WEINBERGER URGES BUILDUP OVER SOVIET 'VIOLATIONS'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000605110004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 18, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605110004-8
WASHINGTON POST
18 November 1985
Weinberger. Improved relations depend on "vigorous response by us."
Weinberger Urges Buildup
Over Soviet `Violations'
By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer
In the presummit report on
Soviet 'violations of arms-con-
trol agreements that accompa-
nied his now-controversial let-
ter to President Reagan, De-
fense Secretary Caspar W.
Weinberger argued that "the
key to improved U.S.-Soviet
relations is a vigorous response
by us to Soviet treaty viola-.
tions."
Weinberger warned the pres-
ident that "current and future
Soviet violations [of arms-con-
trol agreements] pose real risks
to our security and to the pro-
cess of arms control itself." This
threat, he said, could only be
overcome with a vigorous U.S.
defense program and forceful
responses to all perceived So-
viet violations.
Acknowledging that his ad-
vice to seek better relations
with Moscow by being tougher
than in the past "may appear
paradoxical," Weinberger
added:
"It is no more [paradoxical]
than the observation that the
key to domestic peace is a po-
lice force ready to exert itself to
preserve the law."
The general contents of
Weinberger's findings on Soviet
violations were reported last
week.
The 11-page, unclassified
summary of the detailed study
was made. available to The
Washington Post with the cover
letter that has caused a stir. It
contains a number of new
points, as well as a glimpse of
the passion behind Weinber-
ger's views.
They represent the feelings
of many administration officials
that meetings like this week's in
Geneva will not overcome the pro-
found differences between the su-
perpowers.
The cover letter included a warn-
ing from. Weinberger to Reagan not
to agree to continued adherence to
provisions of the SALT II arms-con-
trol agreement and not to accept
limits on research, -development
and testing of a new strategic de-
fense against incoming missiles.
Publication of the letter Saturday
led a senior White House official to
describe it as an attempt to "sab-
otage" the summit.
Secretary of State George P.
Shultz said yesterday that Reagan
will mention past Soviet violations
in his conversations with Gorba-
chev, which are scheduled to begin
Tuesday.
In his report, Weinberger dis-
closed that a new CIA study of the
phased-array radar the Soviet
Union is building in- Siberia "con-
firms that the Krasnoyarsk radar is
not suited for the purposes claimed
for it by the Soviets but is indeed an
early-warning radar."
The Soviets have claimed that
the radar was intended to track ob-
jects in space. The 1972 ABM trea-
ty requires that early-warning ra-
dars be located on the periphery of
each superpower, not in the heart
land, as is the facility near Krasno-
yarsk.
The defense secretary said the
construction of this radar together
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605110004-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605110004-8
with "a variety of other violations
... Of the [1972] ABM treaty" rep-
resent a systematic pattern sug-
gesting that the Soviets may be
preparing a defense against incom-
ing ballistic missiles that "could
have a profound impact on our stra-
tegic deterrent forces.
"Even a probable territorial de-
fense," Weinberger wrote, "would
require us to increase the number
of our offensive forces and their
ability to penetrate Soviet defenses
to assure that our operational plans
could be executed."
This is the same reasoning used
by many critics of Reagan's Stra-
tetgic Defense Initiative, who argue
that if the United States proceeds
toward development of a defense,
the Soviets will inevitably respond
by adding to their offensive
forces-or at least by refusing to
reduce them-to improve their
ability.to counter the U.S. defense.
Repeatedly in his executive sum-
mary, Weinberger argued that "fail-
ure to object or respond to viola-
tions will invite further violations,"
as he put it at one point. And he
made no effort to hide the strength
of his feelings.
For example, Weinberger dis-
missed the body set up to monitor
compliance with past agreements,
the Standing Consultative Commis.
sion in Geneva, as."a diplomatic car-
pet under which Soviet violations
have been continuously swept, an
Orwellian memory-hole into which
.our concerns have been dumped
like yeterday's trash."
Weinberger compared those who
close their eyes to Soviet violations
to appeasers in the 1930s who al-
lowed Adolf Hitler to rearm Ger-
many. Failure to respond forcefully
to Soviet violations now "would sig-
nal the kind of uncertainty and po-
litical weakness that invites adver-
saries to put one further to the test"
and could "undermine our credibil-
ity."
Several times in the document,
Weinberger warmly praised Rea-
gan. After reciting what he termed
the failures of Presidents Johnson,
Nixon, Ford and Carter to "respond
seriously to the many Soviet viola-
tions that took place during their
tenures," Weinberger wrote, "you
became the first president in five
administrations to find the Soviets
in violation" and publicly say so.
He was referring to reports
urged on Reagan by Weinberger
and his key assistant secretary,
Richard N. Perle, accusing the So-
viets of violating some provisions of
past treaties. Publication of those
findings followed sharp battles in-
side the administration.
Weinberger said a decision to
respond effectively to the Soviets
"requires great political courage
.. Indeed, you are the first pres-
ident to decide to do so, and you can
expect considerable controversy
over any specific proportional re-
sponse that you chose to make."
Weinberger is to make specific
suggestions for such responses in
part two of the report he submitted
to Reagan last week. That section
will not be completed until after the
Geneva summit.
ice, 4,.,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605110004-8