U.S. CLAIMS ON NICARAGUA CALLED OFF BASE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000705900004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 12, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP90-009658000705900004-0
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CHICAGO TRIBUNE
12 August 1985
U.S. claims on Nicaragua
By Vincent J. Schoclolski
Chicago Tribune
MANAGUA, Nicaragua-U.S.
claims about the extent of ter-
rorist activity in Nicaragua are
exaggerated, and President
Reagan's threats to strike back
at targets in this country are not
likely to be carried out, accord-
ing to, Western and Nicaraguan
sources.
The Reagan administration
long has accused the Sandinista
regime in Nicaragua of "expor-
ting terrorism, especially in
support of leftist guerrillas in EI
Salvador.
In mid-Jul the administration
sat rt
s
onst
won
a
r
o
i re-
t
~
a
~s
~
an
errons
acts
re
m
n
men
ca.
~ so
sai
~icara
t
ve
s su
tct
rt or
terronsm
on mencans was a ocus o
p ann an erronst action
?e
ut t e sources, including
members of the intelligence
community, say an s vow o
st 'tot is in Ricaragua
terronst alts are carrie'aout
a am cat~zens m ent
ence seems y ~ tke~
tore cam you .
It wo be extremely difficult
and potentially very costly in
terms of American lives to carry
out a successful raid on a ter-
rorist base in this country, the
sources said.
The cost of afull-fledged U.S.
invasion of Nicaragua would be
staggering: One analyst estimat-
ed that it would claim the lives
of 3,000 American troops in the
first two weeks and would cost
more than $2 billion. Thus, the
experts conclude, the most likely
retaliatory action would be a
bombing raid on a strategic tar-
get, such as an airfield.
But several sources said such
a course could backfire by ral-
lying support for the ruling San-
dinistas and damaging the politi-
cal standing of the internal
opposition, which is generally
viewed as pro-U.S.
In any case, the sources said,
Nicaragua may not be the hub of
terrorist activity that the admin-
called off base
istuaton has implied it is.
"I keep wondering why Nica-
ragua is always fingered when
this talk of terrorism starts,"
said a Western analyst in
Managua. "They [the Ni-
caraguans] are hardly big fish.
They are not experts on ter-
rorism. They are certainly not
the people you want to learn
from."
Several sources pointed out
that given Washington's preoccu-
pation with Nicaragua at the
moment, it is not the safest place
to establish terrorist training
bases.
"If you wanted to train Latin
American terrorists, you would ob-
viously want to do it in Cuba," a
Western observer said. "What
more secure place could you ask
for?"
` Accordin to several Nicara an
an extern sources wit reau ar
access to nits ii enceui~ anon
t re is no evt ence o esta is
terronst tratnma uses in t is
country.
Reagan has called Nicaragua an
"outlaw nation," along with Libya,
`Iran, Cuba and North Korea. But
the administration has never pub-
licly pinpointed a terrorist training
abase in Nicaragua.
"Some known terrorists do come
throng ere, sat a extern
server wi access o m i ence
re ors on icara ua. ome
come ere to go to grown i e ;
some come ere to rest tween
o s. ut ow muc actual
trauung an p annmg goes on ere
is ano r s o
e same sauce said his most
reliable information indicated that
the Nicaraguans maintain several
safe houses for terrorists in
Managua but that they are not
occupied by the same people all
the time and not always by ter-
rorists.
That, together with the fact that
the houses are in densely popu-
lated parts of the capital, makes it
nearly impossible to carry out an
effective raid on such a target
without running the risk of high?
?civilian casualties, several sources
said.
The situation would be 'different
in the case of a terrorist bare
outside the center of the city, but
the prospects aren't ~ much more
attractive.
A Weate~tt military analyst of-
fored the tbllowing scenario for a
hgpothetical attack on a remote
terrorist training camp, Par Prom
populated area:, with S00 artntd
ttien tit it.
The analyst, who declined to be
identified, assumed a 3-to-l ratio of
U.S. to guerrilla forces. That
would mean that 1,500 soldiers,
probably marines launched from
an amphibious unit off the Nicara-
guan coast, would have to be
brought by helicopter to the target.
He said bombing raids by air-
craft-carrier-based fighter jets
would first prepare the target
area. [U.S. aircraft carriers and
other warships frequently patml
near the coasts of Nicaragua in
international waters. The Eisen-
hower was here last week.]
He estimated that the time
needed to land the marines, secure'
the target, kill or capture the ter-:
rorists found there, and evacuate
would be four to six hours:
"This is assuming that these
people were there the day we ar
rived and that the operation could
be carried out before the Sandinis-
ta army was able to reinforce,"~ he
said.
He said it was very difficult to
say how many casualties would be
sustained by .the U.S. fAt'ces in
such a raid, but pointed' to the
.failed attempt to rescue the U.S.
host~ge~,4 [n Iran in ` 1980 ' as an
exampld of the. kinds of things that
could go wrong.
"Don't let anyone tell you that
kincil of thing could not happen
ag ," he said.
Several sources pointed out that
though the United States is: cdrtain-
1y capable of such a raid, or even
of invading Nicaragua, the cost in
lives and the political problems
.such actions would lead to made
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP90-009658000705900004-0
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP90-009658000705900004-0 _
them unlikely options for the
Reagan administration as it ap-
proaches midterm elections next
year.
Retired Marine Lt. Col. John
Buchanan, a private military
analyst in Washington, has done a
study of what it would take to
invade Nicaragua and what the
casualties were likely to be.
According to his study, 2,880 U.S.
soldiers would die in the first two
weeks of the invasion and 17,150
would be wounded. Over three to
five years, the time he estimated
U.S. forces would have to stay in
the country to secure the military
and political goals of the invasion,
a total of 6,348 U.S. servicemen
would die and 38,230 would be
wounded.
He estimated that an invasion
force of 63,000 U.S. troops would be
needed, plus 15,000 contra guerril-
las. They would be backed by 250
airplanes, 7100 helicopters and two
battle carrier groups of seven or
eight ships each. The cost of such
an invasion would be $2 billion to
$2.5 billion, plus $3 billion more to
replace destroyed equipment and
$6 billion to rebuild the Nicaraguan
economy afterward.
Buchanan put Nicaraguan casu-
alties at 31,740 killed and 191,150
wounded over three to five years.
He used computer projections
based on casualty figures from
World Wars I and II and the Viet-
nam War to come up with his
estimates.
The high cost of an invasion or a
commando raid leads most ana-
lysts to conclude that the likely
U.S. option would be to bomb a
strategic target in Nicaragua. This
would reduce to nearly zero the
chances of U.S. casualties, bebause
Nicaraguan air defenses are mini-
mal. If the targets were strictly
military, such an option would also
minimize the chances of killing
civilians.
Likely targets for such raids in-
clude the Punta Huete military?
airstrip near Managua, the Puerto
Cabezas strip on the Atlantic coast
and the capital's international air-
port, among other sites.
But one Western observer ar-
gued that any U.S. attack against
Nicaragua, while perhaps pleasing
certain political groups in the U.S.,
would probably have the reverse
effect here.
"It would give the Sandinistas
another means of galvanizing
waning political support at home,"
the observer said.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08 :CIA-RDP90-009658000705900004-0