JONAS SAVIMBI: BIG WELCOME FOR A BAD BET

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000706920004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 26, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000706920004-7
e- I
Jonas Savimbi:
Big Welcome
]For a Bad Bet
By Sanford J. Ungar
AN AFRICAN guerrilla leader named
Jonas Savimbi will arrive in Washing-
ton this week on a tour aimed at
gaining U.S. support for his guerrilla war
against the Soviet-backed regime in Angola.
His goal, in simple terms, is to become
America's "contra" in Africa.
Savimbi is a charismatic African politi-
cian. But his guerrilla movement cannot win
and he does not deserve U.S. financial sup-
port or sympathy.
Savimbi's march on Washington this
week hig is his astonishing-transforma-
tion from . hinese-support revolutionary
to con3ervative-backed- r i er.
Buaely six years ago he co not get an
t even with the asaistant secre-
tatl- state for ncan affairs! ause
Congress had passed a law forbidding
American covert involvement witn
forces in the Angolan civil war. But is
week, Savimbi has an excellent chance for a
private meeting with President Reagan in
the Oval Office.
The Clark Amendment, which prevented
his forces from gaining American aid, was
repealed last year. So now he will be pa-
raded through Congress as the American
candidate for leadership not only of Angola,
but perhaps all of southern Africa. He will
be portrayed as the one man who can give
Cuban troops a bloody nose and help re-
store American influence and prestige
there. Tonight, Savimbi's new high profile
will be evident to 40 million viewers in a
scheduled appearance on CBS's "Sixty
Minutes."
The. trouble is that Savimbi simply isn't
what his best American friends believe or
wish he could be. "Savimbi is a master at
telling people what they want to hear; says
John Marcum, professor of political science
at the University of California at Santa Cruz
and one of the leading U.S. experts on An-
gola. "He has a quality of delivering a mes-
sage in a way that pleases the ear of the
listener."
Today that skill is being used to court
American support, but in the past it has
been employed to stir up sentiment against
the United States.
WASHINGTON POST
26 January 1986
Furthermore, Savimbi built much of his
power base by overtly appealing to black-
nationalist attitudes and antiwhite bias
among some of Angola's tribal groups. His
tactics are every bit as brutal and repres-
sive as those of the government now in
power in Angola - if not more so.
He has proudly claimed to have attacked
the installations of American and other
Western companies. And he has lost most of
his support from other African nations by
collaborating with the white minority re-
gime in South Africa.
Besides, UNITA is far from winning. In
fact, U.S. aid to Savimbi now would prolong
rather than shorten the Angolan war, and it
would increase rather than end the Cuban
presence in Angola.
The United States has no business taking
a position on either side of this civil war.
There is little in Angola's internal conflict
that has anything to do with American na-
tional interests. And the risks are many.
Funding Savimbi now would put the United
States into a de facto military alliance with
South Africa. That would violate the de-
clared policy of the Reagan administration
and would also alienate America's good
friends elsewhere in Africa.
I have met Jonas Savimbi during his pre-
vious visits to the United States, and I
have been greatly impressed with his
political and rhetorical skills. He is a gen-
uinely charismatic figure whose eyes seem
alive with fire when he talks of the struggle
in Angola. He speaks superb English (along
with, it is said, Portuguese, French, and
several other lang'tages), and he is partic-
ularly adept at playing to the American fear
of Fidel Castro, whose troops prop up
Savimbi's enemy.
Other journalists who have visited him in
the bush inside Angola - it is easy to ar-
range trips from South Africa or Namibia on
South African planes - have been even
more dazzled by Savimbi. They have heard
him give dramatic, spellbinding orations to
"party congresses" of his supporters, and
they have been taken with his apparent will-
ingness to stay at his fighters' side in their
most difficult moments - rather than
spending much of his time in fancy restau-
rants in European capitals, as the leaders of
other Third World nationalist movements
have sometimes been known to do.
Nonetheless, it is one thing to recognize
the mystique of Jonas Savimbi and quite
another to commit American prestige -
and deficit financing - to his cause. Those
who would bankroll him as an American
surrogate in southern Africa would do well
to examine the recent history of Angola and
Savimbi's own record.
STAT
S avimbi's involvement in the tangled
politics and the violent struggle for
control of Angola goes back to the ear-
ly 1960s. That was more than 10 years be-
fore the country became independent, fol-
lowing a revolution in Lisbon, and was
thrust into the unenviable position of a
pawn in the East-West struggle. Although
many students of African politics see
Savimbi as an opportunist who adjusts his
ideology to the needs of the moment, most
still recognize him as a genuine Angolan
nationalist - a man whose record and cre-
dentials as an opponent of colonialism en-
title him to some role in his country's fu-
ture.
A member of the Ovimbundu tribe (which
makes up about a third of Angola's popula-
tion), Savimbi was born in the country's
central highlands in 1934 to a family that
one Protestant missionary described as be-
ing of "exceedingly humble, primitive, pa-
gan background." Nonetheless, he gradu-
ated at the top of his high school class, and
the missionaries, who saw great promise in
him, sent him to Portugal for advanced
studies.
Before long, however, he was being ha-
rassed by dictator Antonio Salazar's secret
police for his political activities on behalf of
Angolan independence, and so he fled to
Switzerland in 1960, enrolling in the polit-
ical science department at the University of
Lausanne.
According to one State Department doc-
ument that has frequently been quoted,
Savimbi turned up at the American Embas-
sy in Bern early in 1961, declared that he
had been inspired by a speech by then-Unit-
ed Nations ambassador Adlai Stevenson in
favor of self-determination for all peoples of
the world, and introduced himself as "the
future president of Angola."
Within months of making his ambitions
known to U.S. diplomats, Savimbi had gone
off to Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), the cap-
ital of the newly independent Belgian Congo
(now Zaire), to join Holden Roberto, the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000706920004-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000706920004-7 e1
Savimbi's American
backers believe that
Angola is a place where
the United States can
stand up to the Soviet
Union. It is on the
strength of these
conservative hopes. that
Savimbi is winging to
Washington.
leader of a generally pro-Western organi-
zation called the National Front for the Lib-
eration of Angola (FNLA).
The FNLA was being aided and encour-
aged by the United States as an alternative
to the Soviet-supported Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). (It
seemed unlikely to the superpowers that
Portuguese colonial rule could last much
longer on a continent where so many other
countries were setting their possessions
free, and in this period Washington and
Moscow were characteristically choosing up
sides among the new and future nations of
Afica.)
But in 1964 the rivalry between Roberto
and Savimbi came to a head, and Savimbi
broke away from the FNLA. Two years lat-
er, he brought together his own cadres and
formed a "third force," UNITA - the Na-
tional Union for the Total Independence of
Angola. Savimbi found help from China,
among others, and UNITA managed to play
its own unpredictable part in the war
against the Portuguese.
As independence approached in 1975, the
mil to struggle in Angola-
o a -turned into a
to to civil war among t e nation is
&E29 s, and that doomed the prospect o -
open, air elections. To the surprise o
ours e o servers, 'T actua y or - _
ast the FNL c espite e p roin
he U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, crum-
bled before tie oveet- an u an-aim
MPLA.
M nwhile, South Africa, concerned
about the effects of the civil war on its
neighboring territory of Namibia, had, also
intervened in Angola. Inevitably, the South
Africans offered to help Savimbi, and he
accepted.
The MPLA managed to establish a gov-
ernment in Angola's capital of Luanda late
in 1975, and it has stayed in power since
then with the support of a Cuban military
and civilian contingent now estimated at
between 25,000 and 35,000. But UNITA
has also sustained its guerrilla struggle
against the MPLA, with money and supplies
from South Africa, for more than 10 years.
Savimbi generally claims to control at least
a third of the area of thq vast country.
Last year, even as economic sanctions
were being voted against South Africa,
hardliners in both houses of Congress were
successful in getting the law prohibiting
American involvement in the Angolan civil
war repealed. Savimbi's American backers
believe that Angola is a place where the
United States can stand up to the Soviet
Union. It is on the strength of these conser-
vative hopes - that America can get back
into the fray as a player in Angola - that
Savimbi is winging to Washington.
But before Savimbi is allowed to leave
town triumphantly with a chunk of
the American treasury, it would be a
good idea to take a realistic look at the man
who would be our newest African client.
Savimbi does not have the credible record
as a moderate, democratic, pro- American
figure that is so often cited on his behalf by
his supporters in both parties here.
On the contrary, he built his reputation
during the late 1960s and early 1970s as a
fervid anti-capitalist, anti-American revo-
lutionary. "No progressive action is possible
with men who serve American interests ...
the notorious agents of imperialism," he
said at the time of his break with Roberto.
Among his leading supporters in the years
that followed were Mao Tse-tung, Che
Guevara, and Gamal Abdel Nasser.
During those same years, Savimbi drew a
distinction between his own movement and
the MPLA on the basis of their racial com-
position, denouncing the MPLA for its in-
clusion of, and alleged domination by, white
radicals and mestizos (people of mixed race)
who had accepted Portuguese citizenship.
Roughly one-tenth of the million people
who live in the capital city of Luanda are
white or mestizo, and the MPLA regime,
whatever its other flaws, is multiracial in
composition. "Given Savimbi's past state-
ments on racial issues, (the whites and mes-
tizos) all quiver at the thought of his coming
to power," says Gerald J. Bender, professor
of international relations at the University
of Southern California and an advocate of
American diplomatic recognition of the An-
golan government.
Although Savimbi has been wise enough
to alter his pro-Marxist, antiwhite rhetoric
when it is expedient to do so, the UNITA
slogan remains "Socialism, Negritude, De-
mocracy, and Nonalignment." No one really
knows what his policies would be if he were
to come to power. As The Washington
Post's Leon Dash reported in 1977 after
spending seven months with UNITA forces
in the bush, "Savimbi is an enigma, a man on
whom many labels can stick - brilliant,
charismatic, affable, unyielding, forgiving,
temporizing, Machiavellian, opportunistic,
lying, nationalistic, Marxist, Maoist, pro-
Western and socialist."
Savimbi is miscast as a 'freedom fighter"
defending Western ideals against a harA
Marxist regime,
UNITA has in fact been criticized for its
brutal tactics in the Angolan countryside. In
classic guerrilla fashion, its acknowledged
goals are to grind the Angolan economy to a
halt, prevent development, and destroy ag-
riculture - all to stir up discontent with
the government.
Among the foreigners taken prisoner
during UNITA attacks in recent years have
been many missionaries and church- work-
ers. Just last month, in an incident reported
by the Brazilian Embassy in Angola and
three religious organizations, five Baptist
church workers were killed, three wounded
and two women carried off by Savimbi's
men.
And one of the sharpest ironies of the
situation in Angola is that the MPLA gov-
ernment finds that it needs the Cubans to
help protect Gulf Oil rigs and storage tanks
from threats by the South Africans and the
allegedly pro-American UNITA forces.
Savimbi is not the popular pan-African
politician that he often claims to be.
It is true that in the period just after in-
dependence the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) was sharply divided on the is-
sue of whether to recognize the MPLA or
some FNLA/UNITA coalition as the legit-
imate government in Angola. But as soon as
the nature of Savimbi's connections with
South Africa became known, he lost much
of his support elsewhere on the continent.
Savimbi travels to and from Angola pri-
marily through South Africa and South-
African-controlled Namibia; his headquar-
ters in Jamba are only 18 miles from the
Namibian border. The government in Pre-
toria is proud of its connection with UNITA,
claiming that it proves South Africa's ability
to work with the "right" kind of black Afri-
can leader. In fact, Savimbi was an honored
guest at the inauguration of State President
P. W. Botha in 1984. To this day, most Af-
rican governments depict Savimbi as a
South African puppet.
Further American assistance to Savimbi,
overt or covert, will not lead to withdrawal of
the Cuban forces in Angola
On the contrary, every South African
intervention on UNITA's side in the past
has caused an increase in the number of
Cubans. There is no reason to think that
American aid would produce a different re-
sult. In recent meetings, Angolan President
Jose Eduardo dos Santos has reportedly
warned Chester A. Crocker, assistant sec-
retary of state for African affairs, of that
fact, and he has frankly asked the Reagan
administration not to push Angola into a
greater dependence ort the Soviet Union.
C:ni.::$d
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000706920004-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000706920004-7
The Angolan leadership claims it would
like to send the Cubans home gradually and
take a more truly non-aligned posture in
foreign policy. But the regime insists that
this is impossible so long as UNITA contin-
ues its military efforts and South Africa con-
tinues to invade Angolan territory at will.
Savimbi is not on the wigs of winning the
Power struggk in Angola; and few outside
observers, including the American intelli-
gence community, believe he has any chance
of doing so at any time in the near future. A
IA director William Colby esti-
mated in a mid-1970s that it wou to e
some $100 million in outside--a-275-Ft Fie
'pro-Western- to prevail in ngo a,
Ion before the Clark amendment took e -
e9ct.
Today, U.S. officials estimate that if the
MPLA were strengthened and substantially
greater Soviet-funded Cuban assistance
were offered, even $200 or $300 million ..
far more than anyone is suggeadrig the
United States might be able to provide -
would probably not do the job. With or wits
out an infusion of U.S. funds, the Angolaik
civil war is locked in a stalemate.
Jonas Savimbi's visit to Washington,
then, has little to do with the real pros-
pects for peace in southern Africa, and
a great deal to do with American politics.
Two significant forces are arrayed on
Savimbi's side: liberal Democrats who be-
lieve they have to demonstrate their ability
to support a tough, and-Soviet foreign pol-
icy; and conservative Republicans who, hav-
ing voted last summer for economic sanc-
tions against South Africa, have been under
pressure to take some other persuasive,
anti-communist steps in the region.
An example of the former is 85-year-old
Rep. Claude Pepper (D-Fla.), who has an
increasing number of anti-Castro Cuban
exiles in his district demanding he take a
tougher stand.
An example of the later is 50-year-old
Rep. Jack Kemp, (R-N.Y.), who was warned
by some of his bedrock conservative sup-
porters that his vote for South African sanc-
tions could cost him the GOP presidential
nomination in 1988.
Pepper and Kemp make an interesting
coalition, but they are crafting bad foreign
policy. To be wary of some of what the
MPLA has done and to wish for an end to
the Cuban presence in southern Africa does
not require support for a harsh and unprin-
cipled guerrilla leader about whom the
American government and people actually
know very little. To be skeptical and cau-
tious with Savimbi does not imply endorse-
ment of the regime in Luanda.
ormerly a Portuguese colony,
Angola achieved independence in
F1975 after two decades of
nationalist rebellion and guerrillla
warfare. By the end of 1976, one of
the factions - the Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) -
had gained control of the country with
the aid of Cuban technical and military
expertise. The MLPA proclaimed
establishment of the People's Republic
of Angola and transformed itself into
an orthodox Marxist-Leninist party.
^Despite MLPA's victory, the rival
National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA) under
Jonas Savimbi continued to wage
guerrilla war against the government
with considerable help from South
Africa. In 1976, after disclosure of
covert CIA aid to UNITA Congress
passed the "Clark Am ndmpnt"
banning further assistance.
^Over the years, South Africa has
made numerous land and air
incursions into Angola, ostensibly in
pursuit of Angolan-based guerrillas
fighting South Africa's continuing
occupation of Namibia (South-West
Africa). Angola supports independence
in Namibia after a UN-supervised
cease-fire and elections. South Africa
and the United States insist that a
South African pullout from Namibia
must be preceded or accompanied by
withdrawal of Cuban troops from
Angola.
^ln 1984, UNITA appeared on the
verge of a military breakthrough but in
subsequent months the government -
with Soviet and Portuguese help -
turned the tide against the rebels.
^Last year Congress repealed the
Clark Amendment, and in November
President Reagan indicated he favors
resuming aid to UNITA despite
warnings from Angola that such action
would endanger American economic
interests there and damage prospects
for peace in southern Africa.
^While Angola (population about 8.3
million) has substantial agricultural,
petroleum and mineral resources, its
economy and its transportation and
communications networks have been
severely disrupted by the decades of
warfare, the high cost of defense and
a shortage of skilled workers.
It is fine to treat Savimbi to some good,
old-fashioned, all-American hospitality; we,
have done as much for many unsavory types
from all over the world in recent years. But
if we offer him new aid - either "overt" or
"covert," however it is packaged - the peo-
ple of Africa, as usual, will be the biggest
losers of all.
Sar, author of "Africa The
Peo a and Politics of an Emerging
Continent," is than of the school of
communication at The American
University.
T
3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000706920004-7