BUMM RAP FOR THE CIA?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504400041-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: May 24, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/17 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504400041-7
ARTIGLEAPPEARED ~ ~,,,~~i,i~~,~,~~~ T1,~~
OIiPAGE ~~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~s
COMMENTARY
The CIA appears to be more a victim of
sensational journalism rather than an '
indirect accessory to a mass murder. ~..
aunn RaP
FOR THE
CIa?
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/17 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504400041-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/17 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504400041-7
2
fter a headline story and a
lead editorial in "fhc LVush-
ington Post last week
charging the CIA with indi-
rect involvement in the murderous
March 8 car bombing in Beirut,
chants of "death to America" punc-
tuated the funeral orations for the
victims, and the State Department
alerted U.S. Embassies in the Middle
Fast to the danger of violent retali-
ation against Americans.
From [he welter of accusations,
denials, and explanations left behind
by this journalistic coup, the real
seyuence of events is gradually
beginning to emerge. As the roles
and motives of the principal players
become more clearly understood,
the CIA appears to be more a victim
of sensational journalism rather
than an indirect accessory to a mass
murder.
In contrast to the Post's implica-
tion of CIA involvement, all U.S. offi-
cialswith knowledge of these events
from Secretary of State George
Shultz on down are unanimous in
denying that the agency had any con-
nection, direct or indirect, with the
Lebanese intelligence team that
arranged the car bombing.
All informed American officials
agree that the CIA did not in any way
train the Lebanese who planned and
carried out the bombing nor did it
have advance knowledge of the
event. Typical of the official reaction
is the comment by Robert B. Oakley,
the director of the State
Department's office for counter-
terrorism, who found the Post's han-
dling of the story "outrageous"
But in retrospect it is easy to see
how the Post's investigative report-
ers were led astray by startling dis-
coveries they made after the
bombing. For example, they
unearthed for the first time the fact
that President Reagan had secretly
directed the CIA last December to
train and support Lebanese intelli-
genceteams for the purpose of using
violent action to pre-empt and abort
terrorist activity aimed at American
targets.
Meanwhile, with evidence ~rt tn?
top-secret presidential directive in
hand, it was natural for the Post
reporters to assume at least some
indirect agency connection wtth the
bombing attack on one of the sus-
pected terrorist strongholds. But cn
fact no such connection existed for
two separate reasons.
First, the [op professional intel-
ligence officers in the CIA had long
been skeptical of any attempt to
recruit and train anti-terrorist Leba-
nese hit squads for fear they might
get out of control in the anarchy' of a
disintegrating society. Only very
reluctantly did these intelligent
pros accept the new responsibility,
and they would have preferred con-
centrating on the counterintelli-
gence penetration of the terrorist
organizations as a better way of
ensuring an effective defense.
IVioreover, once the presidennal
order had been issued, the agency
operators in the field found the Leba-
nese security services so fractured
by political and religious rivalries
that no recruitment or training had
been undertaken by March 8 when
the car bomb exploded. In a sense,
this event was looked upon by CIA
officers as a reprieve because it viv-
idly demonstrated all the dangers of
indiscriminate violence they had
been predicting.
In the aftermath of the Beirut
massacre, the presidential finding
in favor of pre-emptive counterter-
rorism was rescinded and the
agency let off the hook for having to
carry it out.
One other facet of the American
intelligence relationship with Leba-
non may have .misled the Post
reporters. For more than 20 years,
the CIA maintained a routine liaison
relationship with Lebanese intelli-
gence as with the intelligence ser-
vices of other non-communist
countries. An exchange of visits and
some training was involved but this
had nothing to do with recruiting
and training counter-terror hit
squads.
however, passed up the opportunity
it was given to appeal up the line
where the judgment might have
been different once all the facts were
on the table.
l'urd :11cry~'r i; ~~ nutiun~tlly ~~'n~
dt~uted culumr!itit.
s permitted by law in cases of
extreme sensitivity, this pres-
idential finding was reported
not to the whole membership of the
Senate and House Intelligence Com-
mittees, but only to their chairmen
and vice chairmen. [n spite of such
extra precautions, this highly-secret
information was somehow leaked to
the Post either from the Congress or
from the executive branch, and the
Icak has fueled a growing demand
fur ti radical review of the whole can
i;ressiunal oversight proves,.
n the light of this background, it
does seem that the Post story was
inflated to suggest conclusions
well beyond what the facts could
support and that the CIA got a bum
rap. In the process, American lives
may have been needlessly endan-
gered.
In fairness to the top editors of the
Post, it should be pointed out that the
press spokesman for the CIA
strongly objected to the story when
it +vas read to him 24 hours before
publication. In the absence of CIA
Director 14'illiam Case}', the agency,
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/17 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504400041-7