DISCUSSION OF CHANGE IN CIA LEADERSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000706580025-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: February 3, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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RADIO N REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 [phone]
CBS News Nightwatch
WUSA - TV
CBS Network
February 3, 1987 3:00 A.M.
SUBJECT Discussion of Change in CIA Leadership
Washington, D.C .
LEM TUCIp&R: After much speculation about his future,
the White House announced Monday that CIA Director William Casey
has resigned. Casey has been hospitalized since undergoing
surgery for a brain tumor on December 18th.
Casey is a longtime friend and political ally of
President Reagan. He was named to head the intelligence agency
in 1981 after helping manage Mr. Reagan's successful presidential
campaign.
Casey's resignation comes at a time when many questions
are being asked about the CIA's role in the Iran-Contra affair.
With us this morning are William Colby, former CIA
Director in the Ford Administration. George Carver -- he was a `I
member of the 1981 CIA transition team:'"He's now with Georgetown
University's Center for Strategic and International Studies. And
John Bross ,._a 20-year CIA veteran. He was also on that 1981,'4
transition team, and he stayed on for a while as an Agency
adviser.
Good morning.
Let me ask you. Mr. Casey has resigned now, and we know
that his Deputy, Robert Gates ._ is going to replace him. Awful
question to ask three Agency guys, I guess. But does Robert
Gates have very big shoes to fill in replacing Bill Casey?
WILLIAM COLBY: Certainly he does. Bill Casey, I think,
has done a very fine job, for one. And secondly, he has a very
close relationship with the President, which is a very distinct
advantage for a CIA Director to be in that kind of connection
OFFICES IN. WASHINGTON DC ? NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES ? CHICAGO ? DETROIT ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES
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Cates, obviously, is of spectacular career service,
himself. He has the confidence of the government, and I think of
the Congress. And so I think he can fill them.
But the answer is, yes, they are big shoes.
GEORGE CARVER: They're big shoes under any
circumstances, not just following Bill Casey. The Director of
Central Intelligence holds an enormously important position in
our government. He must preside as the administrative head of
CIA, and also the senior intelligence officer looking after the
whole community, as Bill knows from having held the job himself.
So, it's a tremendous job, quite apart from the fact
that Gates's immediate predecessor did it in a very distinguished
fashion. And Bob is very able guy, but he's going to have his
work cut out for him.
JOHN BROSS: Well, I agree with both Bill and George.
In fact, I went so far as to call Bob Gates this morning and tell
him that I was sure that his shoes were large enough.
I think he's fortunate in Frank Carlucci's appointment
to the National Security Council at this point because it will
give Bob, I think, a relationship in which he can flourish and
have confidence.
TUCKER: Do you think there'll be a close relationship,
perhaps even closer than before, between the CIA and the NSC,
with Bob Gates and Frank Carlucci having a past?
CARVER: Well, I hope so. The whole governmental system
functions best when the Director of the Central Intelligence and
the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs get along
closely in a professional sense. It's not necessary that they be
bosom buddies, personally.
But when Bill was Director, he and Brent Scowcroft got
along very well, and that benefited the whole government.
TUCKER: Do you see any indication, you want to talk
about, that there was some breakdown in that closeness between
Poindexter and Bill Casey, and then maybe that's part of the
reason why there is a little bit of a mess going on right now?
COLEY: No, I don't think that was the case. I think
what happened here was that with respect to the arms to Iran that
Poindexter was arranging, the Agency was asked for some help, and
did it with a finding from the President that that was a proper
thing to do.
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With respect to the aid to the Contras, the Agency was
prohibited from being involved in that, and it obviously took
considerable steps to stay out of that particular problem.
TUCKER: There are some questions.
COLBY: There are some little steps over the edge of the
line here and there. But I think, by and large, you'll find that
the investigations essentially support what I said.
TUCKER: Let me ask you gentlemen, looking at the
Iran-Contra situation, affair, mess, whatever we're calling it.
Would you give me an appraisal, each of you, a brief appraisal?
BROSS: Of what? Of wnere we stand now?
TUCKER: Of that whole situation. Is it a mess. Is it
-- was it handled badly?
BROSS: We11, it's pretty untidy. But I think you have
to recognize the tremendous pressures which existed, and were
asserted and felt by the President, to do something about the
hostages, which obviously preoccupied much of his concern and
attention.
Then there's this question, which is somewhat contro-
versial, as to the degree to which this represented an overture
to some dissident opposition element in Iran, which again,
ex-the-weapons-problem, was a perfectly legitimate field of
investigation.
CARVER: Well, it isn't tidy. But one of the main
reasons it's untidy, and I think one of its big lessons, is
because the machinery of government that's set up to handle such
matters was simply jumped and not used. The idea was broached to
the NSC staff and to Mr. Poindexter, the Assistant to the
President. It was given to one of his subodinates, Colonel
North, to execute. And the people who could have scrubbed the
Israeli appraisal on which the whole thing was based and who
should have handled the execution of any such program were
deliberately cut out of it, for a whole variety of reasons.
And that, to my mind, is far from the least of the
reasons why it wound up a mess.
COLBY: I agree with George on that. But I think the
arms to Iran was totally misguided and the wrong thing to do.
All one has to do is conceive of what would our situation be if
Iran actually begins to win this war against Iraq and if it
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begins to threaten the rest of the Gulf, and so forth. We'd have
a terrible situation. So there's no justification for the arms.
Dealing with them for the hostages? All right. Looking
for dissidents? Okay.
But with respect to passing money to the Contras, pretty
clearly, if you're going to do something in the clandestine
world, you'd better use the professionals. And if you don't use
them, you're going to get in trouble, such as now they can't find
what happened to between 10 and 30 million dollars.
CARVER: And if you want to deal with dissidents In
Iran, you let the professionals quietly look for the dissidents.
You dun't send planeloads of arms into Teheran airport in a way
that they're bound to gain publicity.
TUCKER: With a bible and a cake.
BROSS: Well, the bible and the cake...
TUCKER: The Agency's involvement. Any criticism of
that that you care to offer? From what we know, on the public
record.
CARVER: I think its involvement was minimal, and I
think it was designedly minimal. I think Bill Casey made some
input as a senior White House adviser and, as Bill Colby
suggested, the Agency provided some assistance to NSC staff
activity during the course of the Iran affair. But I think that
one of the big problems is that neither the Agency nor the
Defense Department nor the other components of government that
should have been involved, both in the appraisal as to whether
this was a good idea and its execution, were involved.
TUCKER: Let's take a quick break. When we come right
back let's pursue another line here.
TUCKER: There are also allegations, reports that the
CIA under Mr. Casey may have been involved in getting equipment
and funds to the Contras during the period in which Congress said
that was a no-no.
guy?
Mr. Bross, would that be appropriate action for a CIA
GROSS: Well, I can only tell you what you know from
reading the newspapers. I gather that there was a concerted
effort by various agencies of the government to enlist the
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cooperation of other nations and organizations in keeping the
Contra program afloat. But exactly who did what to whom, I du
not know.
COLBY: I think the record is pretty clear that the
President felt very strongly about continued aid to the Contras,
to do what he could to get this done, and that this included
going to other nations and asking them for support, and so forth:
including let his staff run loose, fairly loose, the NSC staff
run loose to arrange this separation of money and sending some to
the Contras: having these various private groups operating, with
the NSC staff's knowledge and approval. That certainly existed.
But I think it shows that the agency really kept itself
pretty much out of it, except for a couple of very minor steps
over the line, such as passing a message from Colonel North to
some people in Costa Rica.
TUCKER: Well, with the concern on Capitol Hill about
the entire affair, including the CIA's involvement, do you see
Mr. Gates, Robert Gates having a harder time being confirmed?
CARVER: No, not at all. In fact, I think one of the
reasons why this was a very astute selection is that Bob has
already been through a confirmation process when he was named
Deputy Director.
TUCKER: And he's a 20-year veteran of the Agency.
CARVER: I think that he has excellent relations with
the staff and the members of the oversight committees. And I
think some questions may be asked, but he has personal capital of
trust to trade upon. And I think that one of the reasons it was
wise to pick him was that any other choice, particularly a
high-visibility political choice, might have had much more
difficulty at confirmation than Bob will have.
BROSS: If I may add a thought, Bob Gates is the first
individual to be given this assignment who comes from what we
know as the analytical side of the house. Traditionally, the
Agency has been regarded, to some degree criticized, for coming
to emphasizing its operational responsibilities. Here is Bob
Gates, whose entire experience has been in the production of
estimates and analyses. And I think this will be very reassuring
to the university community.
Don't you?
COLBY: Absolutely.
TUCKER: Do you find that reassuring?
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COLBY: Yes. I think that Bob Gates' appointment
represents the final accomplishment of an analyst becoming the
top element of Central Intelligence. This was always the idea,
from it's very start. But since the enthusiasm got going fur
operations, the operators dominated the history of the Agency fur
a long time.
TUCKER: Let us in a bit on the Agency working, the
operational side, the analytical side. Basically -- well, and
then there's the political side. Many of the...
TUCKER: Well, but William Casey, I mean, was a
political appointee.
C 0 L 8 Y : Well, he was an outside appointee, but he had
spectacular qualifications in his history of foreign affairs,
intelligence work in World War II, and so forth.
And incidentally, one of, I think, the most permanent
contributions Casey will have made to CIA is in his
reorganization of the analytical staff and putting Bob Gates at
the head of it to really move it into the center of activity.
TUCKER: Will he be able -- because he comes from the
analytical side, do you think he will be able to resist the
operational side and those who made -- the next group of Oliver
Norths, who may push for some operation here?
CARVER: Well, I think the experience is sitting right
here. Both Bill Colby and Dick Helms came from the operational
side. And I can assure you, from having worked with both of
them, that neither had any trouble resisting pressure from
analysts when they needed. And I think the flip side of that
applies with Bob Gates and the operators.
BROSS: And I think this is a point that should be
emphasized. The Central Intelligence Agency is an extremely
disciplined organization, probably the most disciplined
organization in the government. And there is no question in my
mind that they will fall into line and do what they're told to
do.
TUCKER: You say that's so, but yet -- and maybe I read
too much. There seems to be an impression afoot the CIA -- you
go all the way back to Chile. There was something, a lot of
Americans said, "Hey, what are we doing there?" You look at some
of the involvement, alleged involvement in funding the Contras.
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"Hey, why is the CIA doing this? It may be in violation of the
law." You look at CIA operatives in Central America dealing with
Contras and other people that they apparently weren't supposed to
be dealing with.
So, I think some of the public would look and say, "What
are they talking about, highly disciplined?"
COLBY: No, no. I think, absolutely, the cases you
describe, the policy decisions were clearly made by Presidents,
not by CIA. They were the Presidents' directives that led to
these actions being taken. The Agency saluted and did them.
The other issue you say, about whether they're complying
with the law, I think you will find that they did comply with the
law. At certain periods they were entitled, under the law, to
exchange intelligence and to provide communications equipment to
the Contras. And when that law change was made, they began doing
it, under the law.
So, I think you'll find very few cases of where -- don't
blame the Agency for Colonel North. He was not in the Agency .
And the real problem was that he didn't use the Agency.
BROSS: And wasn't this the finding of the Church
Committee, the Senate committee that investigated the alleged
abuses of CIA in the early '70s?
COLBY: Absolutely. The Church Committee finding was
CIA wasn't out of control, a rogue elephant. If anything, it was
too much under the control of the President, and that the
Congress hadn't done its proper job of supervision.
TUCKER: Let's take another quick break, come back and
wrap this up.
TUCKER: Any of you think that Congress is going to take
this opportunity -- I know you said you thought Robert Gates
would get confirmed. But there are those in Congress who are
allegedly upset with the way certain things have been done
involving the CIA, William Casey. Do you think the CIA is going
to have to go through a bit of a public controversy -- no, that's
the wrong word -- going to be put in the spotlight for longer
than maybe it would normally be just to confirm a Director?
CARVER: Well, I hope not. Because one of the United
States's great problems in dealing effectively and quietly
overseas is the conviction on the part of many foreigners,
including services and individuals with whom we want cooperate,
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that we can't keep our own mouths shut protecting our own
secrets, let alone theirs, partly because of the glare of
congressional publicity. And I hope that Congress will behave in
a responsible fashion and not try to rejiqqer its balance with
the Executive at the expense of the United States Goverment's
intelligence capabilities, which we badly need in this time of
crisis.
TUCKER: You oppose -- go ahead, sir. I'll come back to
my question. Go ahead.
BROSS: Well, I was simply going to say that with the
number of proliferating committees, of which there are at least
three in the Executive Branch, and heaven only knows how many in
the Congress, all of which has a certain interest in examining
the background and determining what happened in this Iran thing,
I think there will be no paucity, if that's the right word, of
information coming out which may not be too well digested.
In other words, I think this investigative period is
going to be a difficult one.
TUCKER: You oppose the reporting-to-Congress rules that
the CIA has to abide by?
BROSS: No.
TUCKER: Are they too broad?
COLBY: They're very good.
TUCKER: Should we restrict the number of people?
COLBY: They're -- well, it would be ideal if you had
one committee instead of separate ones in the separate Houses.
But that's something Congress has to solve. The fewer the people
the better, of course. But to have Congress involved,
absolutely, it's important that that exist.
CARVER: Congress has to be involved. You do need, in
the interest of security, to try to restrict the number. One
committee would be better than two, although two are better than
eight. And I, myself, regret the amount of turnover on the
memerships of the committees, and particularly their staffs, and
the rate of turnover. Because over a period of a decade or so,
the number of people who have had access to the most sensitive
secrets of the U.S. Government and now are no longer under
effective discipline is staggering, and really rather chilling.
BROSS: I was not referring to the oversight responsibi-
lities and authority of the Congress. I was talking about the
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number of committees which have been create or have an interest
in this specific so-called Irangate issue.
What would each of you, if you had a chance -- let's
assume that each of you is right now the Director of the CIA.
What would be the most important thing? Maybe Robert Gates is
watching and you'll say, "Hey, here's something you ought to do."
What's the first thing Robert Gates ought to do? Or an important
thing you think should be dune.
COLBY: Well, establish a good relationship with Frank
Carlucci and the White House, and a good relationship with the
Senate and House Intelligence Committees. Then look around the
world to see where we need to use our efforts to learn more about
the world and denied areas of the Soviet Union, and so forth, or
entangled areas like the Middle East.
CARVER: Well, I would agree with all of what Bill has
said. And in the process of doing that, solidifying his
relations with the White House and with Capitol Hill. Bob needs
to reassure his colleagues in the Agency and throughout the
community that he's going to be as effective and forceful a
leader of them and representer of their interests on the Hill and
in the White House as was Bill Casey. And that's going to
require a good deal of his time over the next few weeks.
BROSS: I believe that his relationships with the heads
of other agencies of the government, such as the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, are sound, that Bill Webster has con -- I'm
told this, and I believe it's true -- so that I think he gets off
to a very good start as far as his relations are concerned.
He's a very intelligent man, and I think he will make
the most of it.
TUCKER: Can we talk old times dust a second here? Bill
Casey had a hand in founding this country's intelligence
community, did he not?
COLBY: Well, he was a member of the OSS, which was the
predecessor organization. But so was Mr. Bross and so was I.
George was too young.
BROSS: Well, he did have a role in advising General
Donovan about some of the early organizational and administrative
steps that were taken by OSS. And he also played a part in the
operational scene in Europe. So he was in at the creation. I
think you can say that. As was Bill.
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TUCKER: As you look back at those days, obviously, you
opted to stay in the intelligence community. What did you like
most? Each of you, now. What did you like most about being in
what is a very dark secret area to most of us?
COL8Y: Service to your country, I think. That's the
most important motive.
TUCKER: Service to the country. And I don't demean
that one bit, sir. But beyond that, no James Bond loves? No the
fear of a little danger now and then?
COLBY: I've jumped out of airplanes and I've gone up
the back streets of Europe and I've gone into the jungles of
Southeast Asia. I've had enough adventures. But the challenging
part of CIA is understanding what's happening in this great big
world around us, to understand different cultures, different
peoples, get to know them, get to understand what motivates them,
so that you're helping your country.
CARVER: That's abolutely right. I know, also, at
first hand the truth of Churchill's adage that the most
exhilarating thing in the world is to be shot at and missed.
But the basic thing that the Agency gave to me, as I
think to most professional officers, is a chance to use all of
your talents and all of your training on a very exciting,
important series of problems in the service of your country. And
this question of service, it may sound corny, it may be out of
fashion with the spirit of the '60s, the '70s, and the '80s, but
it certrainly motivated those of us who came on board in the '40s
and '50s.
BROSS: I think it's important to remember -- I, for
instance, did not stay on in intelligence, and I don't think Bill
did, either. I think we both came back at the time when the Cold
War seemed to be hotting up in the very early '50s. And this was
in response to what was sort of a national appeal for people to
come in and help in the intelligence field, or the administrative
field or the economic field, or whatever.
TUCKER: And of you worried, as we wrap this up, worried
about the future of the Agency, with the battering, justified or
not, that it sometimes takes?
CARVER: You always worry about it, but it's survived to
date. And I think if Bob gives the kind of leadership which I
know he's capable of giving and has the kind of support that he
deserves from the White House and Capitol Hill, it too will
survive this battering.
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COLBY: I think it's an essential part of our national
security system, just like the Army, just like the Navy. We
don't worry about whether the Army's going to survive. It's
going to survive.
RROSS: If you didn't have it, you'd have to invent it.
TUCKER: That's a good last word.
We've been talking about the CIA and its new Director.
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