'YOU CAN RUN BUT YOU CAN'T HIDE' - THE TERRORISTS WHO HIJACKED THE ACHILLE LAURO FALL INTO AN AUDACIOUS AIRBORNE TRAP.

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CIA-RDP90-00965R000707060067-2
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December 22, 2016
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February 10, 2012
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67
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October 21, 1985
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Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/10 :CIA-RDP90-009658000707060067-2 `You Can Run But You Can't Hide' The terrorists who hijacked the Achille Lauro fall into an audacious airborne trap. he mood in the White House base- munity plunged back to work trying tocon- cepted and shot down by American P-38 ment at 8 o'clock Thursday morning firm the report. Charles Allen, the C[A's fighters in the South Pacific during World was despondent. The Reagan admin- I national intelligence officer for counterter- War [I. "God, we can't shoot them down," istration's counterterrorist team end- rorism, ordered the flow of information replied Poindexter. "No, but we have two ed its first meeting of the day. Egyptian turned up again. Within an hour Allen re- choices," said North. "Our friends could President Hosni Mubarak passed the word ported back that evidence suggested that shoot them down or we can force them to U.S. Ambassador Nicholas Veliotes and the four hijackers were still in Egypt and down somewhere." repeated it publicly: the hijackers of the that neither Egypt nor the PLO had figured "Where?" Poindexter asked. "Sigonel- [talian cruise ship Achille Lauro had left out what to do with them. la," replied North. With Poindexter'sbless- Egypt. The deal, Mubarak said, was struck Back at the White House, North had an ing, North called Vice Adm. Arthur Mo- with the PLO before the murder of Leon idea. "Do you remember Yamamoto?" he reau, theJoint Chiefs of Staff representative Klinghoffer had come to light. The news asked Poindexter, referring to the Japanese on the counterterrorism task force, and told appeared to dash the Reagan administra- admiral whose military transport was inter- him his idea. Moreau said he would look [ion's hope of catching the terrorists. Ve- liotes had attempted to deliver a cable from the president himself to Mubarak, and Sec- retary of State George Shultz had tried to telephone the Egyptian president. Mubarak deflected all contact with the Americans to his foreign minister, Esmat Abdel Meguid, and to Defense Minister Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala. As the meeting broke up, one discouraged team member turned to the group's chairman, National Security Coun- cil Deputy Staff Director John Poindexter. "[t luuks like it's all over," Poindexter said. The American intelligence community, which had kept a close eye on Egypt and the southeastern Mediterranean for signs of the hijackers, lowered the priority of its oper- ations inthe area; raw intelligence no longer was being processed immediately, analyzed and fed to top policymakers. Some of the Navy's elite SEAL Team Six were back in Gibraltar, en route home from another fruitless and frustrating wait at the Ameri- canbase at Sigonella,Sicily. But before they threw in the towel, U.S. officials decided to make one more pass at their sources-and just before 8:30 that morning, there was startling news. One source produced convincing evi- dence that Mubarak was lying, that the terrorists were still in Egypt and that they probably would try to leave by air. Armed with this information, the NSC's terrorism expert, Marine Lt. Col. Oliver North, a veteran of countless covert operations and the Reagan administration's controversial liaison to the Nicaraguan contras, went to Poindexter and said, "Maybe they really are still there." On that hope, the U.S. intelligence com- F-14 Tomcats on the flight deck of the USS Saratoga: A Navy posse took to the skies Continued Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/10 :CIA-RDP90-009658000707060067-2 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/10 :CIA-RDP90-009658000707060067-2 into it. and within l0 minutes he was back on the line. The Sixth Fleet, he said, could do the job. North. Moreau and a team of Pentagon officers went to work, outlining a plan to intercept the terrorists if they tried to leave Egypt by air. The administration had never written a contingency plan for snatching a civilian jet from the air. "This was somewhat more improvisational than usual." said one insider. "[t was just cre- ative thinking." Other officials grilled the Central Intelli- gence A enc ? and National ecurity A - cy un ow sure t ey were of the intelligence they were feeding in a steady stream to the White House Situation Room. At the State Department. Under Secretary for Political Affairs Michael Armacost. aided by Depu- ty Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Af- fairs Arnold Raphel, analyzed the political pros and cons of such a daring move. By late. morning. Adm. William J. Crowe, the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff> was ready to telephone Defense Secretary Cas- par Weinberger with the group's prelimi- nary evaluation. "Our boys are good," he reported. "I think they can do it. I think we should let them try." By 11 o'clock U.S. sources had con- firmed that the terror- ists were still trying to get out of Egypt. Intel- ligence sources had lo- cated the plane the ter- rorists planned to use for their getaway: an EgyptAir Boeing 737 jetliner, drawn up on the runway at AI Maza Air Base northeast of Cairo. The spotters re- ported its identifi- cation number and the name of its pilot to Washington. There were signs that the ter- rorists meant to fly to Tunis. North present- ed his plan for inter- cepting them to Poin- the launching of the aircraft carrier Sarato- ga's F-14 jets and radar planes to surprise the terrorists over the Mediterranean, calling the SEAL's back from Gibraltar to Sigonella and forcing the Egyptian plane to land in Sicily. acking the hijackers as they left Cairo and bringing them to heel At about 11:30 North sent the design to national-security adviser Robert McFar- lane, who was traveling aboard Air Force One to Chicago with President Reagan. North used a secure data communications link (not a phone). The president and White House chief of staff Don Regan had just finished lunch at the Kitchens of Sara Lee outside Chicago.Alfhough McFarlane pro- vided only the broadest ~~utline. Reagan agreed to the idea in principle. The presi- dent insisted, however, that he wanted to know more about the risk of casualties be- fore giving his final approval. cFarlane called Poindexter back and M said the president had approved the plan but wanted to see the specifics, including the exact rules of engagement that would govern the U.S. pilots. before he gave thego-ahead. With that. Pentagon planners set to work writing the actual plan for the operation. North and Moreau went over the proposed rules of engagement un a secure tekphoneline:evenaftertheuperatiun. L'.S. officials refused to discloses hat they were. There wire a few doubts about the wis- dom ufthe plan. At first some State Depart- ment officials worried about the effect the operation-if successful-would have un Mubarak. walking a tightrope brtseen moderation and a rising tide of Arab radical- ism; on U.S. relations with Egypt. and un America's standine in the Arab world. Weinberger, offun a trip to Ottawaand to his summer home in Bar Harbor. Maine, was even more skittish, as was the Defense De- partment's representative un the ~uunter- terrorist task force. Deputy Secretary ~'il- liam H. Taft IV. Weinberger called the president repeatedly to express his reserva- tions about the plan. at one point telling Reagan: "This will destroy our relations with Egypt." In the end. the State Department argued COt1iMU~ Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/10 :CIA-RDP90-009658000707060067-2 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/10 :CIA-RDP90-009658000707060067-2 McFarlane (leR) and Regan wits the president: Weighing the risks before ordering the attack that the risks of hijacking the hijackers were far outweighed by the benefits-especially ~ since the operation would relieve Mubarak of the onus of turning the Arab terrorists over to the West. Nearly all the U.S. plan- ners agreed that if the mission were ap- proved by the president, it would have to be kept under the tightest wraps. The security was so intense that the United States did not alert Italy. The president ordered Weinberger to proceed, risking a major security breach in the process. Ironically, while U.S. intelli- gence was closely monitoring communica- tionsfrom Egypt, the scrambler aboard Air Force One was broken, and Reagan was forced to make his call "in the clear." As a result the conversation with Weinberger was overheard by a ham radio operator who reported that the defense secretary ex- pressed reservations about an operation that might require Navy pilots to fire across the nose of an unarmed civilian plane. Brushing those objections aside, Reagan insisted that the mission be carried out, so long as no inno- cent lives were put at risk. About 2 o'clock, or less than two hours after the president had given the green light, the plan had come together. The word was flashed to the Saratoga and the first planes-E-2C Hawkeye ra- dar aircraft, a flight of four F-14 fighters and the Navy's EA-fiB Prowler electronic war- fare plane-took off and headed south to wait. But the rules of engagement had not final- ly been settled, and the first set the president had insisted that no innocent lives were to be lost, and U.S. intelligence knew that the plane was being flown by Egyptians who had no involve- ment in the hijacking. Although the fighters had been authorized to fire missiles in front of the air- craft's nose, just the intimidating presence of the jets did the trick. Aboard the plane a swaggering crew of terrorists suddenly turned into cornered airborne rats. "I don't know if you ever saw aTom- Vellotes (leR) and cat with all its lights on going like Mubarak: Ambiguity hell," said a crewman from the about Egypt's role Saratoga later. "It's an awesome ~Otlbflll84 Hight of F-14s returned to the carrier. Shortly after 3 p.m., intelligence sources received word that IO minutes earlier the terrorists had arrived at Al Maza Air Base. Thoughtfully, the sources also produced the terrorists' Hight number. Aboard Air Force One, the president snapped, "Let's do it." At 4:13 word came that the EgyptAir plane had filed a Hight plan for Algiers and taken off. Orders were instantly Hashed to the Saratoga to launch its F-14s again. The chase was on. he F-14s and their support planes, in- chiding the Hawkeyes and the Prowler electronic-warfare plane, headed to their station south of Crete and set up an airborne gate, surveying every plane headed out of Egypt until they found the EgyptAir ~ flight they were looking for. Meanwhile, the United States set to work trying to make sure the terrorists had no place to go except into the arms of the law. President Reagan fired off a flash cable to Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, tell- inghim the United States had rea- son tobelieve-despite the terror- ists'flight plan-that the hijackers of the Achille Lauro were aboard an EgyptAir plane headed for Tu- nis. The United States, Reagan said, believed the terrorists should not be allowed to land. According to one knowledgeable Source, some American officials also were worried that the terrorists might try to head for Athens or Beirut; cables were sent to Greece and Lebanon after the EgyptAir flight took off, asking the governments there not to let the hijackers land. Some 45 minutes after the EgyptAir flight took off into the darkness, it flew into the Ameri- cans'gate, 80 miles south of Crete. The Egyptian plane was right on course, flying at 34,000 feet and a speed of 400 knots. Initially the F-14s loitered behind the 737, flying without lights and with darkened cockpits. There is no evi- dence that anyone aboard the Egyptianjet was aware of their presence as they trailed their prey to the ambush point. j Then the Americans turned on their lights i and closed in alongside both wings of the airliner. "I imagine the plane informed the Egyptians when they were intercepted," Weinberger said later. But there was no evidence that the pilot had been ordered to return home. The Egyptian pilot began desperately ra- dioing Cairo for instructions. He tried one frequency after another, but he could not get through and he could hear only garbled sounds in his headset. The EA-6B was jam- ming him, jumping up and down the radio scale right along with him. Finally, reported Weinberger, the pilot "accepted the inevita- ble" and radioed that he would follow the American orders. The EgyptAir plane fell into place and reluctantly followed the pack of American warplanes to Sicily. There was almost no chance the 737 would have been shot down. From the out- 3, Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/10 :CIA-RDP90-009658000707060067-2 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/10 :CIA-RDP90-009658000707060067-2 3. 12:10 a.m. Refused permission to land in Tunis or Athens, the Egyptian plane obeys the order, and the F-14s escort it to the Sigonella Air Base. Italian authorities take the hijackers Into custody. sight. I guess we just scared them down." Only when the little procession was about to enter Italian airspace did the United States inform the Italian government of its plans. To have done so earlier, although it would have been a little more diplomatic, would have risked leaks that could have killed the plan, one official said. But the Italians were less than delighted at the news. "They went crazy," says one American offi- cial. In fact, Italian ground controllers re- fused to grant the 737 permission to enter their airspace and the Egyptian pilot had to declare an in-Hight emergency, saying he was low on fuel, in order to get clearance to land at Sigonella. When he got there, the terrorists found the commandos of SEAL Team Six, who had returned to Sicily from Gibraltar, waiting with the Italian carabinieri. There was a debate over which force- the American or Italian-had jurisdiction. Secretary of State Shultz, in a long tele- 4. 11:30 p.m. The F-14s intercept the 737 in international airspace south of Crete, and a Hawkeye orders it by radio to follow them to a U.S. air base in Sicily. phone conversation with Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti, yielded when Andreotti assured him the pirates would promptly be charged with murder. "We really wanted them to come home with us, but nobody is unhappy with this," said one U.S. official. When they boarded the 737, U.S. and Italian officials found a bonus: not only had they captured the four hijackers who would be accused of seizing the Achille Lauro and murdering Leon Klinghoffer, but they found Abul Abbas, ahigh-ranking aide to Palestine Liberation Organization chair- man Yasir Arafat. Intelligence sources be- lieve Abbas directed the hijacking. Sources 2.8:15 p.m. Four F-14 fighters, two KA-6D air tankers and two E-2C radar planes- plus back-up planes-take off from the Saratoga and patrol north of Egypt. 3. 10:10 p.m. An Egyptian Boeing 737 carrying the hijackers takes off from AI Maza Air Base near Cairo. The E-2C Hawkeyes monitor it. told Newswet=x that Abbas, a member of the PLO Executive Committee, had been in constant radio contact with the hijackers from his base in Beirut, beginning immedi- atelyafter they seized the cruise ship. After the hijackers announced that they had killed one of their American hostages, the sources said, Abbas radioed them and be- rated them for botching their mission. which was to infiltrate Israel to carry out a terrorist operation at a military target near the port city of Ashdod. Late Friday night Abbas and an aide also on the plane were flown to Rome aboard the EgyptAir jetliner by Italian authorities. On Saturday afternoon came the only discouraging news since the operation was launched. The United States had started extradition proceedings against Abbas but the Italians rebuffed the effort, despite a new legal-assistance treaty between the two countries. The issue was a delicate one. The Italians depend heavily on the Middle East for oil. They have close relations with the Arab world and with the PLO. And at least until recently, they have had less Continued Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/10 :CIA-RDP90-009658000707060067-2 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/10 :CIA-RDP90-009658000707060067-2 headquarters in Tunis, sharp enough to put a strain on rela- tions between Jerusalem and Rome. And as the Achille Lauro plowed up and down the eastern Mediterranean, the pi- rates seemed a good deal more interested in getting away than in pressing their original demands. The administration conclud- ed that Italy and Egypt should take the lead in handling the deterioratingsituation. Besides having relatively good relations with the Palestinians, Italy had N a proven counterterrorist unit ~ ofatleast300men.Amongoth- er tasks, it had rescued U.S. Brig. Gen. James Dozier from the Red Brigades. To isolate the ~ pirates, Washington persuaded ~ governments in the eastern m Mediterranean not to allow the ~ hijacked cruise ship to dock. _ . _ ~~ _ I~ The State Department also F ~. .+ On the Achille Lauro, former hostages inspect the spot where KlinghoBer died. Cold blood mentstto the Inononethatthere trouble than others from Arab terrorism. antiterrorist computer network, code- .should be no knuckling under to terrorism On Saturday President Reagan sent a named Flashboard, signaled the White 'and that the Israelis should hang on to their strongly worded letter to Italian Prime House, Pentagon, State Department. CIA prisoners. Minister Bettino Craxi in which Reagan and National Security Agency. State De- The administration succeeded in keeping said he was "surprised" that Italian partment officials set up a crisis command anyone from offering the terrorists refuge. authorities had "summarily rejected" the centertotrytodeterminehowmanyAmeri- and its diplomacy ultimately led to the re- U.S. extradition request for Abbas. whom cans were on the ship. They converted the lease of the hostages. But it did not produce Reagan said had been "criminally implicat- emergency telephone lines that had just the terrorists. The main problem was Mu- ed" in the hijacking of the Achille Lauro. been used for the Mexican earthquake to Barak, who had to secure the release of the He promised that Washington would soon handle calls from worried relatives. hostages while protecting himself against deliver "overwhelming evidence" of Ab- Not until early Tuesday afternoon. when the certain fury of Arab fanatics who con- bas's guilt. The mutual-assistance treaty, Syrian authorities were turning the ship sidered the terrorists heroes. The Ameri- Reagan argued, requires the Italians to ar- away from the port of Tartus, did the full cans and Israelis objected violently to the rest Abbas and to give the United States 45 gravity of the hijacking become clear. Using man Mubarak selected as his intermediary days to make its case against him. But U.S. highly classified eavesdropping methods, to the terrorists: Abbas. leader of the same intelligence sources reported that while an American RC-135 spy plane learned that Palestinian splinter group to which the hi- American officials were trying to serve a one of the terrorists had killed Leon Kling- jackers claimed to belong. Abbas arrived in warrant on Abbas, he apparently slipped hoffer, 69, a New Yorker who was confined Egypt Wednesday morning and quickly out of Italy, dressed in an EgyptAir uni- to a wheelchair. The got in touch byradtowith form. Leaving Rome's Fiumicino Airport ship's radio transmitted the hijackers aboard on a chartered Yugoslav plane, he headed agnslyboasttotheshore. the Achille Lauro that for Yugoslavia, apparently with the conniv- "We threw the first body was then anchored off ante ot-Italian, Egyptian and Yugoslav au- into the water after Port Said. The terrorists thorities. If the Italians collaborated in shooting him in the greeted him enthusiastt- .4bbas's release, they may come to regret it. head," one of the pirates tally. Givingorders rath- "Abul Abbas has a long history of taking said. "Minutes from now er than negotiating, Ab- hostages inorder Cowin the release of people we will follow up with the bas instructed the pirates of his who are in jail," said one U.S. official. second one. Do not wor- to await a boat bearing a "Now that this has happened, I'm glad the ry, Tartus, we have s lot ;~. Palestinian "with a dts- Italians are holding the terrorists, not us." ofthemhere." tinguishingmark"andto The four terrorists accompany the man to hat the terrorists would ever see the seemed more mysterious the shore. His order was inside of a jail did not seem possible in than most. It was difli- '+ followed,andtheAchille T the first hours of the hijacking of the cult toestablishwhothey~ Lauro was free. While Achille Lauro. The four terrorists who were and what they were ~ the U.S. government seized the ship demanded that Israel release really after. Their tar- ~ '~~. could not quarrel with 50 Palestinian prisoners, including at least get-an Italian ship- that result, it could cer- oneconvicted murderer; they threatened to was puzzling. Italy had tainly dispute the means. kill the passengers they had taken captive if issued one of the sharp- The available evidence they didn't get their way. In the United est criticisms of Isra- indicatedthatAbbashad States, the government's special worldwide el's attack against PLO De Rosa: Unanswered questions ordered the terrorists 5. Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/10 :CIA-RDP90-009658000707060067-2 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/10 :CIA-RDP90-009658000707060067-2 WNabsrprs>rowa lrow it was doaa'I'ha dtiwa ~7 worried about Arab rsaatiaat on board the ship in the first place. Mubarak and Foreign Minister Meguid argued that whrn they agreed to grant the terrorists safe conduct out of Egypt they were convinced that none of the Achille Laura captives had been injured. Although the terrorists had been overheard gloating about the murder of Klinghoffer, Meguid claimed to be convinced when the ship's still captive skipper reported "Everybody is OK."The Egyptians had plrnty of opportu- nity to learn the truth after the pirates had left the ship. But when security officials boarded the Achille Lauro at Port Said, they claimed that they were too busy look- ing for bombs to ask whether anyone had been killed. eguid said that he had learned of the M murder only after he had been phoned by Italian Prime Minister Craxi, three hours after the ship had been released. By that time, Meguid said, it was too late to act upon the information: the terrorists were already out of the country. The following day Mubarak chose to blame the lapse on the Achille Laura's skipper. "If the captain had told us that a passenger had been killed," he said, "we would have changed our position toward the whole op- eration." He added that the terrorists had been whisked out of the country to preserve Egypt's credibility. "We took it upon our- selves roger them out of here so that people would believe ua afterwards should there be a similar operation." That, of course, was an outright lie. Ironically, the haggling over the terror- ists gave American intelligrnce operatives more time to discover when they wen. Among other things, the operatives moni- toned a running debate betwern Egyptian and Ps[estinian officials over how to dispose of the hijackers. Mubarak was willing to let them go, provided chat Arafat could find a country willing to accept thtm. From those overheard conversations, U.S. ofliciab ulti- mately were able to pinpoint the location of the terrorists and to predict their movements. Meguid had agreed that the hijackers would be givrn safe passage out of the coun- try. The decision enraged U.S. Ambassador Veliotes, who on an oprn radio transmia- sioo from the Achille Lauro instructed a subordinate to "tell the foreign minister that we demand that they prosecute these som of bitches." Instead, Meguid an- nouncedthattheterrorists had been permit- ted to flee Egypt. U.S. intelligrnce agtncies keeping watch on the Tunisian coast reported that despite the Egyptian claims, the terrorists had not turned up st the PLO's refuge. The Ameri- canfury at Mubarak grew. His aides argued with Veliotes that a small country like Egypt should not be forced to go out on a limb to tight terrorism when the major pow- ers bad refused to confront the problem. "The Egyptians were no help at all," said one srnior U.S. official. Convinced that the terrorists were still in Egyptian jurisdiction, Veliotes declared: "These are murderers, and there should be an investigation and they should be pros- ecuted according to the laws of Egypt like any other crirninala." According to in- formed sources, the terrorists were seen with Abbas in Cairo's Sheraton Heliopolis Hotel many hours after they were said.to have fled. The transparent conclusion was that even after the murder was established. the Egyptians meant to sneak the terrorists out of the country in the company of the very man who may have ordered their pi- ratical act. Feelings became harder when the Egyp- tians detained the ship even as they ap- peared to be letting the terrorists escape. But all along there was enough ambiguity to Cairo's moves to convince some that Mu- barak did not mean for the terrorists to get off scot free. According to swell-placed congressional source, ofRcials of the Egyp- tian intellrgrnce service quietly passed on precise information about the EgyptAir flight. Others including Reagan said the United States had acted alone. artier, New York Republican Sen. Al- E fosse D'Amato expressed the view of many of his congressional colleagues when he called for taking a harder look at Egypt's more than S2 billion a year in U.S. military and economic aid. But such talk was considerably muted once it was learned that Egypt may have supplied Washington with covert intelligrnoe. Ao- cording to one Senate source, it's easy to understand why Mubarak acted a, he did: he clearly understood the risk to Egypt's relations with the United States. Egypt is second only to Israel in the amount of U.S. foreign aid it receives. But he was also aware of the danger he faced from Egyp- tian and other Arab radicals. The Egyp- tians remember all too well what happened to the late Anwar Sadat. Now, however, Mubarak can claim he never gave in to American pressure and still maintain cor- rect relations with Washington. The success of the ambush helped ease earlier frictions. And the administration clearly had no intention of breaking with a vital strategic partner. "As of this morn- ing," said a congressional source after the interception. "you're not going to find any American official attacking Egypt in pub- lic the way they did yesterday." How much sportsmanship Egypt would show remained an open question. Initially at least, Mubarak accused the United States of piracy in seizing the Egyptian air- Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/10 :CIA-RDP90-009658000707060067-2 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/10 :CIA-RDP90-009658000707060067-2 liner. And Cairo rumbled with anti-Amer- ican bitterness. At one point NEWSWEEK'S Rod Nord- land was surrounded by a crowd of angry students. "Are you American'?"they shout- ed, pressing in close, shaking their fists, pulling at his clothes and tearing pages from his notebook. "I thought it wise to lie," he reported. "I'm French," he said, and the mood immediately cooled. Then other voices shouted, "He looks like an Ameri- can," and "He's probably an Israeli spy." "You'd better get out of here fast," coun- seled the single sympathetic voice in the mob, Suddenly, however, a triple line of police began to charge. To Nordland's re- lief, the anti-American mob broke up and fled. An armored car charged through the scattering ranks firing dozens of tear-gas canisters into the crowd. One student ran up to him and shook a hot canister in his face. "See what your country is doing to us," he said, pointing to the inscription that read "Made in U,S.A." ith feelings souring, the released American hostages flew from Cairo to Sicily on a U.S. military jet. At the Italian section of the Sigonella Air Base, the four hijackers were mustered for a lineup. Four of the passengers were led in separate- ly to identify them, "There was positive, unequivocal identification," said Frank Hodes, one of the released Americans. "[ saw them as they came out [of the lineups" said his wife, !Mildred. "And there was no doubt that it was the same men." The for- mer hostages. added Hodes. "were elated, euphoric that they had theguys whocreated this world incident and caused thedeath ofa very dear friend of ours." Back home the sense of jubilation was also stronger than anxiety over what might happen next in the ongoing war against terrorism. "Thank God," exclaimed New York Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan. "We've finally won one." Ronald Reagan placed a phone call to Marilyn Klinghoffer, the widow of Achille Lauro's helpless. inno- cent martyr. According to her son-in-law, she thanked the president for his condo- lences,saying: "I just want you to know how much the terrorists hate you." "I appreciate that," Reagan responded, "but I hope they'll have more reason to hate me in the future as we continue to try to stop these people from committing these terrible acts." "These people don't deserve to live," said Mrs. Klinghoffer with rising bitterness. "They are despicable! Late last night in Italy I had the opportunity to face every one of them. [spat in their faces and [told them what I thought of them," "You did?" exclaimed the president. "God bless you." JOHN WALCOTT with ROD NORDLAND in Cairo. THEODORE STANGER in Rome, y~11LAN 1. KL'BIC in Jerusalem, .ANDREW' NAGORSKI ht Bunn. JOHN BARRt" in w'ashington and SUSAN AGREST m Naw Murk Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/10 :CIA-RDP90-009658000707060067-2