SPY SATELLITES: 'SECRET,' BUT MUCH IS KNOWN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000605470025-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: January 6, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

ST"T
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T)..satewte into a 300-mile+
11-- circular
b
or
it with the mission of collecting electronic
signals from Soviet and Chinese radars. Pre-
cise information about radar locations and
?1:
a
ARTEriE APPEARED
ON
By'Jeffrey T, Richelson and WilIiam')\~I to be routine because it came on the heels of
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the United States will put- into orbit this tent or capability of the shuttle's secret.mili- J
month on flight 51-C of the'space: shuttle; tfry?pe rations
: . _ `We are. working to deny
The Post'~g.story, which,.should have ibeen >. , our adversaries any information that might
routine, sgt' off a furor, led-by-Defense Sec- reveal the identity or.missions' of our DOD
retary.Caspar Weinberger, who said the [Department of Defense] payloads, Abel
newspaper was helping the Soviet Union twsaid. eetweenThis. followed private . discussions be i
Lost.in the .uproar was the fact that Amer ' : Secretary of Defense Caspar Wee}}~aa~
s "secret"." intelligence programs de= Berger and the three television networks`;]
signed to PI up Soviet communications and `:. the Associated Press and Aviation Week &
other electronic signals from pace are not a Space Technology magazine, in which the
secret at all that actually, specialists whosecretary also claimed that disclosure of the
follow this' near its high point for eight hours The secret satellite to be placed in geo
over the syn-
sations and government dispatches, as well Arctic and northern SovietUnion,where it chronous orbit by the space `shuttle Discov_'-'
as communications sent via INTELo can monitor communications and si al traf-1 ery is the result of those plans.
In_addition to their communications ns inter- - Bn .- .: - .
fic from Soviet facilities -in the Arctic, such
ception mission, Klass and Lindsey revealed; as bomber staging bases and the Murmansk The government -presumes that its in- ..,
the Indian Ocean satellite was also intended telligence gathering requires total se
to intercept telemetry (see box) from Soviet naval complex. The Air Force launched the
second of these third-type satellites on Aug. But the- case for suppressing"
missiles launched from Tyuratum in the . stories like the one that appeared in the Post
U.S.S.R. towards the Soviet Far East and 6, 1976, and probably several more since
ten. does not stand up against the realities of the
Pacific Ocean. The Singapore satellite was ' Soviets' ability to gather intelligence on U.S. .
intended to monitor telemetry from shorter The planned follow-on to Rhyolite and Chalet satellites, codenamed Argus, was space activities.
range SS-16 and SS-20 missiles launched initiated but never completed in its orignal
from Plesetsk in the northern Soviet Union. form. According to the 1979 Klass article in
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When the Air Force claims that "The
;yore mission information they [the Soviets]
'gave, the easier it is for them to counter the
cdp_abiiities of those payloads" they. are liv-
ing a, pipe dream. The United States and
Soviet Union both maintain vast. networks;
that collect information. about. the other's'
eavesdropping activities. Each superpower's-
space monitoring networks include detection
.-D I
motivation'for encryption" of missile teleme-,
try was not discovery of Rhyolite but rather
the beginnings of the Sovet multiple war-
head (MIRV) testing program. When Soviet
ballistic- missile testing involved only single
warhead missiles the United States was able
to obtain the information it required via
radar - hence, Soviet encryption would not
have denied the United States any informa-
tion of value. With -multiple warheads,-infor-
mation about numbers of warheads, their de-,
sign and accuracy could be obtained only
from telemetry interception. I
. For many years until the fall of.the shah in-
1979 the U.S. operated antennas in Iran for
the interception of Soviet missile telemetry.
The Soviet Union must have known of these
antennas- from ..'their ' own'-intelligence"
sources,: and must. have--taken. pictures of
them, which would have revealed their likely
purposes. Then, during the SALT II debate ?
in Washington, they ; learned` definitively I
what the Iranian antennas were for:
Today-the United States operates a vari-
ety of antennas and radars in Turkey, China,
Norway and Japan all , targeted 'on' - the
Even if all the above clues had`.totally
evaded Soviet -eyes, the Soviet Union, like
the media, could have picked up the many
clues that a SIGINT satellite launch was to
be expected. The trade magazine Aviation
Week & Space- Technology carried stories in
1979 about' plans for the Rhyolite follow-on
while the Air Force was telling congressional
armed services and appropriations commit-
and tracking radars, telescopes that can see', `tees about plans for shuttle missions which
out to geosynchronous . altitudes,' 'ships would require use of the Inertial Upper
equipped with electronic eavesdropping' Stage (IUS)?'-' a , rocket within the shuttle
equipment, satellites and land-based antenna : which will -propel the new SIGINT satellite
"farms" that intercept data. transmitted be- into ge* osynchronous orbit.. Further, in as
- tween satellites and ground stations.---- ,' _~ much as the Air Force has publicly stated
Thus, despite the,, blanket secrecy the V (also h congressional testimony) that the
Soviet Union maintain?` about,: its militaryi shuttle would not be used to launch a new in-
space program - secrecy that, extends to
denying such a program exists ' the United
States collects an enorm-us amount of- infor- -
mation about Soviet 'space - programs, by
rather 'simple means. Indeed,. even private' 'geosynchronous placement: ` .' ` i
managed to decipher large portions of Soviet.
space operations. For years,.the recentlyre-
frayed-detecting early warning satellite until
1986 and there had recently-been a commu-
nications`-satellite ? launch, only `a :SIGINT
satellite?remained'as the possible payload for
he secrecy that surrounds the, satellite
reconnaissance program is, to a:large
tired Geoffrey Perry ; with the aid of his stu- J -'' extent, a vestige -of its early days,
dents at the Kettering Grammar School in when the Pentagon feared that acknowl-
England, have monitored the =transmissions edgement of U.S. satellite flights over Soviet
to and from Soviet satellites. With the -aid of territory would so embarrass the. Soviet
this data Perry has written . numerous au- leadership that they would be, tempted, to
thoritative articles on the Soviet-.military.. shoot down satellites - just as they had
space program, including Soviet photo- , shot down the U-2 in 1960. Hence, even the
graphic reconnaissance and signals' intelliexistence of the organization coordinating
gence satellites: Itseems likely; eyes inevi-
table, that the Soviets can do at least as well
deciphering, the U.S. program as those
schoolboys, particularly, when. operating
against a far more open society.
.The most conclusive evidence for the
Soviets that a new generation of SIGINT
satellites was in the offing came not from the
Washington media but from observing U.S.
intelligence collection activities in Alice
:'Springs; Australia - an 'installation known
as Pine Gap. There the United States main-'
tams the Joint Defense Space Research Fa-
cility, long known (and publicly discussed in
Australia) as the Pacific ground station for
the Rhyolite satellites.
For some time, work has been underway
to expand the Pine Gap facility '(this expan
sion'was discussed in two official announce-
ments; one in -1983 and another in '84, from
the Australian Defense Ministry). American
aircraft bringing equipment for Pine Gap
land: at a public airport. The Australian de-
fense-niinister has pubicly: announced the ar-
rival of one key piece of equipment. Tipped
off by information like this, the Soviets can
no doubt use their photographic. reconnais-
sance satellites and., presumably,. 'human
such activities- - the National Reconnais-
sance Office - was (and still is) considered
a secret by the .Pentagon. 'It was not until
1978 that the U.S. government officially ad-
mitted that photographic . reconnaissance
satellites existed. This high level of secrecy
!attached to U.S. 'satellite reconnaissance ac-
tivities is not justified on any grounds.
If the 'Soviets ever had any doubt about
the viability . of SIGINT collection from
space, Boyce ended their doubts., Once he
delivered the first material on Rhyolite to
the Russians, the "genie" was out of the bot-
tle. But even without. Boyce's information
the Soviet Union has always taken steps to
protect vital communications `-- even with-
out knowledge of specific interception sys-
tems targeted against those communications
- partly because of its general paranoia
Soviet Union The Soviets'know of these an-
tennas and _ if.
their purpose, yet 'no one has.
claimed that they are anything but valuable.
intelligence assets: Their operations are not
jeopardized by public revelation of the exist-
ence of the sites, nor is there any evidence
of Soviet jamming or electronic- counter-
measures to ground SIGINT collection. The
biggest -impediment to signals interception
on the ground, as well as by satellites, is not
active countermeasures, but encryption.
about U.S. intelligence acitivities, partly be-
cause of its reflexive attachment to secrecy.
Thus the Soviets use open radio transmis-
sions as little as possible for sensitive com-
munications and rely heavily on cables and
i landlines (which can only be intercepted by
physically tapping into the. line). Likewise,
Soviet encryption of signals like missile te-
agents, to observe an enormus' amount of lenietry , often blamed on Boyce's, disclo-
construction at Pine. Gap. This construction sures, began prior to the disclosures, accord-
- openly discussed in Australia has . ing to an informed source, and is a routine
added numerous new "radomes" to house security practice. It seems likely that the
new antennas. Soviet analysts looking at the
photographs from their satellites and then
noting the increase in' electronic 'signals in
and out of Pine Gap could only conclude that
Discovery had placed a new-generation SI-
GINT satellite into orbit. -
f the Soviets already know the important
I details about our space-based intelli-
gence activities, why is there so much
official concern about keeping them secret?
Probably because of a combination of inertia,
bureacratic power plays and a' total con-
tempt for the public's "right to know."
Faced with the disclosures in the Post, of-
ficials admitted that it would have been ex-
tremely difficult to keep the satellite's mis-
sion secret, but suggested,- in the words; of
one official, that it was "worth 'the try" and
that they wanted to "mess with [the Soviets]
minds" (these quotations are from The New
York Times).. This suggests a more important issue than
the simple question whether the purpose of
this particular satellite.could be kept secret.;
Wouldn't a campaign of 'absolute secrecy-
against the media, if it succeeded, prevent
the public from being informed about a very
important and costly part'of U.S. intelligence
activities? Yes it would,' and such 'secrecy
would make it impossible for non-govern-,
ment experts or private citizens to evaluate'
the validity of Defense Department claims of
Soviet weapons development or to assess
cgll lewd
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desirability of our defense _establish
ant's programs. -
B r oader public understanding _of -how -.-the
i?%ifd States,:. collects intelligence, -.on ..the
other hand,, would make, the: govern' eiit
more accountable for, a.'$14 billion dollar pro-
gram whose workings are --'-despite wider-
spread ingnorance about them a_ subject
of constant public debate . within . a . com-
munity of specialists. Evaluations : of Soviet
weapons systems and development:: pro
grams, verification of arms control. treaties,.
evidence of Soviet cheating, questions about
the role. of intelligence collection ' in the
shooting down - of Korean Air Lines Flight
007 and- false claims about. deployment of
MIG aircraft to: Nicaragua have all. been
major news stories-over the"past two yeais.
Wider understanding o'f the' mforntiatwp
available -t&'tt a United States:: about 'such
matters would vastly.improve the quality, of
the public debate.
In the next -five -years; some-30 `secret
military missions for the space shuttle, are
scheduled. For the first time since the
Gemini program, communications between
the mission control center and outer space
on manned space missions will be encrypted.
At a time when anti-satellite operations-and
"Star Wars", are at the top of the superpow-
ers' agendas, is it in our national -interest to
mess with Soviet minds - (and,, everyone
else's) by added secrecy. in any aspect. of the
space program? We.think not.
The administration apparently believes'it
is legitimate to deny information-to the- pub-
lic on -intelligence matters as long as there is
the :slightest chance of making the Soviet
Union's acquisition of information more-diff-
cult or causing it the slightest confusion.
This attitude has already led the administra-
tion'to classify a greater amount of informs-
- tion ,about low-yield nuclear testing, re-
search and development programs, nuclear
weapoms and nival and air operations. But it
is an attitude that is totally incompatible with
the operation of government in'a free soci-.
ety.
This entire shuttle incident indicates a dis-
turbing respect for Soviet secrecy practices,
and an unfortunate desire to mimic them.
Thus Secretary Weinberger stated at a
press conference on Dec. 18:-"The Soviets
.keep practically everything:: secret and no-
body says that's provocative.!!.-:. ?, .
Secrecy does serve a. purpose for, the bu-
reaucracy. The Pentagon-land
.intelligence
community thrive on their own "classified",
.,leaks.'- selective revelations intended to
scare `us about Soviet "progr , ams;, or to pro-' I
mote'American ones. Secrecy allows them
not. only to say absolutely nothing about
politically sensitive programs in response to
.. media '"speculation" but to;. operate with
minimal supervision. The result is ' skewed
information,and public misunderstanding of
,government policy. This is the. ultimate
-means of controlling the public debate: it
A Glossary
OMINT: Communications' In-,
telligence. Intelligence activity
N -A. aimed at intercepting coded or
uncoded voice, teletype or morse
communications. The ' communica-
tions include a wide variety of diplo-,
"matic, commercial, poliical and mili-
tary "traffic." _
FLINT: -Electronics ntelligence.
Intelligence activity aimed at inter-
cepting n_ on-communications electro-
magnetic- radiations (excluding those
produced by radars and the telemetry
signals' transmitted' by missiles and
satellites during testing and opera-
tions..
'Ferret: A'- low-altitude` orbiting
satellite. which: is designed to inter-
cept electronic, emanations from
SIGINT: Signals . Intelligence. A
term comprising both COMINT, and
ELINT - although often used to, ?de-
scribed general electronic collection.
Telemetry: The set of signals by
which a missile, stage of a missile or
missile warhead sends back to earth
data about its performance. during a.,
-test 'flightThe date relates to fea-
tures such as structural stress,
rocket motor thrust, fuel consump-
tion and guidance system perform
ance. Intercepted telemetrycan .pro
vide intelligence on the number, of
warheads carried by a given missile,
its range, payload and throw-weight,
the probable size of its warheads and
warhead accuracy.
Jeffrey Richelson, assistant professor of
government at American university, is the
author of the forthcoming "The U.S.
Intelligence Community. " William Arkin,
author of "Research Guide to Current
Military and Strategic Affairs, " is director of
research on nuclear weapons at the Institute
for Policy Studies
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-What.the Associated Press described as -a "super spy"'satellite was launched by the United
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Stites on_8.n
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Pentagon artist's rendering of the "Clipper Bow" satellite; intended to locate Soviet subma-
rines at sea, but never deployed. The drawing appeared in an unclassified record of ,con-
gressional hearings.
car~nl?g,
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TRW Inc. artist's sketch of a Pyramider satellite, designed to give U.S. secret agents a radio
link to Washington, but never deployed. The sketch, prepared for a trial, appeared in the
best-selling book "The Falcon and the Snowman."
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