BEYOND THE HOTLINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000706890002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 24, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STnT
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP90
ARTIiaE APPEARED ~ `-
Q~ PAS
WASHINGTON POST
24 February 1985
~ PtiLTI'ICS ~
Beyond ,
The Hotline
Controlling the crises that could
lead to war ? BY W/LL/AM URY
n the days of King
Arthur, Modred,
the king's son, re-
belled and raised an
army to overthrow
his father. Two great hosts of
knights met on the field of
Camlan, but at the last mo-
ment father and son decided
not to fight. They called a
truce and sent spokesmen
fo.-ward to seek an agree-
ment. Meanwhile, each army,
suspecting a trick, stood
poised- -
Negotiations were proceed-
ing smoothly until a snake,
slithering in the grass, sud-
denly bit one of the knights.
The knight cried out and
drew his sword to kill it. The
assembled armies mistook
this as a signal for battle and
sprang to the attack. By day's
end, all but two of the
100,000 warriors lay dead.
King Arthur and his son
fought and kflled each other,
and with them perished
Camelot.
Today the United States
and the Soviet Union face a
similar. danger. Each side has
marshaled enormous military
forces poised to strike. Fear-
ing total mutual destruction,
the two sides have been talk-
ing, but suspiciously and
sometimes very little. Yet a
regional conflict, a terrorist
act or an accident could ig-
Hite a deadly confrontation.
For decades, government .
officials, military strategists
and the public have focused
on the danger of deliberate
nuclear attacks. "Today," as
the late senator Henry Jack-
son (D-Wash.) said in a
speech two years ago, "it is
more and more being recog-
nized that a nuclear war
could break out even though
neither side wanted it. It
could break out not by delib-
erate intent, but by accident
or misunderstanding."
The arms talks, which will
resume in two weeks in Gene-
va, focus on reducing nuclear
weapons. Reductions are
vital, but they cannot stop
human error. "Even the most
optimistic arms negotiator
agrees that for decades ahead
we will be living in a world
with tens of thousands of nu-
clear weapons, a few hundred
of which could destroy us,"
says Robert S. McNamara,
secretary of defense under
Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson and former presi-
dent of the World Bank
Arms reduction alone won't
keep us secure. "Therefore,"
McNamara says, "improving
crisis management is an abso-
lately essential step toward
reducing the risk of nuclear
>,
war. -
THE MOST UNEASY
days in the nuclear age gave
birth to the first crisis control
measure-the so-called hot-
line. The Cuban missile crisis
of October 1962 brought
home the lesson that in times
of great hostility the leaders
of the Soviet Union and the
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United States must be able to
talk to each other. During the
crisis the two superpowers
;,ad to rely on an American
Broadcasting Co. reporter
and an open radio broadcast
to relay extraordinarily sensi-
tive messages. So on June 20,
1963, Washington and Mos-
cow agreed to install the?hot-
line, ateletype whose Wash-
ington terminal is in the Pen-
tagon with an extension in
the White House.
Every even hour on the
hour an American officer
sends a test message, usually
light poetry or prose, to his
Soviet counterpart in Mos-
cow. Every odd hour on the
hour, he receives a message
back. The hotline has been
used in crises such as the
Middle East war of 1967 and
thr Lebanese conflict of 1982.
Last July, American and
Soviet negotiators agreed to
add to the hotline the capa-
bility to transmit doc~,iments.
But the hotline is a crude
device for sophisticated com-
munications. The time avail-
able for leaders to respond to
a crisis is shrinking as the
Light times of missiles grow
shorter, their accuracy in-
creases and each side consid-
ers targeting missiles to kill
the other's leaders.
There are too many ways
an unexpected nuclear crisis
could erupt: the superpowers
could become embroiled in
their allies' wars, a missile
might be fired by accident or
fly an errant path, a terrorist
group might detonate a bomb
mistaken for an attack by a
superpower.
The growing sensitivity of
both Soviet and American
warning systems creates a
danger in times of crisis that
a precautionary alert by one
side will set off a similar alert
by the other, which will in
turn provoke the first side to
increase its state of alert, and
so on toward war.
Washington and Moscow
leave instituted safeguards
against mistaken use of nu-
clear weapons, but in time of
acute crisis many safeguards
may be removed to make
weapons more readily usable.
The most worrisome dan-
ger of accidental war is the
possibility that several unea-
_.pected events could occur si-
multaneously at a moment of
severe U.S.-Soviet tension.
Each event could interact to
produce effects none could by
itself. In his 1983 book, The
Command and Control of
Nuclear Forces, Yale profes-
sor Paul Bracken describes
such an instance. In 1956,
just as the Hungarians were
revolting, the British and
French tried to retake the
Suez Canal from Egypt, and
the Soviets threatened to de-
stroy London and Paris with
nuclear missiles.
"1'he headquarters of the
US. military command in
Europe received a flash mes-
sage that unidentified jet air-
craft were flying over Turkey
and that the Turkish Air
Force had gone on alert in re-
sponse,? Bracken wrote.
"There were additional re-
ports of 100 Soviet MiG15s
over Syria and further re-
ports that a British Canberra
bomber had been shot down,
also over Syria (In the mid-
1950s only the Soviet Mies
had the ability to shoot down
the high flying Canberras.)
Finally, there were reports
that a Russian fleet was mov-
ing through the Dardanelles
...The White House reac-
tion to these events is not
fully known, but reportedly
Gen. Andrew Goodpaster was
afraid that the events `might
trigger off all the NATO
operations plan.' At this time,
the NATO operations plan
called for all-out nuclear
strikes on the Soviet Union.
"As it turned out, the `jets'
over Turkey were actually a
flock of swans picked up on
radar and incorrectly identi-
fied and the 100 Soviet Mies
over Syria were resily a much
smaller routine escort return-
ing the president of Syria
from a state visit to Moscow.
The British Canberra bomber ~
was downed by a mechanical
difficulty, and the Soviet fleet
was engaging in a long-sched-
uled exercise."
If this coincidence had
been suggested as a "scenar-
io," it might have been dis-
missed as too improbable.
Two and a half years ago,
the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency asked a
group of scholars at Harvard,
including Dr. Richard Smoke
and myself, to study the
problem of improving U.S.-
Soviet control in such crises.
We began by e%am~ past
tense moments and we asked
policymakers in Washington
and Moscow these questions:
"If you were a leader on the
verge of a serious crisis with
the other superpower, what
might you wish you had dis-
cussed beforehand with your
counterparts on the other
side? What joint institutional
arrangements might you wish
you had in place?"
Our- study had its real
beginnings in 1981, when Sen.
Sam Nunn (D-Ga) asked the i
Strategic Air Command if the
United States could recognize...
a "disguised third-country at-
tack,? anuclear strike by a
third nation that deceptively
appeared to have come from
the Soviet Union. The answer
from SAC was not encourag- j
ing: it recommended. major
improvements in detecting
such a ruse.
Then Nunn, Jackson and
Sen. John Warner (R-Va)
proposed establishing a crisis
control center. The idea drew
support from such well-
known defense specialists as
Bobby Inman, Brent Soow-
croft and James Schlesinger.
Recent events have pushed
the concept closer to reality.
v In March 1984, Secre-
tary Konstantin Chernenko
called on nuclear powers "not
to allow situations fraught
with danger of nuclear con-
flict," adding, "if such a dan-
ger exists, [they should] hold
urgent consultations to pre-
vent anuclear conflagration."
In June, the Senate ''
urged the president to negoti-
ate with the Soviets to estab-
lish crisis control centers
in Washington and Moscow.
In July, agreements
were reached to improve the
hotline.
In September, Presi-
dent Reagan, speaking to the
United Nations, proposed
regular Cabinet-level meet-
ings as well as "periodic con-
sultations at policy level
about regional problems .. .
to help avoid miscalculations
[and] reduce the potential risk
of U.S.Soviet c~nfirontation."
/ In November, the
Aspen Institute International
Group, which included for-
mer European heads of state,
called for creating a network
of crisis control centers.
THE MOST TANGIBLE
way to go beyond the hotline
is to establish two centers,
one in Washington and one in ~
Moscow, each jointly staffed
by American and Soviet crisis
control specialists. The cen-
ters would be electronically
linked by telephone, comput-
er, facsimile transmitters and
teleconferencing. A dozen
military and diplomatic offi-
cers from each side would
work together at each center,
a skilled staff ready on an in-
stant's notice to engage in in-
tensive problem-solving.
Imagine the centers' possi-
ble use in a future Middle
East crisis. War, let us say,
breaks out between Israel
and Syria As in October
1973, the war escalates and
Soviet forces prepare to enter
the fray. The neat day Wash-
ington calls a worldwide nu-
clear alert. That night a nu-
clear explosion devastates
downtown San Francisco.
The president and his ad-
visers face extraordinary un-
certainty. Was it the Soviets?
The act of a terrorist group?
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u
A U.S. weapons accident?
The hotline prints out a
message from Moscow. The
general secretary disavows
any responsibility and offers
his sympathies. He says he .
has directed the Soviet staff
at the crisis control centers to
cooperate in providing proof
' it was not a Soviet attack.
Many in Washington are
suspicious. Soviet submarines ;
are known to be in waters
close to the Pacific Coast.
The Pentagon insists on a
higher alert. The centers
swing into action. A telecon- ~
ference begins among staff
officers in Moscow and
Washington. The American
officers in Was n an
the Soviet of cers in oscow
have man lines of communi-
cation into eir respective j
military services ana ellr- 1
ence ~encies - t r~u~
w 'c uestions and informa-
tion now pour. a meeting
goes on for hours.
Is the San Francisco sce-
nario likely? Not at all. Is it
?? ., ~. i
formation for accuracy and
uses infozrnation filters to
rotect a ainst irate ' ence
leaks. An in anyr case, t e
risk of decentlon L nod sia-
nificantl eater in a staffed
center an rt ~ m anv com-
munication medium, includ-
ing the hotline. Face-to-face
communication may off_ er the
0 ortuni to more effec-
tive ychallenge statements.
ear y e arrangement
should not depend on good-
will, but ss Nunn said: "You
don't have to ? trust the Rus-
sians to do this; you only
need to make an assumption
that they are not madmen,
and they will act in their own
interests."
THERE IS MORE that
can be done beyond crisis
control centers: The United
States and the Soviet Union
could, for example, negotiate
an agreement on incidents in-
volving aircraft. ~
When a Soviet fighter shot
down xorean Air Lines Flight
007 18 months ago, killing all
269 passengers, a wave of out-
rage spread throughout the
world, increasing tensions be-
tween the superpowers. ?
Although no serious esca-.
lotion took place, the sober-
ing "-What ifs?" remained:
What ff the plane had been
American with 269 U.S. citi-
zees aboard? What if the at-
tack had come during severe
international tension?
The Korean airliner was by
no means an isolated incident
Five months ago an American
aircraft carrying 200 passen-
gers drifted 500 miles off
course and came within ~ 15
minutes of overflying the
Soviet Union's Kola Penin-
sula near Norway, where the
Soviets have supersecret m~1i-
tary installations. In Decem-
ber, aSoviet cruise missile '.
went astray, flew over north-
ern Norway and finally
crashed in Finnish Lapland.
These two recent examples
indicate that as hostile super-
powers confront each other
EVEN MORE USEFUL
than such crisis management
is crisis prevention. At crisis ~
control centers, the United
States and the Soviet Union ~
could act jointly to prevent
nuclear proliferation, nuclear
terrorism or a nuclear attack
from a third nation. A pre-
cedent exists. In August 1977,
the So~~iets tipped off the
U.S. government that South
Africa was planning to testa I
nuclear device. A strong but
quiet American protest fol-
lowed, and no test took place.
There is, of course, another
side to this. Crisis centers
could be misus for in '-
genre atherin or deception.
ere ~s no ear protection
for misinformation but there
are precedents to , idl~e the
warv or exa~j21~~
American delesation to the
U.S.-Soviet Standing Consul-
tative Commission, the moni-
torine body for SALT I, inde-
pendently checks Soviet in-
around the globe, the triggers
for accidental war are many.
There is a promising pre-
cedent for creating safety
mechanisms against these
triggers: the Incidents at Sea
Agreement reached in 1972.
The accord was reached
because Soviet and American
naval vessels and tracker
planes follow each other,
sometimes dangerously close-
ly, all over the world. In the
late 1960s and early 1970s
seem to take forever to re-
cover-and often succumb."
"This is a form of aggres-
sive behavior described [in
animals] by Lorentz and
Tinnbergen," Hall explains.
"However, instead of the
body defending against pre-
dators and the external envi-
ronment, it's coping with a
microbial environment And
why shouldn't both systems
be under the same control?"
Many facts support his thesis:
the same hormone levels.that
appear to go along with vari-
ous kinds of aggressive
behavior, such as the ses hor-
mones, are the ones for which
~ there are markers on the cells
of the immune system. These
hormones are known to influ-
ence the functioning of the
immune system.
-Perhaps there is a given
personality that determines
how external events will be
perceived and handled
through life. Mothers with i
several children say they can
feel the difference between I
their newborns from the very
start There clearly seems to
be something special about
the psychologies of "survi-
vors." An important research
question is whether a corre-
sponding difference is re-
flected in the cells of their
bodies as well. ?
One aspect of the question
is how different personality
types respond to "stress."
There's much interest in
Washington about stress and
how it may alter the perform-
ance of people in space, in
submarines, even on the Hill.
We can assume that stress
is anything that pushes an in-
dividual's mind or body be-
yond an ordinary neutral
state. Disease does, strenuous
exercise, sea, something per-
ceived as hilariously funny or
deeply depressing, the changes
of age, the pimples of adoles-
cence, alousy haircut, a sick
child, falling in or out of love.
Life's events, in other words.
Those who experience, re-
spond and act in aggressive
ways-and aggressive doesn't
necessarily mean ugly, more
like actwe~learly seem less
likely to become helplessly
stressed ... and ill. By
evaluating stress' impact on
the individuals involved and
comparing blood cell changes
to those taken in health,
Goldstein and Hall expect to
be able to draw chemical pro-
files of immune system func-
tions under various stresses.
One of the most important
measures will be that of the
thymosin levels.
THERE'S CERTAINLY
little pleasure in aging. All
the talk about the "golden"
and "leisure" years, the smil-
ing, wrinkled faces in condo-
minium ads, are a pure
shuck. The young person
trapped unbelieving inside
the aging body faces a daily
insult in the mirror. But
maybe if Goldstein and his
group can do what they are
convinced they can, things
will be better. Knowing you
could avoid the chronic, crip-
pling disabilities of age would
make a mighty difference.
Allan Goldstein says it's
not only possible, but imnu-
nent He's getting along him-
self, and he isn't wasting any
time. "If we can be as suc-
cessful at fund-raising ss we
have been with treatment-
well, we should see some
pretty dramatic results in
only a few years."
Goldstein and Hall, and
the remarkable group they've
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assembled as directors of
their embryonic institute
(Cranston, Jonas Salk, Mary
Lasker, Nobel laureate Julius
Axelrod and others) need
funding. They ~ are going
about it in a straightforward
way, to the usual sources. But
a major source is closed to
them because the NIH
doesn't fund interdisciplinary
programs. Like his exciting
AIDS study-which won't re-
ceive needed federal funds
for another year or so-the
institute for the study of
aging may also have to wait.
There's a lot of talk about
prevention, but precious little
money for creative thinking
in the area of aging.
Goldstein is marginally
sanguine, having had to fool
`~ around with money people
many times before. But he's
frustrated. 'You .get a good
thing like thymosin, and good
ideas like the ones they're
working with now, and "you
just hate to think of the peo-
ple who could be helped if the
meaey was there." ^
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