MOUNTING SOVIET PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504400014-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: May 2, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sl Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504400014-7
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WASHINGTON TIl`1ES
2 f~1ay 1986
Mounting Soviet pressure
on Pakistan
CORD MEYER
he ability of the courageous
Afghan guerrillas to hold
the Soviet army at bay de-
pends onfour pillars of con-
tinuing support. So long as the
United States, China, and Saudi Ara-
bia continue to provide arms and
money and Pakistan stands firm in
allowing this assistance to cross its
borders into Afghanistan, the
mujahideen have a real chance of
eventually regaining their lost free-
dom.
But as the evolving strategy of So-
viet General Secretary Mikhail Gor-
bachev unfolds in Afghanistan,
Reagan officials begin to see that it
is aimed at undermining the most
vulnerable and exposed of these
four supporting pillars. Through an
escalating series of intimidating
moves, the Soviets seem determined
to cut the vital supply lines through
Pakistan on which the Afghan resis-
tance must rely for arms, food, and
trained reinforcements.
A primary Soviet objective in the
severe fighting last year and in the
early and massive offensive this
spring has been to knock out guer-
rilla strong points inside
Afghanistan that protect the supply
routes.
As the intelligence reports fil-
tered back art week from Lhe mmn_
guerrilla base at Zhawar in Paktia
Province Pentagon officials reluc-
tantl concluded that the uerrillas
ha su ere ea osses before be-
ing a e to reoccupy t o ase a ter
the Soviet and Af ha
wrt rew
In this intensified fighting along
the trails that lead into Afghanistan,
Reagan officials have seen a steady
improvement in Soviet tactical skill.
Relying more on highly mobile spe-
cial forces and much-improved intel-
ligence, the Soviets respond more
quickly to targets of opportunity and
are less easily ambushed. Careful
Russian cultivation of tribal divi-
sions has enabled the Soviets in
some cases to bribe local militias
that have proved effective against
the guerrillas.
In addition to these intensified
attacks on supply lines inside
Afghanistan, the Soviets have devel-
oped awide range of strategies de-
signed to have maximum effect in-
side Pakistan and to bring
increasing pressure to bear on Paki-
stan's new civilian government to
force it to end assistance to the
mujahideen.
As demonstrated in the recent
savage Soviet bombing of the civil-
ian population of the city of Kan-
dahar, the Soviets relentlessly con-
tinue to pursue their scorched-earth
policy that has already driven more
than 3 million Afghans into Pakistan.
These homeless refugees not only
become a heavy burden on the Paki-
stan econorr;y but Pakistani officials
have reason to fear the growing ten-
sions between the local Pakistani
population and the Afghan refugees.
In order to exacerbate these
resentments, the Afghan regime's
intelligence agents are paying local
criminals a healthy fee for blowing
up government buildings in Pesha-
war, the capital of Pakistan's North
West Frontier Province. These
bombings are then blamed on Pres-
identZia ul-Haq's involvement in the
Afghan war, and secret Soviet subsi-
dies to dissident Pakistani tribal
chiefs tend to further destabilize the
border region.
Moreover, since Mr. Gorbachev
came to power last year, there has
been a tripling in the number of de-
liberate violations of Pakistani terri-
tory by bombings and shellings
across the border. There is an impli-
cit warning in these escalating inci-
dents that Pakistan had better seri-
ously reconsider its willingness to
allow Afghan guerrillas to use its
territory for their base camps.
While President Zia has so far
been able to stand up with com-
mendable firmness against these
external pressures, he faces a new
internal political situation that may
work to the Soviet advantage. As
leader of her dead father's Pakistan
People's Party, Benazir Bhutto re-
turned home last month to be wel-
comed by huge crowds. So far she
has resisted the temptation to call
for direct negotiations by the Paki-
stan government with the Afghan
Communist regime in Kabul, as
many in her party want her to do.
ut if the Soviets move to re-
place the ailing puppet pres-
ident of Afghanistan, Babrak
Karmal, with someone less directly
associated with the Soviet invasion
of 1979, Miss Bhutto may then de-
cide to press for direct negotiations
instead of the indirect talks under
U.N. auspices scheduled for May 5 in
Geneva.
Given these mounting internal
and external pressures for an end to
Pakistani involvement in the Afghan
war, the Reagan administration is
hoping that the Pakistan govern-
ment will continue to recognize that
the most dangerous threat of all to
its people would be the consolidation
of Soviet power in a Communist
Afghanistan on its immediate bor-
der And only continuing and even
more effective aid to the mujahideen
can prevent that from happening.
Cord Meyer is a nationally syndi-
cated columnist.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504400014-7