TUGGING AT THE RUG UNDER SAVIMBI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504400004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 20, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

ST Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504400004-8
3 CORD MEYER
AASHINGTON TIMES
20 February 1987
Tugging at the rug
under Savimbi
As the Reagan adminis-
tration staggers un-
der the impact of
new revelations
about its mishan-
dling of the Iranian
affair, there is a real danger that
some of the president's most prom-
ising foreign policy initiatives may
be lost in the wreckage and that the
baby may he thrown out with the
bath water.
For example. a partisan group of
congressional Democrats are mov-
ing to introduce legislation that if
passed would cut off any further aid
to Jonas Savimbi's UN ITA guerrillas
in Angola and would call for U.S. rec-
ognition of the Marxist MPLA re-
gime supported by Soviet arms and
36,000 Cuban combat troops.
To counter this threat to President
Reagan's covert program of SIS mil-
lion in military assistance to UNITA.
passed last year by a bipartisan con-
gressional majority, Mr Savimbi has
sent his able secretary for foreign
affairs. Pedro Chingunji. to Wash-
ington to explain what an enormous
difference the American arms and
training have made and how vital it
is to continue this modest assistance.
On the basis of hard intelli~cence,
State Department o icia s ,rid
analysts are in ag=reement that
\tr llngunji is not cxaggc i'atin~
when he stresses the beneficial mili-
tary political, and economic effects
of the L.S. intervention.
On the battlefield, a combination
of brilliant strategy and effective
American anti-aircraft and anti-
tank weaponry has now removed en-
tirely the danger that a Soviet-
directed offensive with Angolan and
Cuban troops might overwhelm
UNITA's main southern bases.
Critical to this outcome has been the
success of the UNITA guerrillas in
shooting down 41 Soviet planes and
helicopters with Stinger missiles,
while destroying dozens of tanks
and armored cars with anti-tank
rockets.
With Cuban pilots refusing to fly
low-altitude missions, the Soviet
commanders have had to rely on
badly trained Angolan and Ethi-
opian pilots. Making the most of this
opportunity, President Savimbi has
launched a guerrilla offensive
northward, and both MPLA and Cu-
ban troops have been forced to fall
back to defend isolated towns and
diamond mines.
Although the Soviets have re-
placed most of the plane and tank
losses, American officials confirm
UNITA reports that there are clear
signs of bad blood between the Cu-
ban and MPLA troops and even some,
fighting between them.
Among the Angolan population
under the control of President Jose
Eduardo dos Santos's MPLA regime
in Luanda, there is growing resent.
ment against the special privileges
enjoyed by the Russians and the Cu-
bans. Mr. Chingunji also reports that
the effect of U.S. aid has been to con-
vince many MPLA leaders that a
military solution based on Soviet
arms is no longer possible and that
a negotiated settlement with UNITA
is necessary, combined with the de-
parture of Cuban troops.
State Department officials take
seriously claims by the
UNITA leadership that the
political tides in Europe and
Africa seem to be shifting in
UNITA's favor as the result of the
American intervention. Mr. Savimbi
met with Cabinet ministers on his
recent public visit to France, and the
leaders of the ruling Social Demo-
cratic Party in Portugal are on re-
cord as favoring UNITA.
In Africa, the front-line states still
publicly support the MPLA and they
condemn Mr. Savimbi for trading
with South Africa. But in a recent
fact-finding tour, a high-ranking
State Department official found this
front-line support for the MIPLA to
be "perfunctory." In at least six other
black African states, there is strong
backing for Mr. Savimbi's proposal
that a coalition government be
formed that would invite the Cubans
to leave.
Although it is widely accepted
that the Soviets and Cubans would
have no choice but to pick up their
arms and go home, if confronted
with an official request by the MIPLA
regime in Luanda, the fear is that the
MPLA government is so penetrated
by Soviet and Cuban agents that they
would be able to mount a pre-
emptive coup to prevent a deal with
UNITA.
As both Reagan officials and
UNITA leaders see it, there is
therefore no alternative but to in-
crease steadily the cost to the So-
viets and the Cubans of their occu-
pation of Angola until a face-saving
exit becomes the only way out.
Within Cuba itself, perhaps the
last straw for the Cuban people may
he the news from Radio Marti that
the Castro regime's failure to advise,
warn, and test has made almost in-
cyitable an AIDS epidemic spread
by some of the 300,000 Cuban sol-
diers who have returned from Af-
rica over the last 10 years.
The epidemic has only begun its
course and, as it spreads, the
mounting concern of parents and
teen-age sons should put irresistible
pressure on Castro to cut his losses
and ~_,et out of Angola.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504400004-8