GETTING ON WITH GORBACHEV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160008-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 18, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90
18 March 1985
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
on with Gorbachev
By Dimitri K. Simes
I T is important for the United States to start on the
right foot with the new Soviet leader Mikhail S.
Gorbachev. Of course. initially at least, his personal
imprint is going to be limited. The new general secretary
will be no more than the first among equals on the Polit-
buro where the Old Guard maintains considerable power.
Yet Mr. Gorbachev has an opportunity to consolidate his
position rather quickly.
With Konstantin U. Chernenko's death, the Politburo
has shrunk to 10 members. Several vacancies on this top
executive-legislative committee of the Soviet system will
have to be filled in the near future. For instance, with the,
exception of Gorbachev, there is only one member of the
key Party Central Committee Secretariat - Grigory V.
Romanov - who has a seat on the Politburo. One or two
more Central Committee secretaries
will have to be added soon. Also, five
out of 10 Politburo members are in
their seventies. Prime Minister Nikolai
A. Tikhonov is 79, Foreign Minister
Andrei A. Gromyko is 76. To put the
Politburo age factor into perspective,
one should take into account that the
average longevity of Soviet males is
currently just around 62 years. Ac-
cordingly, several departures from the
ranks of the leadership can be easily
anticipated. Finally, the Party Con-
gress is scheduled to convene before
the end of this year. And party con-`
gresses are traditionally used by the
leadership to make personnel changes.
Chances are that at first Gorbachev
will have to be careful to consult oth-
ers in determining additions to the Po-
litburo. But the general secretary's job
is uniquely positioned both institution-
ally and symbolically to allow an accu-
mulation of personal power. Literally -
in a matter of months, the balance in the Politburo may
shift to Gorbachev's advantage, giving him a relatively
free hand in making new top appointments. No outsider
can predict whether the new leader will move fast to ex
ploit the opportunity to pack the Politburo witli his allies
and clients. But the opportunity is there and has to be
considered by American policymakers.
. What can and should the Reagan administration do to
impress Mr. Gorbachev with the seriousness of the- US
intent in seeking a more constructive relationship with
the Soviet Union? The first thing to do is
to avoid ill-conceived gestures which only
create confusion and false expectations
on both sides. The President's instinct
not to attend the Chernenko funeral was
correct. He neither knew the man person-
ally nor enjoyed a warm relationship with
him. And Chernenko was not a political
giant whose funeral was a must to attend.
More importantly, Reagan's encounter
with Gorbachev would have to be brief
and primarily ceremonial. Nothing of substance could be
realistically accomplished.
Instead, the So 'ets would be guessing what the Presi-
dent was up to. T ?would undoubtedly be pleased-that
the anti-Communist President felt obliged to contribute
to the prestige of their regime by paving a visit: Except,
being unsentimental and suspicious, they would prob-
ably fear that his motive was not to have an opening with
the Kremlin" but rather, by appearing in a peacenik's
mantle, to more effectively sell the MX missile to the US
Congress and "star wars" to the West Europeans. More-
over, scores of congressmen and hundreds of media peo-
ple, feeling obliged to accompany the President would
find themselves with little to do in Moscow. Some would
go to visit dissidents and Jewish activists, only to be
roughed up by Soviet police and security agents. Mutual
recriminations would inevitably follow
No unilateral US concessions to Gorbachev are in or-
der. If he is interested in improving US-Soviet relations
there is plenty he can do without surrendering any of the
,Kremlin's important interests. Engaging in serious nego-
tratioirs under UN auspices regarding terms of the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan could be one encouraging
signal. Releasing Anatoly Shcharansky could be another.
But as long as Gorbachev continues the foreign and inter-
nal policies of his predecessors which the US found of-
fensive, there is no reason for the Reaganadministration
to rush toward accommodating him.
There is no need for a major reassessment of the US
policy toward the Soviet regime simply because there is a
new more vigorous and impressive party leader in Mos-
cow On the other hand, precisely because the new gen-
eral Secretary can become both a more formidable rival
and a more promising partner, it makes sense to improve
the conduct of the administration's Soviet diplomacy and
to make sure that Gorbachev clearly understands where
the United States stands vis-a-vis his country.
The arms control talks, which started in Geneva last
week, provide one important format for communication
with the new leader. There are two arms control steps the .
administration should consider. First, it is time to stop
exuberant rhetoric about the great po-
tential of the Strategic Defense Initia-
tive. Nobody knows exactly what SDI
technologies will evolve in the course
of the research and development ef-
fort. A consensus exists in the US and
among the allies that research should
1 continue. Anyway, there is no. way
that limits on research could be veri-
fied through any feasible form of in-
spection. But the way the President'
and some of his associates talk about
making nuclear weapons obsolete goes
considerably beyond the scope of what
is being done in practi
/y.,ate.,:_
Mr. _#ea gan:
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160008-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160008-7
is entitled to his vision of switching
from deterrence to an impenetrable de-
fense against everything nuclear. But
the gap between what the administra-
tion actually does about "star wars"
and its pronouncements is counterpro-
ductive. It needlessly provokes the
Russians, confuses the West Europe-
ans, and creates fertile ground for all
kinds of Soviet peace offensives. Nothing would be sacri-
ficed by adopting a more modest and businesslike tone in
discussion of the, strategic defense options
Second, the administration should do its best to nego-
tiate an extension of the SALT II treaty which expires on
Dec. 31. If the treaty is allowed to lapse, the whole arms
control regime is likely to disintegrate, intensifying the
nuclear competition and superpower animosity. The US
delegation may offer Moscow a trade-off - the extension
should be coupled with an amendment allowing the de-
ployment of the second mobile ICBM.
Only one is currently permissible. Such
an amendment would give a green light to
the Midgetman missiles on the American
side and would eliminate the controversy
regarding the new Soviet SSX-25 mis-
siles. The US claims this missile violates
SALT II provisions, while the USSR ar-
gues that it is no more than a modernized
model of the earlier SS-13. An attempt
should also be made to reach some com-
promise regarding the new Soviet radar currently under
construction in the proximity of Krasnoyarsk in Eastern
Siberia. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger tells
anyone willing to listen that this radar represents a vi-
cious and militarily- meaningful violation of the 1972
ABM treaty. A number of CIA experts, however dis-
a ree on both counts. The issue has to be raised with the
Soviet delegation. Surely, with some ingenuity, a formula
can be found which, without forcing the Soviet Union to
stop the construction, will include modifications in the
design acceptable to the American side.
Caution in selling the SDI and flexibility on extending
SALT II will not require a single substantive concession
to the Soviets. On the contrary, by demonstrating good
faith on arms control, the administration will be better
placed in getting appropriations for strategic programs,
some crucial in their. own right and some useful as a bar-
gaining chip in Geneva. And arms control talks with
Gorbachev would start on a positive note contributing to
an overall stabilization of the US-Soviet relationship.
Dimitri'K. Simes is senior associate at. the Carne-
gie Endowment for International Peace., ._;
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160008-7