CAVE COMMENTS ON CHAPTERS 41-45 ON THOSE PORTIONS WHERE CAVE'S NAME IS SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED.

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000605340001-6
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• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2012
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Ill
From the5hahto
the Secret Arms De,
An insiders Accou)
ofUS.Invo(uemen
in Iran
Mansur Rafizadeh
IS . MM E-r- 1001
ISBN 0-688-8Fnrmpr
Chif'nfcAVAK
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FPT ISBN 0-688-07369-7 >$18.95
From the Shah to
the Secret Arms Deal,
An Insider's Account
of U.S.Involvement
in Iran
Mansur Rafizadeh
Former Chief of SAVAK
The Reagan administration is shaken
by the Iranian arms scandal, Americans,
are held hostage in Beirut and Tehran,
the president's "private" government is
under investigation by the judicial sys-
tem. Where did it all begin, and what is
the truth behind the official lies?
This vivid account is by a man
uniquely qualified to tell the inside
story of Iranian and United States in-
volvement from both sides..A former
chief of SAVAK (the shah's secret
police) and a covert-agent for the CIA,
Rafizadeh begins his story with his
childhood in Kerman where he gives a
remarkable picture of Iranian life. He
tells of his education as a liberal with
h;s mentor, Dr. Mozafar Baghai, and
why he joined with the shah, whom he
then saw as Iran's best hope for demo-
cratic rule. His disillusionment with the
monarchy and the shah's demonic ex-
cesses, which he describes in new and
shocking detail, led Rafizadeh to be-
come a double agent for the CIA. Ra-
fizadeh, stationed in America, began
the secret activity that would help the
United States withdraw its support
from Iran's tyrannical and decadent
monarch.
Why Rafizadeh left the CIA is part of
his account of the secret arms deal,
(continued on back flap)
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved
Irnnrinueu Irum Itwu t-vi
for Release 2012/05/01 CIA-RDP90-00965R000605340001-6 ig facts.
"What did President Reagan know and
when did he know it?" is answered
by the author as he recounts the un-
folding of the arms deal from its in-
ception in 1981. A pattern of deception
and deliberate evasion of congressional
law becomes clear as the president's
men pursue their private diplomacy.
Rafizadeh fits all the pieces together
when he shows what happened in Iran
as well as the United States-disturb-
ing revelations about the day the hos-
tages didn't come home, Reagan's
personal, message-bearing gifts to
Khomeini, the intense rivalry between
the NSC and the CIA and its disastrous
effect, the role of the arms dealers, Kho-
meini's contempt for the United States
as he continued to accept arms and take
hostages. Witness, an insider's story,
takes the lid off the secret and tells the
unbelievable, shocking truth.
Mansur Rafizadeh was born and edu-
cated in Kerman, Iran. He graduated
from the Tehran University Law
School, where he risked his life by play-
ing a leading role in antidictatorship
student demonstrations. His parents,
fearing for his safety, sent him to the
United States in 1957 to study at Har-
vard University and New York Univer-
sity. The eldest of six children, he, his
three brothers and two sisters, and his
mother all live in the United States.
Jucket.design copyright 0 1987 by One Plus One Studio
William Morrow & Company, Inc
105 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10016
Printed in U.S.A.
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CHAPTER FORTY-ONE
Dea th Threat
In March 1986, after the CIA had re"ived some intelligence, about
this book, a senior officer, whom I had not seen since severing my ties
with the Agency in 1983, setup a meeting in New York City.
Justifiably, I was very apprehensive about this meeting. My intui-
tive juices started flowing, and.l realized that I had to protect myself.
I considered my options and called the FBI beforehand. I told them
that a senior CIA official was coming to see me regarding a book I was
writing about my political experiences, and that I would let them know
when and where the meeting would be taking place.
I met with the CIA officer on Wednesday morning, March 26, 1986,
in a nondescript hotel suite. He was seated. behind a large desk, and we
began talking about the '.'old times" when I was associated with his
office, but the conversation's direction quickly changed. He was anxious
to tell me about the developments at the CIA and how "Old Bill" Casey
had gotten rid of the "assholes" and had changed the operation tremen-
dously.
Finally, he got to the real purpose of our meeting. His office was
very concerned about my book, and, because he was an old friend, he
had volunteered to serve as a go-between to prevent me from making
some serious mistakes.
Ultimately, we began to talk about the contents of my manuscript.
He listened calmly as I told him about the early biographical chapters,
but when I got to my experiences with the CIA, he became very angry
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WITNESS
339
When I saw him the next day, first he mocked me. "You always
used to come with a briefcase. Now you have no job and no briefcase."
Then he got right to the point. "Where is the manuscript?" I told him
that when I'd said no the previous night I'd meant it. Then he said,
"Mansur, I have to have itl I promised the office I would bring it back
with me."
He began to threaten me. "If you think that you'll ever get to
publish this book, you're mistaken. You know Old Bill. He's a tough
man. He doesn't tolerate this kind of bullshit. In the nineteen sixties the
CIA went down because of the Vietnam War, because of activists, and
a lot of assholes: people at The Washington Post, The New York Times,
Frank Church, and that kind of garbage. We're still trying to build up
the image of the Agency, and we've been successful, but we still have
a problem with the young people. They don't want to work for the CIA
because of the prevailing negative attitude. The belief that we're incom-
petent, or we're killers. This book certainly wouldn't help. So old
Casey's not going to take it."
His blue eyes glaring, he. pulled out all the stops and put it to me.
"The Bureau [FBI] will get rid of you. lecture this. You are being
interviewed or giving a lecture somewhere. A man in the crowd shoots
you. Who could figure out who shot you? One of the shah's people? One
of Khomeini's people? After all, you were SAVAK!"
I was angry and scared. I had been a professional in this business
long enough to know that one didn't drop the boss's name in a death
threat casually. Obviously, he had been mandated by headquarters
to use whatever means necessary, even murder or its threat, to si-
lence me.
I tried to act calmly even though my insides were shaking. "I've
enjoyed my life," I said. "I've worked with famous people, traveled-
it's been interesting. If the FBI is going to do it, I can't stop them."
He quickly interjected, "They will, you knowl" He warned me,
"You wouldn't have one friend left in the American government.
They'll be the ones to carry out the order. Mozafar [my brother] will
find you in a pool of blood."
He was depressing me as much as he was scaring me. How naive
I had been to think that if the likes of him knew what was going on
in Iran, they would stop the shah. I felt desolate. I had put my
faith in the wrong people for twenty-five years. I broke down and
cried. He seemed pleased, probably thinking that I was finally going
to surrender.
Gently, he said, "Bring in. the manuscript. Let's negotiate. Don't
and defensive. He accused me of being hostile toward his office and of
placing the CIA's "new reputation" in jeopardy. He implored me not
to include material he felt would be damaging. "The office made mis-
takes in the past," he admitted, "but the office Old Bill operates today
is different. By publishing this information you would give the office an
even more terrible reputation-not only here but abroad." Above all,
he explained that it was out of the question for his office to allow the
book to be published. He had a better way to handle it. He suggested
that I come to Washington, where we could review the manuscript in
a civilized way and take out those parts that the Agency was not
comfortable with. Then they would assign a writer to me, who would
help me to replace the stricken sections with some more acceptable
material.
The CIA was demanding carte blanche to rewrite my book-to
rewrite history!
I emphasized that I wasn't interested in harming the CIA, but
merely in informing the American people of the truth, in clarifying a
very important part of history that I had witnessed. I would never
willingly compromise agents or their current intelligence-gathering
methods. And as for the CIA's "new reputation," I said, William Casey
could not be held accountable for things his predecessors had done.
Failing to overcome my resistance, the official tried a different
tactic. "Give us the manuscript and we'll give your cost plus whatever
you think three years of your own time is worth. No receipts necessary.
Just give us the total."
I knew that I could walk out of that room with a promise of a
tax-free $1 million or more. I turned him down flat. The CIA man
banged on the desk. "Asshole!" he yelled.
Finally, he calmed down after a visible effort to get himself under
control. "Give me the manuscript, Mansur," he cajoled.
Again I refused. "I wrote this because of my beliefs, not because
I am hostile toward your office," I said.
He demanded to know who had the manuscript and if any of them
were known to be anti-CIA. He wanted to collect all of the copies before
"this thing gets out of hand."
I didn't reveal any names but made sure that he knew there were
several copies around.
The rest of the evening was spent rehashing old topics, but he never
stopped urging me to bring him the manuscript. When he finally de-
cided to call it a night, his parting words were "Bring it tomorrow!"
I was emotionally drained. It was after midnight.
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340 MANSUR RAFIZADEH
allow yourself to be manipulated by people who just want to make
money for themselves."
Again I repeated, "It's the principle. The American people have a
right to know what went wrong in Iran. How do you know this book
is so damaging?"
"Because I know you and how much you know," he quietly re-
sponded, "and how critical you always were. That's enough." Then,
matter-of-factly, he said, "You still have time to think about it, but a
few things just might happen to you before this book ever gets pub-
lished." In a very businesslike way, he recited the possibilities:
"One, William Casey's office will get in touch with you and ask you
to come and speak with him.
"Two, we will get in touch with the vice-president's office. Since he
is your friend and might have influence on you, he may call to discuss
this with you.
"Three, I will go to them [Casey] and tell them how much time and
money you have spent, and I'll get back to you.
"Four, I won't see you again but the legal department will come
to see you."
Then his voice turned menacing. "Where do you want the flowers
sent?"
(The CIA officer who was threatening me was ironically the very
same one who had warned me three and a half years earlier that I was
on Khomeini's hit list.)
That night I informed an FBI official I had known for years what
had transpired. He was shocked and furious that FBI personnel were
being characterized as front men to kill for the CIA. He insisted that
I make a log of what had been said to me while it was still fresh in my
mind.
I couldn't sleep a wink that night. I was living a nightmare. I kept
imagining how the CIA would carry out its threats against me. Would
a mugger attack me? a car malfunction? a gas tank explode? maybe a
drug overdose?
However, my greatest fear was the suppression of my manuscript.
I wanted to make sure it got published no matter what happened to me.
I met with my lawyer Melvin Gittleman. I told him about my
meetings with the CIA and its attempts to persuade me, bribe me, its
threats to kill me. The CIA's behavior shocked and angered him. He
had expected an attempt to censor the work but not a threat on my life.
He encouraged me to fight back, saying, "Don't worry about the manu-
script. I'm making some more copies and I won't even tell you who has
them. That will be your best protection. Nobody knows where the
copies are."
Next, I called Dr. Bagha, my mentor, who fortunately was visiting
in the United States at the time, and invited him to my home. I desper-
ately wanted to talk to him. He had already read and corrected the
manuscript, and I needed his wisdom and guidance.
"My choices are clear," I explained to him, "I either take a huge
amount of money and let them censor my book to their heart's content,
or I run the risk of assassination at the hands of the CIA." Dr. Baghai
remained calm. "Resist the intimidation. Publish the book," he said. He
took my silence as a sign of fear. It was completely out of character for
him to advocate a course that might lead to violence. When I was a
youthful activist, he always counseled firm but peaceful resistance.
"Courting an assassination is not a policy I would usually recommend,"
he continued. "But there are times when you have to pay for the truth,
even if it's with your life. It's time to take the risk, son. You owe it to
Americans and to Iranians, especially the younger generations. You
have an obligation to tell and they have the right to know."
With a lump in my throat, I responded, "Yes; sir."
The CIA escalated its harassment. It had the Justice Department
contact my attorneys, threaten to alter my immigration status, and
subpoena me if I didn't cooperate fully. The Agency continued to
demand that I turn over my manuscript for censorship, and give it the
names of everyone who had read or worked on the manuscript.
After several tense meetings between the Justice Department attor-
neys, my attorneys, and myself, nothing was resolved. At our last
meeting, held on September 8, 1986, at my lawyer's office in New
Jersey, I was extremely indignant at the behavior of the Justice Depart-
ment and couldn't contain my feelings. "You, as the representatives of
the very Justice Department who threw President Nixon out of office
because he broke the law, should enforce and respect the law! It was
one of the greatest things that ever happened in this country. With that
one incident, Americans proved that no man is above the law." I told
them that the people look to the Justice Department to ensure that
there will be a democracy in the future, but if the department tried to
prevent the public from knowing the truth now, twenty years from now
we would not have the kind of democracy that America stands for. "I
believe if the law is not respected by the highest authority, a revolution
or chaos will come to this land and destroy everything the American
people treasure!"
I also stated that the public had the right to know the kind of genius
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342 MANSUR RAFIZADEH
we have in the White House, and again I told them that what I was
planning to publish would not hurt the national security of this country.
On September 15, 1986, the Justice Department sent a letter to my
lawyers demanding that I turn over my manuscript. The letter also
included the following:
For his [Mansur Rafizadeh's] part, we ask that you and your client
provide us with assurance that no copies of the original manuscript
remain in the hands of third parties at the time of submission and
agree not to distribute any version of the manuscript different from
that finally approved.
I tried to analyze my options and realized that I was faced with an
agonizing dilemma. The Justice Department wanted to silence me and
wouldn't hesitate to take whatever steps it deemed necessary to prevent
the publication of my book, though, I hoped, short of murder.
Was I willing to take the consequences? After. all, I knew that
President Reagan was selling arms to Iran and negotiating for hostages,
that Robert C. MacFarlane, representing President Reagan, had made
a historical trip to Iran in May 1986, carrying a special message, and
that there had been a misappropriation of funds from these arms sales.
Didn't I want the public to know the truth? Adding to -my frustration
was the fear that my phone might be tapped and therefore create
problems for whomever I called. I was forced to make all of my phone
calls from outside of my home.
When I met with my attorneys Melvin Gittleman and Raymond
Durr they got right to the point. "Are you going to give them the
manuscript, Mansur?" I replied with an emphatic "No!" Pleased, they
then said, "Now we know where you stand." Most curious, I asked,
"Are you going to defend me?" Without a moment's hesitation, they
answered, "Yes! The first thing we will do is consult with the Civil
Liberties Union and find out the best way to defend your constitutional
rights." I embraced them tearfully and thanked them. This was the
other side of American justice.
Three years of work on my manuscript, added to the CIA's and the
Justice Department's prolonged harassment, made me so physically
and emotionally drained that I became hospitalized with a severely
perforated ulcer.
During my convalescence in October, in a final act of desperation,
I even attempted to call ABC-TV correspondent Ted Koppel. When
informed he was out of town and asked to leave my name, I told his
office that I would call again.
A few days later, a source called from Tehran and reported that
Ayatollah A. H. Montazeri's faction was preparing a newsletter that
would make public facts about the "secret" American arms-hostage
negotiations.
The first week of November the arms scandal splashed across the
front pages of newspapers around the world. I was vindicated. The
Justice Department hasn't communicated with me since.
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CHAPTER FORT Y T WO
When the Hostages Didn't Come Home
By the time Jimmy Carter became president, the shortsightedness
and mistakes of other administrations had allowed the shah to arouse
the furious animosity of the Iranian people against both himself and the
United States. Carter correctly perceived the need- to champion the
cause of human rights and political reform in Iran, but unfortunately
the shah and his predecessors had antagonized the citizenry beyond
reconciliation.
In a world drowning in cynicism, President Carter was a man of
principle who courageously tried to reconcile his personal beliefs and
diplomacy. He stood firm and refused to sacrifice his values in the name
of political expediency. As a result, he subsequently lost the presidency
in the next election.
In line with his strong and unwavering position on human rights,
President Carter pressured the shah into releasing vast numbers of
political prisoners. Once freed, these very same people caused the shah's
downfall:
President Carter's deeply ingrained sense of morality foreclosed
any possibility of trading the ailing shah for the American hostages, and
therefore he desperately sought alternative solutions. The ultimate one,
the military attempt to rescue the hostages, was doomed from the start
because, in addition to all of the problems inherent in an operation of
such complexity, President Carter was handicapped by several inher-
ited factors.
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One of the most damaging was the rigid Republican loyalty of the
CIA officers in charge of the Iran desk. These men wanted war. General
Oveissi and I had had several meetings with these CIA officers during
that period, and I was astounded by their callous remarks. One agent
said to me, "What do fifty-two American lives mean? Every Thanksgiv-
ing, hundreds of Americans die on the highways. What's the big deal,
Mansur?"
I came upon further proof of the strong anti-Carter sentiment in the
CIA when I learned that it was allowing misinformation about the
hostages to get to Carter, such as: they were being forced to play
Russian roulette, were kept bound in handcuffs on the floor, and were
often beaten up severely and left bleeding. The Agency wanted Presi-
dent Carter to believe the hostages were brutally treated, when in fact
the Iranian captors took great care to keep their prisoners in as good
health as possible.
The CIA gave President Carter these false reports because it hoped
to get him to abandon his nonviolent stance and go after Khomeini with
guns blasting. But I discovered the most damning example of this
anti-Carter sentiment when I surreptitiously discovered that Khomeini
had planned to release the hostages the moment President Reagan was
elected.
Khomeini was completely ignorant of American political proce-
dures. He believed that immediately after his victory, President Reagan
would have a dossier prepared on President Carter and subsequently
have him arrested. After all, this was customary procedure in many
Middle Eastern countries. Khomeini's lack of knowledge about West-
ern culture and history was a constant problem for his aides. For the
longest time, Khomeini even believed that the word "Carter" was a
synonym for head of state, and, much to the embarrassment of his
countrymen, would publicly refer to the Carter of England, the Carter
of France, etc.
Because his aides had made a point of telling Khomeini about
President Carter's nonviolent protests-his use of a candlelight vigil,
symbolic yellow ribbons, and church services to demonstrate his ap-
proach to free the hostages, Khomeini had absolutely no fear of this
nonaggressive leader.
Conversely, Khomeini's aides painted a very different picture of
Ronald Reagan, telling him that Reagan was a warmonger and the
second that he took office he would bomb Tehran.
Fearing this new American leader, Khomeini wanted to free the
hostages immediately after the November 4 election. In fact, George
Bush had been director of the CIA during the Nixon administration
and still had friends in the Agency. When the Republican party nomi-
nated the Reagan-Bush ticket, it was supported by the CIA. Upon their
election on November 4, 1980, the CIA's Iran desk considered the
president-elect and vice-president-elect as their chief. executives, and
Jimmy Carter as a lame duck. Therefore, some CIA agents, one of them
Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, were briefed by' Agency officers to persuade
Khomeini not to release his prisoners until Ronald Reagan was sworn
in. The CIA, consistently hostile to Carter, told Khomeini not to bother
giving Carter the credit when he would no longer have any power.
Thus, the CIA, who had tried to manipulate President Carter into
aggressive behavior by using false reports about "brutal hostage treat-
ment," now sentenced the American hostages to seventy-six more days
of imprisonment.
On January 20, 1981, the hostages boarded .a waiting jet at Tehran
Airport. As they sat trembling in their seats, still unsure of their next
destination and their ultimate fate, a guard stood outside the aircraft
with a radio pressed to his ear and a walkie-talkie clutched in his hand.
Only after the very moment that Ronald Reagan was sworn in as
president did the guard signal the pilot. As Reagan delivered his inau-
gural address, they were airborne to freedom.
During the period of indecision and chaos that followed the re-
turn of the hostages immediately after President Reagan's inaugura-
tion in 1981, Reagan and the director of the CIA, William Casey,
secretly ordered the Agency to give money and other support to
Khomeini's strongest opposition groups. The CIA sought out the
leaders, and soon had liaisons with Shahpur Bakhtiar, based in
France, General Gholam Ali Oveissi, based in the United States, Dr.
Ali Amini, based in France, Admiral A. Madani, based in Germany,
General F. Jam, based in England and the shah's son, Reza Pahlavi,
based in Morocco.
The CIA was able to convince these groups to accept their coopera-
tion and trust by focusing on the purity of their motives: America had
experienced deep humiliation at the hands of the Khomeini regime, the
American pro-human-rights position was well known, and Iran's emer-
gence as a terrorist training ground was making the headlines.
Hence, the CIA officers in charge made it very clear that they
would not participate in this anti-Khomeini operation without the
president's first issuing an executive order. In September 1981 such an
executive order was issued with a one-year limitation. This precaution
was taken so that if the CIA could not promote the overthrow of
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Khomeini within this period, it would have to go back to the presi-
dent for another such order. Privately, we informants were all told by
the CIA that if during this time no one group proved dominant, the.
United States would have no choice but to make peace with
Khomeini. The CIA recognized a major problem with these groups:
They were so diverse philosophically that they were too busy fighting
each other to be really productive. .
In 1982 word leaked out to the Iranians that the president, the CIA,
and other American officials were divided as to whether post-Khomeini
Iran should become a republic or return to a monarchy. The various
opposing factions were delighted, as now each believed that it had
someone in the CIA supporting its own particular cause.
The CIA continued to foster this impression by assigning an officer
to each group, someone who would give the illusion that he was sympa-
thetic only to it. He would meet with the group's leader and gain his
trust by promising to bolster his position if he could show proof of his
faction's strength in Iran. "Washington is under the impression that
Khomeini's opposition is made up of all chiefs and no Indians," he
might say. "If you want to strengthen your leadership position, you
must provide us with as many specifics as possible about your network
in Iran. You must give us the names of your people."
All the leaders of these opposition groups fell for this ploy-hook,
line, and sinker. During the next few months, they desperately vied with
each other to provide as much information about their support people
in Iran as they could.
Shortly after they had all dutifully handed over the information,
their CIA contacts startled them by disclosing that a single Iranian
official had been listed as a primary supporter by no fewer than five
different opposition groups. Each CIA contact then asked, "How can
you prove that he is yours? You must give us more precise informa-
tion." Desperate to prove the man theirs alone, they eagerly offered all
the minute details of the man's modus operandi.
Throughout this period, George Cave, the CIA liaison, operating
under a pseudonym, carried the liaison officers' promises one step
further by assuring each group that it was the American government's
favorite, destined to wear the mantle of Iran's leadership.
General Oveissi, like the rest of the opposition leaders, was a victim
of this deception. At a meeting in Hamburg with a CIA liaison officer,
the general, and me, we discussed various civil servants, religious lead-
ers, and businessmen in Iran who were supporting General Oveissi.
Then the CIA agent matter-of-factly produced a chart depicting the
entire Iranian Army structure, including names and ranks. He casually
told General Oveissi, "Tell me which ones are yours. I'll take this to
Washington and discredit all the other opposition and prove once and
for all.that you should be the leader. This," he continued cheerfully,
.,will prove that you are the strongest. If you want to be shah-we'll
make you shah!"
General Oveissi.slammed the chart closed and said, "No more! I
don't trust you people!"
The CIA officer became angry. He appealed to me. "We try to help
and look what he says! I want to make him the shah and he doesn't trust
us!"
I tried to calm Oveissi down and quickly ushered him, into an
adjacent room. "If you have more information," I pleaded with him,
"give it to them! They are telling the truth. They only want to help
restore human rights to Iran. They are tired of having the American
government humiliated and are tired of having a terrorist government
in power. The American government wants only to help."
Eyes blazing, General Oveissi pounded on the table and said, "You
are naive. I will be wrong in God's eyes." His rage escalating, he added,
"I did it but I'm going to stop it now. They are devious liars!"
I smiled. "You are a cynic," I told him.
"I don't care what you call me," he responded. "All I know is that
God wouldn't forgive me if something happened to these men."
We returned to the other room and I apologized to the CIA officer
for General Oveissi's behavior.
The officer commented calmly, "I understand. He's frustrated.
Let's put this chart together. I'll take it to Washington and then we will
be able to provide him with all our support."
During the entire flight to Paris from Hamburg, Oveissi tried to
convince me that I was wrong, but I held fast to my belief that the
administration and the CIA were too ethical ever to cooperate with
Khomeini's government.
After a few weeks I learned that the CIA had extracted similar
intelligence from all of the opposition groups with the same promises
of support. But still unwilling to believe that the CIA would be so
deceptive, I continued to justify its behavior.
Four months later I was summoned to Oveissi's apartment in Paris.
As we walked to a nearby park on Avenue Foch, I asked him what was
so urgent. Turning to him, I was stunned to see this tough soldier with
tears streaming down his cheeks.
He looked at me and said, "I just received intelligence from Iran
i
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that Khomeini got the whole list of officers that I gave to the CIA.
They'll all be killed."
I was shattered. It was inconceivable to me that the CIA would do
such a thing.
"They only wanted to trick us from the beginning," he continued.
"Reagan's administration only wanted to get on Khomeini's good
side. This is what they really wanted-to gain his trust. We were
duped."
I still couldn't accept this. "Your intelligence must be wrong!" I
insisted. "It can't be true!"
After hashing these events over and over, the general despairing
and I disbelieving, we decided to confront the CIA liaison officer. He
denied providing the list to Khomeini or having any complicity in the
matter. Instead, he tried to shift the blame to General Oveissi.
"It's you who have given interviews to reporters from The New
York Times and The Washington Post," he accused. "You know they
are loaded with Communists! Maybe you leaked the information."
"I never gave them any names!" Oveissi responded angrily.
The CIA officer attacked again. "It is you who have been meeting
with members of the House and the Senate. I warned you to be careful.
They all come from the same breed of asshole. You must have dropped
the information."
Superficially it appeared that the United States was funding the
opposition groups operating in exile in order to develop and maintain
networks in Iran to overthrow Khomeini's regime. When Khomeini
became aware of the CIA's role in this matter, he was extremely angry.
Attempting to smooth his ruffled feathers and prove the United States'
good intentions, the CIA passed the word through intermediaries that
they were not really helping the opposition but merely using them as
intelligence resources to strengthen the Khomeini government. In order
to show its sincerity and hoping that this would prove its true motives,
the CIA compiled a detailed list of intelligence information and at-
tached an anonymous letter explaining its intentions. The CIA then
placed the information in a large manila envelope and left it in front
of the Tehran home of Dr. Mohammad Beheshti, one of Khomeini's
top aides.
In a few days Oveissi discovered conclusively through his sources
in Iran that the American government had indeed supplied the list of
Iranians to Khomeini. Horrified by his role in betraying their identities,
Oveissi futilely attempted to warn as many people as possible in the
hope that some might still be able to escape.
Unfortunately, only some survived. In all, over one thousand names
had been provided by the leaders of the opposition groups. Some of
these people were killed, some were imprisoned, and others placed
under house arrest.
Over the next few months the media gave saturation coverage of
these poor victims' trials and executions. I was numbed by the knowl-
edge that I was partly responsible for their deaths. Throughout the
trials I met periodically with General Oveissi. Humbly, I apologized to
him for having been so completely stupid. I had been blinded by wishful
thinking. At one of these meetings, Oveissi said to me, "I forgive you,
but I don't know if God is going to forgive either of us." Crying,
General Oveissi raised his hands toward the sky and implored God-
"You will take care of President Reagan and William Casey! I had good
faith when I gave names to them!" .
Still troubled by what he regarded as the CIA's betrayal, General
Oveissi met once again with the agents. At this meeting, the CIA
continued to deny any responsibility, and this time tried to shift the
blame to the State Department.
Before leaving, the CIA officer in charge asked Oveissi, "Is there
anything I can do for you?":
After a long, thoughtful pause, Oveissi stared at him and said, "Can
you free me?"
Puzzled, the CIA man asked, "What do you mean?"
General Oveissi begged, "Free me! Free me! Send me to Khomeini
so he can kill me-then I won't have these nightmares every night!"
The agent stared at him coldly and responded, "General, you're too
emotional."
Why did the Reagan administration allow itself to be involved in
such unethical behavior? Because it believed that its actions were jus-
tified. It felt it was the most expeditious way to reach its long-range
objective-stop the spread of communism. The Reagan administration
was interested in maintaining a fundamentalist government in Iran at
any cost, even if it meant supporting a cruel dictator, disregarding
people's basic human rights, returning Iran to a seventh-century men-
tality, or taking hostages. It fit in with its ultimate goals-to keep
fundamentalism in power and put a "Green Belt" (referring to the color
green, which appears in most flags of Muslim countries) around the
southern border of the Soviet Union, thus preventing the Soviet Union
from ever controlling the warm waters of the Indian Ocean.
The Reagan administration truly believed that Muslim fundamen-
talism was its most effective weapon against communism in the area,
and wouldn't take the risk of allowing a moderate or liberal to come
to power in Iran. Unfortunately, this was not the only disastrous exam-
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ple of the administration's desperate and misguided pursuit of
Khomeini's "good side."
In 1982 a high-ranking KGB officer, who had worked in Tehran
as a Soviet diplomat but who was actually in charge of the KGB's Iran
desk, defected to the West. After being extensively interrogated by both
British and American intelligence, he provided a wealth of accurate
information about the Tudeh party's (the Iranian Communist party)
officers, members, long-range plans, and other connections.
. Although the British were also in possession of this information,
they didn't choose to use it.
But in 1984 the CIA felt it expedient to hand over the names of the
Iranian Communists to Khomeini's regime. Khomeini had them all
immediately arrested. Hundreds were brutally killed and hundreds are
still in jail.
I tried to sort out my own feelings and put these events into some
kind of perspective.
For 444 days, Khomeini had kept the American diplomats hostage.
Then fifty-two volumes of top-secret documents found in the American
embassy were published, and America was debased further when copies
of the documents were sold on Iranian street corners for ten cents a
copy.
As I've indicated, a few months before the shah's hasty departure
from Iran, I and other concerned Iranians repeatedly urged the CIA
to remove the embassy's documents from Iran. Iran was a country in
which the shah felt even his father's bones were not safe, and we knew
just how vulnerable classified documents would be when Khomeini
took over. The CIA refused to heed our warnings. Now secret United
States information was available to the Soviet Union or anyone else who
wanted it.
It was uncanny. Iran had consistently humiliated the U.S. govern-
ment by burning American presidents in effigy and openly praying for
America's downfall. Every public gathering (including the delibera-
tions of Parliament) was punctuated with rousing shouts of "Down
with America!"
When Khomeini received the news that the United States had
supplied his aides with information about opposition forces in Iran, he
laughed and said, "So that's the United States's position on human
rights."
How could the American government constantly talk about cham-
pioning human rights while so flagrantly ignoring them in its own
actions? Was its position always a sham?
CHAPTER FORTY- THREE
First Arms Shipment to Iran
During the shah's reign, the great preponderance of Iranian arms
had been bought from the United. States. The shah needed the United
States in order to maintain his sophisticated, costly equipment. Obvi-
ously this offered the United States an almost foolproof method of
controlling the shah's army. When Khomeini toppled the shah's re-
gime, he inherited therefore not only an outstanding military arsenal
but also a built-in dependency on American industry.
As the Iranian war with Iraq escalated, the United States was
confident that Iran could not sustain the hostilities for longer than two
years without refurbishing its major weapons. This was America's
trump card-Iran would collapse without American replacement parts.
The United States seized this opportunity to influence the outcome of
the Iran-Iraq conflict and make inroads with Khomeini's government.
In the spring of 1982, General Oveissi received intelligence from
sources close to Khomeini that in 1981 the United States government
had offered arms to Khomeini's regime. The Reagan administration via
the CIA had made several overtures in hopes of developing a relation-
ship. Khomeini, however, had turned them down, saying that he didn't
need to get any arms from the United States "Satan." Privately, he said,
"The Ameri cans would sell their mother for one dollar. We can get
arms from all over. Why should we deal with them?"
Undaunted by this rebuff, the Americans made another offer
through the CIA again, but this time it carried a stern warning. "If you
i
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CHAPTER FORT Y-FOUR
The Brotherhood of Assassins: From Hasan
ibn al-Sabah to Khomeini
In the eleventh century, Persia's secret sect of assassins gave the
world a new word for political murder-assassinatioT .
Perhaps some readers are unaware of the origin of the word "assas-
sin" and may think that it derives from French or Latin. It does not.
It is of Persian derivation.
Hashashin, or addicts of the drug hashish.(hemp), a secret order
of religious fanatics, originated in the Ismaili branch of the Shiite sect.
Founded in Iran by Hasan ibn al-Sabah, a Persian Fatamid missionary
(died in 1124), the movement was dedicated to propaganda with little
regard for spiritual values. Hasan ibn al-Sabah, known to the Crusaders
as Shaykh al-Jabal, the "old man of the mountains," was chief of
operations. He was aided by two groups of subordinates, the grand
priors, and below them, contingents of desperadoes ready to do or die
in blind obedience to the command of .their chief.
From Alamut, a mountain stronghold. in Kazvin in Iran, Hasan
presided over a network of terrorists, directing activities and pursuing
a policy of secret assassination against the order's enemies; There are
many legends. about Hasan, one of the most mysterious figures in
Persian history. Two stories that best describe his power and charisma
involve his conquest of Alamut Castle in A.D. 1090.
The shah, angered by Hasan's bloody rampages, .sent one of his
most trusted and important envoys to demand that he cease and desist
at once or else deal with his wrath. Hasan, who had an enormous
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WITNESS 361
ers, but I can't help noticing that Persian history has unfortunately
begun to repeat itself in an extremely curious way.
In 1963 Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi sent a secret message
through General Hassan Pakravan, then chief of SAVAK, to Ayatollah
Khomeini, who was living in Qom, the leading Shiite religious center.
The note read "If you don't stop criticizing and agitating against my
government, I am going to wear my father's boots [meaning "I am
going to resort to my father's repressive methods")."
Khomeini, a brilliant dramatic orator, didn't answer immediately,
but waited until after he had gone to the mosque later that day. There
he repeated the shah's message and then, in his most scathing manner,
replied, "My answer to him is-your father's boots are too big for you!"
The next day, on June 5, 1963, Tehran was shaken by huge riots
in which hundreds of people were killed. The shah -reacted by having
Khomeini jailed and then exiled to Turkey. Over the next years,
Khomeini would be forced into a lengthy exile.that would take him
from Turkey to Iraq and from Iraq to Paris. He refused to return to
Iran until the shah had left the country. He made his triumphant return
network of spies throughout the land, was forewarned and prepared for
the envoy's arrival. Hasan, along with his chief of protocol, greeted the
shah's envoy with great pomp, but before offering him the customary
refreshments suggested that he show him the view from the castle's
tower.
Hasan immediately led the envoy to Alamut tower, and no sooner
were they on top than Hasan summoned one of his followers and asked
him, "How much faith do you have in me?" The man immediately
responded, "Your will is my command!" Hasan then told the man to
plunge his dagger into his own heart. The envoy was stunned as he
watched the man obey without any hesitation and in a flash fall dead
at their feet. Without missing a beat, Hasan summoned another man
and asked him, "How much do you believe in me?" The man quickly
replied, "With all of my soul!" Hasan then signaled him to leap off the
parapet. An instant later the man lay dead at the bottom of the tower.
Very calmly Hasan led the trembling envoy to his room. Even
though he was still shaking, the envoy couldn't help noticing how plain
and unadorned this powerful leader's room was in contrast to the shah's
magnificent surroundings. Once they were seated, Hasan spoke in deep,
forceful tones, "This is my answer to the message that you were sent
to deliver to me. Tell your shah," he continued, "that I have seventy
thousand more of the same kind of loyal followers that you saw today!"
One morning shortly thereafter when Sanjar Shah woke up, he was
horrified to discover a sword pierced through his pillows and jammed
into the floor. A note placed next to the sword read "Your Majesty-
if 1 didn't respect you, the sword would have been pushed into your
heart. The same person who is capable of pushing a sword into the hard
floor, can easily push it through your soft flesh." It was signed "Hasan."
Henceforth, even the king of Persia accepted his vulnerability and lived
in fear of Hasan.
The Crusaders returned to Europe bringing with them tales of
Hasan's vicious exploits. His men were charged with being responsible
for the deaths of many statesmen, including some in Egypt and Syria.
The point for today's history is that Hasan was able to maintain
absolute control over his minions because he was a charismatic religious
leader who had convinced his followers that all of his enemies were
God's enemies and therefore deserved to die. After giving them hashish
and delivering powerful rhetoric, he used their blind obedience to rid
himself of all his political foes.
From the eleventh through the twentieth centuries, many other
Persian religious leaders and kings were able to manipulate their follow-
to Tehran in 1979. .
There are many similarities between Khomeini and Hasan. Like his
prototype, Khomeini lives modestly in a humble room, where, in a
country famous for luxurious carpets, he sleeps on a. shabby rug and
eats peasant food; like his famous forebear, he hides behind the banner
of religion, labels all of his opponents God's enemies, and uses his
believers to destroy them; like Hasan, Khomeini is a crafty and charis-
matic orator capable of swaying vast crowds.
While Hasan fortified his believers before battle with hashish,
Khomeini uses just a gimmick. He issues them special "keys to heaven"
-key-shaped plastic medallions that have been. blessed by him and
inscribed with Allah's name. Whoever. martyrs himself for Khomeini
while wearing his "key" is guaranteed entrance to heaven and wel-
comed into Allah's arms. Iran's mullahs, Shiite Muslim clerics, extol
martyrdom, promising direct entry into paradise to all the fallen.
Khomeini's believers, wearing their keys around their necks, fearlessly
attempt the most suicidal missions. Children without proper weapons
are routinely sent off to war against Iraq wearing the keys and shirts
proclaiming GOD IS GREAT as their only protection.
Khomeini has a perfect sense of theater and uses it shrewdly. Before
speaking to a large crowd, he will often stand silently with an out-
stretched hand for a few minutes. Then he will suddenly reach out and
touch one of his disciples, who in turn will touch the person next to him,
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36z MANSUR RAFIZADEH
who in turn will touch the next one, and the chain is continued until
everyone present has been touched. The entire mob becomes charged
with excitement as if an electric current had surged through it. The
people really feel as if they had been touched by Khomeini himself, and,
therefore, touched by God.
When drama alone isn't enough to manipulate his followers,
Khomeini stoops to outright trickery and deception.
Many thousands of boys went to war and died wearing Khomeini's
keys. As a result, the government's casualty stipend that went to their
families was creating a drain on the national treasury. In order to
meliorate this economic problem, a clergyman, with great fanfare, an-
nounced that he had had a dream about the young martyrs. He vividly
described how happy the kids were in heaven, but how embarrassed
they were that their families had been paid for their ecstasy. Many
parents were so moved by the mullah's subterfuge that they returned
the money to the government.
Another example of Khomeini's trickery, how he plays on people's
superstitions, was his resort to the "angel of the battlefield." After an
especially horrible battle, in which thousands of boys were left dead or
maimed and awaiting medical attention, a helicopter secretly landed a
well-trained actor wearing flowing white robes and a turban ingeniously
wired with lights and batteries to create a halo effect around his head.
Thus illuminated, he crossed the field of battle and, in resonant tones,
exhorted the wounded to continue their privileged mission. "My chil-
dren," he declared, "we sent you Khomeini to bring you to Islam. You
are God's servants and will go to heaven. All who die here will go to
heaven, and roses and tulips will spring up from this earth."
In sophisticated Western countries like the United States and
France, there are often stories about religious paintings that cry real
tears, and of statues with stigmata, so it is easy to understand why
weary, uneducated Iranian boys are so willing to accept religious
myths.
Khomeini always gave the appearance of rewarding his loyal fol-
lowers. He often held special gatherings for young men who had re-
turned crippled from war, and he proudly spoke to them: "Some of our
brothers are lucky-they are already in heaven. Some like you are
luckier, you have seen the 'angel of God,' and brought the message
back. I was moved when I heard it, but I send a special message to the
women of Iran. Sisters, you will be blessed if you marry these men."
Subsequently, many of these unfortunate wretches, some of whom
could not perform their husbandly duty, acquired several wives to care
for them, and therefore didn't need to live in state-funded rehabilitation
centers.
In these and similar ways, Khomeini created an arsenal of human
weapons and used them against anyone who opposed him, He even
disposed of enemies by sending men into mosques with TNT strapped
to their bodies-in effect, walking bombs.
Above all, Khomeini constantly rallied his people to destroy God's
worst enemy, America-at any cost. Over the years he targeted many
enemies, but his favorite target was always the United States. The
United States was synonymous with evil, and in his tirades he liked to
demonstrate just how evil, by pointing out the many instances of God's
wrath against the United States and, in contrast, how God had always
supported him.
Had not God after all chased the evil shah out of the palace in spite
of American support? During the aborted rescue mission, had He not
made the red sand rise up from the desert and destroy the American
helicopters? And hadn't the evil Jimmy Carter lost his election?
Khomeini constantly reinforced the notion that his wishes were identi-
cal with God's, and therefore-he, representing goodness, had to triumph
over evil America at any cost.
Because of Khomeini's determination to shatter America's image
and knowing that Beirut was filled with Shiite extremists financed by
him, I realized that the American embassy in Beirut was an obvious
terrorist target and tried to warn the CIA. The agents dismissed the
idea. "Don't be silly," they said. "We have barricades, platoons of
guards, radio control. It's impossible to penetrate. You give Khomeini
too much credit." They refused to believe me. We continued to argue
back and forth. I was adamant. "You don't understand," I said. "They
don't care about their lives. They don't mind dying. They'll do it."
Finally, in desperation, I told them another cautionary tale. They were
relieved that I was going to amuse them. At least they could eat and
drink.
"A man came out of his house one day dressed for hunting, carry-
ing his gun, wearing a cartridge belt with extra ammunition, carry-
ing food and water. He was well equipped. His neighbor came out
and asked, 'Where are you going?'
'Lion hunting.'
'Oh? How much ammunition do you have?'
'Fifty or sixty rounds.'
'What will you do when you see a lion?'
'Shoot it.'
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'What if two come at you from the same direction?'
'Kill them both.'
'What if you are then attacked by two coming from the left and
two from the right at the same time?'
'I'll climb a tree.'
'What if there is a lion guarding the base of the tree?'
'I'll shoot it, and then climb the tree.'
'What if more come and climb atop the body to reach you?'
'I'll shoot them, too.'
'And if you run out of ammunition?'
'I'll use my bayonet to kill them.'
'And if it bends?'
'What! Why are you giving me such a hard time? Whose side
are you on-the lion's or mine?' "
They laughed, but they did not see how the story applied to them.
Then, on April 18, 1983, a dozen men, wired with explosives and
mesmerized by their fanaticism, shot their way through the embassy's
checkpoints, stormed the compound buildings, and blew up both the
buildings and themselves.
On October 23, 1983, as if one horrible lesson in Beirut was not
enough, the CIA tragically learned that it had underestimated the
enemy again. The barracks near Beirut's airport that had become home
to several hundred U.S. Marines, Ronald Reagan's token of earnest-
ness to the status quo in war-torn Lebanon, and which the CIA had
believed to be even more secure than the embassy, was blown up and
253 Americans were killed and 75 were wounded. The terrorists had
used an almost identical modus operandi: Young guerrillas in a truck
loaded with explosives penetrated the checkpoints and, smiling trium-
phantly, hit the target.
I was baffled by American behavior even though I understood they
wanted to keep religious fundamentalists ("Green Belts") in power
against communism. "How could [you] give arms to this maniac,
Khomeini?" I asked. "When you arm Khomeini," I told the CIA, "you
are not just arming Iran against Iraq or American citizens, you are
arming him against humanity."
From 1982 to 1986, the United States' behavior toward Iran be-
came extremely schizoid. The Reagan administration was supplying
Iraq with anti-Khomeini intelligence and demanding that the FBI ar-
rest anyone in the United States discovered selling arms to Iran. Simul-
taneously, the government was covertly arming Khomeini's regime. In
addition, it was supplying these arms knowing that Khomeini was
developing sophisticated terrorist training camps throughout Iran.
In this instance, as in others I know of, the CIA always blamed
incompetence on other countries but never did it admit to its own.
Whenever the Agency's competence was questioned, or when it was
confronted with defeat, it hid behind an elaborate smokescreen by
saying it couldn't give further information because of national secu-
rity.
The CIA's past was filled with anomalies. Had the CIA foreseen
that the shah would fall? It did not: In 1978 the CIA's Department of
Analysis predicted that the shah would stay in power another twenty
years. The CIA was so consistently ineffective that it could not protect
William Buckley, its own station chief in Beirut, who was kidnapped
on March 16, 1984, by Shiite extremists and later murdered.
William Buckley was subjected to unbelievable torture and untold
agony for many months. He was forced to tell everything he knew about
the CIA, its structure and operation. One of the instruments of torture
they used was an electric samovar. The samovar was bound by a belt
across the small of his back. When he refused to talk, they heated the
samovar and when he began to. talk, they would remove it. There was
no way Buckley could keep from speaking. His photograph, which was
periodically distributed at various intervals duringliis captivity,'is the
portrait of a man in hell.
One of his tormentors reported to Khomeini that after a prolonged
session with the samovar, Buckley was thrown into a dark, dank base-
ment where he was left whimpering in pain to die alone like an animal.
It took two and a half days.
Buckley was a direct victim of CIA misjudgment and incompe-
tence. This raises important security questions. As chief of station,
Buckley was in charge of other CIA agents, who worked under him as
case officers, code experts, and otherwise. But far more significant was
the fact that he knew the names of all the Lebanese agents and spies,
and he knew the identities of his colleagues throughout the Middle
East. In addition to knowing their identities, he was also privy to their
policies, needs, and goals, and to the CIA's chief objectives in the
Middle East.
When a man in Buckley's position is kidnapped, tortured, and then
dies, one can only imagine how much information may have fallen into
enemy hands. If the press had been responsible for leaking even a small
part of what this man undoubtedly was forced to tell, it would have
been pilloried for a breach of security of such enormous proportions
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that anyone connected with the disclosure would have gone to jail. This
episode was especially humiliating for the CIA because, after all the
major inroads the agents had claimed to have made into the Khomeini
regime with arms sales, they were unable to secure Buckley's release.
In September 1981, eight months after the American hostages were
freed in Tehran, William J. Casey, the director of the CIA, met with
President Reagan and proposed selling arms to Iran. The reasons Casey
gave were that this would enable the United States to gather intelligence
inside of Iran, to initiate contact with the Iranian Army, and to discover
Iran's military deficiencies.
It was at the same meeting that Casey also proposed the plan that
would later bring General Oveissi and me such personal grief. Casey
would fund the opposition groups in exile and determine their capabili-
ties. He would request the names of their network members in Iran and
offer this information to Khomeini in order to instigate a relationship.
President Reagan agreed and signed an executive order in September
1981. Thereafter, the arms were taken from Israel's stockpile, sent to
Iran, and later replaced by the United States.
. But in spite of this, Reagan failed to make any inroads with funda-
mentalist Iran. By 1984 there were new hostages in Beirut.
In 1985, when Reagan was savoring his election to a second term
and enjoying the height of his popularity, he turned again to his friends
in the CIA. President Reagan, with his White House cronies Meese,
Bush, Casey, and McFarlane, decided to take a more direct approach.
They bypassed the House and the Senate and, trusting the CIA, offered
Khomeini a more straightforward deal-arms for hostages. Reagan's
stance, however, for the benefit of the American public was quite differ-
ent from his secret position.
In his January 20, 1981, inauguration speech, he stated:
Let terrorists beware that when the rules of international behavior
are violated, our policies will be one of swift and effective retribu-
tion. We hear it said we live in an era of limit to our powers. Well,
let it be understood, there are limits to our patience.
Throughout the 1981 to 1986 negotiations with Khomeini, and
from 1985 to 1986 during the arms-hostage negotiations, the White
House never sought Middle Eastern advice from America's vast pool
of scholars and political strategists, nor did it go to the State Depart-
ment. Secretary of State George P. Shultz was kept unaware ofRea-
gan's secret negotiations, but his department was dragged unwittingly
into the scheme because the CIA never represented itself to Iran as
such. Instead, the agents masqueraded as officers of the State Depart-
ment throughout their dealings with the Iranians:
In December 1986, at the public congressional `hearings, Shultz
disclosed that the United States ambassador to Lebanon, John Kelly,
had bypassed the secretary of state to conduct negotiations for the
release of American hostages in Beirut. Ambassador Kelly had re-
ported only to the White House through a CIA, channel-namely,
George Cave, his CIA contact, who reported to Chief of Staff Donald
Regan.
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CHAPTER FORTY-FIVE
Unholy Deals
On December 12, 1983, members of the Iranian Hezbollah (Party
of God), Khomeini's only official political party in Iran, followed a
familiar pattern. They piled one-quarter ton of explosives intQ a truck
and crashed into the United States embassy compound in Kuwait.
Shortly thereafter, five other bombs also exploded at United States,
French, and Kuwaiti targets around the city. In all, six people were
killed and sixty-three were wounded. Seventeen Shiites were arrested
and put in Kuwaiti prisons.
Khomeini was frustrated by his inability to obtain their release, but
instead-of retaliating directly against the Kuwaitis, who were Muslim,
he decided to take seventeen hostages from the international commu-
nity. The initial plan, was to use these hostages to obtain the freedom
of the seventeen Shiite terrorists, but that was never >accom pli shed.
Since 1984 Khomeini has never allowed the number of his hostages
kept in Beirut to fall below seventeen. A careful examination of.how
many hostages have. been taken would show that although sometimes
there have been more than seventeen at one time, -there have never been
less than seventeen. Periodically, the Khomeini government would
barter one or more of the hostages for arms, but it would always make
sure additional people were immediately taken as replacements. It is no
coincidence that in June 1985, when a TWA .plane was hijacked to
Beirut, the hijackers made sure that they held their captives for exactly
seventeen days. After seventeen days, the terrorists released their hos-
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tages; they never meant to keep them longer. By releasing them exactly
after seventeen days, they were sending a hopeful message to the Shiite
terrorists' inner circles in Iran and Lebanon, and especially to the
seventeen prisoners in Kuwait, that they were not forgotten.
The most shocking thing about this whole episode is that the CIA,
the head of an entire intelligence community of some 100,000 individu-
als, and with a billion-dollar budget, failed to discover this correlation.
It is the CIA's function to gather reliable intelligence and offer it as an
aid to America's policymakers. If the CIA had been diligent and discov-
ered Khomeini's true motives for taking hostages after March 1984,
perhaps President Reagan might have chosen to take a different direc-
tion in his negotiations.
In 1985, because new American hostages had been taken in Beirut,
President Reagan again turned to his trusted friends in the CIA. Wil-
liam Casey continued to present the CIA's case to the president's
closest White House aides. They were the only ones privy to the pro-
posed Iranian strategy. These included Chief of Staff Donald Regan,
Vice-President George Bush, Attorney General Edwin Meese III, and
the head of the National Security Council, Robert C. McFarlane. The
bulk of the cadre was made up of retired men such as former CIA officer
George Cave and retired Air Force Major General Richard V. Secord.
The reason ex-officials were in the cadre was that in the event of
disclosure, the administration would be able to say that these men were
not currently in the employ of the United States government. In this
manner, the White House would be able to conduct foreign policy
privately. With no official standing, this team answered to no one but
President Reagan, Donald Regan, and William Casey.
Donald Regan personally briefed President Reagan regularly and
brought the other members of the cadre to see him frequently. This was
very unusual because the group was composed of members of the lower
echelons of government, and Regan, therefore, was bypassing their
superiors by arranging direct access to the president. This unorthodox
procedure enabled the cadre to tell the Iranians, "We have direct
contact with the president."
In essence, the Reagan/Bush/Regan/Casey cadre had carte
blanche to use government services and operational money without
restraint. These men were entrusted with setting up secret negotiations
with Iran in order to provide that country with arms in its war with
Iraq. This way it was hoped to establish a dialogue and position of trust
with Iran, and thereby to negotiate release of the hostages in Beirut.
From January 1985 through the summer, the president's cadre
sought intermediary links to Khomeini's command, among them sev-
eral known arms dealers who claimed to be well connected to the
Khomeini government. Up to this time the CIA had very few, if any,
useful contacts with members of Khomeini's regime.
In July 1985 McFarlane discussed with President Reagan the sale
of weapons to Iran through arms dealers in exchange for the release of
American hostages. The president's cadre was faced with a dilemma.
Each of these dealers had sold arms to Iran in the past. Each claimed
to have connections with the most powerful people in the regime.
In 1980 Manucher Ghorbanifar, an Iranian arms dealer, had ap-
proached the CIA claiming that he could buy the fifty-two hostages'
freedom. The CIA contacted me to establish his credibility. I knew
Ghorbanifar and believed him to be bad news. In Persian Ghorbanifar
means "glorious sacrifice," and I firmly advised them, "As his name
implies, Ghorbanifar would sacrifice anything for money. Stay away
from him!"
In 1985, in spite of earlier warnings from other sources as well as
from me, Ghorbanifar was selected. He and his group promised the
cadre that they would be put in touch with authorities in Khomeini's
regime. -
Who were these authorities? They were high-government. officials
and businessmen, Ghorbanifar assured the cadre.
At a meeting in the summer of 1985 with the president's cadre,
Ghorbanifar's group arrogantly pointed out that since 1980 the United
States' efforts to negotiate with Iran, directly and indirectly; through
Middle Eastern and European countries as well as through Japanese
and Chinese channels, had proved futile. The CIA officers were indig-
nant and interpreted these remarks as an assault on their competence.
The dealers then offered to demonstrate their credibility. They
would provide the most powerful and in members of the revolu-
tionary government, as opposed to the ineffectual underlings the CIA
had dealt with previously, to meet with the cadre in several European
capitals.
The CIA representatives said sarcastically, "Then do it!"
Subsequently, in London and other European capitals, several
dozen Iranian officials and businessmen were lavishly entertained at the
arms dealers' expense.
How did the death merchants effect these informal negotiations? At
the outset, they contacted influential friends in Tehran, many of them
mullahs in Khomeini's theocratic regime, and suggested that they plead
illness or other personal reasons for going to Europe. This all-expenses-
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paid holiday to Europe was a welcome respite from the austerities of
the Khomeini era. Thereafter, some mullahs dressed in flowing robes
were observed departing Tehran aboard an intercontinental jet, and,
later still, arriving in Europe dressed in well-tailored suits, bereft of any
hint of their fundamentalist religious vocation.
There they were pampered by the arms dealers, at first spending a
few nights with high-priced prostitutes and enjoying themselves. After
all, there was nothing wrong with buying non-Muslim women with
non-Muslim money. One of the clergymen even asked if the girl he was
with had a brother. Instantly, a boy was presented for his pleasure.
Meanwhile, the mullahs and other Khomeini allies had been
coached by their friends, the arms dealers, on how to behave. They were
to indicate to the cadre's representatives that they had overriding influ-
ence with the Khomeini regime. They were to make promises of cooper-
at;on with the Reagan administration and also make it "crystal clear"
that they were doing this out of friendship with Ghorbanifar and would
work only through him.
For several months these negotiations and indulgences went on,
solely to effect a connection between Washington and Tehran. Bit by
bit, the door seemed to open. But this apparent success became the
source of endless bickering among the various cadre members. The
CIA representative, George Cave, took credit for the CIA, the NSC
representative, Robert McFarlane, took credit for the White House,
and on top of it all, the military hero of the piece, a young marine
lieutenant colonel, Oliver L. North, an NSC member, took credit for
himself. Even Ghorbanifar took credit. But where was the proof of
their success? Finally, who was going to bell the cat and travel to
Tehran?
Notwithstanding advice from all members of the cadre that no one
should go to Tehran alone, for fear of being taken hostage, Colonel
North volunteered to travel solo to Tehran. In December 1985 he flew
there with Ghorbanifar and was received with great hospitality by his
new friends, his companions at the arms dealers' European parties. For
several days he was introduced to important people in the Khomeini
government. Indeed, so earnest were his friends' efforts to make him
happy and comfortable that specially prepared Western-style foods
were served to him in his personal suite at the former Tehran Hilton.
And on his safe return-everyone being relieved that he had not
.been taken hostage on his unauthorized mission-Colonel North re-
ported directly to the president.
The president, Chief of Staff Donald Regan, and William Casey
received North at the White House, where the colonel had an office.
They were delighted with North's account of his progress. Nothing
loath to accept the plaudits due him, Colonel North pointed out that
up to this time the administration had negotiated with the Khomeini
regime only through third countries, and with unsatisfactory results,
yet this mission, the first direct one with Tehran since 1980, had been
a signal success.
Colonel North was smug about his success and frequently bragged
to his new Iranian friends and other cadre members about how highly
President Reagan regarded him. It was reported to me that North went
so far as to tell the Iranian contacts, who knew the CIA did not like
him and feared its interference, not to worry because he could go see
the president anytime he wanted. To my knowledge North met pri-
vately with President Reagan at least nineteen times. North's arrogant
attitude left him open to CIA jealousy and hostility.
Several additional solo trips were made by Colonel North and
Ghorbanifar. Acting on North's intelligence, without further consulta-
tion, the president and all the members of his cadre decided to deal
directly with the Khomeini regime through Ghorbanifar and eliminate
third-country intermediaries.
Although numerous shipments, including-508 TOW antitank mis-
siles, had been shipped from Israel's stockpile to Tehran, only one
hostage, the Reverend Benjamin Weir, was released on September 14,
1985. The Iranians always contended that the shipments were incor-
rect, incomplete, or composed of inferior materials. Complying with
their requirements, the United States tried to rectify the problems by
correcting the inaccuracies.
On December 4, 1985, Robert C. McFarlane resigned from his post
as head of the National Security Council, and was succeeded by Vice-
Admiral John M. Poindexter.
McFarlane immediately became the president's secret representa-
tive in the arms deals, now ensuring, since McFarlane was no longer
an official of the Reagan administration, the privatization of this mis-
sion.
On December 8, in his new role, McFarlane traveled to London
with Colonel North and delivered the last order to the intermediaries
brokering weapons sales to Iran. He announced, to David Kimche, the
director general of Israel's Foreign Ministry, Manucher Ghorbanifar,
and Yaacov Nimrodi, an Israeli arms dealer, that "by presidential
decree, the weapons shipments are finished." With this untrue state-
ment, McFarlane eliminated Israel and Ghorbanifar from the arms
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deals, thereby clearing the way for private negotiations between the
White House and Khomeini's regime.
Later in December, Amiram Nir, an Israeli government counterter-
rorist expert, went to Washington and said, "The Iranians had sweet-
ened the terms. Just one more shipment and they would release the five
hostages in Lebanon and open ties to moderates in Tehran."
By January 1986 the National Security Council was composed
mostly of military men. The CIA was constantly looking for flaws in
their operations and had never trusted Ghorbanifar. When the entire
cadre, along with Ghorbanifar, came to Washington in January to
discuss and evaluate the Iranian situation, a senior CIA officer insisted
that Ghorbanifar take a polygraph test. Ghorbanifar submitted to the
test but failed. The CIA reported, "He lied about everything but his
name."
Anxious to make North look bad and get rid of Ghorbanifar once
and for all, the CIA informed Casey that Ghorbanifar had failed. the
polygraph test. Casey told the president of the test results and its
possible ramifications. He warned the president that "Ghorbanifar's
information. could be a deception to impress us." According to intelli-
gence regulations, anyone who fails this test can no longer be consid-
ered suitable to serve in the intelligence community. At the same time,
North had promised Ghorbanifar that he would go to the president and
bail him out. The end result was that the president told Casey to waive
the results. This further infuriated the CIA.
On January 7, 1986, President Reagan met in the Oval Office with
Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, Regan, Meese, and Poindexter.
Shultz and Weinberger argued strongly against selling arms to Iran, but
Casey and Poindexter argued in favor of resuming the program with
direct arms shipments. The president decided to keep the channels
open.
On January 17, 1986, at the urging of Vice-President George Bush,
Casey, and Poindexter, President Reagan signed a secret intelligence
"Finding"" that authorized the United States to sell arms directly to
Iran. This document was designed to legitimize retroactively previous
arms shipments. The president's executive order for an intelligence
Finding only authorized the CIA to engage in that particular covert
action. Therefore, any National Security Council involvement was il-
legal. However, the NSC not only played a major role in the Iran
initiative, it also usurped the CIA's power. In reality, the cadre, headed
by Donald Regan, was running this operation and keeping Shultz and
Weinberger in the dark.
Later in January in London, the. president's men informed their
Iranian contacts of the president's decision to sell arms directly to Iran.
These direct shipments, although having been approved by executive
order, were still to be made in the utmost secrecy because Congress had
not been informed. The cadre representatives briefed Ghorbanifar and
his associates about the executive order, and demanded their assurances
that this information would be known only to them. Their reason:
Communists were all over-in the Senate, in the House, in the press.
The group insisted that if word got out, the whole deal would be
damaged. And they added a warning to the Iranian contacts-if they
leaked the information they would kill them.
When Khomeini was told the story of "Communists all
over ...," he said mockingly, "So that's how .a real democracy works!"
He then instructed his government: "Get .the arms; we will defeat Iraq
and then we'll chase the Americans out of the Middle East with their
own weapons." He also instructed his aides to release hostages in return
for the arms. "But," he added, "take two new hostages for every one
released."
In the first direct shipment of weapons on February 16, 1986, to
Iran, the Pentagon transferred one thousand TOW antitank missiles,
more than the United States' entire yearly production. The CIA flew
them to Tel Aviv, and the Israelis flew them to Tehran.
In Tehran meanwhile, cadre representatives, in return for promises
of friendlier relations, agreed to furnish Khomeini additional sophis-
ticated American arms to use in Iran's long war with Iraq. This was
done at a time when the United States was providing satellite spy
intelligence to Iraq concerning the military movements of Iran.
By 1986 the Americans had worn a path to Prime Minister Mir
Hossein Mousavi's door and were now involved in direct negotiations
with the Iranian government. They believed that they were making
inroads by telling Prime Minister Mousavi that America was prepared
to recognize the Islamic Republic of Iran, and that the United States
was not going to interfere with Iran's internal affairs. The White House
cadre representatives kept trying to reassure the.prime minister that all
President Reagan was interested in was aiding the Iranian government
in its war with Iraq and protecting it from communism.
A secondary purpose of these contacts, later much publicized, was
to establish better communications between Washington and moderate
elements in Tehran, the better to facilitate friendly relations between
the two countries in the event of Khomeini's demise or downfall. But
in fact, not one of the factions contacted was moderate.
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In addition to negotiations with the office of the prime minister,
Robert McFarlane, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, and George Cave
with Ghorbanifar, helped develop a contingency plan. Ghorbanifar was
responsible for initiating contact with Ayatollah H. A. Montazeri's
faction. Montazeri, a supposed moderate, is Khomeini's second-in-
command and heir apparent, by the will of the Supreme Jurist,
Khomeini, who has been mandated to rule not only Iran and Muslims
but the whole world.
In several meetings inside and outside Iran, the administration
emissaries assured Montazeri's aides that they would approve of his
succession because of his popularity and powerful position, and they
wanted to be friends. They promised that the United States would
recognize his government and continue to support it directly with
money and arms. They explained that the United States had no choice
but to do so, as at that point Iran would be bankrupt and still mired
in an endless war with Iraq.
The individual members of the cadre emphasized that America was
most concerned about Iran's precarious borders. At one point, they
even went so far as to feed the Iranians deliberate misinformation about
Soviet intelligence, saying that the Soviets had imminent plans to in-
vade Iran. Above all, they approved of Montazeri as Iran's best defense
against Communist subversion.
When all of the cajoling and friendly overtures ended, the adminis-
tration representatives got down to their real motives, and said, "This
is what our president wants. We have proven our sincerity. You have
received the arms. Now prove your sincerity-free the remaining hos-
tages!"
In return, Montazeri's aides, with some members of the cadre as
well as Ghorbanifar, expressed friendship toward America and its pres-
ident. They also appealed to President Reagan for emergency assistance
for the nation's leading theological school in Qom, which they de-
scribed as a vital bastion against internal communism. This assistance
was paid over on the spot by Ghorbanifar.
At this level, the cadre assumed that Prime Minister Mousavi,
always loyal to Khomeini, was keeping him informed about what was
transpiring between the two nations. But the members of the cadre
miscalculated their relationship with Montazeri when they told him to
keep their contact with him secret.
Montazeri, Khomeini's heir apparent, was not going to risk his
standing and play with fire. Knowing that the Israelis were helping the
United States in efforts to release the hostages, he said to an aide,
"When a cake is baked by America and decorated by Israel-I'm
certainly not going to eat it!" Montazeri did not hesitate to report all
of his dealings with the president's secret group to Khomeini.
During this same period, the CIA members of the cadre, led by
George Cave, privately wanted to oust Ghorbanifar and overshadow
North. They told their fellow members that they should not take any
chances by supporting only Montazeri, but pursue another powerful
Iranian leader as well-Speaker of the House A. H. Rafsanjani. Even
though there was some dissension among them over the issue, George
Cave went ahead with this plan. The CIA immediately began to negoti-
ate with Rafsanjani's aides, and through them, made what they believed
to be great headway with none other than Rafsanjani's son, Mehdi.
The CIA assured Rafsanjani that the United States government
regarded him as the best possible successor to Khomeini. They also
advised him that they would seek to develop Rafsanjani as a hero to
the Iranian people in their struggle with Iraq. They would do so by
providing American arms to win the war against Iraq. Rafsanjani's son
was invited to Washington, where he was promised that the United
States would send-Iran an additional five hundred TOW missiles.
The idea was for the Americans to capitalize on their knowledge
that Rafsanjani wanted to usurp Montazeri''s.position. They assured
Rafsanjani that they would do everything 'in their power to get rid of
Montazeri.
Rafsanjani shrewdly mistrusted the CIA cadre's intentions and
dutifully reported all of their meetings to Khomeini. Khomeini, always
the master puppeteer, didn't tell Rafsanjani that Montazeri had also
been in touch with the Americans and, conversely, he didn't inform
Montazeri that Rafsanjani had also had meetings with the Americans.
When my source told me this, I knew Khomeini was playing a Persian
game.
In April 1986 the president's secret emissaries, with Ghorbanifar's
help, began what they believed to be successful negotiations directly
with the Iranian government. On May 15, 1986, President Reagan
approved a mission to Iran, sending his representative, Robert McFar-
lane, to get four hostages released and bring William Buckley's body
home. But the Iranians did not go along with the release of all four
hostages at once. They proposed that when the United States sent them
the sophisticated arms they had requested, they would then release two
hostages. If these arms were satisfactory, they would renegotiate for the
remaining two hostages and Buckley's body.
McFarlane and Ghorbanifar agreed. Before heading for Tehran,
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Say: "O ye that
Stand on Judaism!
If ye think that ye
Are friends to God,
To the exclusion of
[Other] men, then express
Your desire for Death,
If ye are truthful!"
McFarlane had asked Ghorbanifar to guarantee that two of the hos-
tages be released shortly after they landed. He felt this would give the
Iranians ample time to check the arms that McFarlane's airplane car-
ried. Meanwhile, CIA representative George Cave, who spoke a little
Persian, made a secret call to Prime Minister Mousavi from the United
States. In a coded conversation in Persian, Cave told him, "I am calling
from the bank and the president sends his regards. We will be happy
if you send us one promissory note right away." George Cave had
deliberately undermined McFarlane and Ghorbanifar's deal calling for
two hostages. At this point Ghorbanifar's relations with Mousavi began
to deteriorate.
The prime minister called Ghorbanifar in a rage. "Now I want you
to tell me," he screamed, "what are you trying to pull? The Americans
want one hostage released and you want two. Aren't you tired of
suckering up to them?"
On July 8, 1986, President Reagan said:
There can be no place on earth left where it is safe for these
monsters to rest, or train, or practice their cruel and deadly skills.
We must act together or unilaterally if necessary to insure that
terrorists have no sanctuary anywhere.
On May 23, 1986, only forty-six days before this statement was
made, McFarlane, North, and other members of the presidential cadre
boarded a plane loaded with spare parts for Hawk antiaircraft-missile
batteries, and took off for Tehran-the world's primary sanctuary for
international terrorism. This was destined to become a history-making
journey.
In addition to a cargo of sophisticated weapons, they brought with
them special presents from President Reagan destined for Khomeini-
a cake, a verse, a verbal message, an autographed Bible, and two Colt
pistols. The cake was not only decorated with a chocolate key, an exact
replica of the key-shaped medallions that Khomeini's men wear into
battle, but it was also meant to represent the American government's
desire to open up the door for direct negotiation with Iran. The verbal
message from President Reagan stated that he swore on the enclosed
Bible that he should be trusted, that the United States now understood
how genuine the revolution was, and how eagerly we sought the Iranian
people's friendship.
The verses from the Koran were from Sura Jumu'a LXII:
But never will they
Express their desire
[For Death], because of
The [deeds] their hands
Have sent on before them!
And God knows well
Those that do wrong!
The Iranian officials who received this odd assortment of gifts sent
on behalf of the president of the United States were taken aback by what
they could only interpret as his insensitivity or stupidity.
The autographed Bible was considered most offensive by the Mus-
lims, who viewed the defacing of a holy book (be it the Old Testament,
the New Testament, or the Torah, etc.) as sacrilegious. And because
Persian literature had always portrayed Jesus as a prophet who ad-
vocated "the turning of the other cheek" and nonviolence, they were
baffled by the contradiction of a Christian. president sending both a
Bible and Colt pistols. But they felt the most ludicrous aspect of these
gifts was the selection of verses from the Koran that admonished the
Jews for calling themselves chosen to the exclusion of other men. How
could the White House send this quotation as it message to Khomeini
and simultaneously honor U.S. friendship with Israel? The end result
of the cadre's "gift bearing" was that Iranian officials now believed that
President Reagan was either a fool or trying to fool them.
Instead of using their own identities and nationalities, the presi-
dent's men traveled with Irish passports created by the Forging Office
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MANSUR RAFIZADEH
of the CIA. For instance, the forged passport of Robert C. McFarlane
showed he had been traveling under the name of Sean Devlin. If these
men were truly attempting to open the door for direct Iranian-Ameri-
can negotiations, why did they fear using their own passports? It seems
as if almost all of their behavior was unique. It is possibly the first time
in American history that representatives of the president of the United
States have gone on a mission using illegal passports without the knowl-
edge of the State Department or Congress.
Upon their arrival in Tehran, McFarlane, North, Cave, and the rest
went to their suites on the fifteenth floor of the former Tehran Hilton.
McFarlane began to listen to his radio for news of the freed hostages.
Since there was no announcement, he believed that the Iranians might
have needed more time to check the weapons. He kept listening, but no
news of their release was reported.
"What am I supposed to tell President Reagan?" McFarlane que-
ried. "Two hostages were supposed to be released the minute we
landed."
Ghorbanifar's men replied, "Don't get so excited. Wait a little
longer. Don't get your blood pressure up. They need time to check the
arms!"
McFarlane said loudly, "I have explicit instructions from the presi-
dent that if the four hostages and William Buckley's body are not
released, we are to leave immediately."
(The Khomeini government had taken advantage of the extremely
elaborate surveillance equipment that the shah installed throughout the
fifteenth floor of the hotel. Every room was bugged.)
After realizing their mission had failed and believing the suite was
bugged, the Americans went out on the balcony-which, unbeknownst
to them, was also bugged-and commiserated with one another.
McFarlane, very upset, was still listening to the radio in the futile hope
that the other hostages would be released. North was weeping. Cave
was philosophical. He said, "I don't need this. I have money in the
stock market."
After the Americans had cooled their heels in Tehran for four and
a half days, McFarlane was furious. He stated that they had delivered
the arms, brought the cake and other symbols of America's good inten-
tions; they had been promised the release of at least two hostages upon
delivery of the arms. So, since the hostages hadn't been freed, they were
leaving immediately.
The president's emissaries took off on an empty plane. They
couldn't very well demand the return of their arms delivery because the
Iranians had already unloaded the plane; but they did leave behind a
hefty telephone tab at the hotel amounting to $4,800. When the Iranian
government was informed of this, they said, "Don't worry. They'll be
back."
The primary reason they had made this trip was to ensure the
hostages' release before the November 1986 election. McFarlane didn't
realize that the hostages' fate was controlled only by Khomeini, who
would never permit the number of people.taken to fall below seventeen.
In addition to continuing the courtship of the Khomeini-Montazeri
groups from May 1986 to October 1986, the president's men intensified
their concentration on wooing Rafsanjani through his son, Mehdi.
They briefed Mehdi's and Rafsanjani 's aides about attempts made by
an Iranian-Soviet network to prevent Rafsanjani from gaining leader-
ship. They told them about the United States' plans .to do everything
possible to squelch the Soviets' efforts and make Rafsanjani Khomeini's
successor. In return for its support, America wanted only the hostages'
freedom.
In their desire to keep the channels open for additional arms ship-
ments, the Iranians released the Reverend Lawrence Martin Jenco, a
Roman Catholic priest, on July 26, 1986. He had ben held captive for
more than eighteen months.
Between July 1986 and October 1986, Cave and McFarlane con-
tinued to negotiate with Rafsanjani for the rest of the hostages' free-
dom. In return, the Americans assured Rafsanjani that a final shipment
of five hundred TOW antitank missiles would be sent to the government
of Iran. They also reiterated their pleas that all of the hostages be
released before the November 1986 election. "It means a lot to the
president," they said.
A shipment of arms was sent on October 29, the last to go via Israel;
and immediately after that, another hostage, David Jacobsen, was
released. However, the American government, in a futile hope that it
would be able to announce the freedom ;of all the hostages, delayed
making Jacobsen's release public for five days until November 2. When
word leaked out that he had been freed earlier; the White House said
it had held back the news for "security reasons."
In the summer of 1986, George Cave and his. CIA colleagues de-
cided to terminate Ghorbanifar's services and negotiate future arms
contracts directly with the Iranian government. In this way they could
get even with Ghorbanifar, who had slighted them and tarnished
the CIA's image. In spite of vehement opposition from Colonel North
and from Ghorbanifar himself, who had been principally responsible
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WITNESS 383
arms that were earmarked for Afghanistan are being sent to the contras.
The funds for Afghanistan and the money from the Iran arms sales are
commingled. Who on earth can separate these funds? To top it off, your
president, who has launched such a massive antidrug campaign with his
wife, Nancy, leading off all the fanfare, doesn't know that the planes
that delivered the arms carried loads of drugs back from Central Amer-
ica."
"You must be joking!" I said. "How are they shipping drugs on
United States Air Force planes?"
He derided me. "You have been there too long! You have begun to
think like one of them. Am I speaking Greek? I didn't say the air force.
The drug runners have their own airline. It is called Southern Air
Transport and is based in Miami. It used to be entirely owned by the
CIA, but now it is also owned by General Secord, Albert Hakim, and
others. Both of these men are part of the president's mission." Exas-
perated, he said, "If the president's men ever tell the truth, about how
much wrong has been done and how often the law has been broken, the
for the negotiations with Ayatollah Montazeri, the CIA representatives
informed A. H. Rafsanjani, speaker of the house, that Ghorbanifar
was out.
By this time, of course, the CIA men had placed themselves in
opposition to North, whom they had regarded all along as a self-serving
soldier of fortune. In particular, they resented North's direct access to
President Reagan, who in fact eventually pronounced Lieutenant Colo-
nel North "our national hero.
Washington, deep down, wanted to help Montazeri. The CIA rep-
resentatives of the cadre were not specifically opposed to Montazeri, but
they were opposed to Colonel North, Montazeri's man. And as the
consensus in Washington formed around Montazeri, the CIA members
decided to torpedo the negotiations rather than see North get the credit.
In order to do so, they counseled dismissing Ghorbanifar with whom
North had worked so closely and apparently successfully, charging that
Ghorbanifar had been a double agent.
In the fall of 1986, everyone was happy. Montazeri and Rafsanjani
each had a piece of the arms deal, the arms dealers continued to do a
brisk business, the other members of the presidential cadre, as well as
the Iranians involved, were all receiving money under the table, and the
president's men were stashing funds in numerous secret accounts in
Switzerland, Ireland, and other countries. Money was the lubricant that
kept it all in motion and there was plenty of it.
In August 1986, while I was trying to extricate myself from CIA and
Justice Department harassment, a source reported to me that the rumor
mills in Iranian government circles were buzzing and churning out
story after story about the arms dealings. So many different astronomi-
cal numbers were being bandied about-thousands of millions of dol-
lars-that they had become meaningless-this Swiss bank account, that
Swiss bank, secret missions!
My curiosity aroused, I asked, "What are these rumors?"
He answered, "This White House secret mission to Iran has turned
into an octopus. Rumor is, the arms dealers have been grossly over-
charging the Iranian government and the dealers are claiming that the
United States government is marking up the arms to begin with." He
elaborated. "Those fools in the White House are funneling these profits
to the contras in Central America and the Republican campaign fund."
I said to him, "At least the money didn't wind up in their pockets."
"Who knows?" my source said. "Of all the money that the Saudi
government and the other heads of states have contributed for the
contras-most of it-millions, has disappeared." He continued. "The
doorpost will shudder."
After I hung up, I tried to digest what he had just reported. I was
again being accused of being naive, not devious enogh, and too West-
ernized. I thought about all. of the allegations against the Reagan gov-
ernment. The cadre members had flagrantly overcharged Iran, sent
money to the contras when Congress had voted against it, put money
in secret bank accounts, and engaged in South American. drug smug-
gling. If such extensive corruption and illegal activities were indeed
being committed by President Reagan's "private government," then
these crimes would hang like an albatross around President Reagan's
neck.
The accusations that my source reported to me in August 1986 were
confirmed in November and December 1986 by various United States
authorities, including the Justice Department. The money is in the
Swiss bank accounts of the president's men-Secord, North, and others
whose names are still unknown. The arms.-dealing cadre claim some of
the money went to the contras. When Southern Air, owned by General
Secord, Albert Hakim, and the CIA, delivered arms to the contras in
Nicaragua, my source said that the empty planes stopped in Panama
and loaded up on drugs before heading to the United States. Despite
my incredulity at my source's information, he was justified again when
The New York Times, on January 20 and 3.0, 1987, featured articles on
the contras in which it found that "American flight crews covertly
ferrying arms to the rebels returned to the United States by way of
i
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Panama, a major drug transshipment center, to pick up cocaine and
marijuana." The New York Times quoted a drug-enforcement official
as saying, "It was not one of the big smuggling rings anyway." It was
like saying, "She's a little bit pregnant."
The American people have been faced with layers of lies. As of this
writing in February 1987, the Justice Department is investigating the
money that went to the Republican campaign fund. During all of their
illegal acts, the president's men traveled on forged passports. Though
President Reagan ordered a swift investigation of the scandal, his most
trusted colleagues have taken the Fifth Amendment.
When it was disclosed that President Reagan had sent a Bible to
Khomeini, the White House denied it. Later on, the White House stated
if the Bible was sent, the president was unaware of it. On January 28,
1987, when Tehran showed the press the handwritten verse and signa-
ture of the president on the Bible, dated October 3, 1986, the White
House said it was not the president's idea but Colonel North's to send
the Bible.
In February 1987, as reported by The New York Times, McFarlane
said that he didn't know Ghorbanifar's background, and if he had
known what he knows now, he would never have suggested the United
States get involved with him. McFarlane apparently had forgotten a
great deal, including the fact that in January 1986 Ghorbanifar went
under the polygraph and failed. The president waived the results, even
though the CIA was against it.
This all reminds me of a Persian story:
A thief was caught in a garden with a big sack of pumpkins. The
owner saw him and asked what he was doing in his garden. The
thief said, "You won't believe it but a strong wind came and blew
me here. I'm not lying." The owner said, "Granted. But who picked
all the pumpkins?" The thief said because the wind was so strong
and was going to carry him off to some other place, he had to hold
on to the pumpkins and they came off. "I'm not lying," he said. The
owner again said, "Granted. But can you tell me how the pumpkins
got into your sack?" The thief cried, "I have the very same question!
How did the pumpkins get into my sack?"
What happened to the money? This is a question that the whole
world is asking, and perhaps that is why Secord, North, and Poindexter
are taking the Fifth Amendment.
In the summer of 1986, Reagan's emissaries were congratulating
themselves that their mission had been an unalloyed success--Iran was
theirs. The proof was the return of some of the hostages taken in
Lebanon. In a mood to celebrate, they got together for a party in
Western Europe, and euphorically laid down their plans for future
adventures. With Iran now in America's pocket, they would move
farther east-to Afghanistan to solve that country's problems, too, and
with the leftover, laundered proceeds of their Middle East operations,
finally they would heat up America's secret war in Central America.
But the CIA, angered and disgusted by ,Ghorbanifar from the very
beginning of their relationship, decided to depict the Ghorbanifar
group as crooks, incompetents or both. In the fall of 1986, the CIA
members of the cadre moved independently to sell to the Iranian gov-
ernment, through Rafsanjani, arms for up to 60 percent less than
previous weapons sold by Ghorbanifar and other dealers.
The damage was done. Back in Tehran, the government accused all
the arms dealers, especially Ghorbanifar, of gross overcharging. The
arms dealers had lied to the government and it wanted its money back.
Ghorbanifar's colleaguess, were furious at having been betrayed by
their American collaborators. Among themselves, the dealers spoke of
revenge and said, "Hadn't we freed some of the Hostages before their
damn election? Opened the door for negotiations? Made them money
and even pimped for them? We are the ones who actually put the
American hand in the Iranian hand, and this is the end result! How
right Colonel North was. He always said the CIA would screw us in
the end. Let's give it to them!"
Ghorbanifar's group retaliated by blowing the cover of President
Reagan's cadre. First, they contacted Montazeri's aides and told them
that the Americans had been in touch with Rafsanjani. all along, and
were against him and Khomeini. They advised Montazeri's aides to
move quickly and go public. The aides issued a press release, describing
in detail negotiations between the Americans and Rafsanjani-. an-
nouncing to the world that the United States was exchanging arms for
American hostages. This was picked up by the Beirut weekly magazine
Al Shiraa, and ultimately by all the news services.
It was a bombshell! In an instant, Colonel North's personal triumph
exploded into an international disaster whose reverberations were felt
around the world. Colonel North emerged as a controversial and mys-
terious figure. He was at once summarily fired and praised as a hero by
President Reagan.
Khomeini, ever the sly fox, seized the moment to reiterate his old
warning. "How many times have I said, 'Don't get involved with the
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"Great Satan"-the evil United States?' " Khomeini's government de-
manded immediate retribution. Montazeri's aides were disgusted by
America's behavior, Rafsanjani arrested close to five hundred of Mon-
tazeri's followers and put them in jail, and Rafsanjani's son, Mehdi, was
forced to flee the country. The arms dealers demanded payment in full
for their services.
The Reagan administration, hounded by the press, was forced to
confront an incipient crisis.
When the United States began flirting with Ayatollah Khomeini,
it had hostages only in Lebanon and none in Iran. In February 1987
three have been released, one has died; there are new hostages in Iran
and more in Lebanon than at the beginning of the White House-
Khomeini romance.
Reagan's administration claimed that it sought a dialogue with
moderates in the Khomeini government, but unfortunately there are
few moderate voices in the Khomeini regime. Even so, if there was a
possibility of establishing contact with moderates, the cadre was too
inept and amateurish to discover who they were, or to deal successfully
with them. As soon as Khomeini took control, he methodically elimi-
nated all the moderate political and religious voices and subjected Iran
to the most barbaric aspects of Islamic judicial practices. The only
people the cadre was ever in contact with were Khomeini's prime
minister, Mousavi, Rafsanjani, his speaker of the House, and Mon-
tazeri, his second-in-command. Certainly none of them represents a
moderate point of view.
These "moderates" were disciples of a man who, after several so-
phisticated arms shipments reached Iran for which the CIA demanded
William Buckley's return, asked his aides, "Did you receive the whole
order?" When an aide answered, "No, just a part of it," Khomeini
replied, laughing, "Well, send them a portion of William Buckley-one
arm and one leg."
Above all, Vice-President Bush was officially informed while in
Israel in the summer of 1986 that arms were sent to Iran for the radical
groups, not the moderates, if there were any. If the vice-president
informed the president of the nonexistence of moderates what logical
reason did the president have to continue the arms? If Bush did not
inform the president, what logical reason did Bush have? But the naked
truth is that the president, the vice-president, and their men were aware
that they were sending arms to the disciples of Khomeini.
In early November 1986 a source reported that Khomeini was very
angry about the picture the world press was being given of his regime,
and felt that the remarks made by the American government-about Iran
were insulting and degrading. Khomeini s aides threatened the presi
dent's men that they would go public and reveal the incriminating
details of America's clandestine dealings unless Ronald Reagan made
the following statements to the American people:
1. There was never an exchange between Iran and the United States
government of arms for hostages.
2. The Iranian revolution was a genuine one.
3. The Iranian government is not a part of world terrorist activity.
As I listened in amazement, my source went on to say that White
House intermediaries had replied to these threats by assuring the Irani-
ans that they would pass the message along to the president.
I was astounded. I couldn't believe that the White House would
even listen to this obvious blackmail, just to mollify Khomeini's newly
wounded sensibilities. Khomeini was like a wise serpent-he struck at
just the right time.
On November 13, 1986, President Reagan addressed the nation in
a live broadcast from the Oval Office. His talk included the following
statements:
I know you've been reading, seeing and hearing a lot of stories the
past several days attributed to Danish sailors, unnamed observers
at Italian ports.... Well, now you're going to hear the facts from
a White House source, and you know my name....
For 18 months now we have had underway a secret diplomatic
initiative with Iran....
The United States has not made concessions to those who hold our
people captive in Lebanon. And we will not. The United States has
not swapped boatloads or planeloads of American weapons for the
return of American hostages. And we will not....
During the course of our secret discussions, I authorized the trans-
fer of small amounts of defensive weapons and spare parts for
defensive systems to Iran....
i
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