STANDING AT THE BRINK OF NUCLEAR WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000605110011-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: July 25, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
' Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000605110011-0
11RTI CLE
ON PAGE
Stan ' at the Brunk of l~~.clear War
U.S. Planned to Attach Soviet Targets in Cuba,. Then to Invacde
By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Stall Writer
On Saturday, Oct. 27, 1962, one
day before Nikita Khrushchev of-
fered to withdraw Soviet nuclear
missiles from Cuba, President John
F. Kennedy approved plans for air
strikes on Soviet nuclear missile
sites, air bases and Cuban-Soviet
antiaircraft installations on the is-
land, all to take place the following.
Monday. Kennedy and his col-
leagues on the "Executive Commit .
tee" (Excom) of top officials con-
vened to hap~le the ~igis decided
that an invasion of Cam would fol-
low, according to participants in the
decision and notes from meetings in
the White House. In other words,
the Cuban missile crisis-long re-
garded as the most dangerous mo-
ment in the nuclear age-brought
the two superpowers considerably
closer to the brink of war than has
WASHINGTON POST
25 July 1985
duffing one of the first White House
meetings on the crisis.
viet air defer es on Cuba
t}rhtCh had shot down ~.. :: 2
to 'teconnaissance plane on . t. ,
19G2, were growing stronger. daily,
makin it increasin 1 more difficult
to carry out a strike agamst a o-
viet nuctear~orcez or even keep
trac- o it.
"The actions that we took on Sat-
urday," McNamara said in a recent
interview, "were actions that could
have led, might have led to a Soviet .
military response.
"I recall leaving the White House
that night," he added,, "walking
through the gardens of the White
House to my car to drive. back to
the Pentagon and wondering_ ,~
ever see another Saturday,aigliG: _:~~!
According to ~ the recently' rie~!
leased notes of that White ..Horse
Under the NATO treaty; a Soviet
attack on Turkey would have led to
"general war," according to Brom-
ley Smith, who at the time was ex-
ecutive director of the National Se-
curity Council.
Kenned also dela ed retaliation
forte owmn o t ~e 2 des ite
is previous order that the United
a es wou estroy any uban-
a~s~ antaircraft der that hrt a
..p are.
Finally, Kennedy authorized his
brother Robert to give his private
assurance to the Soviet Union-
through its ambassador in Washing-
ton, Anatoliy Dobrynin-that if
Khrushchev took the missiles out of
Cuba, the United States would re-
spond by removing its missiles from .
Turkey, but that a commitment was .
needed the next day.. The newly
available notes of the Oct::.27 meet- . ,
ing provide the first `official. confir-
mation thafi, a: deal of -,this type was.. .
offered tiff .1Vloscow. ~ '
Some tpp,? officials objected to _
that. deal;' :. but Vice President "
Lyndoq 13:-;Johnson asked (accord-
ing to' the':nbtes of the meeting):
meeting;Oct.:_27;: McNamara told '
~s, rS~fss~~~(zi Turktay, the;5oviets
THE Bo~6
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
,. .. .
might attack ;Turkey:.,if the Soviets' ;
do attack ~ahe' Turks; . we must _r~;
spond in the NATO area."' '' __ ;i~'N
previously been reported: For al- neat' also aur.nunzeu acu~us uc-
most an entire day, the United signed to send peaceful signals to
States was actively preparing for Khrushchev, who had started the
military attacks on Soviet installs- ,Cuban crisis as an obvious gamble
and was signaling that he wanted to
tions in Cuba. end it without fighting. Some schol-
' At the time U.S, intelligence ars have concluded that both
believed that 20 of 24 medrum- Khrushchev's decision to put the
ran a Soviet nuclear-warhead mis- missiles in Cuba and his desire to
sites on t e islan were operational, get out of the ensuing crisis had
with more becomipg combat-read Provoked opposition inside the rul-
ing Soviet politburo.
.eac a . Kennedy ordered the immediate
The Jomt Chiefs of Staff had told disarming of the 15 U.S. Jupiter
the Excom that the planned bomb- nuclear-warhead missiles in Tur-
ing raid could not be expected to key, a step designed to show the
destroy all the operational Soviet Soviets that the United States
missiles on Cuba, so the United would not use those missiles (each
States faced the possibility that at with enough range to reach many
least one missile could be launched, Soviet cities) and, at the same time,
causing "almost certain ...chaos in to prevent their unintended use
part of the East Coast" of the Unit- should the Soviets attempt to attack
ed'States, as then-Defense Secre- and seize them.
tart' Robert S. McNamara put it
"Why we. are, not prepared to trade
the withdrawal of U.S. missiles
from Turkey for the withdrawal of
the Soviet missiles from Cuba, if we
were prepared to give up the use of
U.S. missiles in Turkey?"
Khrushchev accepted Kennedy's
proposal; the planned U.S. attacks
on Cuba did not take place. Imple-
mentation of the U.S. side of the
bargain depended on the Soviets
"remaining silent on the deal," ac-
cording to McGeorge Bundy, who
was Kennedy's national security
affairs adviser and a participant in
the discussions. "They kept quiet,
and the missiles came out," Bundy
said during a recentinterview,the
first time he has spoken publicly
about the deal that was struck.to
end the crisis.
Brinksmanship Lessons
The Cuban missile crisis brought
the superpowers closer to nuclear
Continued
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war than at any time in the 40 years
since Hiroshima. In drawing back
from the edge, Washington and
Moscow learned lessons that ap-
pear to have governed their mili-
tary behavior since:
^ Neither side will allow the other
to have an obvious nuclear advan-
tage for very long.
In the 1950s, the United States'
under President Dwight D. Eisen-
hower not only expanded its lead
over the Soviet Union in numbers of
nuclear weapons but began deploy-
ing U.S. intermediate-range nuclear
missiles in NATO countries. Jupiter
missiles based in Turkey across
from the Soviet Union were consid-
ered by the Soviets as first-strike
weapons just minutes away from
key Soviet cities against which no
defense was possible.
U.S. officials had sent the mis-
siles to Turkey as defensive weap-
ons to deter.a Soviet invasion but
without much thought as to how the
Soviets would perceive them.. In the
midst of the Cuban crisis, however,
the Soviet point of view was recog-
nized. In a White House meeting on
Oct. 16, 1962, Gen. Maxwell D.
Taylor, then-chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, described the U.S.
missiles in Turkey as a "pistol point-
ed at the head" of the Soviet Union,
which would be imitated if Khrush-
chev succeeded: irr putting his mss-..
siles in Cuba, which may well have
been why Khrushchev wanted to
put them there.
The Cuban missile crisis gave
both sides an opportunity to look
seriously at the consequences of
launching even some of the limited
nuclear forces available at that
time. What they saw convinced
each side that any superpower nu-
clear exchange had to be avoided.
McNamara said recently that one
Soviet missile in 1962 "directed at
Miami or New York or even Wash-
ington, might have killed a million
or 2 million people. That was some-
thing that a responsible president
didn't wish to expose his nation to
and was determined not to do."
^ Any direct military confrontation
between the superpowers can.
quickly escalate to a nuclear show-
down.-
That is what happened in Cuba;
and it sobered both sides. Since the
1962 missile crisis the superpowers
have repeatedly taken steps to
-avoid situations that could lead to
American and Soviet military forces
confronting each other, even as the
two nations have continued to com-
pete, politically and militarily.
In those areas where U.S. and
Soviet forces_ both operate, private
agreements are worked out to pre-
vent any military attacks on each
other. When they do occur, systems
exist for preventing them from get-
ting out of hand. For example, the
two nations' navies have worked
.out rules of the road so their sea
forces that exercise near each other
.cast avoid incidents.
'? Sb the Cubar4 crisis was a turning
point in the nuclear age. It also pro-
vides the only detailed case of the
type of crisis that, many fear, might
lead to a nuclear war. Newly discov-
ered documents and interviews
with participants have provided im-
portant details on the worst-and
last-case of a major, direct nucle-
ar confrontation between Moscow
and Washington.
Seeking a Naclear Balance
Kennedy took office in 1961 de-
termined to correct the "missile
gap" between the United States and
the Soviet Union.
As McNamara said recently,
however, after the Eisenhower mil-
itary buildup "there wasn't any mis-
sile gap .. ,rather there was a gap
but it was the reverse of what had
been thought." .The United States
had 6,000 nuclear weapons, roughly
5,500 more weapons than the So-
viet Union.
Khrushchev and his military lead-
ers were as determined as Stalin
had been 15 years earlier to reach a
nuclear balance between the Soviet
Union and the United States. After
Khrushchev's June 1961 meeting
with Kennedy in Vienna-a meet-
ing that apparently convinced
Khrushchev that the young Amer-
ican president could be pushed
around-the Soviet leader decided
to move more quickly.
"After the Vienna meeting," Ar-
kady Shevchenko,the highestrank-
ing Soviet diplomat to defect to the
United States, said in a recent in-
terview, "I heard Khrushchev him-
self telling that Kennedy is a weak
president. He is not a strong man
.. He will not dare to do some-
thing ... to stop what the Soviets
are doing."
Shevchenko said it was cheaper
and easier for the Soviets to deploy
medium-range SS4 missiles in Cuba
than to build and deploy new inter-
continental-range missiles inside
the Soviet Union.
At the time of the missile crisis,
the United States had 129 intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
based on American soil; 144 mis-
siles on Polaris submarines, and
1,300 strategic bombers. The So-
viets had 44 ICBMs; 97 missiles on
submarines and 155 strategic
bombers, according to recently pub-
lished documents.
One month before the United
States etermine t at t e oviets
had installed missiles in u a, a
entral me iRence Qency esti-
mate ; continded that"" the' .Soviets
wouid~ not undertake such'an action
because it was too rest a risk.
The nZ'I~~irector John Mc one,
however, d~i_sa~r_ee~d with his a en-
c s conclusion and to d the pres-
s ent t at a e~eve rus c ev
a een stren t emn i e as-
tro s a~rcra t an an defenses so
muc tat it meant a wou rmg
m rmss es. '
~u U~ ? hotos clearl show-
ing tie' start o ~t-viet medium- .
ran a m~ss~ a u[s bons m 'u a
mar t e morntnA o ct. 16~
1~ _.
Kennedy .qufckly. called a meeting
of his top aides, including Secretary
of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of
the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon,
Attorney General Robert F. Ken-
nedy, Vice President John"son,
McNamara, Bundy, Taylor and
Bromley Smith of the NSC staff as
note-taker.
This group, the Exeom, bean
the first of a series of session to
deal with the crisis. The first day's
meetings on Oct. 16 were secretly
taped by Kennedy. The transcript
of the discussions that day-more
than three hours long-was recent-
ly made public with some deletions
for national security reasons. It has
never before been publicized.
It illustrates more than any single
document the questions, doubts and
conflicting ideas that run through
the minds of public leaders in the
nuclear age at a time of crisis.
The first option seized upon was
a surgical air strike to destroy the
Soviet missiles in Cuba.
Defense Secretary McNamara
stressed initially that analysts had
to find and target the nuclear stor-
age sites and that "if we are to con-
duct an air strike against these in-
stallations, or against any part of
Cuba, we must agree now that we
will schedule that prior to the time
these missile sites become oper-
ational ...because if they become
operational before the air strike, I
do not believe we can state we can
knock them out before they can be
launched."
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Gen. Taylor responded that it
would be difficult to determine
when the missiles were operational.
Speaking for the joint chiefs, Taylor
said his approach would be to have
"an initial pause," to get the target
picture correctly, while maintaining
secrecy over the fact that the Unit-
ed States knew the missiles were
there. Then, "virtually concurrent-
ly, an air strike against the sites
that we know of. At the same time,
naval blockade."
These would be accompanied by
reinforcement of the U.S. Navy
base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba
and evacuation of U.S. dependents
there.
Taylor also wanted mobilisation
of reserve military units but, as far
as invading the island, he warned
"that's the hardest question mili-
tarily in the whole business-one -
which we should look at very close-
ly before, we get our feet in that
deep mud in Cuba."
The idea of a blockade, which ` ?
became the first option, was not put
forward strongly by McNamara un-
til the end of the first day: That may
have been because when the idea
was first offered by Taylor, Pres-
ident Kennedy said, "I don't see
how we could prevent further [mis-
siles) from coming in by submarine
.. I mean if we let 'em blockade
the thing, they come in by subma-
rine." [In fact, large missiles could .
not be transported by sub, but no
one in the meeting brought that
technical detail to 'the president's
attention.]
Secretary of State Rusk, not sur-
prisingly stressed the international
implications of a surgical strike.
"There is no such thing, I think, as
unilateral action by the United
States ...any action we take will
greatly increase the risks of direct
action involving our other alliances
and our other forces in other parts
of the world."
He went on to offer, as a first
suggestion, that the .United States '
publicly announce the existence of i
the.~niissiles "some time this week"
and''build:up forcesao "deliver an?:
overwhelming strike at any of these
installations." In the interim Rusk
wanted "to alert our allies and Mr. ?
Khrushchev that there is utterly
serious crisis in the making here
and that Mr. Khrushchev may not
himself really understand that or
believe that at this point."
"I think," Rusk added, "we'll be
facing a situation that could ~ well
lead td_general war" and that every-
thing`ought to be done to. prevent
that before the positions of the two
superpowers got too firm.
By the time the top officials. had
made their presentations, it was
clear there were some basic dis-
agreements.
One major difference among Ken-
nedy's advisers appeared when
Bundy asked "how gravely does this
change the strategic balance?"
McNamara responded that the
joint chiefs "said substantially," and
then added: "My own personal view
is, not at all."
Kennedy then noted that Khrush-
chev was undertaking the deploy-
ment in the face of Kennedy's own
statement just?a few months earlier
that the United States would op-
pose such a move.
"They've got enough to blow us
up now anyway," the president said.
"I think it's just a question of .. .
this is a political struggle as much
as military."
Attorney General Robert Ken-
nedy,-who later in the week became
a forceful advocate for an initial
blockade of Cuba, on the first day
supported an air strike or even in-
vasion.
At one point he asked, "Could you
stick planes over [the missiles in
Cuba) until you made the announce-
ment ... to make sure that they
weren't taking any action or move-
ment?" Gen. Tayloi ?quickly re-
sponded, "I can't visualize doing it .
successfully that way." . _ .
Another early Robert Kennedy
suggestion, was whether there was.
some way to create an ibcident .ln ~ ~.
Cuba to~ permit military. action
"through Guantanamo Bay or some-
thing or whether there's some ship.
that, you know, sin)lc the Maine.
again or something" in refei-ence~to _
the action that letl~ to the Spanish
American waz.
Several times during the day,
President Kennedy questioned his
aides on why Khrushchev was. ?try-
ing to do something that clearly
could lead to nucleaz war.
At one point Taylor suggested
that Cuba "malces_ the launching
base for "short-range missiles
.agains~thea}3suted States_to.supple-
ment,::t~ir;~iathet decrepit ICBM?
systemfor example,"
A~':aaother;?p'oint, when discus-:
r sign-turned`to what Robert:';Kesi-
~.:.
Wady shouldsay to Ambassador Do-
;:` brynin: about; the missiles;: the pies=
' ident mused: "hdon't kno~t+,?whether
[Khrushchev] is aware of -what I
said .... I can't understand their
viewpoint, if they're aware of what
we said .... I don't think there's
any record of the Soviets ever mak-
ing this direct a challenge, ever, re-
ally ...since the Berlin blockade."
National security adviser Bundy
attempted to soothe him by saying
that "they made this decision, in all
probability, before you made your
statements," to which Treasury
Secretary Dillon? coldy added, they
"didn't change it" after Kennedy's
press conference.
Rusk said CIA Director McCone
ha su este some wee s ado
t t, on~t~~ r, rus ~c ev. may .
nave m? tmrta. is that he o rcl-i ws we
~ave a~ substantial nuclear superi; "
or~ty ut . e a so ows t at we
don't really hve under fear of bis
nuclear wea ons to the extent that
' ~.: e_ s to lroe under fear bf
ours. so? at we ave.- nuclear
wea ons nearby, in Tu kev and
.paces ike that.
Rusk went on that "Khrushchev
may feel that it's important for us
to learn about living under medium-
range missiles, and he's doing that
to sort of balance that."
At the afternoon- session, when
Bundy agreed with a State Depart-
ment idea that perhaps Khrushchev
might be putting the missiles in
Cuba as a ploy to later trade for
"something in Berlin, saying he'll
disarm Cuba ... if we yield some of
our interests in Berlin," President
Kennedy burst out saying: "It's just
as if we suddenly began to put a ma-
jor number of MRBMs [medium-
range ballistic missiles] in Turkey.
Now that'd be goddam dangerous, I
would think."
To which Bundy replied, "Well
we did, Mr. President," and Ken-
nedy responded, "Yeah, but that
was five years ago." [In fact, instal-
lation of the U S. Jupiters in Turkey
began in 1960, and was continuing
at the time of the Cuban crisis.]
By the end of the day, the pres-
idettt listed three options: "We're
going to take out these, uh, mis-
siles" but questions remained as to
whether there would be "a general
air strike" and "general invasion."
As the week went on, however,
the notes show that the Excom let
the air strike, which Kennedy ten-
tatively .set for Oct. 20, slip, and
moved up the blockade, which was
oublicly announced Oct. 22. 1962.
COatiwled
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along with disclosure of the Soviet
missiles in Cuba..
As the crisis unfolded over the
next five days;:.. McCone tokl...the .
xcom at t rrst::cni- es were.,:.;
,o~erationa ;; a e .pies' ent ,and;`,his
' .ships ? "; to .stop . and, , _~aliich r.: toto ~'leE
? r~,ahe end;;; if~;was determined`'
'.chat a>'nuh~ry,,confrontation with
the Soviets would be better in Cuba
than on the high seas. But when
Khrushchev accepted the deal Ken-
nedy proffered-dismantling his
missiles in return for the withdraws
al of .U.S. Jupiters from Turkey-
no confrontation was required.
In retrospect, McNamara and
Bundy said recently, it was secrecy
that made possible the final reso-
lution: secrecy allowed days of dis=
cussion and analysis, and then a
back-channel offer of a confidential
deal to end'the crisis.
".We avoided tremendous brow
haha of selling out our European
friends" by withdrawing the sup=
posedly Turkish-owned Jupiter mis=
siles, Bundy said recently, "but we
did i!L keeping it' secret. Not alto-
gether a' happy thing to do. It has
costs, playing secret diplomacy."
McNamara observed in a recent
interview that in today's world, it_
would be difficult to maintain the
kind of secrecy that worked so well
in 1962, when the world really did
go to the nuclear brink.
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