ISRAEL: THE QUESTION HERE IS WHY SPY?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000707040044-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: December 1, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/06: CIA-RDP90-00965R000707040044-9
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LOS ANGELES TIMES
1 December 1985
Israel: The Question
Here Is Why Spy?
By Richard Straus and Kan WuMack
A few months ago a senior official of
the Mossad, Israel's central intel-
ligence agency, told friends, "We
are able to obtain 95% of the information
we need from the United States openly.
Why should we risk such a relationship
for the other 5%?" Why indeed?
The disclosure that a U.S. citizen,
Jonathan J. Pollard, had been charged
with spying for Israel sent tremors
through official Washington last week,
causing shock or disbelief among Israel's
friends and supporters. "We expect this
sort of thing from our adversaries, not our
friends," said one of Israel's staunchest
congressional allies. He predicts this inci-
dent could "haunt" U.S.-Israeli relations
for years to come.
A number of past and present Adminis-
tration officials consider the alleged Is-
raeli actions particularly egregious in
light of the degree of intimate cooperation
between the two countries' intelligence
communities. "The intelligence sharing
we conduct with Israel is among the best
we have in the world," says one State
Department insider. A former U.S. intelli-
gence official agrees; "The areas not
shared are marginal," he says.
Even the Israelis admit that Pollard's
actions, if proven, violate a quarter-cen-
tury "gentleman's agreement" between
the United States and Israel not to engage
in covert activities against each other.
U.S. officials insist they have scrupulously
kept their end of the bargain. One Reagan
appointee, on first joining the govern -
ment, spent much time reviewing U.S.
intelligence procedures regarding Israel.
He found there were no covert activities,
no surveillance and, to his surprise, no
monitoring of Israeli communications
from Washington.
Worse than a simple breech of trust, the
Pollard affair could, in the view of several
U.S. officials, undercut the positive trend
in intelligence cooperation that has accel-
erated under the Reagan Administration.
The U.S. intelligence community, led by
CIA4lrector William Casey, reluctant-
ly acceded to the Administration's policy
guidelines that, in effect, call for a
generous and open relationship with Isra-
el-across e oard. The lone holdoout,
the Defense Department under Caspar W.
Weinberger, had to be continually prod-
ded by the White House. Now Israel
supporters within the Administration fear
slippage. "Their troubles with the Penta-
gon could become a model for the rest of
the government," says one official.
Another Administration official under-
scores that attitude: "There's a great deal
of resentment in the intelligence commu-
nity. People are saying that if the Israelis
behave like this, then they should be
treated differently." Even dispassionate
observers who downplay the Pollard
affair-"silly" is a typical description-
admit that it will probably be used by
those in intelligence who do not like the
"new, improved" U.S.-Israeli intelligence
relationship.
The Israeli political and intelligence
Establishment stands to lose the most if
the relationship deteriorates. For that
reason, a number of sources are convinced
that Pollard's alleged activities were
probably concocted by elements outside
the mainstream of Israeli political society.
One name mentioned in the Israeli press,
Rafael Eitan, fits this description. Though
a former adviser on terrorism to Prime
Minster Menachem Begin, Eitan is viewed
as a product of the extreme right in Israel.
And it is on the extreme right where one
finds those most distrustful of America's
commitment to Israel. "They hate the
feeling of dependence on the U.S.," says
one sympathetic U.S. official.
Moreover, the Israeli Establishment has
a well-deserved reputation for profes-
sionalism in Washington. Almost alone
among Middle Easterners, the Israelis are
viewed as key players. Most foreign
diplomats, lost in the sea of conflicting
institutions, overwhelmed by an open and
free-wheeling political system and ig-
nored by most of the city's power brokers,
retreat into an irrelevant social whirl. Not
the Israelis.
They have mastered the intricacies of
Congress, the press and the special-inter-
est groups. Working with the politically
active and influential American Jewish
community, they often set the standard
for other embassies, particularly those
from the Middle East.
The absurdity of resorting to covert
actions when most doors are open is
recognized even by the Israelis. "My
problem has always been a fear of
drowning in information," said one be-
mused Israeli official.
Yet State Department officials already
see signs that the Israeli Establishment is
taking the matter seriously, moving to
investigate charges and contain damage.
(According to these officials, the Israelis
must act quickly since U.S. law enforce-
ment authorities have obtained the origi-
nal purloined documents).
As a result, a number of U.S. officials
and congressional sources believe the
U.S.-Israeli relationship will weather this
"crisis in confidence."
They believe the Israeli Establishment,
like the American, may be cumbersome
but, also like ours, is ultimately held
accountable at home. ^
Richard Straus and Ken Wollack are
co-editors of the Middle East Policy Survey.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/06: CIA-RDP90-00965R000707040044-9