A DUTY TO SUBVERT GOVERNMENT?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000605060002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 7, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/04: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605060002-6
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BALTIMORE SUN
7 May 1987
A Duty to Subvert Government?
B RITAIN TODAY has an even more
sensational political scandal than Ir-
angate, nonetheless posing the same
problems of secret power and accountabili-
ty, and of what an individual should do
By William Pfaff- --
when conviction clashes with an elected
government's policies.
The British affair is of alleged treason,
among other high crimes. An element in the
British security service. M15, is said to have
contpired to undermine two British govern-
ments at the beginning of the 1970s.
The story is set forth by a former officer
of M15 named Peter. Wright. He claims that
some 30 members of MI5, politically moti-
vated. conspired to overthrow the Labor gov-
ernment of Prime Minister Harold Wilson,
and that they also tried to discredit the Con-
servative government of Edward Heath be-
tween 1970 and 1974. Prime Minister Wil-
son was held to have about him people
working for the KGB, or even to be himself
compromised by the Soviet or East Bloc in-
telligence services. Mr. Heath was thought
insufficiently anti-Communist.
Mr. Wright says the CIA was also in-
volved. and that he and his colleagues
bugged and burgled our way across Lon-
don" during a five-year period. He says that
he himself committed 23 criminal acts and
12 acts of treason in the course of the affair.
One interpretation of this affair is that it
was simply a rogue operation by right-wing-
ers In the secret service. A more circumstan-
tial argument holds that whatever it eventu-
ally became, it began with authorization at
highest M15 levels, based on credible infor-
mation concerning Mr. Wilson or his associ-
ates. and that "far from being a conspiracy
to bring down an elected government, the
operation was aimed at protecting that gov-
ernment from danger by subversive agents"
(to quote an anonymous apologist for M15).
The phrasing of this explanation is not with-
out ambiguities.
The underlying question is an important
one: What does a responsible security ser-
vice do if it has good reason to think that a
nation's leader is compromised by foreign
agents or unshakeably under their influ-
ence? What does It do if its officers become
convinced that the executive arm of govern-
ment, to which it owes obedience, is itself
insecure? What do responsible officials do if
they believe their government's policies ac-
tually betray the nation?
The last question transports us from
London to Washington, and to the Irangate
hearings. In this case officials took policy in
their own hands, convinced that Congress's
ban on U.S. government support for the Nic-
araguan contras was wrong and that they
had a duty, or right, to break the law.
Even if these people acted with President
Reagan's implied endorsement, the problem
posed is that of individuals in government
who come to believe they possess a private
grasp, lacking to the public, of some great
issue, and that they accordingly have a mor-
al obligation to do something about it even to
the extent of breaking the law.
If a democratic nation freely elects for
itself a course toward ruin, do responsible
people inside the government have to go'
along with this? To act to do otherwise may
amount to subversion or treason. What does
an honorable man do In such extreme
circumstances?
The key distinction seems to me to be
that between moral issues and political
ones. It is a recognizable distinction even if
the two often overlap. An official seems to
me obliged to confront, fight, and in the ex-
treme case disobey or subvert, an immoral
national policy. This is something which in.
volves many prudential considerations, but
the principle seems tome unassailable. The
obvious modern example Is that of the July
20 conspirators in the wartime German gov-
ernment-who tried to overthrow Hitler.
But we are not talking about extreme
cases in the M15 and Irangate affairs. We are
talking about people who interfere with
elected governments on political or security -
grounds, and do so when there are alterna-
tive courres available within the political
system. 1 hat this occurs, and possibly is
occurring more often than the public thinks.
is a disquieting matter. To employ secret
powers to thwart the policy of an elected
legislature. or undermine a government,
thereby denying the public will, is an act?
destructive of representative government. .
To the individuals involved, of course,"
things are never so clear. When they pos- .
sess power for which they are not publicly-
ac ountable, the possibilities offered by that-
power can become intoxicating. This is what*
happened in Washington, and it quite possi-
bly Is what happened in Britain. We may-
never know in the British case. Prime Minis
ter Margaret Thatcher refuses to offer a full-
explanation or to order an inquiry.
Americans, not to speak of the British,,,
are nonetheless inclined to be complacent.
Each scandal is interpreted as a reassur"t
ance that "the system is working." One"
wonders, though, if there may not be more
occasions than we know when it did not.,
work. and if we can so confidently rely on its?
continuing to work.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/04: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605060002-6