SIGNIFICANCE OF RECENT U.S. ESPIONAGE CASES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000605470003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 8, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/01 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000605470003-0
RADIO 1V REPORTS, IN
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4701 W-LI D AV UE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 [phone]
FbR. \
PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAM The Today Show STATION W R C- T V
NBC Network
DATE April 8, 1987 8:15 A.M.
Washington, D.C.
SUBJECT Signifcance of Recent U.S. Espionage Cases
. BRYANT GUMBEL: On After Eight this morning, embassy
security. In Moscow it's been compromised. You know that. The
question is, just how much?
As we've been reporting, President Reagan now says the
new American Embassy in Moscow is apparently so riddled with
listening devices that we won't move in until its fixed.
The problem, of course, recently came to light when
several Marine guards were relieved of duty after allowing
Soviets to move freely in some of the most sensitive parts of the
building. Two of the guards, Sergeant Clayton Lonetree and
Corporal Arnold Bracy, are accused of having allowed the Soviets
near-total access to the embassy, sometimes for hours at a time.
In all, half of the 28 Marines assigned to the Moscow Embassy are
undergoing polygraph tests and will be reassigned.
In our Washington newsroom this morning is Dr. Jeffrey
Richelson. He is a member of the faculty of American University
and the. author of several books on intelligence.
Is it true. that you think this problem's been blown out
of proportion?
DR. JEFFREY RICHELSON: Well, I think, in general, the
espionage cases that have occurred, the damage, has not been as
great as projected in the media and by prosecutors.
GUMBEL: And by that, I assume you mean the Pollard spy
case, the Walker spy ring, that these things have each been
called, what, the greatest spy...
OFFICES IN: WASHINGTON D.C. ? NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES ? CHICAGO ? DETROIT ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES
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DR. RICHELSON: Each one, in succession, has been termed
the greatest damage to the country in many years.
DR. RICHELSON: Well, if we're talking about the
embassy, certainly it's highly disruptive of the functioning of
the embassy. It may have compromised some intelligence
operations, which is certainly damaging, to a certain extent.
But the thing that has to be kept in mind is how much- is any of
this going to really change significantly U.S. relations with the
Soviet Union or history. And often it turns out to be the case
that these events, in. the long run, in the long run of history,
sort of wash out.
GUMBEL: Let me get a different perspective here in New
York, where joining us is George Carver, who was with the CIA for
26 years. He's now. a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies at Georgetown.
How do you assess the damage?
GEORGE CARVER: Well, I assess it somewhat more
seriously than Dr. Richelson. I agree that you can't say that
every one is the worst. But I think the damage_h-as been very
major indeed. I think our entire Moscow Embassy operation has
been compromised. I think the Soviets know whom we're seeing in
the Soviet Union, what we're thinking. I think they knew what
President Reagan's fall-back positions at Reykjavik were supposed
to be. And if you're trying to enter into a negotiation, Bryant,
where the other fellow knows all the cards that you have and how
you plan to play them, your chances of coming out ahead of the
game are very slim indeed.
GUMBEL: How much, gentlemen, do we fault the Soviets in
all of this? I mean I'm not saying what they did was ethical.
But I'm wondering, in the land of intelligence and
counterintelligence, just how unethical was this? Is this
something that everybody does?
DR. RICHELSON: Yes.
CARVER: Well, the Sovits are behaving like Soviets.
They do it more extensively and more thoroughly than almost
anyone else. And, sure, we try to keep track of who goes in the
Soviet Embassy in Washington, and other things like that. But if
weever were to engage in the kind of wholesale espionage against
the foreign diplomatic establisment in Washington, you in NBC,
.your colleagues in the media, Congress and the press would be all
over the U.S. Government, and clawing and screaming and calling
for heads
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And so we- do not do it anything like as extensively as
they do because we play by different rules.
GUMBEL: Dr. Richelson?
DR. RICHELSON: I'd have to disagree. The history says
that the United States has all over the, world targeted Soviet
embassies, for a variety of reasons: the collection of
intelligence, monitoring what the Soviets are doing in a
particular country. And former CIA employees have written
extensively about tapping phone lines, trying to plant bugs in
foreign embassies, Soviet embassies, monitoring the personnel,
trying to set up personnel with women, and so forth.
So, it's hardly something that is only done on one side.
GUMBEL: What about the President's now-concern for
occupying the new building? Do you think it well-founded?-
CARVER: I think it's extremely well-founded, because
allowing the Soviets to construct the building outside of our
observation, allowing a Soviet architect to help plan ,it, and
then disappear in the Soviet Union, means that it's likely to be
so riddled with listening devices actually build into the fabric
of the building, that I think we'.ll probably never be able to
clean them out.
I was glad to see the President say what he did, Bryant.
But I hope he hasn't climbed out on yet another limb off of which
he's going to back. He said we'd never swap anyone for Daniloff,
and we did. He said we'd never negotiate with terrorists, and we
did. And now he's saying that we're not going to move into the
new.embassy until he can be assured it's secure, and that may be
a very long time.
GUMBEL: We have about a minute and a half left.
Dr. Richelson, look ahead for me a little bit, if you
might. How do we avoid this kind of thing in the future?
DR. RICHELSON:. Well, I think we. have to be more
realistic in terms of building embassies, particularly in the
Soviet Union; and also in terms of manning those embassies. It
simply.has to be done with people that we can be sure are not
going to be on the KGB payroll.
GUMBEL: What's that mean? I mean how can we be sure?
Supposedly, Corporal Bracy was a Marine's Marine.
DR. RICHELSON: Well, we can't be absolutely sure, but
we can certainly minimize it by trying to have as many Americans
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there working at the embassy as we can. If we have 200 or so
Russians working at the embassy, it's certainly going to be the
case that. a fair proportion of them will either be KGB employees
or co-opted by. the, KGB.
GUMBEL: But if you have Americans working in some of
the jobs that are considered the more menial jobs, aren't they
very vulnerable, then, to money as a motivation?
CARVER: Well, they're less vulnerable than Russians who
are already under the KGB control. And.I think Dr. Richelson is
absolutely right. It's very nice to have friendly
English-speaking Soviets get your Bolshoi tickets, clear your
household effects, do customs, do all these- other good things.
But if they're running around working for the KGB, cleaning out
your IN box in the process, that way lies madness.
And unfortunately, Bryant, our bureaucracy, our State
Department, and even my good friends in the Foreign Service have
always fought against taking effective security measures.
They're inconvenient, they're. intrusive, but they're necessary if
you're dealing with a closed society like the Soviet Union.
GUMBEL: Would you say our attitude towards security
our embassies has been, what, nonchalant in the past?
CARVER: It's been almost nonexistent. This bothered me
when I was a CIA officer. It bothered me when I was on Reagan's
transition team in 1980. And basically, I've had friends in the
Foreign Service tell me that worrying about security is
McCarthyite paranoia. And so long as you have that set of mind,
you're going to have problems such as we have today.
GUMBEL: George Carver, Dr. Jeffrey Richelson, thank you
both, gentlemen, very much.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/01 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000605470003-0