SANDINISTAS GROW STRONGER, ANALYSTS SAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504430008-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 9, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504430008-1
T, .
`Sandinistas
Grow Stronger,
Analysts Say
By MARJORIE MILLER,
Times Staff Writer
MANAGUA, Nicaragua-Five
years into their war against the
Sandinista government, the U.S.-
backed Nicaraguan rebels are still
a rudimentary and ineffectual
force, unable to mount a real
military threat to their well-
trained and well-equipped oppo-
nents, diplomats and military ana-
lysts here say.
These observers say that the
Sandinistas, on the other hand,
have become an experienced, pro-
fessional force. They describe the
rebels, the so-called contras, as
"almost a defeated army" and raise
questions about how much pres-
sure the rebels could put on the
Sandinistas even with the $100
million in military and humanitari-
an aid the Reagan Administration
wants to give them.
Nicaraguan Confidence
"All you can be sure of is that it
keeps them together as a fighting
force for another year," said a
diplomat who asked not to be
identified. "You can't predict how
they will use it."
The Sandinistas' confidence
tends to reinforce this view.
Last April, when Congress was
considering a request for $14 mil-
lion in military aid to the contras,
the Sandinistas and their support-
ers were- in a state of near-panic.
The request was defeated, but
Congress then approved $27 mil-
lion in so-called non-lethal aid
after President Daniel Ortega trav-
eled to the Soviet Union.
This time, the Sandinistas seem
unruffled. The public mood is mat-
ter-of-fact, and Ortega, apparently
untroubled by his experience of a
year ago, is in Cuba.
"Before, with $14 million, we felt
they were going to kill us," a
Sandinista supporter said. "Now
we are sure they are going to get
the money, but we are more sure
that even with the money, we will
defeat the contras."
To be sure, the war is causing
problems for the Sandinistas, who
dust devote about 50% of their
budget to the military and continue
with unpopular military conscrip-
LOS ANGELES TIMES
9 March 1986
tioll. By government count, they
lest 1,143 soldiers and 281 civilians
lhst year in clashes with the con-
The military is given priority for
scarce resources, causing shortages
and discontent among civilians and
fhniting the government's ability to
ove ahead with other programs
pnd services.
But none of the observers feel
that the problems are being trans-
lated into internal support for the
ebels or that such problems will
orce the Sandinistas to the bar-
aining table. Some say they worry
mostly that a prolonged war could
lead to increased restrictions on
political freedom in Nicaragua.
Officials of the Reagan Adminis-
4.ration, which financed thecontras
r
q 1984, used to say that U. f
was designed to opin
e _ i as in El Salvador. Now
ese officials say their aim is to
gressure the Sandinistas to enter
%nd,negotiations with the contras
to remake their political sys-
ivately, the contras make it
w and replace the Sandin-
llstimated Numbers
41.
'- The Reagan Administration cal-
Ct4ates the strength of the rebel
welting supplies in Honduras and
data Rica. Western observers
lien say that the total is about
15,000 and that, at most, 3,000 of
thl v are in Nicaragua.
~Il1e numbers cannot be con-
f3rnied, because access to contra
bases is restricted by the contras
and; the Honduran military. But
i$ er? their numbers, the con-
'to control arty strategic part
, they have failed to
;li, ' major military victory and
front with urban opera-
lomatic and military obeerv-
ca incompetence and San-
superiority.
e last year, the contras have
ed to shoot down one gov-
ulder-fired surface-to-air
to, open a new front in the
provinces of Boaco and
es and to keep up a stream
df_ ambushes. But in general they
live been overpowered by the
~dinistas on the battlefield.
Coffee-Area Action
When the 1984-85 coffee crop
~VVas being harvested-coffee is
1~Tjcaragua's primary export-the
tras attacked 59 farms and
plants, causing a loss of
million in equipment an d coffee
left on the trees to rot. This season,
the Sandinistas concentrated
troops in the northern coffee-pro-
ducing provinces of Matagalpa and
Jinotega, and the contras did not
attack.
Also in the last year, the contras
were forced to pull - back their
southern front on the Costa Rican
border, and, according to observ-
ers, they botched some of their
larger military operations.
"They have been incoftetent
and ineffectual militarily," one dip-
lomat said. "And they don't seem to
know what to do in a guerrilla
war."
He pointed to an operation in the,
northwestern province of Esteli
last August in which the guerrillas
dynamited four bridges and inter-
rupted traffic for a time but left
with all four bridges still in place.
The contras say the Sandinistas'
introduction of helicopters last
year has been a key factor in the
war. In the Esteli operation, the
rebels attacked the town of La
Trinidad, on the Pan American
Highway, at dawn. They held the
town briefly but, as they retreated,
the Sandinistas surprised them
with airborne troops and Soviet-
built MI-24 gunships. As many as
150 contras were reported killed
Heavy Losses Told
In November, again at dawn, the
contras attacked the town of Santo
Domingo in Chontales province, far
from their havens on the Honduran
border, but again the Sandinistas
responded with helicopters, inflict-
ing heavy casualties on the rebels.
"They should learn you don't go
in at dawn," a military observer
said. "You-go in at dusk, because
helicopters can't fly at night."
Success has been mixed on the
contras' Boaco-Chontales front.
Last year, the rebels vowed to cut
traffic on the east-west highway
linking Managua to the river port
of Rama. The river empties into the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504430008-1
r
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504430008-1
and the capital.
Caribbean, aria the Managua-MUM
highway is a vital military cargo
route for the Sandinistas. being the
only paved link between the sea
oecUpied the cattle town of
Pftsil-
litas on the highway but have failed
since then to interrupt the route.
Now, observers say, many contra
troops are pulling out of the region
because of supply shortages.
U.S. officials and contra leaders
blame the rebels' lack of succees.on
transportation problems, supply
shortages and a need for training.
all of which they hope to rectify'
with the requested $100 million in
U.S. aid.
"You can't run an army when
today you have bullets but no boots
anti tomorrow you have boots but
no tsiffgra," Aristides Sanchez, a
'rebel ptt', said in a recent inter
,view in Honduras. "If the aid is
approved, We can disrupt the San-
army and put very effective
pressure on them."
Of the 'W. million in U.S. aid
approved lad, year, much of it is
still unspent, and the supplies
bought by some of it are backed up
in a New Orleans warehouse. Last
year, former' Honduran President
Roberto Suazo Cordova blocked
deliveries to. the contras, but the
new president, Jose Azcona Hoyo,
appar4ntly has given his approval.
. In November, the, abfY
Observers. describe the contras
as needing what amounts to a
thorough overhaul if they are to be
turned ? into an army that could
pressure the Sandinistas. ,
In addition to needing anti-air-
craft weapons, artillery and ammu-
nition, the contras need basic mili-
tary and weapons training. They
had SAM-T surface-to-airmissiles
long before they shot down a
Sandinista helicopter in December,
but they were unable to use them
because they did not know how to
clean them. A foreign expert hired
by U.S. ftgid-raisers taught them to-
do this.-
Officer Shortage
Analysts say the contras are
severely limited in what they can
do in, the field by an absence of
trainedn}id-bevel officers and non-
commissioned officers.
"You've 'got task force com-
manders who- can't read a map," a
diplomat said. "They can't move
their forces from A to B; because
The contras also need help with
building. a logistical system to get
supplies to their troops. - -
"The frost common meaicai
problem they have is hernia," 'the
diplomat said.'"They carry these
70- to 80-pound packs, and they
come down with hernias."
Some military' analysts believe
that with adequate training.. and
direction, the contras could attack
strategic economic targets and
could inflict more casualties on
Sandinista troops. They say the
Sandinista army is vulnerable to
ambushes because their convoys
travel close together and the troops
set up their camps in clusters, "like
a Boy Scout troop."
But other observers say that the
contras'=problems run deeper than
training,.transportation and supply
shortages. They cite bickering
rel groups-the larger, Wash
i n-favored Nicaraguan Demo-
cratic Force (FDN), headed by
Adolfo Calero; the United Nicara-
guan opposition, an umbrella group
to which Calero belongs together
with banker Arturo Cruz and engi-
neer Alfonso Robelo, both former
members of the Sandinista govern-
ment, and a faction of the Revolu-
tionary Democratic Alliance led by
guerrilla leader Eden Pastora in
Costa Rica.
Leadership Concern
Even U.S. officials in Washing-
ton admit privately that incompe-
tent leadership is a concern. They
complain that Col. Enrique Bermu-
dez, military commander of the
Nicaraguan Democratic Force,
spends more time in Miami and
Tegucigalpa, the capital of Hondu-
ras, than in the field.
Another problem, analysts say, is
that the contras have not devel-
oped a social base inside Nicaragua.
They have no people to help them
with communications and supplies,
no safe houses that would be
needed in the event of urban
operations.
The contras get tacit support
from Cardinal Miguel Obando y
Bravo and from conservative oppo-
sition business and political groups
in the country, but they have been
unable to turn that into a mass
base. The war and the govern-
ment's state of emergency have
prevented these groups from ac-
knowledging their apparent sym-
pathy.
For a long time, the contras had
no political platform, although one
was drawn up last year, and the
Sandinistas, meanwhile, succeeded
in branding them all as "Somocis-
tas"-followers of the late dictator
Anastasio Somoza. Several of the
contra military leaders, including
Bermudez, were officers in the
National Guard under Somoza.
"A major failure of the FDN is
that no one knew what they stood
for politically," a diplomat said.
"Belatedly, they did something
about it, but the impact it has had
here is zilch.
",People are undoubtedly worse
off, economically. They find life
difficult. But I don't think they are
so, -disenchanted as to say, 'Let's
join the contras,' especially when
tlp* contras are so nebulous."
'Rome observers believe that
with a few battlefield successes,
the contras could develop momen-
tum and attract supporters. But
others say Washington's contra
policy actually discourages internal
opposition.
"U.S. contra policy is preventing
an internal front by fomenting an
external front or drawing them out
of the country," a diplomat said.
"As long as the contras are organ-
ized and financed, it is easier to go
to Costa Rica and Honduras than to
stay here."
While the contras have lagged,
the Sandinistas have improved, in
the opinion of most observers, who
say the strength of the Sandinista
Popular Army has grown to about
60,000. Two years ago, the Sandin-
istas sent conscripts into combat
with little or no training, but now
draftees are given 45 to 90 days of
basic training before going out in
the field. The Sandinistas have
trained noncommissioned officers,
and their units reportedly are a
mixture of experienced men and
recruits.
"The Sandinista Popular Army is
a growing army that increasingly
has benefited from the expertise of
Cuban advisers and from six years
of their own experience," a military
analyst said.
Also, the Sandinista army has
complete air superiority over the
rebels, a situation that, according to
some observers, mirrors that in El
Salvador. As occurred in El Salva-
dor, where the United States sup-
plied the helicopters, Soviet-sup-
plied helicopters in Nicaragua have
changed the nature of the war,
giving government forces mobility
and intense firepower and prevent-
ing the rebels from building up in
large numbers.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504430008-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504430008-1
The Sandinistas are reported to
have about a dozen functioning
MI-8 transport helicopters and at
least six armed MI-24 gunships.
Observers say that more helicop-
ters have been delivered recently,
but they are not sure what kind or
how many.
On the ground, the Sandinistas
have long-range artillery and
about 14 specially trained counter-
insurgency battalions they use to
seek out the contras rather than
waiting to respond to attacks.
Sandinista troop morale is said to
be high because distribution of food
and other supplies is good and
because they feel they are winning.
A soldier near El Espino on the
Honduran border told reporters he
was getting weekends off because
there wasn't much fighting in the
area.
Observers say that the Sandinis-
tas have excellent intelligence.
They easily intercept commumc -
tions and hav- tho~ougnly -mfif-
trat the contra forces. In addi-
tion, their internal security
making it almost impossible for the
contras to set up an internal front
operations have all been stymied
by the Interior Ministry, headed by
veteran Sandinista leader Tomas
Borge.
and urban operations. Penalties
involvement in contra activities are
up to 30 years in prison.
Contra leaders have said that
their attempts to establish internal
And while the contras have not
developed an internal base of'sup'+~
port, the Sandinistas have woi'kel
very hard to do so, with projects
and propaganda. Times may be
difficult, a diplomat said, but people,
are not starving, and there are no
bodies at the sides of streets.
"One of the successes of the
government has been to blame all
its problems on Uncle Sam and the
contras," this diplomat said. "Peo-'.
ple largely accept that their mis-
fortunes are the result of extrane='
ous forces."
Another diplomat, however, said
that strength, not propaganda, i5
what wins a war.
"What the contras need, he
said, "is success on the battle-
field.... It is the Leninist idea of!
consolidation of forces. Once you
start a war, you damn well better
be winning."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504430008-1