GORBACHEV'S 'MANDATE'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504820034-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: November 1, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504820034-9
r i
ARTICLE
ON PAGE
Rowland Evans
And Robert Novak
WASHINGTON POST
1 November 1985
Gorbachev's
`Mandate'
Belying advice from diplomatic experts that Presi-
dent Reagan quickly show arms control cards on his
wa tote high-stakes table in Geneva, res inte i-
gence reveals a trump in his hand: Mikhail orba-
chev s power and prestige as the new Soviet leader
have n overstated the West.
The intelligence, from a well-placed political source in
Poland with intimate ties to the boviet Politburo, dis-
closes a tenser, less decisive selection of Gorbachev as
Communist Party geeneral secretary last Ma-WE 11 than
was report ed at the time. He eked out victory by 5-to-4
on a secret ballot against the party's elderly Moscow
boss iktor Grishin (who was nominated by Gorbachev's
~,drchrival, re on omanov . The secrecy was de-
manded by Andrei Gromyko, Gorbachev's champion.
he outside world never can know what happens
vie o f uro e
around the table when the
new leader of the world's onl true em ire. But intell-
gence recently arrived here has a ring of authenticity.
Romanov's nomination of Grishin was calculated to
win support for one last round of the geriatric leader-
ship that has burdened the Soviet Union since the late
1970s. Romanov, the clear heir apparent if he could
get Grishin elected, told the Politburo that the dying
wish of Konstantin Chernenko was that Grishin suc-
ceed him, according to these reports.
An alarmed Gromyko, who had confided to a Western
statesman a day earlier that Gorbachev would be the
new leader, struck back hard. He doubted, he said, that
Chernenko had ever stated such a preference on his
death bed; the old man was too far gone to confide any-
thing to anyone. He then demanded and got a secret bal-
lot from the eight other Politburo members present.
Reagan administration partisans of the theory that.
Gorbachev cannot afford to lose in Geneva because of
his shaky mandate believe this greatly strengthens the
president's hand. They mean that Gorbachev needs an
arms control deal for domestic economic reasons far
more than Reagan does. The president can avoid buy-
ing an arms control pig-in-a-poke.
But Secretary of State George Shultz has labored
hard and honorably to work out an arms control pack-
age as the centerpiece of Geneva. On Oct. 22, in the
final National Security Council discussion of Reagan's
U.N. speech, Shultz advised Reagan to insert a couple
of strong paragraphs on arms control to accompany
the basic thrust of the speech on "regional" issues
such as Afghanistan and Angola (though that emphasis
originated in the State Department with Shultz's ap-
proval). Reagan was quickly told that if he followed the
secretary's suggestion, the headlines would center on
arms control, not the Soviet-backed regional conflicts
Reagan wanted to emphasize. That would advance
Gorbachev's plan for an arms control summit,
strengthening him back home.
Hence the concern among Shultz's colleagues about
what may emerge from his Moscow talks with the
Soviet leader. They hope he will engage in positive
thinking about Gorbachev's slender Kremlin mandate.
While the secretary of state is under domestic and
NATO pressure to talk arms control, it can only
strengthen the president's adversary at Geneva.
19&5. News America Syndicate
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504820034-9