HOW U.S. DECIDED TO PRESSURE GADHAFI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504850016-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: August 29, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504850016-6
WASHINGTON POST
29 August 1986
How U.S. Decided
To Pressure Gadhafi
Renewal Surprised Public, Some Top Aides
By Don Oberdorfer and Lou Cannon
I~ Waahmeton Pat staff writers
The resurgence of tension this
week between the United States
and Libya was rooted in a Reagan
administration plan to pressure Col.
Moammar Gadhafi, which was first
formulated in January and updated
in mid-August by President Reagan
and his top foreign policy advisers,
administration officials said yester-
day.
The sudden return of the U.S.-
Libya conflict to front pages and
television evening news shows was
a surprise to the U.S. public-and
also to the top ranks of the execu-
tive branch, which reacted to the
unexpected publicity with disarray
and confusion.
One decision made in mid-
August, according to a participant,
was to withhold any information
about the newly revamped U.S.
campaign against the Libyan leader.
Thus many officials were taken
aback on Monday by an unusually
lengthy and detailed Wall Street
Journal account of the plan, which
stirred a week of comment and
speculation.
The U.S. plan, according to
knowledgeable officials, includes
economic, political and military
pressures, from economic sanctions
to covert action to U.S. military
exercises in the Mediterranean in-
tended to impress Libya with Amer-
ican might. Another element, an
official said, is "keeping psycholog-
ical pressure on Gadhafi" in an ef-
fort to add to his many problems.
An official who participated in
several U.S. planning meetings said
he had never heard anyone say dur-
ing the discussions that an aim was
to "scare Gadhafi" into taking irra-
tional actions. However, another
participant said the "hidden agenda"
of some officials seems to be to pro-
voke Gadhafi into dangerous and
erratic action, but that such a goal
does not appear in any policy paper.
Since coming to power, the Rea-
gan administration has been
gripped, some say obsessed, by the
mercurial Libyan leader. Libya was
a major item on the agenda of the
first Reagan-era National Security
Council meeting on Jan. 21, 1981,
and the topic has often recurred. A
U.S. plan to combat Gadhafi-and
especially his support for interna-
tional terrorism-was drawn up by
mid-1981, before U.S. and Libyan
warplanes clashed in the Gulf of
Sidra that August.
A more detailed anti-Gadhafi pro-
gram was drafted last January un-
der the council's deputy director,
Donald R. Fortier, who died recent-
ly. This plan led to Reagan's Jan. 7
announcement of new U.S. econom-
ic sanctions and unannounced de-
cisions to renew U.S. air and naval
operations near Libya as part of a
long-term war of nerves.
In March, Reagan ordered U.S.
naval vessels to cross Gadhafi's
"line of death" in the Gulf of Sidra,
which Libya claims as its own,
knowing that Gadhafi likely would
react militarily. When Libya
launched antiaircraft missiles and
deployed patrol boats, U.S. forces
attacked a missile site on Libyan
territory and sank two patrol boats.
The following day. Gadhafi an-
nounced in Tripoli that "it is a time
for confrontation-for war," and
private y sent coded messages-
which were intercepted b . in-
te igence-to Libyan diplomatic
missions around the rld or erring
a actFTs on Americans. When such
an attack took place, on April 5 in a
West Berlin discotheque, Reagan
retaliated 10 days later with bomb-
ing raids on Tripoli and Benghazi.
Since the immediate fallout of the
April bombing raid-including ef-
forts to enlist European support for
anti-Libyan sanctions-the subject
of Libya had faded from public at-
tention and from attention of top
U.S. policymakers.
That began to change, so far as
administration insiders were con-
cerned, by late July when Reagan
approved a new Libya policy review
within the National Security Coun-
cil. This led to two meetings of the
highly secret Crisis Pre-Planning
Group on the subject of Libya, and,
in the week of Aug. 11, a meeting
of Reagan and his top advisers in a
National Security Planning Group
that formulated the revised U.S.
plan.
Several reasons have been cited
by officials for the renewal of U.S.
planning. Secretary of State George
P. Shultz and national security af-
fairs adviser John M. Poindexter
thought "it was time to take another
look," said a policymaker. He and
others said there was also the re-
newal of intelligence reports of Lib-
yan efforts to arrange terrorist ac-
tions, after a period when few such
efforts were reported.
Senior White House officials say
they have "hard evidence" that Gad-
hafi has been planning new terror-
ism against Americans and "other
targets" in Europe. Another official
familiar with the intelligence said
"the stuff wasn't real hard" but that
U.S. agencies in cooperation with
other governments are attempting
to pin it down.
Whatever the quality of the in-
telligence, nobody has claimed it is
the sort of "direct ... precise ...
irrefutable" evidence that Reagan
cited in announcing the April i5 air
strikes against Libya. That Oval
Office address included specific de-
tails of the intercepted messages to
and from the Libyan People's Bu-
reau, or embassy, in East Berlin at
the time of the disco bombing. This
information, which was made public
by Reagan in justification of the air
strikes against the advice of NSC
staff members, is said to have dried
up Libyan use of electronic means
for passing confidential instruc-
tions, making U.S. knowledge of
them much more difficult to obtain.
It was not secret Libyan commu-
nication but open communication
within the United States, namely
The Wall Street Journal article and
its aftermath, that held the atten-
tion of policymakers since Monday
of this week. With Reagan, Shultz
and others on vacation and officials
split between Washington and Cal-
ifornia, policymakers were alterna-
tively pleased, nonplussed or dis-
mayed by the report, which was at
various times embraced or dis-
counted.
As of yesterday, several impor-
tant officials continued to say that
an NSC staff member acting on his
own volition had "leaked" the latest
U.S. plans to the journal. The
newspaper's managing editor, Nor-
man Pearlstine, said the story was
the product of "some old-fashioned
reporting" from a variety of good
sources, "not at all a planted story
by the administration."
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504850016-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504850016-6
.A~ J WASHINGTON POST
29 August 1986
How U.S. Decided
To Pressure Gadhafi
Renewal Surprised Public, Some Top Aides
5
By Don Oberdorfer and Lou Cannon
Waafmgton Post staff writer.
The resurgence of tension this
week between the United States
and Libya was rooted in a Reagan
administration plan to pressure Col.
Moammar Gadhafi, which was first
formulated in January and updated
in mid-August by President Reagan
and his top foreign policy advisers,
administration officials said yester-
day.
The sudden return of the U.S.-
Libya conflict to front pages and
television evening news shows was
a surprise to the U.S. public-and
also to the top ranks of the execu-
tive branch, which reacted to the
unexpected publicity with disarray
and confusion.
One decision made in mid-
August, according to a participant,
was to withhold any information
about the newly revamped U.S.
campaign against the Libyan leader.
Thus many officials were taken
aback on Monday by an unusually
lengthy and detailed Wall Street
Journal account of the plan, which
stirred a week of comment and
speculation.
The U.S. plan, according to
knowledgeable officials, includes
economic, political and military
pressures, from economic sanctions
to covert action to U.S. military
exercises in the Mediterranean in-
tended to impress Libya with Amer-
ican might. Another element, an
official said, is "keeping psycholog-
ical pressure on Gadhafi" in an ef-
fort to add to his many problems.
An official who participated in
several U.S. planning meetings said
he had never heard anyone say dur-
ing the discussions that an aim was
to "scare Gadhafi" into taking irra-
tional actions. However, another
participant said the "hidden agenda"
of some officials seems to be to pro-
voke Gadhafi into dangerous and
erratic action, but that such a goal
does not appear in any policy paper.
Since coming to power, the Rea-
gan administration has been
gripped, some say obsessed, by the
mercurial Libyan leader. Libya was
a major item on the agenda of the
first Reagan-era National Security
Council meeting on Jan. 21, 1981,
and the topic has often recurred. A
U.S. plan to combat Gadhafi-and
especially his support for interna-
tional terrorism-was drawn up by
mid-1981, before U.S. and Libyan
warplanes clashed in the Gulf of
Sidra that August.
A more detailed anti-Gadhafi pro-
gram was drafted last January un-
der the council's deputy director,
Donald R. Fortier, who died recent-
ly. This plan led to Reagan's Jan. 7
announcement of new U.S. econom-
ic sanctions and unannounced de-
cisions to renew U.S. air and naval
operations near Libya as part of a
long-term war of nerves.
In March, Reagan ordered U.S.
naval vessels to cross Gadhafi's
"line of death" in the Gulf of Sidra,
which Libya claims as its own,
knowing that Gadhafi likely would
react militarily. When Libya
launched antiaircraft missiles and
deployed patrol boats, U.S. forces
attacked a missile site on Libyan
territory and sank two patrol boats.
The following day, Gadhafi an-
nounced in Tripoli that "it is a time
for con rontation- or war," and
privately sent coded messages;=
wc were intercepted by U.S. in-
telligence-to Libyan diplomatic
missions around the world or erm
attacks on Americans. When suc
an attack took pace, on April 5 in a
West Berlin discotheque, Reagan
retaliated 10 days later with bomb-
ing raids on Tripoli and Benghazi.
Since the immediate fallout of the
April bombing raid-including ef-
forts to enlist European support for
anti-Libyan sanctions-the subject
of Libya had faded from public at-
tention and from attention of top
U.S. policymakers.
That began to change, so far as
administration insiders were con-
cerned, by late July when Reagan
approved a new Libya policy review
within the National Security Coun-
cil. This led to two meetings of the
highly secret Crisis Pre-Planning
Group on the subject of Libya, and,
in the week of Aug. 11, a meeting
of Reagan and his top advisers in a
National Security Planning Group
that formulated the revised U.S.
plan.
Several reasons have been cited
by officials for the renewal of U.S.
planning. Secretary of State George
P. Shultz and national security af-
fairs adviser John M. Poindexter
thought "it was time to take another
look," said a policymaker. He and
others said there was also the re-
newal of intelligence reports of Lib-
yan efforts to arrange terrorist ac-
tions, after a period when few such
efforts were reported.
Senior White House officials say
they have "hard evidence" that Gad-
hafi has been planning new terror-
ism against Americans and "other
targets" in Europe. Another official
familiar with the intelligence said
"the stuff wasn't real hard" but that
U.S. agencies in cooperation with
other governments are attempting
to pin it down.
Whatever the quality of the in-
telligence, nobody has claimed it is
the sort of "direct ... precise ...
irrefutable" evidence that Reagan
cited in announcing the April i5 air
strikes against Libya. That Oval
Office address included specific de-
tails of the intercepted messages to
and from the Libyan People's Bu-
reau, or embassy, in East Berlin at
the time of the disco bombing. This
information, which was made public
by Reagan in justification of the air
strikes against the advice of NSC
staff members, is said to have dried
up Libyan use of electronic means
for passing confidential instruc-
tions, making U.S. knowledge of
them much more difficult to obtain.
It was not secret Libyan commu-
nication but open communication
within the United States, namely
The Wall Street Journal article and
its aftermath, that held the atten-
tion of policymakers since Monday
of this week. With Reagan, Shultz
and others on vacation and officials
split between Washington and Cal-
ifornia, policymakers were alterna-
tively pleased, nonplussed or dis-
mayed by the report, which was at
various times embraced or dis-
counted.
As of yesterday, several impor-
tant officials continued to say that
an NSC staff member acting on his
own volition had "leaked" the latest
U.S. plans to the journal. The
newspaper's managing editor, Nor-
man Pearlstine, said the story was
the product of "some old-fashioned
reporting" from a variety of good
sources, "nOt at all a planted story
by the administration."
LI/
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504850016-6