WHEN ISRAEL JUMPED THE NUCLEAR FIREBREAK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504350006-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 9, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

-TAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504350006-2
V
LOS kN'GFLES T 1"TES
d PaAa.
When Israel Jumped the
Nuclear Firebrea
By Charles William Maynes the benefit of illegally acquired U.S.
WACHINGTON material Israel has now deployed a num-
or many years Israel's supporters in ber of Jericho II nuclear-armed interme-
the United States have worked diate-range (700 kilometers) ballistic
1 assiduously, and with considerable missiles.
success, to persuade American leaders Both prnnellant and guidance systems
that the security interests of the United were apparently developed with material
States and the security interests of Israel obtained illegally from the United States.
are virtually identical. But now a number The missile is said to feature an inertial
of sensational revelations suggest that yet guidance system that sources claim was
another unexpected-and undesired- tested in Iran in the mid- to late-1970s
legacy of Menachem Begin's years of when the relationship between the Shah's
prime minister may be precisely such f government and the Israeli government
gap between Israel's interests and Ameri- was close. In addition to the Jericho II,
ca's own.
Over the long run the United States
may have few security interests as central
as its non-proliferation policy. Maintain-
ing the nuclear firebreak is important
both politically and militarily.
Politically, America's nuclear arsenals
give it extraordinary power, power pro-
gressively weakened as others acquire
nuclear weapons. Militarily, the lack of
nuclear weapons in most of the rest of the
world minimizes the danger of a nuclear
exchange by two minor powers that could
drag the superpowers toward the ultimate
catastrophe.
Yet as important as this policy is to U.S.
security, it now appears that, during the
Begin years, the Israeli government may
have taken a number of steps to under-
g
p
ess
n
erest in
mine it. First to come to light was the iobtaining anatural-uranium/he
avy - wa
-
illegal export to Israel, beginning in 1980, Ater power reactor. And when supplier
of some 800 sophisticated timing devices countries refused to assist Israel in this
called krytons that can be used to trigger effort until it signed the Non-Prolifera-
nuclear weapons. This disclosure was tion Treaty, at least some Israeli officials
highly embarrassing to the governments were willing, apparently, to obtain the
of both Israel and the United_ States necessary technology through illegal
because so many commentators had taken means. According to reports then appear-
such a critical position when Pakistan had mg in Haaretz, Israel's most distinguished
attempted to acquire these timing devices newspaper, Israeli Science Minister Yuval
illegally. Neeman, among others, believed that
Indeed, the Committee on Foreign Israel could obtain the necessary technol-
Affairs in the House of Representatives ogv through "under- and next-to-the-ta-
has proposed an amendment to the for- ble" deals. Perhaps some other unusual
eign assistance act that would end all U.S. events of the period should now be
aid to any non-nuclear country that reviewed in anew light. On Sept. 22, 1979,
attempted to acquire illegally from the the world learned of a mystery flash in the
United States "any material, equipment, South Atlantic Ocean that displayed the
or technology which would contribute characteristics of a nuclear explosion.
significantly to the ability of such country Precisely what happened has never been
to manufacture a nuclear explosive de- clear. U.S. government agencies disa-
vice. . . . " But this amendment would not greed on whether a test had taken place.
apply retroactively, as early news ac- But the CIA argued that if a test had taken
counts wrongly reported. place, Israel was its most likely author.
Regrettably, the illegal acquisition by In June, 1981, Israeli bombers de-
Israel of such material may not be stroyed the Osirak reactor outside Bagh-
restricted to 800 krytons. According to the dad. Such an action could be consistent
highly regarded Aerospace Daily, with with an Israeli decision to rely more
openly on nuclear weapons. So would be
the strategic debate that broke out in
Israel's primary nuclear force now re-
portedly consists of low-yield warheads
that the F-4, F-15 and F-16 could deliver,
nuclear-capable Lance missiles and nu-
clear artillery rounds.
Although the Aerospace Daily reports,
attributed to U.S. government officials,
have not been confirmed by other sourc-
es, the questions raised cast new light on
other, possibly related events during the
Begin years. Thus, if Israel did decide to
increase the size of its nuclear arsenal
dramatically in that period, then Israel
would have begun to worry about obtain-
ing increased quantities of weapons-
grade material to carry out its nuclear-
weapons program.
Indeed, about the same time as the
alleged deployment of the Jericho II,
Israel did be
in to ex
r
i
t
Israel during this perioa as some promi-
nent Israeli strategists argued that Israel
should overtly go nuclear to deter the
Arabs from a conventional attack.
Questions about the Israeli nuclear
program could not come at a worse time.
The 1985 review conference for the
Non-Proliferation Treaty is scheduled for
September. A record of American indif-
ference to Israeli transgressions in such a
sensitive area before the conference can
do enormous damage to the American
position. How can the United States be
firm about Pakistan, for example, if it
overlooks repeated Israeli transgressions
of U.S. laws? How can the United States
request strict nuclear accountability from
others when it insists on none from one of
its friends?
Yet now is also not a time for strain in
the U.S.-Israeli relationship. For the first
time since 1977, the Israeli government
follows policies thet are congruent with
American aims in most key areas Israel
itself faces a-gaage economic crisis and
needs American help. Provoking a crisis
over nuclear issues may also limit the
political possibilities for movement in
other key areas such as the peace process
with Israel's neighbors.
A U.S. Administration truly interested
in this country's national security, how-
ever, really has little choice. The previous
Israeli government under Begin appar-
ently showed utter contempt for Ameri-
can laws and sovereignity. Over the long
run the United States has no higher
national security interest than preventing
the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The
Reagan Administration should therefore
immediately undertake the following
steps:
-Insist that Israel, which has offered to
return the unused krytons, return all
equipment or materials relevant to the
manufacture of nuclear weapons procured
in violation of the provisions of the 1977
foreign-assistance act.
-Demand the right of U.S. inspection
of the Jericho Its and all U.S.-made
aircraft in Israel if return is physically
impossible.
-Demand that punitive measures be
taken against Israeli officials who cooper-
ated in a knowing violation of U.S. laws.
The choice between. this country's
non-proliferation policy and its desire for
good relations with Israel is a choice
between the head and the heart. But in
international relations a country's own
interests come before friends.
Charles William Maynes is editor of For-
eion Policy maoazine.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504350006-2