WHO'S IN CHARGE ANYWAY?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000605450006-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 19, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605450006-9
PR1ICLE APPEAL
19 November 1986
WASH INGTON"I7 mes R-eston
Who's in Charge Anyway?
WASHINGTON
D wring the Bay of Pigs disaster,
President Kennedy, irritated
by the opposition of the State
Department, turned on Ambassador
Charles E. (Chip) Bohlen and de-
manded to know, "What's wrong with
your department?" Bohlen replied,
"You are, Mr. President!"
Secretary of State Shultz, caught
between his personal honesty and his
loyalty to President Reagan, was less
candid during the recent Iranian flap
but was getting at much the same
point.
Bohlen was saying, with the utmost
respect, that foreign policy was too
complicated and too dangerous to be
left to the whims of Presidents. No-
body questioned the President's au-
thority as Commander in Chief, Boh-
len thought, but everything depended
on how he exercised that authority
and where he sought advice in mak-
ing his decisions.
Kennedy relied on the Central Intel-
ligence Agency at the Bay of Pigs and
failed; he took the entire Government
foreign policy establishment into his
confidence during the Cuban missile
crisis and succeeded.
It's not always so, but President
Johnson on Vietnam, President Nixon
on Watergate and President Carter in
the first Iranian crisis all brushed
aside the doubts of the professionals
to their regret. Likewise, President
Reagan went back to Iran with mili-
tary arms witout the knowledge of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, against the
advice of the Secretaries of State and
Defense, and without consulting with
Congress in advance.
The President has dealt with this
latest blunder after his fashion. He
has denied that he has done anything
wrong and says he won't do it again.
A private
White House
government
He ignored Mr. Shultz's advice and is
now taking it. He vilified She Demo-
crats during the Congressional elec-
tions, and evaded them on Iran, and is
now calling for their support.
One can only hope that he gets it,
for nothing could. be worse than leav-
ing the conduct of foreign policy in
the next two years to the collective
judgment of a divided Democratic
Party running wild toward the Presi-
dential election of 1988.
The President will,. however, have
to pay more respect to the responsi-
bilities of the Secretary of State, un-
less he is willing to lose him. And he
must rein in the C.I.A. and the subver-
sive operations of the National Se-
curity Council unless he wants a run-
ning battle with Congress over the
next 24 months.
He is now on his fourth national se-
curity adviser in six years, and Admi-
ral Poindexter, his latest, is not the
pride of the Ship of State. He is the
officer who misled the press on the in-
vasion of Grenada, and is the author
of the "disinformation" program on
Libya.
There is no evidence that the Na-
tional Security Act, establishing the
N.S.C., gave that body authority to en-
gage in covert operations in Iran or
anywhere else. It started with a staff
of 10 and now has over 100 beyond the
call of Congress.
It was authorized "to assess and
appraise the objectives, commit-
ments and risks of the United States
in relation to our actual and political
,military power; and (2) to consider
policies on matters of common inter-
est to the departments and agencies
of the government concerned with the
national security, and to make
recommendations to the President in
connection therewith."
Nothing there to justify Bud
,McFarlane and Colonel North carry-
ing weapons to Iran, armed with false
passports and official lies.
This private government within the
White House, however, is the Presi-
dent's personal responsibility. If the
C.I.A. mines the harbors of Nicara-
gua and the United States refuses to
explain this to the World Court, that
can be done only with a wink and a
nod from the President.
It may be, therefore, that some-
thing useful will come out of the Ira-
nian embarrassment. For years now,
the C.I.A. and the National Security
Council have been skirting the law,
trying to achieve by covert action
what they cannot justify or explain to
Congress.
The result is that there is now a
crisis of confidence in the Govern-
ment precisely at a time of critical
negotiations over the control of nu-
clear weapons and control of the
budget, now in alarming deficit.
This has been a topic of private
anxiety here for years. It has poi-
soned relations between the White
House and Capitol Hill and even per-
sonal relations between members of
the Cabinet. But the facts are begin
ping to come out, and despite all the
official arts of television propagan-
da, even the people are beginning to
notice. Li
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605450006-9