REPLACING NIGHTMARES AND DREAMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 9, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

ST
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Corv Approved for Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160001-4
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PACE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
9 April 1987
Replacing nightmares and dreams
T By Dimitri K. Simes
could be contained through diplo-
macy and marginal economic
concessions.
And that was not all. After de-
priving the Nixon and later the Fbrd
administrations of the ability to chal-
lenge Soviet expansionism on the
ground, Congress, through the Jack-
son-Vanik Amendment, denied the
executive branch the remaining eco-
nomic leverage to induce Soviet mod-
eration. With carrots and sticks
greatly reduced, all the US could do
was to preach to the Soviets the vir-
tues of accommodating the American
fashions of the day.
It is no wonder that preaching has
fallen on deaf ears. What is surpris-
ing is how little - not how much - the
Kremlin has exploited its US-surren-
RE Americans capable of
ILI I _X dealing with the Soviet Union
in a mature and responsible
fashion? For anyone familiar with
the record of the last fifteen years
since President Richard Nixon went
to Moscow for the May 1972 summit,
the answer is far from obvious.
Often the dominant thinking in
the US about the USSR has been
based on ugly nightmares and sweet
dreams rather than on a cold-blooded
analysis. The nightmares and the
dreams were more reflective of the
US political mindset of the moment
than of Moscow's conduct at home
and abroad. In the early '70s, despite
numerous warnings from Leonid I.
Brezhnev to the effect that detente
did not mean the preservation of the
international status quo, the conven-
tional wisdom in the US assumed
that the ambitious rival superpower
Still, American hopes of US-Soviet
harmony were so exaggerated that
even Moscow's minor transgressions
were viewed in the most apocalyptic
light. Increasingly influential neo-
conservatives were poor in knowl-
edge of Soviet intentions and capaci-
ties but rich in imagination.
Americans were told that the Soviets
believed they could achieve a mean-
ingful victory in a nuclear war. US
strategic deterrence was in tremen-
dous jeopardy due to the so-called
"window of vulnerability" of US
land-based missiles. The Cubans
The US desperately needs
a strategic review of its
policy toward the (new?)
USSR. What Americans get
from the administration and
Congress are disjointed, ad
hoc decisions devoid of
forming the USSR into a more effi-
cient, prosperous, and even enlight-
ened society. If Gorbachev succeeds
- nobody can be sure - the Soviet
people may benefit considerably.
But what is there for the United
States? Has the Soviet Union reduced
its defense spen o acce
inati in fact mere w
increase m
from its costly
imperial commitments? On the con-
trary, the abundance of evidence in-
dicates that, from Afghanistan to
Nicaragua, the Kremlin is prepared
to do more, not less, in support of its
clients. Nor has Moscow stopped vi-
cious anti-American disinformation
efforts. Gorbachev's glasnost still
does not apply to foreign affairs. Re-
cently the Soviet media accused US
intelligence agencies of producing
the AIDS virus, masterminding the
assassination of former Swedish
Prime Minister Olaf Palme, and mas-
co
erence.
sacring hundreds of members of the
Pkeo le' q%--1- G
s
were about to conquer Arabia on the
Soviets' behalf. And to make things
worse, the Red Army had entered
Afghanistan for no other reason but
to march straight through that land-
locked rebellious country to take
over the oil riches of the Persian
Gulf. In South Africa the Soviets
were charged with pursuing the de-
nial strategy to cut off the West from
strategic mineral reserves.
As ridiculous as most of these the-
ories sound in retrospect, they had a
major impact on initial assumptions
the Reagan administration had about
relations with the Soviet Union. And
now there is a current and present
danger that the pendulum will swing
again. Just at the time when the So-
viet adversary has acquired a new
for US greatness than many Ameri- dynamic and assertive leadership, a
cans themselves. And fortunately for growing segment of US opinion ap-
the US, at precisely the time the pears once more ready for euphoria.
USSR reached the peak of its geopo- Granted, Mikhail S. Gorbachev is an
litical influence, the old men in the impressive leader. And a growing
Kremlin began to lose the talent for body of evidence suggests that he
effective governance. may indeed be serious about trans-
dered global advantage. The Brezh-
nev leadership had a higher regard
vision and
h
p
m uyana.
There may be interesting opportu-
nities to reach mutually beneficial
understandings with Gorbachev. His
creativity and courage are important
assets in cutting deals when Soviet
and US interests overlap. But these
opportunities may be destroyed if
Americans fall to the temptation to
act impulsively and impatiently.
What the US desperately needs at
this historic juncture is a strategic
review of its policy toward the
(new?) USSR. What Americans get
from both the administration and
Congress are a series of disjointed, ad
hoc decisions devoid of vision and
coherence. The right is battling hard
to block any agreement with the Rus-
sians. The increasingly self-confident
left is equally determined to find an
escape from global responsibilities.
Will history be allowed to repeat
itself?
Dtmitri K Simes is senior as-
sociate at the Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706160001-4