CONFUSING CHRONOLOGY OF A CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000605100002-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 28, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/21 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000605100002-1
73 n WASHINGTON POST
'.1 28 December 1986
Confusing Chronology of a Crisis
White House Aides Disagree on How Iran Affair Transpired
,(89-"Wa1ter PIncuirn
WmhIniftotiPfit-Statf VItItte"
On Nov. 4. immediately after the'
first_public confirmation by an Iran-
ian official that the United States
had shipped arms to Iran. a group of
oast and current advisers to Pres-
Went Reagan met at the White
House to try to produce a chronol-
02V of their secret Iranian policy
over the previous 18 months. They
were unable to agree on what had
happened, according to informed
sources.
On Nov. 6, the president told re-
porters at a bill-signing ceremony in
the White House that the "story
that came out of the Middle East"
about former national security ad-
viser Robert C. McFarlane travel-
ing to Tehran "to us has no founda-
tion." That clay McFarlane. his suc-
cessor. Vice Adm. lohn M. Poindex-
ter. National Security Council
(NSC) aide Lt. Col. Oliver L. North
_and a representative of Central In-
telligence Agency Director William
LCasev were trying to reach
agseement on what had occurred,
sources said.
Eventually, North prepared a
chronology, but it has proved inac-
curate in some details, according to
White House aides.
"They just had different memo-
ries or views of what happened,"
according to one source. The offi-
cials also disagreed on how much
information should be disclosed,
sources said.
Complicating the search for the
truth about what has become the
Iran-contra scandal was the White
House's practice, directed by chief
of staff Donald T. Regan, of so-.
called "damage control," that is,
making statements intended to de-
fuse the issue and get it off front
pages of newspapers and out of
television news programs.
When newspapers began to de-
scribe large shipments of arms to
Iran, the White House countered
with a presidential speech describ-
ing what Reagan had approved as
"small amounts" of arms that "could
easily fit into a single cargo plane."
Later it became clear that the quan-
tity of arms delivered to Iran in at
least siTt separate shipments was
much greater than that.
; When the president was accused
;of trading arms for hostages, the
White House countered with stories
of Iran's geostrategic position next
to the Soviet Union and Moscow's
Attempts to gain favor there.
Many public statements made in
November by Regan, Poindexter,
McFarlane, White House spokes-
man Larry Speakes and by Reagan
turned out to have been wrong or
misleading; many have been
amended since by the White House.
The mistakes then made and the
efforts to correct or change them
reveal some of the biggest political
and legal problems that now face
the White House in what has be-
.come the major scandal of the Rea-
gan presidency.
The most important shift has oc-
curred on the key issue of whether
the president approved the initial
Israeli shipments of U.S. arms to
Iran either before or after the event
in September 1985. That was four
months before Reagan signed an
intelligence "finding" that provided
explicit legal authority for U.S. par-
ticipation in such an activitx. Before
that finding was jignesl. U.S. an-
prcival of and participation in secret
Israeli arms shipments to Iran in
1985 may have been illegal. That
was the view of at least one senior
CIA official who insisted that a ret-
roactive finding be Prepared when
he learned that a second shipment
had gone out in November on an
agency-arranged aircraft.
In the chronology he prepared,
North said that the president
.turned down the Israeli proposal in
the summer of 1985, and approved
it only in October, after the fact,
when word reached the White
House that the shipment had been
made. In North's chronology, the
November shipment was also made
without notice, and was ordered
returned when Washington found
out about it.
McFarlane, who once indicated
that Reagan reacted negatively to
the idea of Israeli arms shipments,
subsequently testified to congres-
sional committees that the presi-
dent gave him vocal approval for
the shipments in August 1985, be-
fore the first arms were sent.
White House chief of staff Regan,
who on Nov. 14 told reporters that
the president approved the Israeli
shipments before they were made,
changed that story within days. tie
has since told congressional com-
mittees under oath that the pres-
ident's approval came only after the
first Shipments were made in Sep-
tember.
Confusion on this point was also
evident in the wrong answers Rea-
gan gave at his Nov. 19 news con-
ference.
In a practice session on Nov. 18,
with aides playing _reporters, the
president was asked if he had ap-
proved any Israeli shipments, as
reported in the news media. In re-
sponse Reagan denied he had, and
was corrected by Poindexter,
sources said.
According to these sources, who
were present at the session, Poin-
dexter told the president that he
had condoned such shipments "We
don't want to identify that country;
we don't want to point the finger at
Israel," the sources said Poindexter
told the president that day.
At these mock news conferences
the president usually tries a second
answer when aides express dissat-
isfaction with his first try. But on
this occasion, one knowledgeable
source said, Reagan did not try to
answer the question a second time
in light of Poindexter's guidance.
The next night, Reagan either
disregarded, forgot or was confused
by Poindexter's correction. Three
times during his televised news
conference, he denied that he had
condoned the 1985 arms shipments
by Israel.
Minutes after the session ended,
a "clarification" was released in the
president's name saying he had con-
doned such shipments.
Confusion over past events has
been evident also in NSC decision
documents prepared this year to
bring Reagan up to date for key
meetings to discuss making direct
U.S. arms shipments to Iran,
McFarlane's May trip to Tehran
and the last arms shipment in Oc-
tober, according to sources in the
mriri Annrnved For Release 2013/02/21 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000605100002-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/21: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605100002-1
administration and on Capitol Hill
'"where the documents were sent
last week. One source said these
documents "show inconsistencies"
in descriptions of the events.
Sources on Capitol Hill familiar
with testimony to date disagree
over whether the White House has
been engaged in a cover-up since
the first public disclosures or just
cannot settle on one story.
One source who has heard much
of the testimony and reviewed
White House material said what he
has seen indicates "incredible in-
competence and freewheeling op-
erations," with North, for one, at
times "exceeding his authority and
not telling his superiors."
Several congressional investiga-
tors said they were not surprised
that the White House has yet to
come up with an authoritative his-
tory of what happened between
June 1985 and last month. "Now,"
according to another source in-
volved in reviewing the data, the
participants "are trying to protect
themselves or others and are
changing their stories."
Reagan's Nov. 6 remark that
there was "no foundation" to re-
ports of a secret McFarlane mission
to Iran was followed by a week of
"no comments" and warnings to re-
porters like the one White House
spokesman Speakes gave on Nov. 7:
"Lives are at stake, and American
interest is at stake."
Speakes attempted to undercut
published stories that Secretary of
State George P. Shultz and Defense
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
opposed and were ignorant of the
Jan. 17 intelligence finding that au-
thorized arms shipments to Iran. On
Nov. 14, Speakes said at his daily
news briefing that Shultz and Wein-
berger "participated in meetings in
which the president made his de-
cision. They were aware of the
president's finding in January."
Poindexter, during Nov. 14 brief-
ings, also said that Shultz and Wein-
berger took part in discussions of
the finding and were aware that it
had been signed.
When Shultz testified under oath
before Congress in December, he
said he was not present when the
president decided to go ahead with
the Jan. 17 finding, and did not
learn about it until it became public
in November.
Speakes also was caught out on
the question of whether the pres-
ident's finding contained a directive
to Casey not to inform Congress
about its existence. On Nov. 17,
three days after the finding was
disclosed, Speakes told reporters
there was "a general agreement"
that the White House would not tell
Congress, but Speakes said he did
not believe it was in writing or in
the finding. It was.
The conflict over authorization of
the first 1985 shipment could prove
significant.
After more than a week of refus-
ing all comment, the White House
decided to put the president on tele-
vision on the night of Nov. 13 to
take the offensive on the Iran arms
sales. The speech was designed in
part to distance the administration
from reported shipments of many
tons of arms to Iran, hence Rea-
gan's claim that night that he had
authorized only "minuscule" ship-
ments that could have fit easily in a
single aircraft.
In a briefing for reporters before
the speech, a senior administration
official insisted that Reagan had not
violated his arms embargo against
Iran or any other law because he
had signed the intelligence finding
in January. "We didn't do anything
illegal," said this briefer, who can-
not be identified under ground rules
of this "background" briefing. The
official has since resigned from the
White House.
Asked about shipments in Sep-,
tember 1985, the official re-
sponded, "They are not related to
the U.S. government."
The next day, after the speech,
Regan and Poindexter gave eight
interviews on television shows and
to reporters as part of the well-pub-
licized damage-control effort that
began with Reagan's speech. In
those interviews the two men said
that Reagan had approved arms
shipments in 1985 by a third coun-
try, later identified as Israel, before
the arms had been sent?and there-
fore months before the president
signed the Jan. 17 intelligence find-
ing.
In a briefing for television report-
ers that day, Regan said that "in the
summer of 1985 . . . there was a
request that a third party be al-
lowed to sell [Iran] some weapons,
and we agreed that if that third par-
ty wanted to sell weapons of that
same nature as we were discussing,
we would not object to that."
Two hours later, Poindexter was
questioned on the subject by the
same TV reporters and said the
1985 shipment "was authorized ver-
bally . . . by the president." Did
that happen in September? Poindex-
ter replied, "I honestly don't re-
member the date but it was several
months prior to that."
.McFarlane in those days ducked
the question of the president's de-
cision. On a Nov. 16, television in-
terview program, for example, he
told one questioner that he should
ask the president if he had approved
the shipment before it was sent.
When asf ,d if he were "arguing
with the nief of staff' on the issue,
McFarla ie said that the "portrayal"
of the situation "doesn't match my
own understanding."
McFarlane's statements led to
news reports that the president had
not approved the 1985 shipments.
At the White House the next day, in
the midst of Speakes' daily briefing;
a senior administration official said
he could not clear the matter up
because McFarlane, who originated
the operation, was no longer at the
White House and Poindexter, his
deputy at the time, "does not have
the details that we need to discuss'
the matter.
Sources close to McFarrane
talked to reporters about Nov. 20
and said the former national Seca
rity.adviser first told the president .
about an Israeli proposal to trade
arms for hostages in July 1985
while Reagan waS?hospitalized re-
covering from colon cancer sur-
gery. At that time, according to
McFarlane's account, both he and
the president opposed the proposal,
but Reagan did favor exploring bet-
ter relations with "moderates" in
Iran and recognized that they might
need weapons to defend themselves
against radicals in the Khomeini
government.
Later, according to McFarlane's
'account, David Kimche, the Israeli
official then involved in secret deal-
ings with Iran, met with McFarlane,
in part to see if Reagan would ap-
prove the arms shipments. Accord-
ing to the account McFarlane pro-
vided to associates then, McFarlane
told Kimche he could not condone
the arms shipments, but McFarlane
nevertheless had the impression
when Kimche left that the Israelis ..
would go forward with the plan to
ship arms.
npflassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/21: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605100002-1
Declassified
and Approved For Release 2013/02/21 CIA-RDP90-00965R000605100002-1
The day after - Reagan's news
conference, Speakes tried to per-
suade reporters not to write that
the shipments were undertaken be-
fore Reagan had legally authorized
them in writing.
"We're off on a legal track here
that seemed to say that if we did it,
if there were shipments prior to
Jan. 17, 1986, it would have been
illegal," Speakes said. "So I'm trying
to guide you: don't write that kind
. of stuff, because it would be inac-
curate."
Later in the briefing Speakes said
that he did not think any White
House official meant to give the
impression that there was any U.S.
condoning of an Israeli shipment in
September, at about the time that
the Rev. Benjamin Weir was re-
leased.
McFarlane contradicted that ver-
sion before the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence on Dec. 1,
when he told a more complete and
different story than that he had ear-
lier related to associates.
The president, McFarlane tes-
tified, approved the idea of Israeli
shipment of U.S. arms to Iran after
an Aug. 6, 1985, discussion of the
idea with his top advisers, including
Shultz and Weinberger, who both
opposed the proposition.
In a private meeting with McFar-
, lane?from which there are no
notes, sources said?Reagan said
that if the Israelis decided to go
ahead with the idea, he would ap-
prove replenishing any American
arms they transferred, by McFar-
? lane's latest account.
As described by McFarlane, Rea-
gan's position was that if Israel pro-
ceeded with the arms shipment, the
United States would make up the
508 .TOW antitank missiles Israel
planned to sell to the Iranians. In
fact this transaction was completed
this year after the Jan. 17 finding
was signed, sources said.
In return for shipping the TOWs,
the Israelis, who handled all the
negotiations, led the White House
to expect that at least two and per-
haps all six Americans then believed
held hostage in the Mideast would
be freed. But only Weir was re-
leased.
There was a second shipment
from Israel to Iran in 1985, but this
was ignored in last month's White
House discussions of arm S ship-
ments before the Jan. 17 ?finding.
According to McFarlane's testimo-
ny to Congress, he also approved
this second shipment under author-
ity he had from Reagan.
McFarlane discussed this ship-
ment, which included Hawk antiair-
craft missile parts, with .Israeli De-
fense Minister Yitzhak Rabin short-
ly before the Nov. 21-22 Soviet-
American summit in Geneva.
While at the summit, McFarlane
got a phone call from the Israelis.
The Portuguese government had
created obstacles to the transship-
ment of weapons through that coun-
try as planned, the Israelis re-
ported. They asked for help.
3
McFarlane called North back at
the White House and asked him to
settle the matter. North called the
CIA and sought assistance of one of
Casey's top aides, Duane (Dewey)
Clarridge. The CIA helped obtain
another plane and .the shipment
went through. Later, it turned out
that the Israelis had sent obsolete
Hawk parts to the Iranians and no
hostages were released.
The CIA's then-deputy director,
John N. McMahon, told colleagues
when he learned of the agency's
role that he thought the action was
illegal because there was no written
presidential authority. He later told
the Senate intelligence panel that
he had said there were to be no sim-
ilar actions without the president's
signature.
A draft finding was sent to the
White House in November by the
CIA, authorizing the shipments that
-had taken place and any future
ones. Agency officials, sources said,
never received back a signed copy
of the finding. Poindexter said later
that after the president signed a
finding dated Jan. 17, the document
was kept in the NSC adviser's safe.
Since the first news stories were
published on Nov. 27 describing the
November 1985 arms shipment
that the CIA had supported, the
White House has never acknowl-
edged that such an event took
place.
npriaccified and Approved For Release 2013/02/21 CIA-RDP90-00965R000605100002-1
\?(