MAN BEHIND THE MASK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504850033-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: February 3, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504850033-7
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WASHINGTON POST
3 February 1986
Man Behind the Mask
After 3 Years at State, George Shultz
Is More the Fighter and Less the Sphinx
First of two articles
ft Den O d Xfer .
w_wne. Pe.e swr edr
Shortly before Christmas, Sec-
retary of State George P. Shultz
startled the executive vice presi-
dent of the Heritage Foundation,
Philip Trulucki with a "very cold
very unfriendly greeting" when
the two were' introduced at a hol-
iday party. As Truluck recalled,
Shultz ,,'jumped. right down my
throat,' inaccurately charging that
the conservative think tank had
called for his resignation and berat-
ing Heritage for sending him "ridic-
ulous letters."
About the same time, Shultz sur
prised the nation-and the White
House-by threatening to resign if
required to take a polygraph test
under an order signed by President
Reagan. The following day, Reagan
exempted Shultz from any lie de-
tector tests and sharply modified
his directive.
Then, a few weeks ago, Shultz
erupted at presidential chief of staff
Donald T. Regan at a meeting
called to discuss the U.S. response
to the Rome and Vienna airport
attacks by a Palestinian group with
links to Libya, according to reports
circulating at the White .- House.
When Regan reportedly charged
that "we have no antiterrorism pol-
icy. Shultz snaoned back that the
chief of staff didn't know what he
was talking about.
What is happening to the previ-
ously unflappable, impassive, often
Sphinx-like secretary of state? Is his
recent uncharacteristic behavior a
sign that Shultz is preparing to
leave after 31/2 years-a longer ten-
ure in the job than any of his last
four predecessors, Henry A. Kiss-
inger, Cyrds R. Vance, Edmund S,
Muskie or Alexander M. Haig jr,~
"Shultz these days often seems
fed up-tired and short4emperld.
He seems more uncommunicative
and less patient ~ than in the past,"
said an official who sees him
quently. "There seems to be in him
a little bit the sense of a man throw-
ing caution to the winds .. I
don't think he is looking to leave; or
to stay. But I think it would take
very little to trigger his departure."
Compared to his immediate pre-
decessor-the mercurial Haig-
Shultz has imparted an aura of calm,
if not cohesion, to U.S. foreign re-
lations. With the exception of the
U.S. failure in Lebanon, the Shultz
era has seen few crises and no dra-
matic disasters. Unlike the reign of
Kissinger or Vance, the Shultz era
also has seen no dramatic accom-
plishments for U.S. foreign policy-
no successful Arab-Israeli disen-
gagement or peace agreements, no
strategic arms treaties with the
Soviet Union, no new openings to
China.
The pink-cheeked, stocky Shultz,
settling back wearily into a yellow
wing-back chair before a crackling
fire in his office at the end of a long
day recently, denied that he is los-
ing his cool and hinted at intentions
of staying in office for the rest of
Reagan's term.
"I would like to have the admin-
istration end with a kind of sense of
continuity, that the things that have
been put in place have been suc-
cessful enough so that whoever suc-
ceeds the Reagan administration-
obviously I hope it will be a Repub-
lican administration-will feel that
those are the right things," Shultz
said when asked about his goals for
the future.
"The interests of the United
States around the world are moving
in a generally positive direction," he
continued. "That is to say, the
strength of democracy, the
strength of our basic idea of free-
dom, the developments in the world
economy, our relationships with
major countries, our alliances; all
have been in a positive mode."
Much of that
cratic boilerplate, but in the view of
Shultz and many others, a rebuild-
ing of U.S. military and economic
power have brought basic improve-
ments in the U.S. world position
since 1981. The administration
came to office believing that an
American decline in the 1970s rel-
ative to the Soviet Union and other
industrialized nations needed re-
dressing as the groundwork for for-
eign policy gains.
It has been easier to obtain con-
sensus within the administration on
rebuilding American power than
agreement on what the United
States should do in the world from
an improved position. In the ab-
sence of a chief executive with
clear-cut ideas about international
strategy, or who is willing to im-
pose decisions on opposing factions
within his administration, the past
31/2 years diplomatically have been
essentially unassertive, unexciting
and nondynamic.
Shultz's attributes of patience
and persistence appear well-suited
to such a time of relative stability.
But as the Reagan administration
heads into its sixth year, the inter-
national challenges of the Mikhail
Gorbachev era and the internal
challenges of bureaucratic deadlock
and budgetary pressures may call
for more imaginative efforts.
For the most part Shultz has
been a manager of diplomatic re-
lations rather than a strategist in
the Kissingerian mold or an activist
resembling Vance or Haig. The un-
pretentious Shultz's favorite met-
aphor for his job is that of a "gar-
dener" of diplomacy, who persis-
tently cultivates the soil of relations
for some future bounty.
Little Things 'Add Up'
Shultz's notion of foreign policy
leadership emphasizes small incre-
ments and modest choices rather
than dramatic initiatives. "To a cer-
tain extent what you do all day is
cope," he said. "A tremendous
amount of policy comes about
through the way whatever little
things you do all day long add up, or
whether they don't add up .... If
you have a sense of direction as you
are working with the details, then
there is a chance that the way the
details are handled will gradually
support the general line or direction
you're going in."
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504850033-7
To make the point, Shultz ap-
provingly noted the title of an ar-
ticle in the Harvard Business Re-,
view: "Good Managers Don't Make
Policy Decisions."
Shultz, who turned 65 in Decem-
ber, is the most experienced and, in
some respects, the most powerful
member of the Reagan Cabinet. On
his chair at the White Mouse Cab-
inet table are four small brass
plates, each commemorating a Cab-
inet-level post: secretary of labor
(1969-70), budget director (1970-
72) and secretary of the treasury
(1972-74) in the Nixon administra-
tion, and secretary of state for Rea-
gan. Except for Defense Secretary
Caspar W. Weinberger, a long-
standing rival who once was
Shultz's deputy in the Nixon budget
bureau and who owns three brass
plates on his chair, nobody else at
the Cabinet table comes close.
Former undersecretary of state
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, who has
seen a succession of U.S. diplomats
at close range, said Shultz is com-
parable in many respects to the two
longest-serving secretaries of state
since World War II, John Foster
Dulles (1953-59) and Dean Rusk
(1961-69). "There is a bit of the
moralism of Dulles in Shultz," said
Eagleburger. "And he is solid and
steady and with a style reminiscent
in some ways of Rusk."
To take the measure of the man
and his record is difficult since so
much depends on the course of pol-
icies whose foundations have barely
been laid, and because Shultz's
back-room methods of operation
make it hard to fathom what he re-
ally is up to.
"He is one of the great bureau-
cratic actors of our time," said an
official who has watched Shultz at
close range in interagency combat.
In private meetings among his
peers, he said, Shultz can be blunt,
even dramatic, in expressing his
views. "Shultz is very self-
possessed. He likes power, he likes
to run things and he likes to have
his way."
In inner-circle meetings, he has
begun his presentation on several
occasions by saying flatly, "I strong-
ly disagree with the secretary of
defense," according to a participant.
"All the stories you've read and
heard about [Shultz-Weinberger)
conflicts over military power are
true," said an official who has
watched their interaction. More-
over, on a personal level, "they
don't like each other at all" despite
a long history of close association in
the Nixon administration and Bech-
tel Corp.
A Pentagon official, whose posi-
tions often clash with Shultz's, said
the secretary of state is a master at
inside maneuvering: "He knows
when to speak up and when to hang
back, and how to twist around po-
sitions to appeal to the president."
Nonetheless, after 3% years of bu-
reaucratic combat and personal in-
teraction with the secretary, the
official added, "I still can't tell
whether Shultz is bright or not."
Before he chooses a position,
even those closest to him have no
clue as to what Shultz .,ii,::.s about
the questions being discussed. "I
can tell when he is working a prob-
lem. He sits quiet and doesn't say
anything. He just listens and is re-
ally silent," said a key aide.
An official of another agency,
who used to meet regularly with
Shultz, abandoned the meetings in
frustration after months of one-sid-
ed discussions. The secretary of
state was always courteous, atten-
tive and patient, but never revealed
has own ideas, this official recalled.
U ultz s experience and stature
are major assets, but his greatest
clout derives from an unusually
close relationship with Reagan that
developed since he replaced Haig in
July 1982. Former White House
deputy chief of staff Michael K.
Deaver recently recalled the May
15, 1982, meeting when then-busi-
nessman Shultz, who had visited
allied leaders in Europe and Japan
as a special emissary to prepare for
the Versailles summit meeting, re-
ported to Reagan in the Oval Office.
"As I watched, the president just
visibly relaxed with Shultz. He has a
marvelous staff style that appeals to
Reagan, and he is a tough guy, a
good interlocutor and a consum-
mate government official. It was
clear the president was very com-
fortable with Shultz," Deaver re-
called.
This was confirmed six weeks
later when Shultz was Reagan's
immediate choice for secretary of
state after Haig's resignation. "If
push comes to shove on important
matters of foreign policy, the pres-
ident usually goes with Shultz,"
Deaver added.
Oval Office Meetings
Since August 1983, when Shultz
complained bitterly that disarray in
policymaking was "a disgrace," he
has had a claim to at least one hour
each week of the president's time
for a private meeting on any subject
of his choosing. This arrangement,
which was inaugurated after Rea-
gan was informed that "you have a
very unhappy secretary of state,"
usually involves two Oval Office
meetings of a half-hour or longer on
Wednesdays and Fridays, to which
Shultz has often invited the White
House national security adviser.
Such sessions are not given to other
Cabinet members.
On rare occasions Shultz has
used his privileged relationship with
Reagan to obtain approval for dip-
lomatic maneuvers that were un-
known to competing Cabinet mem-
bers, especially rival Weinberger.
An example of this, according to
several officials involved, was the
U.S. draft communique for Rea-
gan's Geneva meeting with Soviet
leader Gorbachev. Shultz, after
checking with Reagan, took the
draft to Moscow two weeks before
the Geneva meeting.
When Weinberger and his aides
discovered that Shultz had
presented the Soviets with a paper
the Pentagon had never seen, they
raised the roof. State reportedly
was forced to disavow the paper
after Reagan decided that he did
not want to "trivialize" his discus-
sions with Gorbachev by focusing
on a piece of paper. It was only on
the second day of the summit meet-
ing, according to a U.S. participant
at Geneva, that Reagan gave the
go-ahead to draft a final communi-
que.
Bureaucratic infighting between
State and Defense is nothing new to
Washington, but White House fail-
ures to referee have opened the
way for a guerrilla struggle outside
the normal rules of competition and
left unresolved more issues than in
the past. The Defense Department
has become adept at delaying tac-
tics to thwart decisions unpopular
with Pentagon officials. State has
retaliated by seeking to deny Pen-
tagon officials access to meetings,
cables or key decisions. Both sides
have taken their arguments to the
public, all of which is frustrating for
Shultz, who prefers harmonious
teamwork.
According to Shultz or those
close to him, each of the recent in-
cidents involving polygraphs or
symptoms of irritability are attri-
butable to different causes: his ir-
ritation with criticism from the con-
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504850033-7 .3
servative right, because he consid-
ers himself and his policies deeply
conservative and because he is un-
accustomed - to public attacks; his
deep sense of personal rectitude,
which was violated by the polygraph
directive; and his exasperation at
being _ unable to bring about more
forceful U.S. responses to interna-
tional terrorism, a goal that has be-
come his passion since hundreds of
U.S. Marines were killed in Leba-
non in October 1983.
To some degree, the "new
Shultz" of recent weeks is the pro-
jection into the public arena of an
assertive, argumentative "old
Shultz" that previously had been
seen mostly in private. For exam-
ple, Shultz's celebrated anger and
table-pounding at a Belgrade news
conference with Yugoslav Foreign
Minister Raif Dizdarevic Dec. 17 is
reported by State Department
sources to have been a repeat in
public of Shultz's earlier private
reaction to Italian Foreign Minister
Giulio Andreotti. In both cases, the
foreign diplomats angered Shultz by
speaking sympathetically of the po-
litical causes undergirding interna-
tional terrorism.
Beyond his campaign against ter-
rorism, Shultz has most left his
mark in the past 31/2 years on "pro-
cess"-one of his favorite words-
which in his sense means diplomatic
negotiations on international prob-
lems.
A former labor mediator who be-
lieves in the importance of dialogue,
Shultz has worked to open negoti-
ations or to keep them going across
a broad spectrum of trouble spots:
the Middle East, Central America,
Southern Africa and, most notably,
with the Soviet Union. In many
cases, these efforts drew criticism
from conservative groups more in-
terested in confrontation than di-
alogue with unfriendly countries.
Once discussions were under
way, however, Shultz often has
proven to be uncompromising in his
attitudes and positions. That re-
flects his own conservatism as well
as the political tendencies of the
administration and the difficulties in
obtaining a consensus.
Moreover, Shultz has repeatedly
backed paramilitary actions-for
example, covert and overt U.S. aid
to Nicaraguan counterrevolution-
aries and covert U.S. aid to antigov-
ernment rebels in Angola-that
tend to sharpen international con-
flict and complicate dialogues. At
this point, none of the regional ne-
gotiations has produced agreements
and some are barely alive.
Shultz seems unperturbed by this
lack of success. He speaks approv-
ingly of the Arab-Israeli disengage-
ment agreements and Camp David
accords of the 1970s as "fun" as
well as "masterpieces of diploma-
cy." But to advance more recent
negotiations would have required
"concessions" on the part of the
United States, Shultz said recently.
"We didn't think they were quite
the right things to do, so we didn't
do them."
The most important diplomatic
efforts generated by Shultz are the
nuclear and space arms talks with
the Soviets in Geneva and the
broader U.S.-Soviet dialogue
capped by the November summit
meeting and the followup summits
planned for 1986 and 1987. Like
Haig before him, Shultz successfully
pushed for arms and summit talks
despite internal skepticism and op-
position.
Since the rise to power of Gor-
bachev, the Soviet Union has been
unusually assertive in its diplomacy
and has occasionally initiated major
proposals, while the United States
has seemed more passive. This is a
reversal of the usual roles since
World War II.
A key question about the future
of U.S. foreign relations is whether
Shultz is capable of meeting the
challenges and opportunities of this
new situation. His record and his-
torical reputation as secretary of
state are likely to depend in part on
whether the Sphinx can rise to this
occasion with energy and imagina-
tion.
NEXT.- Terrorism and polygraphs
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504850033-7