CUBAN INTELLIGENCE HAS FINGER IN MANY PIES -- BUT RECORD IS MIXED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000807190003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 6, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000807190003-7
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
6 January 1986
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Cuban intelligence has finger in manY pies
but record is mixed
Cuban intelligence agencies spy on the
United States, police Cuban exiles, and
give assistance to terrorist operations.
But they have not been particularly
successful in supporting revolution.
By Charles Waterman
Special to The Christian Science Monitor
When four Cuban Embassy employees tried to kidnap
a Cuban political refugee in Madrid last month, there
could be little doubt that Cuban intelligence and security
officials were behind the affair.
Bystanders foiled the kidnapping. Spain expelled the
Cubans. Later Cuba requested extradition of the refugee
charging that he had "committed serious financial
irregularities," and tried to steal $499,000 from a Madrid
bank account.
Whether or not Cuba had a case against the defecting
official is unclear but what is clear is that Cuban intelli-
gence and security officials were prepared to use violent
means to influence events.
Just how unsavory is Cuban intelligence?
Western propaganda services have labeled it as simi-
lar to third-world services, such as Libya, which regu-
larly flaunt normal standards of international-behavior.
But the truth is more complex.
The structure of Cuban intelligence is complicated,
and consists of six separate organizations. Three of these
are most prominent:
? The Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI) under
the Ministry of Interior, responsible for counterintelli-
gence as well eliminating dissent.
? The Americas Department under the Cuban Com-
munist Party's Central Committee, which along with
DGI supports revolutionary covert operations in the
Western Hemisphere.
? The Department of State Security (DSE) under the
Ministry of the Interior. DSE operates in areas where ex-
iles militate against the Castro regime. Although difficult
to ascertain, the DSE may be responsible-for the Madrid
operation cited above. One news agency cited "G-2" -
DSE's predecessor group - as the responsible organiza-
tion.
Western intelligence sources assert that Cu-
ban operatives in larger Western capitals are
particularly aggressive against their own ex-
iles. But beyond this, Cuban intelligence gives
extensive support to revolutionary organiza-
tions that use the tools of terrorism. Training
for such insurgents has occurred regularly in
Cuba. Some 300 Palestinian guerrillas were in
Cuban camps as of 1979, and links with groups
such as the African National Congress and
South-West African People's Organization are
well documented.
Most experts agree that, by the early 1970s,
President Fidel Castro's zeal for revolutionary
internationalism had diminished. He had retreated from
a commitment to armed struggle, stopped attacks on
Latin American Communist Parties, and acknowledged
Moscow's leading role in the world communist
movement.
But a review of Cuba's intelligence record is less clear
on this point.
? In South America: In 1974, an umbrella organiza-
tion called the Junta of Revolutionary Coordination
(JCR), comprised of leftist groups from Argentina, Bo-
livia, Chile, and Uruguay was formed. Its members re-
ceived arms and training in techniques of clandestine
warfare - mostly arranged by Cuban intelligence. In
1977, 13 of 14 Latin American terrorist groups then exist-
ing had an extreme leftist ideology. And the Venezuelan
terrorist "Carlos" (Illich Ramirez Sanchez), responsible
for kidnapping ministers of the Organization of Petro-
leum Export Countries in Vienna in December 1975, had
received guerrilla training in Havana under DGI aus-
pices. He also engaged in a terrorist raid in Venezuela.
? In Central America: As of 1979, terrorism in South
America was on the wane because of harsh repression.
But in Central America it was increasing. Besides the
ruling Sandinistas in Nicaragua, Cuban intelligence has
maintained supportive links with El Salvador's left-wing
guerrillas of the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) and
Armed Forces of National Resistance (FALN), as well as
groups in Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica.
? In the United States of the 1960s and early 1970s:
Cuban intelligence support to the radical Weather Under-
ground organization included guerrilla training for cer-
tain leaders, clandestine communications support via the
Cuban Embassy in Canada, and the printing of propa-
ANALYSIS
ganda materials in Cuba. DGI offi-
cials of the Cuban United Nations
mission were also involved in fund-
ing black militant groups of the era
.
Explosive material to be placed at the Statue of Liberty
was supplied to the Revolutionary Action Movement, a
black militant group, in 1965 by an employee of the Cu-
ban Embassy in Canada.
? In the US of the '80s: DGI support to the violence-
prone Puerto Rican Armed Forces of National Liberation
has included training and operational assistance. Oper-
ations by "Los Machateros," a Puerto Rican terrorist
group, have included a $7.2 million robbery in Connecti-
cut and destruction of military aircraft in Puerto Rico.
? On narcotics: US government sources report a con-
tinuing Cuban intelligence role in facilitating narcotics
trafficking in the Caribbean. Testimony in 1983 by the
Assistant Secretary of State of inter-American Affairs al-
leges that "in exchange for Colombian drug runners
smuggling arms to Cuban-backed insurgents (M-19),
CONTINUED
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Cuba offered safe passage for ships carrying narcotics to
the US through Cuban waters."
A key element in understanding Cuban intelligence, in
particular the DGI, is the unusual degree of influence
wielded by the Soviets. DGI defector Gerardo Peraza,
testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee in
1982, stated that Cuba's intelligence service was "under
the direct orders of a Soviet general since 1970."
And as observed by noted British expert Brian
Crozier: Since 1964, 60 Cubans a year have received 10
months' intelligence training near Moscow - half mili-
tary and half DGI.
In summary, the more flamboyant manifestations of
Cuban intelligence activities run in three categories:
? Policing of their own community and its exiles.
? Joint Cuban/Soviet anti-US intelligence operations.
? Support of various revolutionary groups which of-
ten utilize terrorist methods.
The first category is not dissimilar from those of other
third-world countries, and results in activities similar to
the event cited at the beginning of this article. The suc-
cess met in the second category, although potentially
damaging, is unknown. It is in the third category that the
most notorious Cuban intelligence activity has occurred.
It is worth noting that Cuban support to revolution
has not been particularly successful. Only in Angola and
Nicaragua have Cuban-supported revolutionaries been
victorious, and both are under counterattack at the mo-
ment. In 25 years of support to revolutionary groups,
this record is not enviable.
The writer was a government official for two dec-
ades before becoming a consultant on international
affairs. _ ... .. - - . .
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000807190003-7