NSC DOCUMENT URGED EASING OF EMBARGO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504530015-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: November 18, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/24: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504530015-2
1vSC Document
Urged Easing
Of Embargo
-7 By Molly Moore
WASHINGTON POST
18 November 1986
The National Security Council
circulated a top-secret document in
June 1985 recommending that the
United States ease its worldwide
arms embargo against Iran and en-
courage some allies to sell selected
military equipment to Tehran to
cultivate closer ties with certain
Iranian government factions, in-
formed sources said yesterday.
When the proposal, which had
been prompted by a CIA internal
memo, reached the desk of Defense
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger,
he scribbled on the document, "This
is absurd," sources said.
The Central Intelligence Agency
memorandum, dated May 17, 1985,
was a response to growing U.S.
concerns that the United States
was lagging behind the Soviet
Union in cultivating Iranian con-
tacts that could be useful in the
event of the overthrow or death of
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,
sources said.
The NSC staff then took the
memorandum-which one source
said was sent by CIA Director Wil-
ham J. Casey-and developed a
broader proposal for a National Se-
clity Strategy Directive (NSSD).
A draft of that plan was sent to the
White House and distributed to
Weinberger and Secretary of State
George P. Shultz for comment, ac-
cording to sources.
.-.The proposal recommended that
the United States encourage its
Western allies to help Iran by es-
tablishing commercial trade, includ-
ing the sale of selected military
equipment on a case-by-case basis,
sources said. The plan also sug-
gested that the United States relax
a worldwide arms-sale embargo
against Iran, which was known in
the U.S. government as Operation
Staunch.
Weinberger, in a written re-
sponse to then-national security
adviser Robert C. McFarlane, rec-
ommended that the United States
change none of its policies toward
Iran until after Khomeini was no
longer in power.
The CIA memorandum made no
reference to American hostages or
resuming U.S. arms sales to Iran,
according to sources. It is unclear
whether the subsequent NSSD
draft proposal was a factor in what
became the covert operation ap-
proved by the White House to sell
arms to Iran as part of an effort to
improve relations and free U.S. hos-
tages held by pro-Iranian terrorists
in Lebanon.
It also is unclear how Shultz re-
sponded to the NSSD draft. Shultz
reportedly joined Weinberger seven
months later, in January 1986, in
opposing President Reagan's secret
diplomatic overtures to Tehran. In
recent days, Shultz has become in-
creasingly vocal in his opposition to
sending arms to Iran, and sources
said Weinberger has not changed
his opinion since the January meet-
ing.
Reagan said last week that plans
to explore Iranian contacts began
18 months ago, about the time of
the exchange of documents among
the CIA, NSC, White House, Pen-
tagon and State Department.
The NSC draft proposal was dat-
ed three days after the June 14,
1985, hijacking of a TWA flight to
Beirut. The.White House eventually
came to recognize that Iran was a
key player in obtaining the release
of several of the hijacked hostages.
The CIA memorandum concen-
trated on the failure by the United
States to identify factions within
Iran who were potentially sympa-
thetic to Western concerns, sources
said. The report noted that U.S.
intelligence on the internal work-
ings of Iran was sketchy. It also in-
dicated that the CIA believed the
Soviets were strengthening their
influence by establishing strong
contacts with the L avian govern-
ment, according to sources.
The CIA document also was
based on a belief by some analysts
that the Khomeini regime was on
the verge of collapse and that the
United States should be in a posi-
tion to "move first" if the opportu-
nity arose, sources said.
The proposal suggested that the
United States and Western allies
make inroads by taking advantage
of the political situation in Iran, im-
proving relations with certain ele-
ments there and avoiding actions
that would exacerbate poor rela-
tions, according to sources.
Some administration officials in-
volved in reviewing the proposals
said that if the United States failed
to develop contacts in Iran, it risked
being "left out in the cold should
another revolution come," sources
said.
Sources said Weinberger thought
the CIA assumption of an imminent
revolution or change in the Iranian
government was wrong, prompting
him to label the suggestion as "ab-
surd."
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/24: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504530015-2