SOVIET SPIES ARE A THREAT-AND AN OBVIOUS WEAKNESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 26, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160006-9
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ARTICLE A5 LT IL
ON PAGE J-r'~
LOS ANGELES TIMES
26 July 1985
Soviet Shies Are a Threat-
and an Obvious Weakness
By DIMITRI K. SIMES
It is an open season on spies in Washing-
ton. Currently, more people are awaiting
trial on espionage charges than at any time
since 1945. The Administration and Con-
gress alike are announcing steps
with the newly discovered threat.
The threat is real. So is political exploita-
tion. Ideologues of the right are only too
eager to exploit the situation to expose "the
evil empire. And quite a few liberals are
using espionage as a safe way to demon-
strate their hard-line credentials.
of KGB
Ironically, the omnipresence
operatives reflects the systemic weakness-
es of Soviet society. The Kremlin does not
trust its own subjects, including diplomats.
In fact, the Soviet Union doubts the loyalty
of its diplomats so much that in both New
York and Washington it houses them in
special carefully guarded complexes with-
out private phones. With the exception of
the ambassador, his deputies and several
senior counselors, most Soviet diplomats in
Washington are confined to their embassy.
is not ElprigpS that the KGB per-
forms some unctions that in the United
States would-be among rou ne rensi-
bilities of ore' rvice officers. Normal
m ence-
mmnuz al eC political
:
Lem-
-ROB'-
its among the, a duties.
The KGB's insatiable appetite for Ameri-
can technology is a reflection of another
profound Soviet failure. Long gone are the
heady days of Sputnik and the first manned
space flight, when Nikita S. Khrushchev
boasted that the Soviet Union would
surpass the United States in the field of
high technology. Despite Moscow's tre-
mendous investment in science, the Soviet
Union has fallen even further behind
during the last two decades.
Is-there a chance to ut an end to the
KGB's spying in America. "Nothing can
done ~__reduce the level of espionage
says Harry Rositzke, former
cgB4qerQbI
CIA chief Soviet 2WEUons. indeed, a&
long as the Soviet Union remains weak on
self-confidence and o ogy. u strong
on securit services the Politburo will
keep trying like it or not, the greed
tees t e KGB
]actor alone guaraj
_ m some eager R;c is among Americans.
The United States must wage a protract-
ed war against Soviet espionage. This war
requires a cool head, professionalism and
patience rather than harried and hysterical
responses. Unfortunately, there are plenty
of voices trying to outdo each other in
demanding extremist solutions. This would
only make the KGB smile. The House voted
in favor of the death penalty for spies tried
by military courts in peacetime. Not ex-
treme enough, some claim: Let's extend
executions to civilian traitors as well. And
the executions should be made public via
television and radio. This profound advice
comes from Sen. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska).
All this in addition to the House's vote to
expand the use of polygraph tests on more
than 4 million people with security clear-
ances at the Department of Defense and
defense contractors.
Forget about decency and civil ri hts for
a moment. Disregard a r18 K o a
and, in t o case of the Indiscriminate use
lie detectors and kTemised executions,
of eon the practices o the Soviet
ce state. How o would it take before
Rah
the pendulum o public o wourd
swing back and would an outcry
over counterintelligence abuses? An ec-
tive struggle against espionage is a struggle
that could sustained by the U.S. political
process. KGB spymasters, like terror-
ists rarel fear indiscriminate counter-
measures. One of their purposes is to erode
the internal fabric of Western societies, to
trigger hysteria and wholesale suspicion.
There are some practical and ethical
ways to address the espionage problem:
First, reduce the number of Soviet
diplomatic personnel in the United States.
There are legitimate reasons for why there
are many more Soviet officials in America
than U.S. officials in the Soviet Union, such
as the presence of the United Nations in
New York and the Soviet Union's practice
of bringing in its own support staff rather
than hiring locals. Still, the current gap-
about 1,075 officials versus 300, in Mos-
cow's favor-is disturbing. The Adminis-
tration should also think carefully before
entering agreements with Moscow to open
additional consulates. The one that the
Soviets have in San Francisco, with 41
officials, is a nest of spies.
Second, the number of FBI counter-
intelligence en should increased-
but not in naBte. Quality as impo as
quantity. east tning a we need are
more Mr. Millers on the FBI payroll. Too
few r' agen speak Russian or have any
systematic training in Soviet studies.
Third, common sense dictates the need to
reduce both the numbers of classified
documents and persona with clearances.
Yet, no foolproof defense against espio-
nage conceivable. e Soviet case a
huge security apparat as much a
problem as a solution. The 2wressive
regime enates the Soviet Union's best
ushi of
antest. A
_ a ewthem
into
the ane CIA. Obsession with
security es one lees secure.
Dimitri K. Shnes 1s a senior associate at
the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace in Washington.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160006-9