THE SECURITY MANIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000807400016-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: March 29, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/03/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000807400016-9
NEW YORK TIMES
;X29 March, 1985
Ok P!~
IN THE NATION
Tom Wicker The Security Mania
the historic avenue is "still very
much in the planning stage." So there
should be time to stop this latest high-,
handed scheme of Washington's
myriad security zealots.
s it really so hard to protect Ronald I The major weakness in any official
Reagan - or any future President secrets act is in defining what's to be
- that the secret service must _ kept secret, on pain of criminal prose
close the two blocks of Pennsylvania cation. "Classified information" is no
Avenue that run in front of the White answer, since virtually anything, for
House? And if the threat is that great, any reason can be and is classified
will even such an extreme measure by government officials in any Ad-
prevent some fanatic terrorist from ministration. And even some military
doing his evil work at some other secrets - for example, a plan to in-
location or in some as-yet un- vade. Nicaragua, if one existed -
dreamed-of fashion? would be better exposed to the public
Fortunately, James A. Baker 3d, before the United States found itself
who as Secretary of the Treasury involved in a war that was a fait ac-
oversees the Secret Service, has told compli.
Congress that the proposal to seal off That, however, is not why an inter-
.
.
.
7ney aun L ail+aya 15- .,,-j.
The Reagan Administration, for in- I gests that the Administration might
stance, has just smothered a proposal ' yet put forward a secrets act, since
h officials
her
th hi
d
agency group rejected the Casey
plan. "If you're going to do something
like this," an official told Stuart Tay-
lor Jr. of The New York Times, "you
don't do it as an obscure provision in a
authorization bill." That sug-
A
I
C
g
o
Mr. Reagan an
are known to be eager to stop leaks to
the press. But a major political effort
probably would be required to over-
come congressional resistance. _
Recognizing that, surely the Ad-
ministration will move slowly and
think long and hard before trying to
close Pennsylvania Avenue. Tearing
two blocks out of its heart would not
only disrupt a major Washington traf-
fic artery; it would prevent the hun-
dreds of thousands of Americans who
bring their children to the nation's
capital from enjoying one of its great
symbolic sights - the view of the
north portico of the White House from
the avenue passing between it and
Lafayette Park.
Why not sandbag the President's
house itself? Or build a 20-foot con-
crete wall around it? Little more
damage would be done to the open-
ness of this society, or to confidence
in its institutions. Americans, after
all, have been strolling or riding
along Pennsylvania Avenue for
nearly two centuries, sometimes
even catching a glimpse of the White
House's . temporary occupants;
they've watched inaugural parades
from the sidewalks, and funeral
parades too, and seen the leaders
of the world come and go. And the
security zealots can protect nothing
more important. than what they
would risk: the democratic sense
that this Government belongs to its
citizens.
cast the information, the reporter
could be subpoenaed and ordered to
disclose his source. If he refused, he
cupid be held in contempt of court and
sent to jail. -
I A secrets act, though aimed at gov-
ernment officials, also would hamper
journalists by intimidating their
sources and would lead inevitably to
the criminal prosecution of reporters.
If an official defied the act and gave
classified information to someone in
the press who then printed or broad-
enacted, could have been used to
muzzle whistle-blowers, cover up offi-
cial wrongdoing, hide embarrassing
Administration blunders and gen-
erally clamp a lid on information the
public needs about government policy
and its effectiveness - or lack of it.
It's not so certain that it would have
protected vital secrets, whatever
they are, any better than such mat-
tern are now shielded.
William J. Casey, the C.I.A. Director.
Mr. Casey wanted to include in a
C.I.A. authorization bill a provision
making it a crime for Government
employees to disclose, to anyone not
authorized to receive it, classified in-
formation that "reasonably could be
expected to damage the national se-
curity."
Reasonably? Secrecy buffs like
Mr. Casey might consider it "rea-
sonable" to expect that disclosure of
an impropriety by, say, the C.I.A.
Director would damage national se-
curity. And all kinds of information,
some important and much not, gets
classified by the thousands of Gov-
ernment officials, high and low, who
are authorized to wield a secrecy
stamp.
Thus Mr. Casey's brainchild, if
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/03/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000807400016-9