troops.
"Habra seems to be gaining some ground now," says
one Western source. "The French seem more committed
to him."
. "But," remarks another source here, "don't forget
that Habre's home town is Faya-Largeau in the north.
The Libyans hold it. Don't forget that the core of Habre's
fighting support is northern soldiers. For both reasons he
feels he has to go back north ... eventually."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807450001-0