YURCHENKO: PROBABLY A KGB PLANT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160004-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 15, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160004-1
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
15 November 1985
Yurchenko: probably a KGB plant
By nimiai K. Sines
THE KGB is very trusting. Or so we are asked to are holes in the theory believe in the case of the mysterious redefection of Ttwe Of
Vitaly Yurchenko. Less than 48 hours after Colo- Yurchenko's being a plant, but fewer than
net Yurchenko entered the Soviet compound in Washing- in an alternative interpretatkm. if it is
ton, he was presented to the assembled news media at a difficult to believe that the KGB would t
KGB press conference in the United States capital. The put
stakes were high. Yurchenko's performance took place a valuable colonel at risk, it is harder to
two weeks before the Geneva summit and precisely on accept that an experienced KGB rative
the day when Secretary of State George Shultz and na-
tional-security adviser Robert McFarlane were negotiat- Would impulsively decide to redefect ....
lag with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in Mos-
cow. Only the Politburo could have approved the defec-
tor's press conference in America on a day'like that. And
the Soviet leadership had to be assured by the KGB that
Yurchenko would not embarrass the Kremlin.
But why would the KGB be prepared to provide such
assurances unless Yurchenko were a Soviet plant? The
Soviet secret police would not be so naive as to accept the
tale of Yurchenko's being kidnapped and drugged by the
CIA. The boys from Lubianka would at a minimum have
to entertain the possibility that the colonel was a genuine
defector who had a change of heart. Of course, the KGB
had reason to believe that once inside the Soviet com-
pound. Yurchenko would say whatever was required to
win lenient treatment at home.
Still, there could be no complete certainty about his
state of mind. It was not just a question of sticking to his
story of being an innocent victim of the CIA's monstrous
crime. On the eve of the summit it was imperative to have
a flawless act, an act that could hardly be expected of a
defector who was either a horrible liar or an emotional
wreck, or both.
Yet. Yurchenko did not disappoint his Kremlin mas-
ters. Under intense questioning, his responses were cali-
brated and precise. Accusations against his CIA han-
dlers were carefully balanced with suggestions that
neither President Reagan no: even CIA Director William
Casey was aware of the Yurchenko ordeal. That is de-
spite the fact that the colonel actually had a meeting with
Mr. Casey. With patronizing magnanimity Yurchenko ex-
plained that he was drugged before the session, that the
conversation was quite general, and that it was entirely
possible that Casey was kept in the dark about his subor-
dinates' actions against the KGB man.
Such generosity is deadly. On one hand, the CIA, and
by implication the administration in general, were por-
trayed as a bunch of vicious fools. On the other, the Sovi-
ets sounded like wounded but sweet people who did not
want to be too provocative just before the summit.
Throughout the press conference Yurchenko was pro-
fessional. He was ill at ease only when he spoke English
- hardly surprising for a person whose command of it
was less than flawless in front of TV cameras. There was
no sign of nervousness when he was using his native
Russian. Another remarkable feature of the press confer.
ence was the sense of authority with which the supposed
former traitor handled himself. On three occasions he
overruled the Soviet official in charge of the event, Victor
Isakov. minister counselor.
But would the KGB use as a plant such a senior and
knowledgeable officer - general-designate, as he was de-
scribed by the CIA? First, a lot of his background was
provided by Yurchenko himself and was not indepen-
dently verified. Second, a colonel who was promised pro-
motion is still a colonel, and there are dozens of generals
in the KGB. Not only was Yurchenko not No. 5 in the
KGB (as the CIA leaked), he was not even among the
first 50. He was a senior operative, not a top spy master.
There is something about members of the nomenklatura
that helps to distinguish them from mere mortals.
Yurchenko simply does not look like one of them.
No outsider knows exactly what Yurcherrlco gave the
CIA in terms of information to establish his bona fides.
The agency contends that it was good and useful intelli-
gence. No doubt. The KGB is smart enough not to send a
double agent without at least some chicken feed. But wA~q
Yurchenko's information unique and truly damaging to
Soviet interests? Up to now the colonel was publicly cred.
ited with exposing a former CIA officer who was already
thrown out of the intelligence community and could not
be of further use to Moscow. Incidentally, the officer man-
aged to escape with or without KGB help. Yurchenko
also confirmed that a Soviet defector and FBI double
agent. Nickolas Shadrin, was indeed killed in Vienna a
decade ago. But that was hardly news to those familiar
with the Shadrin case. And according to Yurchenko,
Shadrin died from an excessive dose of chloroform ad-
ministered by KGB people who were rushing him for in-
terrogation. Sounds like an unfortunate accident which
should not reflect too badly on the KGB.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160004-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160004-1
Certainly there are many holes in the theory of Yur-
chenko's being a plant, but still fewer than in any alterna-
tive interpretation. If it is difficult to believe that the
KGB would be prepared to put a valuable colonel at risk,
it is even harder to accept that an experienced KGB oper-
ative would impulsively decide to redefect simply be-
cause the CIA was not sufficiently sensitive to the needs
of his vulnerable Russian soul. As someone who went
through two months of CIA debriefing when I myself
emigrated to the United States 12 years ago, I can say
that the exercise is not universally fun and games. Some
frustration on the part of the defector and emigre is
understandable. But there is nothing in my experience or
in the experience of others I am familiar with that iould
even remotely explain why a career KGB security man
would, after three months with the CIA, opt to escape
back to the Soviet Union and risk a firing squad.
Of course, there are still many unknowns about the
Yurchenko affair. And it makes sense to avoid definite
conclusions on the basis of incomplete evidence. But at
this point the hypothesis of Colonel Yurchenko's being
deliberately sent to the United Statesrby the KGB to dis-
credit American human rights policy (especially to the
Soviet audience), as well as current and potential defec-
tors, appears more plausible than others.
Dimitri K. Simes is senior associate at the Carne-
gie Endowment for International Peace.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160004-1