WHY THE CIA LEAVES ITS CONTRAS HANGING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000605020003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 6, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605020003-9
` -0.0 o "April 1J60
Why the CIA Leaves
Its Contras Hanging
By David Atlee Phillips
APRIL 17 MARKS the 25th anni-
versary of the landing at the Bay
of Pigs by CIA-supported Cuban
exiles. It was a Monday in 1961, with an
uncertain dawn and an ominous twilight.
The worst day of the operation was
the following Wednesday. That was
when those of us in the CIA's Cuban
task force, headquartered in a former
WAVE barracks near the Reflecting
Pool, knew the landing was a failure be-
yond salvage. The invasion force had
been routed.
The Cuban exile military commander
of Brigade 2506 was about to abandon
the fight. In what was to be his final ra-
dio report, his voice was clear. There
was no static to muffle the obscenities
he used to describe the American gov-
ernment. He cursed us as individuals.
The Cuban brigade commander had
been a friend of the CIA's Washington
task force chief; that man's face was
white with remorse and fatigue as he
listened to the transmission from the
Cuban beach. The Marine colonel who
had been seconded to the CIA from the
Pentagon to direct the military aspects
of the operation held his hand over his
face, .as though trying to hide. One of-
ficer scratched his wrists so viciously
that blood stained his arm and darkened
his fingernails. Another rushed from the
room to vomit in a wastebasket.
The. Cuban brigade commander ra-
dioed :that he was standing in the shal-
lows. "I have nothing to fight with ....
Am heading for the slvamp."
He cursed us again. Then it was over.
The radio was dead.
To this day I am haunted by the image
of that Cuban exile commander on the
beach. It is my worst memory of aban-
doningan ally, but it.isn't the only one.
In my 25 years with the CIA, I was
aware of too many instances in which
allies and_ agents were left stranded af-
ter a -successful operation or dumped
after a_failed one.
Paramilitary covert action has never
been easy for the United States, even in
what , some intelligence professionals
rempmher as the good old days. We
David Atlee Phillips was the chief of
Latin American and Caribbean
;operations when he retired in 1975 from
the CIAr#Ie is the author of The Night
Watch: 25 Years of Peculiar Service.
This manuscript was submitted to the
CIA for clearance.
have tended too often to leave our
friends-individuals and groups-hang-
ing out to dry in hostile circumstances.
The reasons for this continuing difficulty
tell us some painful things about our
society: we are impatient and some-
times hypocritical; our covert-action
operations are too often tactical mis-
sions, short-term ventures for short-
term ends. We ask people to take risks
for us without fully comprehending the
logiistical-and moral-commitments
we have made to them.
The covert-action problem is worth
taking seriously now, at a time when the
U.S. is embarking on important new
commitments to paramilitary forces
around the world. Whatever one thinks
of the merits of the various "freedom
fighters," we should recognize that once
our country makes a commitment to
them, it is unfair, and perhaps immoral,
to turn our backs.
The Bay of Pigs illustrates the diffi-
culty we have had, even in the glory
days of the CIA, in delivering on our
commitments. The primary reason for
the humiliation at the Bay of Pigs was
President Kennedy's last-minute deci-
sion to cancel the sorties of Cuban exile
aircraft, their engines warming up on
Central American tarmacs, to provide
air cover for the invasion force of 1,400
exiles and a platoon of tanks.
T he young president-in office less
than three months-manfully ac-
cepted responsibility for the fias-
co. But there was sufficient blame to
spread around, including CIA's reluc-
tance to recognize that the amphibious
landing might be beyond its capabilities
and the agency's failure to make that
clear to Kennedy. We were the profes-
sionals, and we were aware of the intel-
ligence maxim that you can't cover a
hippopotamus with a handkerchief. You
certainly can't cover .a tank on a Carib-
bean beach with one.
The, realization that we had let our
Cubans down was the most painful per-
sonal element of that disaster 25 years
ago. Most of them were taken prisoner,
some died. We had recruited them, in-
doctrinated and trained them, and sent
them into battle without the air cover
they;; expected ("The skies will be
yours, ,we had .promised:) We failed our
contras. We didn't all 1e Cubaits, of
Brigade 2506 that ,in 1961, but they
were our contras.
CIA officers aren't sentimental. ey
understand that in espionage or. coun-
terespionage operations there are often
personal casualties. But these victims
know what they are getting into; they
are spies who, for one motive or anoth-
er, often money, have betrated their
country. Most spies know they must be
prepared for a day of reckoning if things
go wrong. Thus professional American
case officers who manage spies perform
their assignments without having to fine
tune their sense of personal ethics.
But even the most hardened intelli-
gence officer is uneasy when foreigners
supporting a CIA covert-action opera-
tion are the victims. These are people
who volunteered their services or were per-
suaded to rally to a cause. When they are
abandoned it is disquieting for their Amer-
ican case officers, who carry away a burden
of remorse and second thoughts when they
walk away from the wreckage.
It has happened too frequently. The CIA
has recruited and trained foreigners for
paramilitary or political action endeavors
and, when the operations were concluded,
left them out in the cold. Not because the
CIA is institutionally callous. Generally, the
problem has been that post-operation sup-
port has been beyond the agency's capabil-
ity or authority-such as funding a long-
range aid program following a decisive
change in leadership abroad.
There is a long list of these failed para-
military ventures. I would be uncomfortable
revealing details of those endeavors, and
even if I were inclined to do so, the CIA's
Publication Review Board would remind me
of my secrecy oath. But the burgeoning
public literature on U.S. secret operations
contains several case histories.
In his memoirs, former Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence William E. Colby describes
the covert paramilitary support given by
the CIA in 1972 to Kurdish mountain peo-
ple fighting Iraq in a border dispute, sup-
port requested from Richard Nixon by the
Shah of Iran. Three years later the Shah,
having settled his own differences with
Iraq, had no further interest in the Kurds.
American support to the mountain fighters
ended abruptly. "CIA's cable traffic," writes
Colby, "suddenly was jammed with requests
to help the refugee and exiled Kurds instead
of shipping arms and military supplies to
them clandestinely."
The most comprehensive study of the
CIA is the Thomas Powers book, "The Man
Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and
the CIA." While I cannot vouch from per-
sonal knowledge for his examples from
Southeast Asia, he writes of three illustra-
tive episodes:
MW
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605020003-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605020003-9 I
^ The Sumatran rebel colonels: they were All intelligence professionals agree on
abandoned to their fates in 1958 when the one aspect of modern covert action in Cen-
CIA operations against Achmed Sukarno in tral America. If it is decided that we will
Indonesia failed abruptly and embarrassing- cease supporting the Nicaraguan contras
ly, albeit in secret. we should cut the ties sooner rather than
^ The Meo tribesmen who were a CIA later, combining to the extent possible a
army during the Vietnam war: In the begin- humane yet cauterizing method of disen-
ning a few hundred of them were a small- gagement. If we decide to keep the contras
unit guerrilla; later they became a 30,000- on our paramilitary tether, we should not
man army. In 1975, a "pitiful remnant" of jerk them in and out of theconflict in reac-
10,000 escaped to Thailand. tion to political whims or each political de-
n Nine teams of Montagnard tribesmen on velopment. Deciding each 90 days if we will
an intelligence and harassment mission in support them is an absurd evasion of re-
North Vietnam: When President Johnson sponsibility. If we decide to keep the con-
halted air strikes over North Vietnam in tras, they deserve to know where they
1968, resupply drops to the Montagnards stand with us. Now, after four years of U.S.
ceased as well. The CIA had to abandon support, the Nicaraguan contras in the field
them behind enemy lines. Some of the don't know where they will be next month,
agents were taken prisoner, others per- or next year.
ished. In the past decade the rules of the covert
Now the rules have changed. The se- action game have changed. From the view-
crecy that once prevailed, and hid point of the professional intelligence officer,
details of the recruitment and aban- the covert-action option-what has been
donment of paramilitary forces, has given described as "the tool of middle resort"-
way to a system of quasi-public debate. Now began to deterioriate in the wake of the
even the planning for future operations is in sensational headlines and public scrutiny of
the public domain, as we can see from the intelligence operations in 1975. The capa-
public debate about support to our contras bility for covert action operations remained,
in Nicaragua, but the chances of keeping them secret di-
The contras debate has given the Amer- minished drastically.
ican public a glimpse of the people who ac- Despite the transparent cover of modern
tually do the fighting in paramilitary oper- U.S. covert-action operations, the Reagan
ations, and the reality isn't always attrac- administration has found it useful to take
tive. For example, it is difficult to detect advantage of CIA's flexibility to originate
much that can be called romantic or admi- and fund operations that for some are now
rable about the individual contras in Ni- identified as "overt covert action." Future
carauga, and charisma has eluded their administrations probably will, too.
commanders as well. Even their war name The current overt-covert situation leads
is pathetic. Contra as a verb in Spanish some people to question why the U.S.
means to be against; thus a contra is "an shouldn't drop the fig leaf. Our government
against". The CIA-supported dissidents who shouldn't be ashamed to support democratic
overthrew a leftist government in Guate- forces overseas, this argument runs, and
mala in 1954-a political action achieve- therefore we should fund deserving military
ment that President Eisenhower thought
was dandy-were dubbed "liberators". 0th- groups and political parties openly and Bi-
ers who have attacked their own govern- rectly. Although refreshingly straightfor-
ments in similar situations have been de- ward, this approach overlooks one reality.
scribed as fighters or rebels for one cause In many cases the beneficiaries of such aid
or another, or, on a loftier level in Santo would be the first to insist that it be given
Domingo in 1965, as constitutionalists, discreetly. It would be political suicide for
The national debate over support to the them to accept direct foreign assistance,
contras extends to the intelligence commu- just as it would be for a political party in this
nity. A survey of active duty officers and country to take money from abroad.
former intelligence professionals indicates The intelligence professional deplores
the majority believe we should back the the developments of recent years, and
contras in Central America. Most of that yearns for the day when covert-action op-
majority take the position because of per- erations will no longer be conducted in
sonal political conviction and implacable Macy's window. The intelligence operative
distrust of the Cubans and Soviets. A few looks forward to the time when covert-ac-
believe that intervention in Central Amer- tion capabilities are not used as smoke-mak-
ica is morally wrong. A larger segment of ing machines, the bellows often being
the minority of CIA professionals who op- pumped by someone wishing to send a po-
pose assistance to the contras fear that the litical signal rather than to achieve a clan-
fallout from covert action inevitably ob- destine objective. But the intelligence pro-
scures and threatens CIA's primary busi- fessional recognizes that paramilitary and
ness of gathering and processing intelli- political action operations in our society will
gence. be, without question, more overt than co-
vert in the future.
f that's the way it is going to be, then
I the good soldiers at CIA will salute and
obey their marching orders. That is one
reason presidents will continue to use the
Agency for covert operations when overt
action might be more practical. (The CIA
"good soldier" and "can do" tradition is, on
balance, a useful attribute. Its negative side
was evident during the planning for the Bay
of Pigs: CIA should have ignored the tra-
dition and confessed to Eisenhower and
Kennedy that the amphibious operation, if
conducted at all, should have been managed
openly by the Pentagon and not a secret
army.)
The opening of covert operations to pub-
lic scrutiny has one benefit for the practic-
ing intelligence officer. Now the moral re-
sponsibility toward those recruited to serve
our ends in foreign covert operations has
become a more general, public one. Ethical
questions no longer must be resolved by a
few people deliberating in the shadows. In-
stead, they are debated in public forums, or
in private chambers from which leaks drip
immediately. Guerrilla wars, and sometimes
even the tactics the insurgents will employ,
are now negotiated in a public forum, most
recently by votes in Congress.
Now that Congress and the public are
part of the dirty work, let a former case
officer offer a word of caution: Every blue-
print for covert action should include, as a
routine matter, a disaster plan. This plan
should set forth a course of action to be im-
plemented when things go terribly awry.
The Bay of Pigs project was a good example
of the failure to prepare for disaster and,
when it came, the inability to cope with de-
feat and minimize damage.
Today all of us must, share responsibility
for American foreign policy decisions that
establish alliances with rebels abroad. Given
the reality and complexity of the U.S.-So-
viet conflict, each case is different and each
decision is tricky. We should pause before
reaching a personal conclusion, or before
making our views known to our Congres-
sional representatives. Because once we
resolve as a government to support contras
of any kind in any place, we have incurred a
serious responsibility.
The personal decision to support a "co-
vert-action operation"-the quotation
marks are now mandatory-should be made
only after serious introspection. But if when
all the votes are in, our government re-
cruits foreigners to fight for us, we should
all resolve that we, as a nation won't aban-
don them if things go wrong. We must not
give them a reason to curse us, or leave
them with no option other than heading for
a swamp.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605020003-9