POLITICAL MOVES CLOUD ISSUE OF AID TO CONTRAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000605760012-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: March 14, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605760012-8
Political moves
cloud issue of
aid to contras
By Charlotte Saikowaki
Stan writer of The Christian Science Monitor
WashkMPM
Amid the flashes of political lightning around tht
"contra" aid issue, the debate in Washington appear
increasingly bogged down in partisan rather than foreigr
policy considerations.
The political maneuvering intensifies.
President Reagan yesterday put in an appearance at the
State Department to view a display of weapons allegedly
smuggled to guerrillas in Central America and to meet with
three opponents of the Nicaraguan regime. As he was
playing up the theme of the export of Marxist revolution,
US special envoy Philip Habib was in El Salvador starting
to explore the possibilities of a regional diplomatic solu-
tion. The President has not ruled out that Mr. Habib might
contact Sandinista leaders during his mission.
In Congress there is more and more talk of a possible
compromise with the White House on the President's
request for a $100 million aid package. The House votes on
the package next Wednesday, with congressional observ-
ers still expecting a defeat for Mr. Reagan.
The Senate is planning to begin debate of the issue
Monday. Sen. Richard Lugar (R) of Indiana, chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, decided not to
bring the aid package to a vote in the committee yesterday
because of majority opposition to it. Now-Senate lawmak-
ers, too, are toying with the idea of a compromise under
which aid for the contra. rebels would be delayed for
several months while diplomatic negotiation is given a
chance. .
In the end Congress is expected to pass some aid legisla-
tion - but it may not resolve the core
issues. Diplomatic observers voice con-
cern that, in the midst of political con-
frontation, fundamental questions raised
by the existence of a Marxist-leaning re-
gime in Nicaragua are not being ade-
quately addressed:
? Can the rebels be turned into an ef-
fective resistance force capable of induc-
ing the Sandinista government to sit down
and negotiate? Would $70 million in mili-
tary aid realistically accomplish that ob-
jective? Would $200 million? $500
million?
? Would an infusion of aid escalate the
military confrontation, ultimately requir-
ing the commitment of US troops? Should
the US be willing to send troops?
? If the Congress does not approve aid,
and diplomatic efforts do not succeed, are
the lawmakers - and the American peo-
ple - prepared to live with a Marxist
regime openly. committed to the spread of
its left-wing ideology? What would be the
consequences for regional stability?
? What is Nicaragua actually doing to
destabilize neighboring countries and pro-
mote Marxist revolutions?
? Has the administration made a good-
faith effort to bring about a diplomatic
solution in Central America? Is a negoti-
ated solution a pie-in-the-sky goal or a
realistic objective?
? If the Latin American countries are
not willing publicly to support US aid for
the coptras (but privately nudge the US to`
provide such aid) should the US act uni-
laterally, once again conveying the image
of a strong-arm interventionist?
The issues are complex and the an-
swers far from clear. Independent ex-
perts on, Central America themselves dif-
fer on what US policy should be. And
because of the growing repressiveness of
the Sandinista government, even some
former critics of administration policy
now believe that diplomatic efforts will
not work without some form of military
pressure on Managua.
Robert Leiken, a Central America spe-
cialist at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, believes that the US
should help the-contras but that such aid
should be tied to several conditions that
would test the viability of the resistance
movement: That the various rebel groups
in Nicaragua be united; that the Unified
Nicaraguan Opposition be restructured so
as to put the political leaders in charge,
that human rights be guaranteed, and
that the diplomatic track be pursued.
"If that were passed by 250 or so mem-
bers of the House and 60 to 70 in the
Senate, the Sandinistas would be faced
with a serious situation, that is, a biparti-
san consensus," says Mr. Leiken.
One factor casting doubts on the ad-
ministration's position is that there is lit-
tle hard evidence that the Sandinistas are
supplying as much help to guerrilla move-
ments in Central America as is claimed.
The administration has not supplied such
ful in ormation, possibly because it does
not wish to disclose US Intel
ering' meth
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605760012-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605760012-8
Former US Secretary of State-Dean has consistently taken a hostile position
Rusk suggests that the administration against the Nicaraguan government.
-'
would bolster its case by making public' In January, he notes, the Contadora
convincing evidence. "If the facts are that countries plus Argentina, Uruguay, Peru
Nicaragua is engaged in monkey business and Brazil (the support group) mer in
in El Salvador and Costa Rica;-that is Caraballeda, Venezuela, to try to
prohibited conducted and I'd be. for invigorate the diplomatic process. They
[contra aid];" he said recently. endorsed the ' Contadora process and
Differences of opinion called on the US to resume
also arise over the effec- `If Nicaragua is bilateral negotiations with
tiveness of diplomacy given engaged in monkey Nicaragua and stop all aid
the growing radicalization to the contras. But the US
of the. -Managua regime. business in El .has turned down the plea.
Mark Falcoff, of the Ameri- Salvador and Costa 'By rebuffing this over-
can Enterprise Institute, Rica, that is ture from the Caraballeda
faults the Democrats for prohibited conduct countries and 'requesting
"burying their heads in thestill more aid for the
sand" and ignoring the se- and I'd be for contras, the Reagan admin-
curity problem. - [contra- aid].' istration has placed itself in
At the same time he criti- the position of openly
cizes the administration.for -Dean Rusk blocking progress toward a
not explaining why there Contadora accord," Smith
are difficulties with the so-called told the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
Contadora process, in which four Latin tee on March 4. "It is not a position our
American countries are trying to achieve great nation should be in."
a negotiated regional settlement. , - The administration maintains that
"Contadora is very flawed . because what these countries say publicly differs
there can be no political solution without with their private position. But diplo-
the political will of all the parties to en- matic observers see risks in the US pursu-
force it," says Mr. Falcoff. Would Colum- ing in effect a unilateralist policy in Latin
bia, Venezuela, Mexico, ad Panama (the America.
Contadora countries) be willing to send "I tend to be leery of those who say
troops to enforce it asks the scholar? something in private,, because it means
But opponents of contra aid argue that their assessment of public opinion is that
the Reagan administration has not genu- they would have a hard time defending
inely supported the Contadora process. it," says David Newsom, director of
Wayne Smith, professor at the Johns Georgetown University's Institute for the
Hopkins School of Advanced Interna- Study of Diplomacy. "So the US cor}id be
tional Studies, says 'the' hkirtifiistration `l'eft holding the bag. -
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605760012-8