CENTRAL AMERICA IN US FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504480007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 30, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504480007-7
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
30 January 1986
Central America in US foreign policy
The making of US
policy for Central
America is a text-
book example of
the challenges of
building domestic
consensus on
key international
issues. Just a few
decades ago,
liberals and con-
servatives worked
together to `con-
tain' communism.
Since the divisive
Vietnam war,
however, agree-
ment on major US
security issues
has eluded
policymakers.
By George D. Moffett III
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
Washington
WHEN Reagan administration
officials took over the job of
managing US relations with
Central America five years ago, they
came loaded for bear.
Pointing to evidence of Soviet en-
croachments in the Western hemisphere,
they announced plans to make the re-
gion a test case of the administration's
resolve to "draw the line" against com-
munist advances in a region judged criti-
cal to the national interests of the United
States.
In swift succession, Reagan officials
launched, and then expanded on, a spate
of new initiatives, increasing US aid to
help El Salvador to fight leftist insur-
gents, and organizing an undeclared war
against Nicaragua's Marxist Sandinista
government, using Nicaraguan rebels
(called "contras") who were trained and
funded by the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Since 1981, over $4.7 billion in US
economic and military assistance has
been spent in or committed to Central
America, up six times from the Carter
years. Carter administration appointees,
and even those Reagan appointees
judged "soft," have been purged from
key Latin America policy posts. A trade
embargo has been imposed on Nicara-
gua, even though the US maintains full
diplomatic relations with Managua.
Meanwhile, the largest US military ma-
neuvers ever in Central America, code
named "Big Pine," have underscored
the Reagan commitment to restore pre-
dominant US influence in the Western
Hemisphere.
Reagan officials insist the tough new
approach to Central America has been a
success.
"In 1980, the situation looked almost
hopeless in El Salvador. Today, Salvador
has become a success story," says one
State Department official. "In Nicara-
gua, we've substantially 'increased the
costs of trying to export communism to
other countries."
Even so, the policy has encountered
rough sledding at home. Congress has
made life difficult for the President. It
has often questioned the administra-
tion's basic assumptions about Central
America and, by suspending aid to the
contras last year, it temporarily gutted
one key part of the President's strategy
for dealing with communist influence in
the region. At the same time, a tenacious
collection of interest groups has led suc-
cessful efforts to hold the Reagan team
to account on issues like human rights in
Cental America.
For the most part, President Reagan
has managed to stay in control, setting
the tone and, ultimately, the terms of the
national debate over policy for the re-
gion. But experts say the struggle over
Central America policy provides a text-
book example of the complex workings
of the nation's fragmented foreign policy
process.
Despite the President's clear objec-
tives and personal popularity, experts
note that the limits of presidential lead-
ership in foreign policy have been set by
a variety of factors.
One is public opinion. Opinion polls
show that most Americans agree with
the President that Central America is
important to US national interests. Most
agree that communism poses a threat to
the region.
But public support for Reagan objec-
tives has not always translated into a
mandate for more decisive action in the
region. Reflecting their fears of involve-
ment in an unpopular war like that in
Vietnam, Americans worry more about
the danger of becoming "too entangled"
in Central America than about the
spread of communism "because the US
doesn't do enough to stop it," says poll-
ster Burns Roper.
In other words, for most Americans,
the cure may be worse than the malady.
To the extent the President has advo-
cated excessively strong cures, public
approval of his handling of Central
America policy has languished.
Policy has also been hamstrung by
countervailing views within the adminis-
tration itself. Moderates, led by Secre-
tary of State George Shultz, have gener-
ally favored keeping the negotiating
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option alive. Hardliners, including Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency director Willi
as an Assistant Defense Secretary
-Fred Ikle, have favored more extreme
measures, including severing diplomatic
relations with Managua and recognizing
the contras as the legitimate government
of Nicaragua.
"As the administration's on-again,
off-again commitment to negotiations
with Nicaragua suggests, the result has
been to make US diplomacy in the re-
gion somewhat more eratic," says a con-
gressional source.
In addition to disagreements among
top Reagan officials, differences
betweeen Reagan appointees and career
foreign policy bureaucrats at the state,
defense, and treasury departments and
elsewhere have also worked to moderate
policy
The views of regional experts who
oversee the day-to-day aspects of US
trade, immigration, security, and invest-
ment policy toward Central America
have tended to reinforce the learning
process of political appointees, exerting
a strong gravitational pull toward the po-
litical center, Abraham Lowenthal, a
Latin America specialist at the Univer-
sity of California at Los Angeles has
written.
But experts say the main constraints
on policymaking stem from the more ba-
sic fact that foreign policy is not made
by presidents alone. Since the Vietnam
war, Congress has acquired a much
larger role in the foreign policymaking
process. In addition, various
nongovernmental groups, ranging from
multinational corporations to religious
organizations, have acquired more influ-
ence on the shaping of US Latin Amer-
ica policy.
The best-organized opposition to the
Reagan policy has come from a coalition
of religious and human rights groups.
Church groups began organizing against
military aid to El Salvador following the
March 1980 assassination of
Salvadorean archbishop Oscar Arnulfo
Romero and the December 1980 killing of
four US missionary nuns. Both atroc-
ities were attributed to right-wing death
squads linked to the Salvadorean
military.
Although the human rights lobby has
had no success in forcing cuts in US
military aid levels to Central America, it
has helped make compliance with hu-
man rights standards a condition for
US aid by focusing attention on alleged
human rights abuses of both the
Salvadorean government and contra
forces in Nicaragua. Meanwhile, many in
Congress have rallied in opposition to
the Reagan policy, concerned with its ac-
cent on military means and fearful that
it could lead to direct US intervention in
Central America.
Despite charges contained in a series
of administration "white papers," con-
gressional opponents say there's little
convincing proof that significant
amounts of aid from Nicaragua are being
channeled to Salvadorean guerrilla
forces. The Reagan administration has
charged that arms are being shipped
from Nicaragua to leftist rebels in El Sal-
vador for the purpose of destablizing
both that nation and the region as a
whole.
In addition, many in Congress have
questioned the shifting rationale for ad-
ministration policy in Nicaragua. Mr.
Reagan first said that aid to the contras
was needed to interdict arms supplies to
the Salvadorean rebels. By 1984, the
President was dropping clear hints that
the real purpose of contra aid was to
overthrow the Sandinista government, a
policy widely held to be in violation of
internationl law
"It was one thing for the contras to
have that as their objective. Where I fell
off the bandwagon is when the President
said so too," says one senator, John
Chafee (R) of Rhode Island, who
changed his stand on the issue of contra
aid.
Congressional opposition to Reagan's
Nicaragua policy was catalyzed
news leaked in April 1984 that the Cen.
tr Intelligence Agenc.
had played a
rect role in laying underwater mines in
Nicaragua's harbors. Later reports im-
licated the CIA in producing a 90-page
field manual for Nicaraguan contras en-
orsing the "selective use of violence"
_including assassination - against
Sandinista officials.
The revelations led to the high tide of
congressional opposition, prompting a
cutoff of US aid to the contras and a pro-
hibition on the use of any US funds for
the purpose of overthrowing the
Sandinista government.
Despite these setbacks, few disagree
that Reagan has left a deep imprint on
US Policy in Central America. Congress
has now resumed aid to the contras for
"humanitarian" purposes. Reinforced
by Nicaragua's worsening record on po-
litical and human rights, Capitol Hill
sources say the administration's case for
restoring military aid this spring may
yet carry the day in Congress. Current
humanitarian assistance runs out in
March.
But by restricting the military option
and encouraging negotiations - and by
forcing Reagan officials to rank poverty
and human rights abuses with Soviet in-
terference as root causes of the turmoil
in Central America - other participants
in the policy process have defined the
limits of US involvement in Central
America.
` `Central America is a re-
gion of great importance
to the United States.... And
it has become the stage for a
bold attempt by the Soviet
Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua
to install communism by force
throughout the hemisphere."
Presdent Reagan, May 10, 1984
` `Sandinistas have been
engaged for some time in
spreading their communist
revolution beyond their bor-
ders. They're providing arms,
training, and a headquarters to
the communist guerrillas who
are attempting to overthrow
the democratically elected
Duarte government of El
Salvador.
President Reagan, April 1S, 1985
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1 to
on map show combined US military
and economic assistance to Central
America in 1985.
government In Nicaragua. Figures
Early in his tenure, President
Reagan increased US aid to help El
Salvador fight W M insurgents and
funded Nicaraguan rebels in their
efforts to overthrow the Sandinista
'sr
PF,A $24 million
r, I
T his series is keyed to the
New York-based Foreign
Policy Association's
"Great ft ions" program,
which is designed to help
Americans become better
informed about critical foreign
policy issues. The articles will
appear on Thursdays from Jan.
30 through March 20.
The subjects are:
How foreign policy Is made
The case of Central America
-2-
"Star wars" and the
Geneva Tdca:
What future for arms control?
.3-
Democracy in Latin America:
Focus on Argentina and Brazil
-4-
International terrorism:
In search of a response
.S_
European Cornnumity anti
the US:
Friction among friends
-6
Thbd-vvorW devekvment:
Old problems, new strategies?
-7-
Iarael acrd the US:
Friendship and discord
-&
Region in Ylternatiornl
poN IM
Why the resurgence?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504480007-7