MOSCOW'S DOUBLE GAME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000807420002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 27, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807420002-2
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New ssplss for soon leysl Miss: A Sandinista-owned Soviet Mi-24 helicopter
Moscow's Double Game
A mix of arms offers and Third World adventurism
S oviet foreign policy these days may
owe as much to Ralph Waldo Emer-
son, who said that "a foolish consisten-
cy is the hobgoblin of little minds," as to
Marx and Lenin. Moscow's new arms con-
trol proposal is clearly part of a diplomatic
offensive designed to improve its world-
wide image. But at the same time, Soviet
leader Mikhail Gorbachev has launched an
ambitious though less visible campaign to
rearm a host of Third World allies who are
fighting U.S.-backed rebel movements or
supporting terrorist attacks on the West.
While the Kremlin has stepped up support
for its clients, the Reagan administration
has shown a growing interest in attacking
them. The danger is that both sides could be
setting the stage for a confrontation that
neither expects or wants.
While Libya's Muammar Kaddafi has
vowed to back "terrorist and suicide mis-
sions," the Soviets have intensified their
support for him. Some U.S. and Arab diplo-
mats speculate that Moscow may have had
a hand in last week's abortive coup in South
Yemen (page 341. In Nicaragua, U.S. ana-
lysts believe the Soviets may have reversed
an earlier decision and decided to improve
the quality of their military shipments to
the Sandinistas; in turn, the administra-
tion plans to ask Congress for as much as
$100 million in military aid for the contras.
The Soviets have also stepped up support to
the Marxist government in Angola, and
now Washington is debating whether to-
respond by providing covert aid to anti-
communist leader Jonas Savimbi- A classi-
fied CIA study reports that Gorbachev has
sharply increased overt and covert mili-
tary aid to virtually all the Kremlin's Third
World clients, including Afghanistan,
Ethiopia, Syria and Vietnam.
Gorbachev's objectives may be similar to
Ronald Reagan's in 1981. Like the presi-
dent, Gorbachev took over after a period of
weak leadership, economic floundering
at home and repeated embarrassments
abroad. The succession of ailing Soviet
leaders, of setbacks in Syria. Grenada and
Afghanistan. and of a new challenge from
the Chinese leadership all contributed to a
suspicion that what Marxists call "the cor-
relation of forces" had turned against Mos-
cow in the early 1980s. Now Gorbachev
may want to reverse that correlation of
forces before settling down to serious nego-
tiations about Third World hot spots.
'Low intensity warfare': But while seeking to
tweak the American eagle's beak. Gorba-
chev has been careful to avoid moves that
might cause it to unsheath its talons. In-
stead of challenging the U.S. in areas
where it has an advantage-nuclear war-
fare or full-scale conventional conflict-he
has supported paramilitary and terrorist
operations that take advantage of Ameri-
ca's need to build a democratic consensus
and its reluctance to risk a full-scale super-
power confrontation. Recently U.S. mili-
tary analysts have coined a name for the
strategy: "low intensity warfare" (LIW).
Last week the administration convened
a conference in Washington to discuss how
to fight LIW. While differing on specifics,
many of the current and former officials
and other experts who attended seemed to
be trying to build consensus for military
action. Secretary of State George Shultz
criticized Congress and the European allies
for balking at retaliation, and argued that
America's respect for international law
should not prevent it from acting in self-
defense. Shultz identified four areas where
the administration should focus its efforts:
encouraging a national debate about LIW;
making full use of nonmilitary weapons
such as antiterrorist defenses, criminal
laws and economic aid to the Third World;
better utilization of intelligence capabili-
ties, including covert action, and resolving
as a last resort to use military force, start-
ing with Army and Marine units trained
for limited interventions.
For two years Defense Secretary Caspar
Weinberger has publicly taken a more cau-
tious line than Shultz's. Before acting, he
has argued, the United States must first
perceive a threat to its vital interests, iden-
tify clear military objectives, muster do-
mestic support-and be sure it has the will
to win. At the LIW conference military
authorities still sounded less bellicose than
the civilians, but Weinberger seemed to
modify his position. He recommended re-
moving legal restriction on U.S. training of
foreign police forces, renewing Vietnam-
style "nation-building" efforts in the Third
World, devoting more time to mobilizing
consensus at home and using Special Oper-
ations units when appropriate. He also said
that "we must be prepared to act alone."
In a number of cases Gorbachev has
moved to dampen tensions in the Third
World: he has hinted at a possible with-
drawal agreement in Afghanistan, tried to
encourage a Middle East peace conference
and pressured Syrian President Hafez As-
sad to arrange the release of the TWA hi-
jack victims last June. But Gorbachev's
actions elsewhere now stand to heighten
tensions. The danger is that if Gorbachev's
efforts to reassert Soviet power are rubbed
energetically enough against the Reagan
Doctrine, the friction could start a fire.
While both sides have avoided any confron-
tation, a dangerous question remains: can
the superpowers escalate out-of-the-way
conflicts without slipping into larger and
far more dangerous showdowns?
JOHN WALCOTT with KIM WILLFNSON
In Washington
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807420002-2
27 January 1986