HONDURAS WARY OF U.S. POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504870069-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 69
• Publication Date: February 24, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504870069-6
APPEARED
WASHING ION POST
24 February 1985
AN UNEASY PARTNER'
First of Three Articles
onduras Wary of U.S. Policy
Support for Nicaraguan Rebels, El Salvador Raises Concern
Another airfield, at Palmerola, northwest.of Tegu-
By Joanne Omang and Edward Cody cigalpa, expanded with U.S. military construction funds,
Kashington Post Starr Writers has become headquarters for a 1,200-man semiperma-
The United States and Honduras-have reached a nent U.S. military presence, including a field hospital
crucial stage in their relations as the Reagan admin-' and a U.S. air reconnaissance squadron that flies reg-
istration strives to keep pressure on Nicaragua's ular missions in support of Salvadoran Army troops.
leftist government from Honduran bases and Hon- Officially, relations between the United States and
duran leaders grow wary of getting in too deep. Honduras could hardly be warmer.
The Hondurans' hesitation, chiefly among military But Honduras, as it has for decades, wants to be
officers, has cast a shadow over U.S. policy in Cen- more to the United States than a stationary aircraft
tral America, which has placed Honduras at the cen- carrier. In the words of one knowledgeable State De-
ter of efforts against Nicaragua and leftist insurgents partment analyst, Honduras is "squeaking in an effort to
in El Salvador. get some grease," asking for more economic and mil-
For the most part, the Reagan administration ap- itary aid, staking out some independent policies and
pears to be listening to new Honduran demands with demanding a written U.S. defense commitment.
halt an ear, concerned more with how Honduras fits The most dramatic demonstration of its new de-
into U.S. goals in the region than with Honduras' mands came last September, when Hondurans barred
own objectives. Salvadoran soldiers from the Regional Military Training
This article examines the role of Honduras in U.S. Center set up with U.S. funds at Puerto Castilla on the
policy. Subsequent articles Monday and Tuesday will Atlantic coast expressly to train Salvadorans without
look at the country's importance to rebels fighting increasing the number of U.S. advisers in El Salvador.
the Nicaraguan government and at the political pro- About 5,000 Salvadorans went through courses under
cess in Honduras. U.S. trainers from June 1983 until Honduras, which has
When leftist Sandinistas took power in neighbor- a longstanding border dispute with El Salvador, insisted
ing Nicaragua in 1979, and leftist guerrillas gained that no more Salvadorans be trained there.
strength in El Salvador, official Washington scram- A ranking U.S. official in the Honduran capital of Te-
bled to befriend neglected Honduras, rediscovering gucigalpa said agreement looks likely before the end of
old alliances and forging new ones. Honduras, wor- next month, when new U.S. money must be committed,
ried that it was the left's next target, was happy to to resume training Salvadorans under a compromise
oblige. acceptable to the Honduran military command. Reso-
Honduras now is the staging area for U.S. military lution of other demands also is probable in the long run,
exercises and clandestine operations against ica- U.S. and Honduran sources said, because senior Hon-
ra ua. It is a rest-and-recreation stop, a training `duran military officers share U.S. concern over the San-
field. intelligence center and supply base. dinista government in Nicaragua and have become de-
About 1,300 U.S. military and 150 diplomatic per- pendent on U .S. leadership and financial aid.
sonnet are stationed there, and the number grows to , i "If the United States stopped aid, I don't know how
around 5,000 during the nearly nonstop military ma-
neuvers. The exercises have cost the United States long the ammunition would last," said a Honduran who
at least $100 million, and further millions have gone strongly opposes his government's extensive cooper-
- u ation with U.S. policies. "It is a total dependency."
into housing, two radar stations, a field hospital and into Honduran and U.S. sources with access to the mil-
building or improving eight airfields-most of it alleg- itary emphasized, for instance, that the government so
ed!y temporary construction for the exercises. There is 'far has done nothing to stop or scale down Big Pine 3,
also a U.S.-built Regional Military Training Center, 11 weeks of joint military maneuvers that began Feb.
which Washington hopes to make permanent. 11 and are scheduled to involve up to 4,500 U.S. sol-
An airfield at Aguacate in central Honduras, im- diers with M60 tanks and M113 armored personnel
proved for what the administration said then was sup- carriers.
port for the Big Pine 2 exercise in 1983, has become But they added that the armed forces commander,
the main base for, anti-Sandinista airdrops to guerrillas Gen. Walter Lopez, appears resolved to halt or reduce
in Nicaragua, according to a knowledgeable rebel offi- ononduran support of anti-Sandinista guerrilla forces
cial. - based here unless the U.S. Congress endorses admin-
istration policy by approving renewed CIA funding for
the rebels.t:inL'C~
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..
One Honduran source with access to Lopez said the I
commander ,.ersonally has become determined to re-
duce or end Ionduran support for the Nicaraguan reb-
els and hk. notified Nicaraguan President Daniel Or-
tega of his intention through a private channel. But an-
other source explained that Lopez has not gained high-
level support in the Army for his stand and said that the
general complained to a recent visitor that he feels
"alone" on this.
"There is a sector of the Honduran Army that feels
its sovereignty and its dignity have been trampled, and
they are determined to recover respect, both for them-
selves and for the country as a whole," said a Honduran
analyst. "There is another sector that is just trying to
get better conditions for Honduran cooperation with
the United States."
. Lopez has declined interview requests recently to
explain the situation, following Honduran tradition that
military matters fall outside the public domain.
The Reagan adn.: nistration has not worked out what
it would do if Haaiduras were lost as a' base for Ni-
' caraguan rebels and U.S. military maneuvers aimed at
pressuring the Sandinistas, a U.S. official said; In that
.event, he said, there would be little choice but to adopt
a 'long-term containment policy" by building up the mil-
itary and economic strength and political .will of Nica-
ragua's neighbors. This would be difficult because Cos-
ta Rica, to the south, has a constitutional ban against a
national army and Honduras, to the north, rests on a
young and uncertain political system ill-equipped to sup-
port the weight of U.S. policy for the region. -
"This is not Europe" the ranking diplomat added,
referring to the containment policy directed against the
Soviet Union after World War II.
Some of the administration's problems with Hondu-
ras, and in Central America generally, stem from its
execution'of policies before making much effort to se-
cure public or congressional support for them, he said.
The CIA sped into building up anti-Sandinista rebel
forces here in 1982 and 1983, for example, on the basis
of explanations to Congress that the purpose was to
choke off arms supplies to Salvadoran guerrillas by d e-
rect action and by pressuring their Sandinista suppliers
to "turn inward." According to a 1983 report from the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
administration officials only later said that the rebels
would serve to "bring the Sandinistas to the bargaining
table" and force them to hold elections.
. President Reagan, expanding the latter argument in
a press conference Thursday, said his objective was to
remove the "present structure" of the Sandinista gov
ernment or get it to "say uncle." - I
The response in Washington to Honduras' demands,
beneath warmly receptive formalities, has been weary
annoyance.
"They're already getting what they deserve. They're
just seeing how far they can push it," the State Depart-
ment analyst said.
The Hondurans pushed it too far last Jan. 18 for Rob-
ert C. McFarlane, President Reagan's national security
.adviser, who stalked out of a meeting during his visit to
Tegucigalpa when Honduran officials insisted on a writ-
ten promise of U.S. military support in the event of out-
side attack.
The Hondurans had told McFarlane that they trusted
his word and the word of President Reagan, but they
were worried that a future U.S. president "might not be
as strong" and would fail to act in a crunch, according to,
one person who was present at the meeting.
They said they were worried about threats not only
from Nicaragua, but perhaps also from El Salvador.
McFarlane "got a real earful," one Honduran said.
McFarlane said the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance, which considers an armed attack
on one American state to be an attack on all, binds the--
Western Hemisphere together well enough and would
suffer if there were bilateral agreements besides. He
expressed annoyance that the president's word was not
enough and left, the observers said.
But the Hondurans had made their point. "I wouldn't
rule. out a written statement. of some kind now," a State
Department official said.
U.S.-attention to Honduran demands was focused by
the barracks coup March 31 that ousted pro-American
Gen. Gustavo Alvarez as chief of the armed forces and
replaced hirr, with Lopez, an officer much more skep-
tical of U.S. goals in the region. Lopez is at least co-
equal in power with President Roberto Suazo Cordova.,,.
The coup 'was unforeseen in Washington and was an
acute embarrassment for the CIA, which reportedly had
been so close to Alvarez that all its informants were
ousted with him. Clearly, the U.S. Embassy was out of
touch.
"That did it for [U.S. Ambassador John D.] Negro-
ponte," said a State Department official who does not
admire Negroponte. A staunch conservative his critics
called "the proconsul" during his four years in Hondu-
ras, Negroponte is returning to Washington to become
assistant secretary of state for oceans and environmen-
tal and scientific affairs.
Honduras asked for bilateral talks to redefine its
overall relationship with the United States, and discus-:-
sions began in August.
An influential Honduran, saying he reflected Lopez's
views, said Negroponte was typical of most U.S.' dip-
lomats in not trying to understand Honduras' desires
except in the context of what Washington wants Hon-
duras to do.
"That has to change," the Honduran said. "You think
we don't have any options, but we do. We can talk to
Nicaragua, too."
That statement is greeted with skepticism at the
State Department. It is still policy bedrock there that
the conservative, devoutly free-enterprise Honduran
government may be somewhat divided on the surface,
especially with an election pending, but that it is first
and foremost terrified of Nicaragua and will do nearly
anything to strengthen itself against any future Sandi-
nista threat. -
Several U.S. officials have voiced a judgment that
Honduras has no choice but to remain part of U.S. pol-
icies in Central America. During a visit to Honduras last
fall, U.S. and Honduran sources said, Gen. Paul Gor-
man, outgoing chief of the U.S. Southern Command,
bluntly told complaining Honduran officers, including
Lopez, "You can stay with us, or you can go with the
Cubans." '
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504870069-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504870069-6
Hondurans admit their division and their worry, but
insist that they must prepare for the day when the Unit-
ed States' attention wanes in' the region and they are
left to their own devices. Then, they argue, they will be
threatened not only from Nicaragua but from El Sal-
vador.
"We regard EI Salvador as being as much of a threat
to us as Nicaragua," said a senior Honduran political
figure. "The Reagan administration doesn't understand
that."
"If Nicaragua ever invades us, it will be an interna-
tional problem immediately, and the U.S. or the Organ-
ization of American States or something will be on
hand," reasoned a conservative Honduran businessman.
"But if we have problems with El Salvador, it is only a
local affair and we will get no help."
The famous "soccer war" between Honduras and El
Salvador began in 1969 with escalating fistfights after a
game. After a decade of tension, the countries agreed in
1979 to five years of direct talks on their disputed bor-
der, but tl~e talks end this year, and no agreement is in
sight.
Now the Hondurans see what used to be a shabby,
corrupt Salvadoran Army becoming a formidable fight-
ing force with U.S: aid. Convinced, that El Salvador's
leftist rebels will be- eliminated one way or another
eventually, the Hondurans worry that the Salvadoran
colonels will turn their new strength toward them.
Several administration officials smiled at the thought.
"That's a bit of hyperbole," one said.
L. Craig Johnstone, deputy assistant secretary of
state for Central America and a key architect of U.S.
policy in the region, said the Salvadoran issue is an ex-
ample of the fact that Honduran officials raise more
issues in public and with the media than they do with
U.S. officials..
As another example, he cited recent published wor-
ries in Honduras over the future of the. estimated
14,000 armed Nicaraguan rebels. who have used U.S.
aid and Honduran soil to mount attacks against the San-
dinistas..---- -
If Congress fails to provide the additional $14 million
that the Reagan administration wants for the program,
these rebels would be broke, jobless, homeless and
armed, posing a serious problem for Honduras. Officials
already have charged that the rebels have murdered
leftist Honduran politicians on behalf of rightist Hon-
?duran military officers whom the government says it is
trying to curb. "We don't want to be another Lebanon,"
one officer said.
Johnstone said Honduras has "a legitimate beef" in
complaining that it gets less aid than either Costa Rica
or El Salvador while running equal or greater risks.
Since fiscal 1981, Costa Rica has received $651.8
million in U.S. economic aid and El Salvador $1.08 bil-
lion through fiscal 1985. By contrast, the United States
has allocated $519.6 million to Honduras, and much of
that is still in the pipeline or held up in disputes with the
State Department over reform measures, such as cur-
rency devaluation, that Honduras is reluctant to take.
After hearing Honduras' complaints and promising
consideration, the Reagan administration proposed con-
siderably less economic aid for fiscal 1986 than it gave
Honduras this year: $142.9 million as opposed to
$214.7 million.
"You can easily overdraw" Honduras' importance,
.Johnstone said. "It's a key, not the key, to our policy.
It's no good to have Honduras if you lose El Salvador."
The State Department has taken a tough line on de-
manding economic reform in Honduras, particularly a
devaluation or at least the creation of a parallel market
with a realistic exchange rate. If there is no agreement
by March 1, Honduras could lose $72.5 million in fiscal
1984 economic aid. Another $75 million is at stake in
1985 money.
All sides say they are hopeful that something can be
worked out in all these disputes. As a senior adminis-
tration official summed up the U.S. view, Hondurans
have to be patient with the U.S. bureaucracy, especially
when Honduran voices are divided and tnoney is short.
"They're trying to pressure us in various ways, but
their real position hasn't changed," a senior administra-
tion official said. "Neither has ours."
Next: Who wields power in Honduras
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504870069-6