IN '40S AND '50S, NUCLEAR ARMS STILL SEEN USABLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000605110012-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: July 22, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
/ Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000605110012-9
11RTICL= 1PP?iI{]?
0),I PAaY,~~_
WASHINGTON POST
22 July 1985
In '40s and 'SOs, Nuclear Arms Still Seen
Second of four articles
to be published this week
By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staf(Writer
In the years that followed the explosion of
atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
1945, conventional military thinking was
turned on its head.
Often unbeknownst to its citizens, the U.S.
government in the late 1940s and 1950s re-
peatedly considered using nuclear weapons.
The three American military services com-
peted fiercely to come up with possible ways
to exploit the newly discovered power of the
atom.
The postwar years also saw the beginning
of arms control discussions (they were unsuc-
cessful) and of what was subsequently called
"nuclear diplomacy," the threat to use- atomic
weapons as a means of ending aU.S.-Soviet
crisis.
Perhaps the greatest difference, at least in.
attitudes, between that era and the present
was the then common assumption that use of
nuclear weapons again was virtually inevita-
ble.
The enemy against which they would be
used, of course; was the Soviet Union. Imme-
diately after Hiroshima, the Soviets embarked
THE BOMB
DAWNING OF NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY
on a scientific crusade to build a bomb of their
own.
At the United Nations, the United States
made an effort to persuade the Soviets to get
along without their own bomb, but that "Ba-
ruch Plan" got nowhere. Joseph Stalin was
apparently bent on matching the Americans in
this new category of weaponry, which seemed
to promise so much power-diplomatic as well
as military-to the countries that possessed
it.
McGeorge Bundy, national security affairs
adviser under President John F. Kennedy, said
in a recent interview that his research in writ-
ing ahistory of the atomic age showed that
Stalin was "absolutely determined" to get the
bomb because he believed that "the Americans
have upset the equilibrium" and that he
needed an "equalizer:'
In the United States, military men and Usable
many scientists who had worked on the Man-
hattan Project fully expected the next war to
be nuclear, and set to-work preparing for it.
Hans Bethe, for example, said in a 1979
interview that he and other scientists who
worked on the bomb in 1945 at Los Alamos,
N.M., thought atomic weapons would be used
-again .within 10 years. Like some others;
13ethe disliked the idea of the bomb, but he
turned from private life in 1950 to help develop the
Hydrogen bomb, because he was fearful that Soviet de-
velopment of such a weapon would put the United
States at a disadvantage.
~; The first atomic bombs were based on the principle
-rof fission, creating explosive energy by splitting atoms
apart. In the much more powerful hydrogen bomb;, the
=explosion is created by fusion, in which atoms are
forced together, triggered by a small fission explosion.
~~forecast Eerily on Target
It would be wrong to suggest that the early years of
the nuclear era were dominated by ignorance. In fact,
many officials. and military men did understand the im-
plications of the new weapons. .
Even before the first bomb was dropped on Hiroshi-
ma, some-Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, for .
example-forecast many of the diplomatic problems
with the Soviet Union that nuclear weapons would cre-
ate, and that we are living with today.
One striking example was a paper delivered in Jan-
uary 1946, five months after Japan surrendered, by the
Army chief of staff, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, to the
joint chiefs.
Buried until recently in the National Archives, the
formerly "top secret" document outlined the Army's
views on the "effect of atomic weapons on national se-
curity." It eerily. predicted almost all that has occurred
in the succeeding 39 years.
Eisenhower's Army staff reasoned:
If within five years there were no international
agreement to prevent other nations from, getting the
bomb, including unlimited on-site inspections, "the
v~iorid would head directly into an atomic weapons ar-
Itiaments race with the assurance of supremacy ...for
tQe nation winning that race."
The United States, which at that time had a nuclear
monopoly, faced "true peril" in "a world of unrestricted
atomic bombs."
"With atomic weapons, a nation must be ready to
strike the first blow if needed. The first blow or series
of first blows may be the last " (In today's parlance, that
marked the birth of the "first strike" doctrine.)
Continued
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000605110012-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000605110012-9
0(~ .
An "atomic war will very likely be a war of surprise
and surely one of national survival," but not "a pro-
longed one."
"Two disciplined nations each using the bomb can
destroy each other's entire national life, yet neither
could invade the other with large armed forces in the
face of atomic bombs used on the convoys, beachheads
or airheads. It makes war unendurable. Its very exis-
tence should make war unthinkable."
' "Defense against the atomic bomb will always be in-
~dequate .... [T]he only defense which we can yet
foresee is to stop the carrying vehicle."
"If we were ruthlessly realistic" we would not permit
any foreign power, other than an ally, "to make or pos-
less atomic weapons."
' "If such a country started to make atomic weapons,
~e would destroy its capacity to make them before it
had progressed far enough to threaten us." (But that
vYas a course that, Eisenhower's staff acknowledged,
tfie U.S. government would not pursue.)
The paper concluded, "If there are to be atomic
weapons in the world, we must have the best, the big-
gest and the most ...."
"All possible methods of delivery of atomic weapons,
including aircraft, guided missiles, rockets and subma-
r~nes should be studied and developed."
Sending Nuclear Signals
n The first excursions into nuclear diplomacy were
donducted~by Harry S Truman.
In 1948, the Soviet Union closed down land access to
Berlin and Truman instituted an airlift. Faced with the
prospect that Allied planes could be harassed, Truman
briefly considered the use of nuclear weapons-al-
though the United States then had fewer than five op-
erational bombs, according to official records.
On July 15, 1948, Truman's National Security Coun-
cil (NSC) decided to send 60 B29s to Great Britain. The
decision to send "atomic bombers" was given wide pub-
licity, creating the impression that Truman was prepar-
~g to use nuclear weapons.
However, no nuclear bombs were sent, and it has
since been learned that the planes were not equipped to
Earry them.
? A year later, however, after the crisis eased, nuclear-
capable bombers were sent to Britain. And in 1950, at
the request of the Pentagon, Truman agreed to send
tihe first non-nuclear components for the bombs to Brit-
ain and later to bases in the Pacific, so they would be
ready for use on short notice.
The superpower situation changed sharply in 1949.
On~ept. 3, a . '. RB29 airplane, fl in from Ja an to
as a on a regu ar mte igence ig t. picked up radio- ~
active ebr~s m the air off the Soviet Kamchatka
Peninsula. When matched with later samples it con-
#irmed that the Soviets had ex loded an atomic device.
ne immediate consequence was Truman's decision
~o proceed with the hydrogen bomb.
After the Korean War began on June 25, 1950, Tru-
man had one more fling with nuclear diplomacy.
According to declassified NSC papers, the president
agreed that nuclear. weapons would be used only if the
dotal defeat of the United States and other U.N: forces
were imminent. And although the Chinese almost drove
the Americans into the sea, Truman never turned to
nuclear bombs.
One reason, according to Paul H. Nitze, who was on
the State Department's policy planning staff then, was
the paucity of available bombs. If nuclear weapons had
been used in Korea, Nitze said recently, the United
States would have been left with too few nuclear bombs
to deter the Soviet Union in Europe.
In the fall of 1952 however, Truman a proved a
Central Intelligence Agency 'disc ormation program
j to s rea t o rumor t at ecause o t e rest enUa
campai n can i ate isen ower rom~se to o to o-
res to-sett e t e war t o ruman administration was
going to a orce to use atomic ombs not 'ust in Ko-
rea ut m ma, accor mg to a ootnote to notes from
a ept. meetm .
s a new y inaugurate president in 1953, Eisenhow-
er was frustrated by the lack of progress in the Korean
peace negotiations. He pressed his military advisers to
come up with ways to use nuclear weapons if the talks
ended and fighting resumed against a large Chinese-
North Korean force.
During a Feb. 3, 1953, NSC meeting, Eisenhower
said, "We should consider using tactical atomic eapons
on the Kaesong area, which provided a good target for
this type ofiweapon," according to published notes from
the meeting.
When Gen. Hot .Vandenber ,Air Force chief of
staff, su este usin nuc ear
om s a amst air bases
in ma,.t en-
Greta
o
tale o n
otter
u es
and his brother,
IA
irector Allen W
Dulles
ob-
jected. They feared that this could brink the Soviets
into the war and that U.S. forces would make a better
target or a ov~et nuc ear attac
A mont ater, en. Lawton Collins, Army chief of
staff, reported that he was "very skeptical about the
value of using atomic weapons tactically in Korea. The
communists are dug into positions in depth over a front
of 150 miles," he said. He pointed out that a nuclear
test "last week proved that men could be very close to
the explosion and not be hurt if they are well dug
in . "
After a presentation by the joint chiefs in May, which
reported "no good strategic targets within Korea,"
notes from a May 13, 1953, NSC session said,. "the mil-
itary were most anxious to make use of atomic weapons
...outside Korea."
I In a recent interview, former president Richard M.
Nixon, who attended those sessions as vice president,
said Eisenhower was sending private messages to the
North Koreans through John Foster Dulles, threatening
use of nuclear weapons. That type of nuclear diploma-
cy, Nixon contended, brought a satisfactory end to the
Korean War.
Bundy said he believed that Eisenhower had led his
military commanders to think they would get approval
to use nuclear weapons. "He didn't mind conveying the
message that it could happen," Bundy said, "but he nev-
er came anywhere near facing the judgment in Korea,
or indeed anywhere else, that this was something he
was prepared to order."
~Slttlt9d
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000605110012-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000605110012-9
s 'More Cavalier' Attitude Army soldiers who took part in at least one of those ~.
The Eisenhower years saw the biggest growth ever
in the nation's stockpile of nuclear weapons, from
roughly ? 1,000 warheads when Eisenhower arrived at
the White House to 18,000 when he left.
It was a time when the three services fought each
other for more of the annual production of nuclear ma-
terials and encouraged scientists to develop weapons
suitable for their respective use.
It was also a period when the United States started
putting nuclear-capable weapons and their warheads
around the world-particularly in countries near the
Soviet Union-and undertook regular exercises of nu-
clear-capable forces, such as airborne bomber alerts,
that would seem frightening and provocative today.
Dr. Harold Agnew, a physicist who worked on the
Manhattan Project and later headed the Los Alamos
National Laboratory, said recently that nuclear scien-
tists and military planners "were much more cavalier
about the use of weapons then. Fortunately, they were
never used."
When Eisenhower became president, he believed
that atomic bombs were a major advance over earlier
weapons and had to be integrated into the military
forces. He also felt that their deployment could save
money hY providing defense without the need for the
United States to maintain large standing forces.
Eisenhower translated his belief into a national se-
curity directive that declared that, for budgetary and
contingency planning, the military services were to con-
sider nuclear weapons to be like conventional weapons.
This led to the purchase of so-called dual-capable sys-
tems, such as artillery pieces that could fire convention-
al and nuclear shells.
Thus, nuclear versions of conventional weapons be-
came available for use in a crisis, albeit with a require-
ment of presidential approval in each case. Some weap-
ons acquired under that authority-such as nuclear
warheads for antiaircraft weapons-were deployed
during Eisenhower's administration with "predelegated
authority."
That meant theater commanders could authorize
their use without specific presidential approval.
The Korean War sent the Army rushing to develop
tactical nuclear weapons-small devices that troops
could use on the battlefield. When the Army engineers
asked for a weapon, for example, Los Alamos $cientists
took aHiroshima-type bomb and "put it in a can,' ac-
cording to Agnew, thus producing the first atomic de-
molition mine. The device, which, on paper, could have
closed off the three possible invasion routes from east-
ern to central Europe, has never been accepted by the
Western Europeans for use on their territory.
Nonetheless, hundreds were built, and the Army to-
day is attempting to develop a lightweight model that
could be carried by an individual soldier.
Artillerymen pushed development of a nuclear shell
and the so-called atomic cannon. When sent to Europe,
they were so unwieldy that they regularly got stuck in
the narrow streets of Western European towns. Lack-
ing treads, however, they could not be used off main
roadways.
~~
To prove that they could operate on a nuclear bat-
tlefield;'the Army successfully pushed the Atomic En-
ergy Commission (AEC) to allow it to hold exercises at
the Nevada nuclear test site in conjunction with weap-
ons tests at a time when the long-term effects of radi-
ation on humans were not known.
abnormally high number of cases of leukemia.
Services' Own Nuclear Race
Interservice rivalry was intense during the 1950s.
One of its victims was Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, for-
mer director of the Manahattan Project.
In the fall of 1951, Oppenheimer took part in Project
Vista, atop-secret study of the defense of Western Eu-
ropeand possible uses of nuclear weapons there. In that
capacity, he and other scientists met for several days in
France with Eisenhower, who was then supreme Allied
commander of the NATO forces.
At a later government hearing, Oppenheimer said
that they discussed "anti-air use of atomic weapons,
[andJ their use to put out enemy airfields." He. added
that Eisenhower urged the scientists "to make atomic
weapons available."
With the help of Oppenheimer's chapter in the final
report on the use of nuclear weapons in a NATO war,
the Army was able to win Pentagon and later congres-
sional support for the development of a large number of
battlefield nuclear weapons.
Later, according to other testimony at government
hearings, Air Force officials were critical of Oppenhei-
mer's assistance to the Army. According to Dr. Her-
bert York, a physicist who headed the Lawrence Liver-
more Laboratory in California and later worked at the
Pentagon, the Air Force told its civilian scientists not to
use Oppenheimer as a consultant and to keep classified
information from him because of the help he had given
the Army.
The Air Force also forced a reopening, of charges
that Oppenheimer's earlier associations with American.
Communist officials and sympathizers represented a
"security risk." (Those associations had been investi-
gafed prior to the Manhattan Project.) The Eisenhower
administration ordered a security hearing in 1954,
which resulted in the withdrawal of Oppenheimer's se-
curity clearance.
The Navy, too, was eager to join the competition.
For example, after learning in 1953 that President Ei-:
senhower was searching for a way to use nuclear weap-.
ons in Korea should the truce break, the Navy trained
four pilots to fly nuclear-equipped fighter bombers off
the USS Lake Champlain.
With specially designed nuclear vaults, the carrier
sailed across the Pacific and waited off Korea for the
order that never came, according to one of the four
pilots, who recently resigned from the Navy as a flag--
ranked officer.
In 1958, when Eisenhower again asked about using:
atomic weapons in case the United States had to defend;
the islands of Quemoy and Matsu from aCommunist=
Chinese invasion, the three services developed compet-
ing plans. '_
The whole idea was killed when then-Secretary of:_
State Dulles finally got estimates from the AEC that, if:
executed, the military's plans could kill 8 million Chin-
ese on the mainland.
U.S. nuclear Matador missiles, capable of dotting then
mainland, were subsequently stationed on Taiwan.
In the late 1950s, the Strategic Air Command kept~?
some of its large, B36 bombers on airborne alert, a few
carrying the Mark 1? hydrogen bomb with an explosive:
force of 20 megatons, 1,000 times more powerful than:
the Hiroshima bomb.
Continued
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000605110012-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000605110012-~
Not to be outdone,. the Navy flew fighter-bombersF
armed with nuclear weapons off its carriers in the Pam
c~ is towar ma, or enn t em to veer rom t eF
coastline at the last moment so avy mte Bence co
lectors could read how the Chinese radar reacted. R
During the mid-1950s, .America's NATO allied
wanted more control 'over the U.S. nuclear weapons:
.within their borders-only the British had their own':
weapons then.. The Western European allies and they
United States. discussed ancY eventually rejected the2
idea of having multinational crews serve on vessels carte
rying nuclear weapons.- After that, the United States:
began selling nuclear-capable artillery pieces, missilesM
and bombs to its allies. "
By the end of the decade, West German fighter
bombers carrying American nuclear weapons remained
on alert on West German runways. Only a U.S. guard"`
prevented them from being used without the required;'
authori2ation from a U.S. president.
In the late 1950s, the Eisenhower administration also
sold 15 Jupiter intermediate-range missiles, which car-?
ried a nuclear warhead, to Turkey. Beginning in 1960;
the missiles were installed near the Soviet border, with,;
U.S. troops at those sites controlling the warheads.
Bromley Smith, who worked ? for the NSC at than
time, said recently, "They were there for the purpose of
reassuring the Turks that the Russians would not come
across their border." Smith said he also had been told
that the Jupiters were installed "because we had so
many of them that they were coming out of our ears
and this was a good place to get rid of them:'
Walter Pincus works part time as a reporter for-The
Washington Past and part time as a producer/writer for
CBS News Much ~f the reporting for this series was
done in preparing a CBS documentary on the history of
nuclear weapons, "Hiroshima.Plus 40 Years and Still
Counting," to be broadcast nationally on July 31.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000605110012-9