US STRATEGIC THINKERS DEBATE PROS AND CONS OF 'PROXY STATES'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000807190011-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: September 3, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000807190011-8
ANIZARM '41
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
3 September 1985
US shategic thinkers debate pros
and cons of using ?proxy states'
By Charles WaIenn
special to The chnstian science Monitor
Washington
The Soviet Union has successfully used certain of its
third-world allies to intervene on its behalf in touchy
areas - in other words, to act as "proxies."
Some strategic thinkers believe the United States, too,
should make use of proxies.
ANALYSIS
The attractions for either su-
perpower of acting through
third-world proxies are clear:
Political acceptability of the
surrogate for military actions that would be deemed "im-
perialist" if done directly by the superpower; avoidance
of direct conflict with the other superpower; lack of direct
casualties; and a potential for "distancing," in case of de-
feat, without an intolerable loss of prestige.
The Soviet use of proxy or "surrogate" forces in the
third world was first seen in Africa.
In 1975, several-thousand Cuban troops were de-
ployed to Angola in an effort to secure the besieged
Marxist regime of Augustinho Neto. Carried out in co-
ordination with the Soviet Union, Cuban troop strength
ultimately swelled to 25,000 to 30,000. It remains so to
this day.
In 1978, Cuban troops were again deployed - this
time to Ethiopia. Under direct Soviet command, they
brought victory to the regime of Ethiopian leader
Mengistu Haile-Mariam against Somali forces in the
disputed Ogaden region. About 5,000 Cubans still re-
main there.
Western observers have since broadened the defini-
tion of proxy forces when referring to the actions of So-
viet allies. Not only out-of-area deployments such as
Cuba's in Africa, but the regional military actions of
Vietnam in Indochina, Syria in the Middle East, and
Libya in Africa have been lumped into the proxy
category.
One analytical school believes a num-
ber of guerrilla organizations that use ter-
ror tactics and Soviet weapons - includ-
ing the Palestine Liberation Organization
- should be included in the Soviet-proxy
category.
The degree of actual control enjoyed
by the Soviets over their allies is debat-
able, particularly in the cases of Syria
and Libya. It can be argued, however,
that the Cuban missions in Ethiopia and Angola have
been successful in the sense that both of those regimes
have survived thus far.
The proxy idea holds a fascination for some American
strategic planners who have toyed with creating such a
capability in certain third-world areas. Categories of po-
tential cooperative forces are:
? States which would be available to intervene in tar-
get areas distant from their own borders. To do so re-
quires a mixture of ideological commitment, internal po-
litical cohesion, and military efficiency which is
uncommon in the West. Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan
have the requisite military prowess. But none of these
states are likely to risk intervention in areas not of direct
concern to themselves, even with US urging. And each
state has its own set of liabilities in certain areas - Israel
in the Islamic world, for example.
? States which would agree to assume
security responsibility for a neighboring
region, and engage in contingency plan-
ning with the US for prospective inter-
vention. This concept is more practical
than the global availability required in
the preceding category. A regional power
such as Egypt, has plenty of motivation -
to monitor developments in the Sudan
and to intervene in the face of a leftist or
Libyan takeover. The West shares this interest.
? States willing to sustain a pro-Western insurgency
in a bordering country. A well-publicized example is
Honduran aid to the "contras" in Nicaragua.
? Insurgents willing to engage in insurrection against
a state hostile to the West. Current anticommunist
insurgencies can be found in Nicaragua, Afghanistan,
Angola, and Kampuchea.
Although many US defense experts believe the possi-
bility of developing pro-Western global surrogate forces
akin to Cuba is fantasy, governments willing to plan con-
tingency actions in their own backyards are available.
Both insurgencies and states willing to support them can
be found. Some are already supported by the West.
But as shown by wrenching debate over the propriety
of US involvement with the Nicaraguan contras, the po-
litical toll is high indeed when insurgency is prolonged.
The West does not appear to have reached a consistent
consensus on the moral desirability of fomenting insur-
gency against its enemies.
Yet the proxy concept continues to intrigue policy
planners, despite its difficulties. A recent Rand Corpora-
tion..seminar of defense experts focused exclusively on
the issue, and another session will be held this fall.
The writer was a government official for two dec-
ades before becoming a consultant on international
affairs.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000807190011-8