EXPORTING IDEALISM: THE RIGHT KIND OF INTERVENTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000605740061-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 61
• Publication Date: April 1, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
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WASHINGTON MONTHLY
April 1985
STAT
Ong Idecuism:
7T~e Right Kind
of In~tian
By Harden Smith
"Meddling in the internal affairs of other
countries." American foreign policymakers usual-
`, ly take pains to deny such intentions. Yet the
economic assistance we provide, the development
projects we sponsor, and, above all, the military
aid we give to Third World countries are anything
i but neutral. These programs inevitably affect the
internal dynamics of a country, propping up the
existing government or setting in motion political
changes that may eventually undermine it. The
real question is not whether we are interfering in
~ the political life of the Third World. Rather, it's
whether our intervention is effective.
Vietnam, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Iran, El
=; Salvador, Lebanon-the list of countries that
have given us grief despite American-aid is a long
one. Our ostensible purpose in providing aid to
these countries has been twofold: to contain the
j spread of Soviet influences and to promote
democracy by encouraging such democratic insti-
~ tutions as a free press, fair elections, trade unions,
and representative assemblies. We spend billions,
sacrifice both international prestige and countless
American lives-and often end up with little to
show for it.
Why do we keep failing? While second-
guessing is easy, I think a major reason is our
Harden Smith is a retired foreign service officer.
failure to do enough meddling in these countries'
internal affairs. Or, more precisely, we restrict our
intervention to economic and social programs,
hoping that well-fed people will not turn to the
Soviets and that grassroots social programs will
build responsive political institutions at the na-
tional level.
Economic aid obviously can be helpful, and
not only in feeding malnourished villagers or
building a new school or hospital. The economic
and social assistance undertaken by John F. Ken-
nedy's Alliance for Progress in Latin America;
for example, helped solidify the democratic in-
stitutions of Costa Rica. But when such efforts
go unaccompanied by the right kind of political
action, they can produce results contrary to what
we seek. Ethiopia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and
Libya all have received extensive economic
assistance; but because we did not work as hard
to strengthen the political institutions in these
countries, the results have tended to be negligible
at best and sometimes even destructive.
To be sure, some of the problems come with
the territory. Economic aid can produce rising ex-
pectations among a populace that the nations in
question cannot meet. (See "Great Expectations:
The Real Cause of Revolution," October 1983.)
But we make matters worse when we neglect a
developing country's need for institutions that
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can give it a chance to resolve these conflicts-and
that will ensure that the benefits of our economic
and social aid are widely shared. Instead, all too
often, our aid strengthens dictators wl~o stand in
the way of democratic reform. Witness, among
countless other examples, the repressive policies
of a President Mobutu of Zaire or a Marcos of
the Philippines. In much of the Third World "in
.place of the Speaker with a wig, there stands a
soldier with a gun," as Dennis Austin sadly com-
ments on Britain's ex-colonies in Africa. Our
major concern seems to be whether that soldier
is on our side.
These days "political action" is a dirty word,
suggesting such massive and inept interventions
as the Bay of Pigs, the campaign to overthrow
Salvador Allende in Chile, and the recent min-
ing of Nicaragua's ports. But political action
doesn't have to be this sinister. It can, and should,
be a series of small initiatives taken over a long
period of time by various arms of the United
States government for the purpose of increasing
the odds that massive intervention won't be
needed later. After all, isn't it better to risk some
embarrassment now with our ostensible allies,
than to grapple later with the choices that cur-
rently confront us iq countries such as El
Salvador?
There's nothing fancy about this kind of
"political action." Just one example: Why wasn't
Benigno Aquino of the Philippines invited to the
White House before his fateful return to his home
country? Such an invitation would have com-
municated an important message to Ferdinand
Marcos: that we sympathise with noncommunist
reformers who sincerely desire to promote
democratic institutions in that troubled country.
Why didn't we let the dictator and his cronies
know that there would be a price to pay if Aquino
came 'to harm? Marc_ os would have been upset,
but it's doubtful. he would have done anything
more than protest. He needs us more than we
need him, despite our military bases in the Philip-
pines. Indeed, distancing ourselves from Marcos
in such a fashion would have enhanced our abili-
ty, in the long run, to keep those bases. To pre-
vent a communist takeover in the Philippines-
. apossibility that grows each day-we need
credibility among Marcos's noncommunist op-
~ ponents. If they see us solely as obstacles to prog-
ress, not only will they write us off as hypocrites;
more, they may join with the communists out of
desperation-and retaliate against us if they ever
assume power.
The United States must stop being defensive,
overlooking a regime's authoritarian behavior un-
til a crisis occurs and then invoking the specter
of incipient communism. Put another way, as
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge did aquarter-
century ago, our foreign policy should promote
the Declaration of Independence instead of be-
ing constantly on the defensive against the
precepts of Karl Marx.
Rice 1~iiJt
Having served with the State Department for
some years in three countries (Libya, Liberia, and
Somalia) where coups have destroyed embryonic
democracies, I am left with a very strong sense
that we missed our opportunities. Perhaps we
would have lost anyway, but our chances would
have been much better had we aggressively and
directly intervened to assist the democratic
process.
Recent events in Liberia are an apt example.
One of the oldest nations in Africa-it was
founded in ]847 by former American slaves-
Liberia at first glance seems more like a success
story than- one of failure. It is not in the com-
munist camp; in fact, following a brief flirtation
with doctrinaire socialism under the military rule
of President Samuel K. Doe, it recently has
sought to shore up its traditionally friendly rela-
x lions with the West.
Appearances, however, do not tell the story.
Liberian society today is less open, its institutions
less "democratic," than they were a generation
j ago. The government is dominated now by the
~ military, which in turn is dominated by the
Kranh, one of the country's 23 tribal groups.
', Liberia appears to be starting to succumb to the
coup-counter-coup cycle that afflicts so many
African nations. And in this regard, Liberia is
typical: a decade from now we might well look
back upon events in Liberia, as we have done with
so-many other countries, and wonder why our
efforts came to naught. Like most of our foreign
policy failures, it is not self-evident today, but
rather is quietly in the making.
To understand America's missed opportunities
in Liberia, some history is in order. The ad-
ministrations of both William V. S. Tubman
(1944-1971) and William Tolbert .(1971-1980)
I represented primarily the interests of a minority
oligarchy-the Americo-Liberian establishment
j that descended from the former slaves who
created the country. During the Tubman ad-
ministration, however, the direction of change
was toward wider participation by all groups in
government and in the economic life of the coun-
try. No one would accuse Tubman of being a
front man for Common Cause. But he did set in
motion a policy of "unification'sparticipation
by all of the country's 23 tribal groups, not just
the Americo-Liberians. Early in his administra-
tion, Tubman eliminated the dual administrative
system that created "counties" along the
W'vii uiiwb {
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coastline, where the Americos had settled, but
consigned the upcountry areas inhabited by other
tribal groups to the status of "territories" The
heads of two of the country's four security
organizations (Tubman believed in checks and
balances) were members of indigenous tribes, not
Americo-Liberians. Rather than intimidate
potential dissidents Tubman coopted them, ad-
vancing many of the brightest into government
after informants spotted them while still students.
Tubman's under-secretary of state, for instance,
had been identified as a student radical while
studying in the United States.
Tolbert, who succeeded Tubman in 1971, re-
versed these trends. His brother Stephen,. the
country's finance minister, capitalized on the
power he shared with Tolbert to increase vastly
their personal wealth. After touring government
lands that were in reserve for future expansion
of Monrovia, Liberia's capital, President Tolbert
appropriated the best land for himself, invoking
a provision of a law intended for unsettled rural
land. His brother channeled government pur-
chases to his own companies and intimidated
rivals into selling out to him at depressed prices.
With this corruption and the visible shift away
from democratization of the political and
economic life of Liberia, Tolbert's regime became
', increasingly vulnerable. When concession
negotiations with iron and rubber companies
failed to produce expected benefits for Liberia,
the public presumed that the companies had
bought the Tolberts off. When Tolbert revoked .
a subsidy on rice, Liberia's basic food, and its
price soared, riots broke out in the capital.
Tolbert mishandled the riots, and a military coup
followed that brought Doe, a former military
sergeant, to power.
Where did we go wrong in Liberia? In a
multitude of small ways; largely sins of omission
rather than commission. For instance, we could
have insisted, even before the end of Tubman's
administration, on a different focus for our
economic assistance projects, directing more to
tribal areas and less to Monrovia. The existing
~ aid patterns merely increased the resentment of
tribal groups that traditionally had been ex-.
cluded: Instead of building the huge and under-
, staffed W. V. S. Tubman Memorial Hospital in
downtown Monrovia, as the government wanted,
'~, we could have insisted that our dollars be spent
for smaller, upcountry hospitals and clinics sup-
ported by a mid-size hospital in Monrovia. This
might have antagonized the government, but it
would have shown Liberians that we were com-
mitted to the continued broadening of the
popular. base of government. Similarly, our
assistance to Liberian schools was unwisely con-
centrated in Monrovia.
'~ Secondly, our advisers assigned to the various
', ministries could have filled the watch-dog role
that a free press serves in a developed democracy.
They should have been instructed to report to the
U.S. mission any official abuses. they. observed. .
American officials who' advised the Liberian
police knew, through the police grapevine, of
brutal interrogation techniques, abuse of power
by senior police, and foul detention facilities.
American personnel tried to counter these trends
through better training programs and by exerting
pressure on police officials. Our embassy did not,
however, systematically attempt to confront
higher authorities in the Liberian government
with evidence of these abuses, or exert pressure
to put a stop to them.
Another omission was our failure to react when
local politics interfered with programs we sup-
ported. For instance, we did nothing when a
Peace Corps volunteer was transferred for trying
to do his job. The volunteer had attempted to
resolve priorities between two road building pro-
jects for which he was responsible by ar-~a~rgfr~~?
a meeting between the leaders of two clans. This
did not please the district commissioner, who had
been playing one clan off against the other to
protect his own base. The interior ministry
transferred the volunteer to the other end of the
country. Nobody on the Peace Corps staff or in
the U.S. embassy protested.
We also should have monitored and countered
influence-buying by major American companies
investing in Liberia. American missions are not
encouraged to report such behavior, even though
these corporations are often obstacles to pro-
moting open, democratic institutions. In Liberia,
a major bank and a rubber company, among
others, employed the law firm of the speaker of
the house, each paying a monthly retainer of
$2,000 for very little legal work. Even such
j relatively commonplace corruption can become
fodder for anti-American factions within a coun-
t try, and frustrate our efforts to nudge local of-
I facials in the right direction. A brave ambassador
could have raised the problem locally with the
companies, or sent such information to Wash-
ington and urged the State Department to raise
the issue with the companies' home offices. But
it was never done.
Foreign pay-offs won't stop until there is joint
action among the major trading nations. But
meanwhile we have to stop them when they give
our country a black eye. Our foreign service of-
facers are better situated than anyone to blow the
whistle, if only they were not so reluctant to do so.
Even if Tubman and Tolbert had continued to
halt the progress towards democracy, they could
~ not have ignored all complaints by their principal
supplier of assistance. Most important, by set-
ting apattern of discussing sensitive political
issues with Tubman, we could have continued
such discussions with Tolbert and his brother
without implying a lack of confidence in them
during their accession to power. But by the late
1960s, American dialogue with Tubman had.
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NV~j~lIMV1i4
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verged on sterility, consisting largely of meetings
on such subjects as next year's budget or an up-
coming U.N. vote-not on how the U.S. could
help expand his nation-building initiatives. If the
discussion route failed, we still could have
.pressured Tolbert to clean up his act-by cutting
aid, inspiring congressional inquiries, briefing
journalists, and the like. In short, we should have
engaged in a lot more "political action."
But we allowed? the situation to deterioriate
because of our own cast of mind. On the one
hand was the "liberal" impulse that deemed it
inappropriate for Westerners to seek to guide the
political development of a small, backward coun-
try. The conservative view was that it didn't real-
ly matter who ran Liberia, as long as the coun-
try remained in the "Western camp." (This view
was epitomized by the foreign service officer who
once told me we needed more "little black
fascists" in Africa.) Others were passive because
of their sense of the magnitude of the problem.
Above all was the bureaucratic inertia of
American officials in Liberia and in Washington,
bolstered by their knowledge that Liberia was
only one of many small countries competing for
policymakers' attentions.
Quiet American
In other countries, what form should our
"political action" take? In contrast to the more
controversial covert operations with which he has
come to be associated William Casey has also
proposed a "nation butld-ng" strategy. Ina re-
cent speech in Fulton, Missouri, the IA trec-
tor urged America to foster "the infrastructure
of democracy, the system o a ree press, un-ons,
' political parties, universities, which allows a peo-
ple to choose its own ways." With 7itbman, this
approac mpg t we l have been effective. How-
ever, asey s strategy is doomed to fail with more
reca citrant regimes. is notton o applying
pressure is tm~te arge y to eman s tactfully
and privately" delivered "that our friends observe
certain Stan ards of behavior with regard to basic
uman rtgltts," along with "land reforms, cor-
ruption, and the like." Tolbert might have listened
~ to private lectures by our ambassador on his and
his brother's acquisitive abuse of nnw~, but tf
a leader is not willing to listen we should make
clear that we have ways of embarrassing the
regime if he doesn't respond-and that we are
willing to use them. Demands "privately de-
livered" to countries like South Africa and the
Philippines seem to have fallen on deaf ears-
I and have failed to identify the United States with
change and progress in local eyes. For all ils short-
comings, the CarCei- htimah rightspoli~y bene-
fited the subjects of repressive regimes
throughout the world. There is no reason that
public displays of displeasure cannot he used to
encourage the democratizing of the political pro-
cess as well.
In extreme cases, where prolonged repression
has already built up a potentially dangerous head
o steam, t to CIA as a va id and useful func-
t~on. t is not t e stereotyped "bad gum role of
helping local security services ferret out op-
ponents of the regime; but rather, [ire quiet role
of esta ~s mg contact and working with the op-
position. It's worth recalling that the CIA has
played such roles in the past. Liberals tend to
forget this now; memories o Kissinger s an Ntx-
on's flawed "Track II" and the heavy-handed
machinations by American business in Chile
overshadow the CIA's positive role in supporting
the Christian Democrats of Eduardo Frei as an
alternative to radicals on the right or the left. We
helped save democracy in Italy in similar fashion
in the turmoil of the late 1940s. Whispering cam-
. paigns and street demonstrations to bring
pressure upon a recalcitrant regime are also
possibilities.
There is another valid role for the CIA in our
relations with repressive regimes: to counter ex-
treme right-wing groups such as the "death
squads" in EI Salvador. It's been n~iv~ to~up-
pose that protests by our ambassador to the
~. Salvadoran government would be effective. The
balance of power there is too tenuous, the courts
themselves too threa_ tened b_y_the__d_eath squads,
and the military looms too darkly in the
background. The CIA should have been trying
to penetrate the sgua s an t_eir com_ m_an_ struc-
ture (not assisting these squads, as some evidence
' has suggested .More important we should be
I --.
willing to do something with the information that
results from such efforts, even if it proves embar-
rassing to the government. Our agents could
publicize the names of both killers and_targeted
vtcttms, give advance notice of operations, dis-
credit the death squads by forgeries-whatever
is necessary to destroy their terrible effectiveness.
Of course, it's not possible to dispatch the CIA
to every oppressed nation on earth where such
action may be desirable. But in countries where
we are involved for better or worse-El Salvador
for example-the CIA can serve a useful role. On
the other hand, the CIA should rely much less.
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i
upon._`.`covert" operations-political or Para-
military=m the Third World that are inherently
overt tot _ose against whom they are directed.
Harry Rositzke, a former Soviet expert with the
A, suggested (among others) in The
WasJiingfon Posh tFat i Nicaragua's ports had
to be mined, it should have been a military, not
- -----
a CIA, function. If_we are not_proud of such
actions-if we aren't willing to take open respon-
sibility for there-_ then we shouldn't do them.
Covert operations encourage an admi_n_ istration
to wade into foreign commitments that the
American public doesn't know about and ulti-
------
mately will?not_support, It,_ispolicy_makng by
back room elites. When foreign policy is ou_t in
the open, rt is more likely to be what the
:American people want. A tighter rein on covert
aci~ons would be an effective.wa}' to ward_o_f_f that
national~buga oo-an_other Vietnam.
Generally, covert operations are most suited for
sma -sca e, sort-term projects tat do not
become institutionalized-infiltrating the
Salvadoran death squads to undo them would be
a.prime example. Sometimes we need to resort
to_such actions when our open s~ppQrS_would
embarrass those we seek to help. But it is far bet-
' ter two public in support of an Aquino (whose
followers are generally pro-American) than to
..pro_p_up covertl a Ferdinand Marcos.
After all, isn't this where our foreign service
', comes in? Most of what the CIA does-
; especially the ?atherinQ of information-the
foreign_service is supposed to do in the first place.
There wouldn't be as much need for the CIA if
;more foreign service officers were dorng their
i jobs-if they weren't afraid to apply political
leverage in the right directron or to drsp ease top
' officials in_their host countries. (Frequently,_by
the time the CIA gets involved, it's too late
fi anyway_~_But this kind of intervention requires
a president who encourages State Department
employees, from the ambassador down to the
32-year-old political officer on his first assign-
merit, to take risks. This in turn means standing
up for those employees when an unhappy, cor-
rupt regime tries to send them packing.
When the officials on the ground feel that their
promotions will come from taking the initiative
rather than waiting for their duty tour to end,
we will have effected a true revolution in
American foreign policy. It's a revolution that,
in the long term, is the best strategy for pro-
' moting the kind of revolution we enjoyed two
centuries ago-and for avoiding an altogether
more unpleasant type of revolution later on. ^
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